Shore up the Kosovo state

This week’s announcement that the prosecutor of the Specialist Chambers in The Hague has recommended an indictment of Kosovo President Hashim Thaci and a former Speaker of the parliament wrecked the prospects for a Serbia/Kosovo supposedly “economic” summit that was to have taken place in Washington this weekend. That has led some to conclude that Europeans plotted the maneuver, as they resented the American initiative and some have targeted Thaci for years. I’m more inclined to think the Americans did it to themselves, because they had concluded the summit had little chance of success.

Whatever. It’s hard to believe the unusual, some would say illegitimate, initiative to publicize the indictment recommendation was not known in both in Brussels and Washington before it happened. Neither stopped it. The result is an earthquake that has shaken the Kosovo state.

The right reaction is to reinforce that state. Kosovo will need a government with a wider margin in parliament and a new president.

No Kosovo prime minister should come to Washington or Brussels to re-engage in the dialogue with Belgrade without a majority that comes close to matching that of President Vucic, who won more than 75% of the his parliament’s seats in last weekend’s election in Serbia, as the opposition boycotted.

To achieve this, Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti, who came into office less than two months ago, would need to bring in either Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) or Vetevendosje (Self-Determination, or VV), which led the short-lived government that preceded Hoti’s. Both joining the government is asking too much, as they despise each other. The PDK will be licking its wounds, as the President is its founder and the Speaker is its party secretary, and there are likely other proposed indictees among its leadership. VV would drive a hard bargain but would be a hefty addition to a weak coalition.

If the indictment is confirmed in July, President Thaci will need to resign–in dignity–and commit to go to The Hague to defend himself. There is ample precedent for this: former Prime Minister Haradinaj resigned twice to defend himself in The Hague, successfully. The parliament will then need to elect a new chief of state, or risk new elections within 45 days. A distinguished, uncompromised, and unpolitical candidate, comparable to former President Atifete Jahjaga, is the right direction. Kosovo has an ample supply of well-qualified people, especially women. Few of them can be accused of war crimes and many are unsullied by corruption and other malfeasance.

A new election would likely bring VV back to power with stronger representation in parliament than it had the last time around, when it came in first by a smidgen. But the time and political competition required for an election would leave Kosovo adrift at a crucial moment. A weakened state would be vulnerable to all sorts of shenanigans, by Europeans, Americans, Russians and others. It would be far better if VV’s obvious political strength could be recognized without repeating the October 2019 contest.

With a new president and a widened government, Kosovo needs first and foremost to stabilize itself, ending all attacks on Serbs and Serb property as well as the internecine quarreling within its majority Albanian population, which makes Kosovo look ungovernable. Attacks on Serbs give Belgrade the ammunition it needs to argue that the ethnic groups need to be separated and Serb-occupied territory transferred to Serbia as well as much of the Serb population south of the Ibar river. Such a land/people transfer is an enormous threat to Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state, as it would remove a big obstacle to union with Albania: the Serb population.

The cancelled Washington summit was ill-conceived and no loss to anyone. But Kosovo and Serbia both need to improve their political and economic relations. The EU-run dialogue has been without significant results since 2013, but Brussels still holds the key incentives to make normalization between the two countries a reality, including the promise of Kosovo recognition by the five nonrecognizing EU states. The proper US role is one of support for the EU, which is admittedly difficult right now because the Trump Administration dislikes both Europe and the Union. It would be much easier in a Biden Administration, which is starting to look likely as Covid-19 resurges across red states in the south and west.

But that question won’t be resolved until November 3. Right now the power balance in the Balkans is what counts. Serbia is already strong. Strengthening the Kosovo state is a prerequisite for a better outcome.