Day: June 21, 2020
What can Grenell produce?
I’ve done three interviews in the last week on the Serbia/Kosovo talks to be held in Washington next weekend. Here they are:
Fitim Gashi (Koha Ditore)
Q: President Trump’s envoy for Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, Richard Grenell, has reignited the engines to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. He received confirmation from governments in Pristina and Belgrade that they will respond the invitation for a meeting in Washington on June 27. How do you comment on this?
A: It’s a bad idea whose time has come. No one should be negotiating anything important with an American Administration that could lose power in less than 5 months.
Q: The meeting in Washington, came at a time when EU Commissioner Miroslav Lajcak visited Pristina and Belgrade with the aim of setting future dates of the dialogue? Do you see EU-US conflict of competence in terms of dialogue?
A: Yes. The US is aiming to upstage the EU. This is juvenile, but so is President Trump.
Q: The lack of coordination EU-US, how much harms the process and the quality of potential agreement?
A: Lack of EU-US common purpose is bad: the US needs EU leverage to get good things done in the Balkans, and the EU needs US prestige with both Belgrade and Pristina. Together they can achieve something good. Separately they can do far less and may cause serious harm.
Q: Regarding EU-US division, how much has contributed developments within Kosovo, where we have President Thaci contesting the mediating role of Lajcak?
A: The President is siding with Grenell against Lajcak, who will have to try to deal with Prime Minister Hoti. Hoti has stated a clear and compelling position on negotiations with Belgrade, but his government is weak and President Thaci seems uninterested in what it says and wants.
Q: Do you see attempt to rush for an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, before the US presidential election?
A: Yes. Grenell is trying to deliver a diplomatic show-piece for Trump before November 3.
Q: What is the risk of signing an agreement that does not contribute to long-term stability in the region? Significant: despite their denials, the Americans have opened the door Belgrade’s partition ideas, which would be bad not only for the region but also for many other places, especially Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Only Presidents Putin and Vucic could be happy with partition.
Q: What compromises should make both sides, and what must be done if there is an attempt to reach an agreement that implies border changes?
A: I can’t decide what compromises they should make, but there is lots to do in removing trade barriers, opening direct contacts between the two armies, encouraging people-to-people contacts, implementing the existing “technical” agreements, ensuring protection of property rights in both countries, and ensuring that Albanians in Serbia and Serbs in Kosovo have comparable rights and status.
Q: Will Kosovo be able to reject a bad agreement, if it is signed in Washington?
A: The government, parliament, and people of Kosovo have all made clear their opposition to partition. But if the two Presidents were to agree to it, people in both northern Kosovo and southern Serbia would start moving, creating facts on the ground that would be hard to reverse. The results will be disastrous for human rights and a triumph for ethnic nationalist ideology.
Q: Mr. Grenell on several occasions has mentioned the intention for Kosovo and Serbia to reach a peace agreement through useful economic measures. Can this be done?
A: Economic measures can help to pave the way. They are the most important thing to do now. But Grenell has talked he talk. He hasn’t walked the walk.
Q: Can all the open problems between Kosovo and Serbia be solved, which would lead to mutual recognition?
A: Yes, eventually, but I doubt it at present. President Vucic seems uninterested in that proposition, unless and until he gets territory.
Q: Do you expect Russia to be involved in the process?
A: The Russians don’t have to be involved in a partition process, because it will fulfill their dreams without any effort on their part. Eventually, they will need to be on board with Kosovo membership in the UN.
Q: What will happen to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue if Russia is included, can this process it end up in Security Council of UN?
A: The Security Council will have to approve Kosovo membership in the UN, without a veto from Russia or China. Putin will demand a high price for that: likely US recognition of the “independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as Russian annexation of Crimea. I doubt the Americans, even under Trump, will agree to even the first half of that, but Trump is unreliable and volatile. You never know, because he understands little and cares less.
Besnik Velija (Gazeta Express)
Q: In yesterday’s interview for our newspaper, Grenell said that the meeting in Washington will be only for economic issues. As he declared, the Phase II (political one) belong to Europe. What are your expectations for such a meeting in the White House and do you really believe that Kosovo and Serbia will travel to Washington to discuss economic issues?
A: I’ll be happy to see the Washington meeting focus on economic issues, including non-tariff trade barriers as well as unimplemented “technical” agreements between Belgrade and Pristina. You’ll have to ask the Presidents whether they are traveling for that purpose. Grenell says they are.
Q: Traveling to Washington, Serbia and Kosovo have been forced to give up pure political issues such are the derecognition campaign and seeking membership in international organizations. Why would this be necessary, if only economics will be discussed on the White House?
A: The suspension of the derecognition campaign and seeking membership in international organizations are confidence-building measures of little consequence, since they were initially announced to last only until the meeting. I am not convinced extending them would be a good idea. If Serbia wants to demonstrate that it is a friendly neighbor, it should be sponsoring Kosovo for membership in international organizations.
Added to this, Vucic one day before traveling to White House will meet Vladimir Putin in Moscow.
Q: Does this mosaic of previous meetings and events deny Grenell’s declarations for an “Economic Meeting” in the White House?
Q: You’ll have to ask President Vucic. He is certainly making it clear that he will not abandon his coziness with Putin in favor of a Western alignment. Playing Moscow against the West is classic non-aligned hedging behavior that will prevent Serbian membership in the EU.
Q: One last question about land-swap. Richard Grenell on his recent interview for FOX News declared that territorial details were policy of John Bolton, trying to create a gap between Trump and such an idea. Do you see this as a strategic election campaign move from the Trump side?
A: I do think Grenell may have realized that partition was a bad idea, which would be good if true. But truthfulness is not a value of this Administration. We’ll have to wait and see what the Washington meeting produces.
Veljko Nestorović (Dnevne novine):
Q: What do you expect to be the topic of conversation, economics as announced by Grenell or something else?
A: We’ll have to wait and see. I’ll be glad if they discuss economic issues like elimination of non-tariff trade barriers and implementation of the technical agreements already reached between Pristina and Belgrade.
Q: Richard Grenell said that the idea of correcting the border was John Bolton and not president Trump. Your comment?
A: If this is an effort to end the talk of border changes, my compliments to Mr. Grenell for recognizing partition as a bad idea. But this Administration is not known for its truthfulness. We’ll have to wait and see what happens.
Q: Can an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina follow by the end of this year?
A: Sure, you can have all sorts of agreements between Belgrade and Pristina before the US election, which is what Grenell wants. But there is unlikely to be an agreement on mutual recognition and entry into the UN, which are the big issues.
Q: What if Trump loses the election, does that change the US approach to the Kosovo problem?
A: Yes. Mr. Biden, whom I have testified in front of a number of times, will be a committed opponent of any border changes to accommodate ethnic differences in the Balkans and elsewhere. He will be a far stronger supporter of Kosovo sovereignty and territorial integrity than Mr. Trump has been, and he will vigorously support Serbia’s candidacy for EU accession as well as close US cooperation with the EU in the Balkans and elsewhere.
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Peace Picks | June 22-28
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live-streaming.
- Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves | June 22, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
Algerian officials in the northeastern border area between Algeria and Tunisia continue to permit the cross-border smuggling of petrol and other commodities. In turn, smugglers have participated in the authorities’ efforts to neutralize security threats, even as they continue to engage in the illicit trade. The two ostensibly adversarial parties effectively complement each other. In her new paper, Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves, Algerian political scientist Dalia Ghanem examines such paradoxes and argues that state formation remains an evolving process in the country.
Speakers:
Dalia Ghanem: resident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Max Gallien: political scientist at the Institute of Development Studies.
Isabelle Werenfels: senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
- Assessing the Implications of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act | June 22, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On June 17, the long-awaited Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into force, imposing the most comprehensive set of sanctions against Syria’s Assad regime to date. Aimed principally at preventing further war crimes by preventing any foreign investment into the Syrian regime, the sanctions will almost certainly have a consequential impact on Syria’s politics and economy. As the act comes into force, Syria is already beset by a spiraling economic crisis, the effects of which have generated unusually defiant and persistent anti-regime protests in the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda and rising levels of discontent within regime-held territories. Southern Syria faces an expanding insurgency, ISIS is slowly resurging in the central desert, Turkey is doubling down on a permanent presence in the northwest and for now, U.S. troops appear to be staying.
How will the Caesar Act’s sanctions be enforced and with what goals in mind? What effect are they likely to have within today’s context? Does a policy of escalating pressure on the Assad regime promise diplomatic progress or humanitarian suffering?
Speakers:
Amb. James F. Jeffrey: Special Representative for Syria and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
Rime Allaf: Syrian writer and commentator; board member, The Day After Project
Qutaiba Idlbi: Non-resident scholar, MEI; Syria fellow, International Center for Transitional Justice
Charles Lister (Moderator): Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs, MEI
- U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East | June 22, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
While prominent voices in Washington have argued that U.S. interests in the Middle East are dwindling and will require the United States to “do less” there, Jake Sullivan argued in a recent Foreign Affairs article that the United States should be more ambitious using U.S. leverage and diplomacy to promote regional stability.
Speakers:
Jake Sullivan: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Geoeconomics and Strategy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Jon B. Alterman: Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program
- Iranian Kurds: Challenges, Existence, and Goals | June 23, 2020 | 11:00 AM | Washington Kurdish Institute | Register Here
With 12 million people, the Iranian Kurds make up the second largest population of the Kurds in the greater Kurdistan. Similar to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the Iranian Kurds have been struggling for decades for freedom under the current Iranian regime. The Kurdistan region of Iran (Rojhelat) has the highest rate of political prisoners in the country. The regime’s discriminatory economic policies in Rojhelat have resulted in poverty and poor living conditions for the Kurds, which led many to become border porters known as Kolbars. Hundreds of Kolabrs are victims of the Iranian border guard attacks and executions every year. The dire political, economic, and security situation of Rojhelat continues under the current regime that has been suppressing its citizens on an ethnic and sectarian basis.
As the first founders of the Kurdish nationalism and political parties in greater Kurdistan, the panel will discuss the current situation of the Iranian Kurds and their goals. The panel will also discuss the Iranian Kurdish relations and cooperation with other opposition groups in Iran and potential future understandings.
Speakers:
David L. Phillips: Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights
Arash Salih: Representative of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan to the United States.
Salah Bayaziddi: Representative of the Komala Party to the United States.
Kamran Balnour: Representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party to the United States
- The World Economy After COVID-19: A Conversation with President Romano Prodi | June 23, 2020 | 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register Here
Join Johns Hopkins SAIS for a conversation with Romano Prodi, Former President of the European Commission (1999-2004); Former Prime Minister of Italy (1996-1998; 2006-2008). The event is moderated by Justin O. Frosini, Adjunct Professor of Constitutional Law, SAIS Europe; Director of the Center for Constitutional Studies and Democratic Development and Associate Professor, Bocconi University.
- The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division | June 24, 2020 | 7:00 AM – 8:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
The 2011 uprising in Syria totally transformed the religious establishment in Damascus. The regime sent into exile many prominent, influential religious figures who, forced to work from abroad, formed a religious opposition group called the Syrian Islamic Council. The regime also restructured what remained of the capital’s competing religious institutions. This robbed the religious establishment in Damascus of the financial and administrative independence that had been its key privileges. But it also presented new Sunni clerics from the capital’s hinterland with opportunities to enter the competitive religious arena — as well as posing a major challenge to the SIC, obliged to operate in exile. In her latest paper, The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division, Laila Rifai mentions how the religious sphere in Rural Damascus Governorate is poised to become a political battleground as both the regime and the exiled opposition seek to court a new rising group of religious leaders.
Speakers:
Laila Rifai: writer and researcher, specializing in Syrian religious affairs.
Thomas Pierret: senior researcher at CNRS-IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence.
Muhammed Mounir Al Fakir: fellow at the Omran Centre for Strategic Studies.
- Turkish-Israeli Relations: Prospects for Improved Diplomacy | June 25, 2020 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Over the past decade Israel-Turkey relations have been strained. There have been recent positive signs, however. Israel’s decision not to sign a statement by France, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and Egypt condemning Turkey’s actions in the eastern Mediterranean and a tweet posted by Israel’s official Twitter account praising its diplomatic relations with Turkey raised hopes. Turkish analysts saw the moves as a sign of both countries’ willingness to cooperate when it comes to eastern Mediterranean energy but tensions remain.
How does Israel and Turkey’s involvement in Syria and increasing opportunities for economic cooperation affect the prospect of improved bilateral relations? How will Israel’s plans for annexation and Turkey’s public support for the Palestinians affect diplomatic relations? Are there enough incentives to normalize Israel-Turkey relations or will the barriers be insurmountable?
Speakers:
Nimrod Goren: Founder and head of Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Karel Valansi: Political columnist, Shalom Newspaper
Gönül Tol: (Moderator): Director of Turkey Program and Senior Fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
- The Broader Implications U.S. Disentanglement from Afghanistan| June 26, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On 29 February, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban designed to allow for an orderly withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan by next spring if not sooner. Coming after many months of difficult negotiations, the decision carried a promise from the Taliban to deny to any terrorist group or individual the use of Afghan soil to undertake an attack on the United States or its allies. The accord also carried a Taliban commitment to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue quickly aimed at a peaceful resolution of the civil conflict. American policy for Afghanistan must be seen as well on a broader canvas of continuing U.S. diplomatic, political and military disengagement regionally. As in Afghanistan, withdrawal leaves unanswered many questions about how American national security interests may be affected, particularly at a time of increased great power competition.
What might be the impact of a full U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan on the course of the civil war and prospects for peace talks? What would the United States do if after departure the Taliban broke the terms of their agreement or threatened the survival of the Afghan state? How would the end of an American military presence affect relations with Pakistan? And is the United States prepared to accede to strongly increased Iranian, Russian, or Chinese influence in Afghanistan and the region?
Javid Ahmad: Nonresident fellow, Atlantic Council
Ronald E. Neumann: President, The American Academy of Diplomacy
J. Alexander Thier: Senior advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Senior fellow and deputy director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center
Marvin Weinbaum (Moderator): Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI
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Nuclear reminders
Former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Pantelis Ikonomou writes occasionally for peacefare.net. We have never met in person, or even spoken on the phone, but his unequivocal commitment to containing and reducing nuclear risks, combined with his technical expertise, has been more than enough reason for me to open the blog to his always welcome contributions.
He has now written and published with Springer a wonderful comprehensive volume modestly titled Global Nuclear Developments: Insights from a Former IAEA Inspector. It is a first-rate primer on:
- the technology required to make a nuclear weapon,
- how the current international regime to control nuclear weapons evolved and how it functions,
- how major nonproliferation crises have been handled in North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, Romania, and the former Soviet Union,
- possible future proliferators, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan, and South Korea,
- nuclear incidents/accidents, and
- the nuclear weapons states, both within the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty–US, Russia, China, UK, and France–and outside it–India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.
Throughout, Pantelis demonstrates his excellent and dispassionate command of the details while also offering practical and well-founded guidance for the future. North Korea, he thinks, will not be giving up nuclear weapons but its program might be frozen, given the right incentives. The US, he thinks, made a colossal error in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA) and thereby shortening the time required for Tehran to obtain the material needed to build a nuclear weapon. He understands that the deal in which Libya gave up its military nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief was a good one, but Qadaffi’s ultimate end will have strengthened North Korean resolve not to do likewise. I found his discussion of the South African and Israeli pursuit of nuclear weapons particularly interesting.
Pantelis is proud of the work of the IAEA, but blunt about the shortcomings of the regime it administers. He regards its Additional Protocol as adequate to limiting the possibility of hiding a military nuclear program within a civilian one, but he also notes that it is not universally and unconditionally accepted, most notably by Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (which accepts it only within the context of JCPOA) as well as Israel, which remains outside the NPT. He also underlines the tensions between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states over the reluctance of the former to deliver on nuclear disarmament, which contributed to the failure of the 2015 review conference and what he feared would be the likely failure of the 2020 edition before it was postponed this spring.
In the end, Pantelis speculates on the emergence of a new “tetra”-polar equilibrium among nuclear weapons states:
- US and UK;
- Russia and India;
- China, Pakistan, and North Korea;
- Israel and France.
I am not sure how he comes to this conclusion. Even if 1. and 3. are historically well-rooted, I’m not convinced that India will ally with Russia or that today’s France is interested in allying with Israel, even if Pantelis is correct that France helped Israel develop its nuclear weapons in the past. Nor do I see why this configuration should be stable. It seems to me that two-party nuclear standoffs (US/USSR, India/Pakistan, US/China) are far more likely to be stable than anything with four corners to it.
Pantelis reserves his final enthusiasm for an epilogue in which he pleads with the world’s scientific community to convince the nuclear weapons states, especially the US and Russia, to engage seriously in nuclear disarmament rather than their current race to modernize and proliferate nuclear weapons, which is intensifying. I wouldn’t fault him there at all. The craziness of pursuing weapons that can never be used without sealing your own country’s destruction has not been lost on most of the world’s states. Lowering the level of mutual assured destruction could free up a lot of resources for more useful things. It is fortunate we have well-informed observer/participants like Pantelis to remind us of what we should be doing.
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Fizzle
Donald Trump last night in Tulsa tried to excite his extremist base with a lot of red meat about Democratic radicals, denunciations of burning of the American flag and toppling of statues, suggestions that less testing for Covid-19 would reduce attention to it, and blatant racism. I suppose the crowd liked it, but the arena was half empty and not even his enthusiasts were enthused.
Trump can no longer hide his failures. Covid-19 is growing exponentially in states that he owns. The economy is still moribund, despite a dip in unemployment claims. Most Americans support Black Lives Matter and other “radicals” whom Trump deplores. Trump’s base, which is the only part of the population he cares about, is clearly in the minority, making voter suppression a vital part of his re-election strategy. States run the presidential election, so Republican-led states are aggressively purging voter rolls, reducing the number of polling places, and limiting mail-in ballots.
Trump is however still trying to hide his personal malfeasance and the misdeeds of his pals. That is the short version of why he fired the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) this week. But he did it so sloppily that he is ending up with the career deputy acting in the position, instead of the toady he wanted. That is a great good fortune. SDNY is notoriously independent and likely has the goods on Rudy Giuliani if not on Trump himself, who is reputed to have pressured the prosecutors not to go after a Turkish bank at President Erdogan’s behest.
Trump’s situation is no better abroad. North Korea and Iran continue to defy Trump’s nuclear demands. Both have made significant progress on missiles and nuclear technology in the past 3.5 years. Venezuelan President Maduro remains in office. China is filling the vacuum wherever “make America great again” retreats. Russia has offered Trump nothing for his many efforts to court Putin. The “deal of the century” for the Palestinians has turned into a green light for Israeli annexation of a big chunk of the West Bank. Even that however might not come off, as the Israelis are getting a lot of pressure not to proceed in order to protect their relations with Sunni Arab countries.
The only thing working for Trump right now is Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority leader. He is proceeding apace with confirmation of unqualified Federal judges Trump dutifully nominates. But they don’t always behave the way McConnell and Trump might like. Despite the Administration’s opposition, the Supreme Court has extended equal protection of the law to LGBTQ people and prevented Trump from reversing the Obama program that protected people brought illegally to the US as children from deportation.
The Trump Administration is still capable of doing astoundingly bad things. But it is losing its grip on the popular imagination of most Americans. Joe Biden, who hasn’t yet been campaigning vigorously, is rising markedly in the polls, including in swing states crucial to Trump. The Electoral College could still save him from defeat, but the odds of that are declining. With four months to go before Americans start to cast their ballots, Trump is fizzling. May it last.
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