Day: May 19, 2020
Kosovo’s decisive summer
These were my remarks to a Columbia University panel on “The Future of Kosovo” held via Zoom today.
Let me start by saying how much I appreciate David Phillips having put this panel together. It isn’t easy to wrangle such illustrious participants, even to a remote meeting. Thank you, David.
My job today is to try to frame the issues in a broader context and from a Washington perspective.
The key thing to understand is that the Americans have abandoned their well-established policy on the Balkans and on Kosovo in particular.
That well-established Balkans policy, part of the broader 1990s effort to establish “Europe whole and free,” had three pillars:
• Protection of Kosovo’s population and sympathy for Kosovo’s independence aspirations as well as commitment to Bosnian sovereignty.
• Support for liberal democracy throughout the Balkans.
• Commitment to acting in tandem with the Europeans, especially with Germany and the United Kingdom.
My message is just this: things have changed. The Trump Administration has equivocated on all three of these pillars. Let me take them in reverse order.
I see no real effort in this Administration to cooperate with Europe. It has put the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue in the hands of an American Ambassador in Berlin who has offended the German government and spoken against the EU. Professional diplomats who know the Balkans well are now sidelined.
Washington now favors border changes to accommodate ethnic differences, even though they would signify inability to treat all people equally, which is the liberal democratic ideal. Regrettably, Europe’s High Representative Borell has gone along, as did his predecessor.
Finally, it is all too clear that Belgrade, not Sarajevo or Pristina, is today Washington’s preferred Balkan partner.
These changes signify a major shift in U.S. policy. How did it happen?
The Trump Administration is ethnic nationalist. It sympathizes when it hears from Serbia’s government and lobbyists that Serbs should govern Serbs and Albanians should govern Albanians. President Trump is trying to appeal almost exclusively to whites and to limit minority voting. Why wouldn’t it listen to Balkan ethnic nationalists?
Moreover, Republicans know that Serb Americans in a potential swing state like Ohio are an electoral bonanza far more valuable than the Albanian Americans in New York, which is a lock for the Democrats.
The Trump Administration has failed so far in all its major foreign policy initiatives. Ric Grenell is trying to give the President a good headline before November 3. All the better if it is one that kills two Clinton achievements, Bosnia and Kosovo.
So U.S. government support for Kosovo’s aspirations has weakened: you see it in the cut off of funding and the threat to withdraw U.S. troops. These are irresponsible moves.
You see the weakening of U.S. support also in the lack of concern in the Administration about the impact of a Kosovo land swap on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
So, you may ask, what is to be done? I’ll leave it to the panel participants to address the issues. My views on some of them are well-known: I support reciprocity between Pristina and Belgrade, I oppose partition, and I think a deal on tariffs and non-tariff barriers is doable.
Three further options for Kosovo need to be considered. I’ll call them the 3Ds:
• Diversify
• Deter
• Delay
Let me take each of these in turn.
How can Kosovo diversify its support beyond the U.S.? Germany first and foremost: Kosovo needs to ensure that opposition to land swaps is sustained not only in the Chancellor’s office but also in the Bundestag. Berlin must continue to make it clear that it will not accept changes in borders to accommodate ethnic differences. It needs to reign in Borrell.
Switzerland, the UK, and Ukraine are other countries that have their own powerful reasons for opposing land swaps. Even for non-recognizing Spain, the idea should be anathema.
How can Kosovo deter land swaps? The key here is reciprocity.
In all future discussions, Kosovo should seek the equivalent of whatever Serbia seeks: the same acreage, the same powers for an Albanian municipal association in Serbia as for a Serb one in Kosovo, the same representation in Belgrade for Albanians that Serbia has in Pristina, equivalent removal of non-tariff barriers in exchange for removal of tariffs.
And above all, mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives, with an unequivocal and verifiable commitment not to block Kosovo entry into the UN or other international organizations.
Sadly, deterrence is unlikely to work perfectly, because of the strong American lean towards Belgrade. Delay is also vital.
Vucic has made it clear he will wait until after the Serbian election and government formation in late June for any deal with Pristina. The Trump Administration will then press for land swaps before the fall. So July and August, when Europe is asleep, may be crucial months.
A Kosovo Constitutional Court decision to disallow formation of a new government without new elections could cause a further, welcome delay.
By October 1, Kosovo will be safe from partition if it hasn’t been done yet.
What, you will ask, about the American elections?
If I were a Kosovo patriot, I wouldn’t bank on a Biden victory in November, but I would hope for one. Joe Biden knows the Balkans well and would return to the well-established policy of support for Kosovo and Bosnia and cooperation with Europe. A Biden Administration should close the door on land swaps, loudly.
If Trump wins a second term, the electoral pressure for a quick deal will fade but I would still expect Grenell and others to pursue land swaps, if only to feather their nests for their next jobs.
And the President himself will feel completely uninhibited: expect wild moves, not only in the Balkans.
So the next few months are vital for Kosovo’s future. I am hoping to hear from the other panelists how they think its statehood, territorial integrity, and sovereignty can be ensured.
P.S. Here is the full video of the Columbia event:
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Stevenson’s army, May 19
– WH vs CDC
– Pompeo vs State IG
– Trump vs US warriors in Afghanistan
– Trump vs WHO
– China hawks vs truth
Also note: Dexter Filkins on the twilight of the Iranian revolution
Think tank analysis of the disinformation war by Russia, China, Iran
In an article on the Flynn case, note this historical reminder: The idea that federal prosecution is exclusively an executive-branch concern is not accurate. The public prosecutor was generally a far less significant government figure throughout the late 18th and most of the 19th centuries than it is today, and most definitely not seen as an inherent bearer of executive power in 1789. The British common-law tradition was one of private prosecution. Although a variety of public prosecutors appeared during the colonial period, private prosecution in the United States persisted throughout much of the 19th century. The early version of the public prosecutor in the United States was considered a judicial officer. In Joan Jacoby’s 1980 The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity, still a leading history of American prosecutors, she explains: “At the beginning of the nineteenth century in America, the district attorney was viewed as a minor figure in the court, an adjunct to the judge. His position was primarily judicial, and perhaps only quasi-executive.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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