Iraq under pressure
“While the PMF initially gained widespread popular support among Shias for its role in defeating ISIL, the killing of Suleimani and Muhandis in January and the withdrawal of units associated with Sistani from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in April opened new questions about the future of the PMF and its relationship with both the Iraqi government and Iran.” AGSIW hosted a virtual panel discussion on June 10 examining the future of the PMF and their relationship with the new Iraqi government. The virtual panel was moderated by Ambassador Douglas A. Sillman and featured three speakers:
Ali Alfoneh: Senior Fellow, The Arab Gulf States Institute Washington
Michael Knights: Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute
Ambassador Rend Al-Rahim: Co-Founder and President, Iraq Foundation
Ambassador Douglas A. Sillman (Moderator): President, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Iraq is under intense pressure on several fronts
Sillman highlighted various key developments that have occurred within the last year in Iraq. These events have had a strong impact on the future of the PMF.
1. Mass demonstrations against widespread corruption and the lack of governmental services brought down the government of Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi in May of 2020.
2. The coronavirus pandemic has increased stress on Iraq’s already fragile healthcare system.
3. There has been a resurgence in attacks conducted by ISIS, which has begun to reorganize and has launched its most complex attacks in years.
4. Oil prices have plummeted. OPEC has cut Iraq’s oil production quota by one million barrels a day. This has sparked a budget crisis.
5. At the end of 2019, competition between the United States and Iran flared up with increased attacks on US forces, an attempt to sack the US Embassy, and the killing of Quds Force Commander Qassim Soleimani and PMF deputy commander Mahdi Al-Muhandis.
6. Mustafa Al-Kadhimi was elected Prime Minister of Iraq in May of 2020.
The PMF are divided and some imperil the government
Knight believes that the fate of the new Iraqi government under Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi and efforts to reform the PMF remain intricately intertwined. Furthermore, Knight classifies the present PMF as a state within a state in control of its own foreign policy. Ultimately, the PMF developed as a security force that drew on opposition elements fighting against the US occupation in Iraq. More recently, the PMF has involved itself in Syria and has fought on the side of the Assad regime. Knight believes that a lack of professionalization and reform within the PMF has resulted in ineffectiveness.
Al-Rahim underscores that the PMF itself cannot be regarded as being a homogenous body. To Al-Rahim, the PMF remains divided between those who owe their allegiance to Iran and those who owe their allegiance to Grand Ayatollah Sistani of Iraq. In regard to the Iraqi population at large, Al-Rahim believes that the Sunni and Kurdish populations favor the continuance of US coalition presence in Iraq. Because the PMF has seized political and economic control of the various areas in which these groups reside, overall distrust has emerged along ethno-religious lines. This polarized environment can be regarded as being a conducive to the reemergence of ISIS.
Iran likes it that way
Alfoneh believes that Iran desires to maintain Iraq in what he views as a “permanent state of crisis” that provides Iran with the ability to achieve its own tactical goals on the ground in Iraq. If Iraq were stable, Iran could not interfere in its internal affairs. Alfoneh believes that Iran utilizes various militias separate from the PMF in the interest of maintaining rivalry and competition between groups.