Month: June 2020
Stevenson’s army, June 24 and 23
[Forgive the delay. I’ve started reading John Bolton’s memoir. I buy all the memoirs of senior officials and even have personally autographed volumes by Eisenhower’s Robert Cutler, JFK’s McGeorge Bundy, and Brent Scowcroft.]
Pay to play: WSJ says Chinese nationals have paid a lot to get close to Trump and his people.
Politico lists several foreign leaders seeking Trump favors while he’s still president.
WSJ says Germany is caught between US and China.
I can’t believe this Tata guy.
WH has a new official Arctic policy. Read it before it melts.
I missed posting yesterday’s Stevenson’s army, so htere it is:
– NYT explains how Administration is divided over Israeli annexation.
– CIA is recruiting, including on Hulu.
– Foreign Affairs tells of US efforts to interfere in foreign elections
– New Yorker has profile of Fiona Hill.
– Lawfare writer notes similarities between debates on counterinsurgency and community policing.
– FP sees China reaching across Pacific into Kiribati election. [remember, pronounced kiribas]
– Congress wants to realign missile defense agency chain of command
I don’t know what to say about this. It’s a dumb and futile ideas to try to involve China in US-Russian nuclear talks [the headline would be: Trump tries to force China to greatly increase its nuclear arsenal against US”], yet I see the photo op as clever messaging for a bad policy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Kosovo is in trouble
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) charged with ensuring accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the aftermath of the 1999 NATO/Yugoslavia war announced today that the prosecutor on April 24 charged President Thaci and former Speaker of the parliament Veseli, who is now the head of the political party Thaci founded. The announcement added:
The Indictment is only an accusation. It is the result of a lengthy investigation and reflects the SPO’s determination that it can prove all of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. A KSC Pre-Trial Judge is currently reviewing the Indictment to decide on whether to confirm the charges.
The Prosecutor is said to have found it necessary to make the charges public because of “efforts by Hashim Thaci and Kadri Veseli to obstruct and undermine the work of the KSC.”
This surprised me. First, because I have doubted that sufficient evidence still exists even to bring charges, never mind convict. Second, because it comes just days before Pristina and Belgrade are supposed to send delegations to Washington for talks sponsored by the Trump Administration. The SPO is a Trump-named American. I suppose someone may have thought publicizing this secret indictment would bring pressure to bear on Thaci, but it is hard to picture him coming to DC with this indictment pending.
In principle, the talks could proceed anyway, as both the Constitutional Court and the Kosovo Assembly have decided that the responsibility for them lies with the government headed by Avdullah Hoti, not with the President. It may test whether the Prime Minister can exercise independent authority, but it will necessarily put him at considerable political risk. If he appears in Washington, he will be criticized at home and at an enormous disadvantage diplomatically.
It is also a test of Thaci and Veseli. If confirmed by a KSC judge, they should both resign their positions and go to The Hague to defend themselves, as former Prime Minister Haradinaj has done several times. Their resignations would make big waves in Kosovo politics. The Assembly would need to replace Thaci, which would be a big challenge in the aftermath of the indictment. Replacing the head of a political party would be far less controversial, but still consequential. Would the PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo) respect its Kosovo Liberation Army heritage, or move beyond it to choose someone less connected to the armed rebellion against Serbia?
If Thaci and Veseli do not resign, Kosovo will face other challenges. Neither Europe nor America will be interested in meeting with or helping politicians under indictment. The result will be international isolation. The political response inside Kosovo will be defiance. It is hard to picture anything positive coming of that kind of confrontation. Prospects for international investment, cooperation with NATO, visa-free travel in the EU, and other aspirations will be dashed.
Belgrade of course will be pleased with the indictment, both because it has sought justice for crimes against Serbs in the aftermath of the war and because it will give Serbia a leg up in any negotiations with Europe and the US. Belgrade may try to reopen the question of territorial compromise with Kosovo, claiming that the indictment proves Serbs should not be expected to live in a country dominated by criminal enemies.
To add insult to injury, the strongest supporter of Kosovo in the US Congress, chair of the House International Relations Committee Eliot Engel, was soundly defeated yesterday in a Democratic Party primary in New York City. He will speak for himself, but I won’t be surprised if Engel calls for resignations before he leaves office in January.
So the indictment is not only a personal question for Thaci and Veseli. It is an institutional and international one as well. Kosovo is in trouble.
Next weekend the Balkans come to DC
Sunday’s Serbian parliamentary election delivered a resounding landslide to President Aleksandar Vucic, as the main opposition parties decided to boycott. They rightly claimed conditions for free and fair elections did not exist, due in large part to media that are not free and courts that are not independent. I still might have preferred they participate, if only to provide a serious opposition voice in parliament, but that is water under the bridge now.
Vucic, elected to a five-year term in 2017, will stand again in 2022. The opposition is divided, incoherent, and weak. Some are right-wing Serb nationalists indistinguishable from the war criminals of the 1990s who sought to create Greater Serbia by chasing Bosniaks, Croats, and Albanians from their homes in Serb-populated or claimed areas of former Yugoslavia. Some are devoted liberal democrats who want to see equal rights for all citizens throughout the Balkans, justice for the victims of the 1990s, and Serbian membership in the European Union. It will be difficult to unify the Serbian opposition, but partial unification brought down Milosevic at the polls. It could happen again.
Vucic, once a minister in Milosevic governments, enjoys the blessings of the nationalists. He has abandoned the unabashed pro-European stance of his last election campaign and now cozies up to Beijing and Moscow, the former because of its money and the latter because of its weapons and Slavic identity. He has harsh words for Europe, despite its substantial assistance and ongoing negotiations for EU accession, and enjoys a good reputation with the Trump Administration, which holds liberal democracy and the EU in disrepute. Ethnic (white) nationalism the Administration’s only consistent ideology. While the State Department was reserved in its reaction to the parliamentary election, the White House will no doubt greet Vucic warmly next weekend, when he is expected to drop in for talks with Kosovo President Thaci under the aegis of former Ambassador to Germany and former Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell.
Some may still hope Vucic will use his strong political position in Serbia to bite the bullet on Kosovo. His position is so strong that he could survive announcing that Belgrade will recognize its now-independent province, exchange ambassadorial-level representatives with it, and sponsor its UN membership. But that isn’t going to happen because he wants Serb-populated territory in exchange. There is little else he can ask for, as the EU and US have provided Serbia with virtually all the goodies in their pockets. Some think a massive investment program might move Vucic in the right direction, but who has the money for that right now? Grenell says he will focus the talks on economic issues. I hope these will include implementing the many technical agreements Pristina and Belgrade have reached but not implemented, as well as removal of the non-tariff trade barriers that their respective chambers of commerce understand well.
It’s incongruous that Washington is focused on economic issues, which are the natural purview of the EU, while Brussels will be focusing on the bigger political questions, on which it has little purchase. This division of labor is more the result of competition than cooperation. It won’t likely last. Virtually any economic issue can be turned into a sovereignty question. All sovereignty questions have economic dimensions. The US and EU would both do better working together than competing, but that is not possible for the Trump Administration. It loathes the EU, and many Europeans, especially Germans displeased by his tenure as ambassador in Berlin, loathe Richard Grenell.
Expectations for next weekend’s meeting should be minimal, but we should also expect President Trump to try to take credit for what he will describe, if anything happens at all, as a terrific breakthrough, one better than any president has ever previously achieved in the Balkans (never mind the two wars brought to an end during Bill Clinton’s presidency). Exaggerated bluster is Trumps only real talent. It hasn’t been working well lately, because Covid-19, North Korean, Iran, Venezuela, China, and even Russia haven’t been yielding to Trump’s reality show threats. Maybe he’ll have better luck with Presidents Thaci and Vucic, but I doubt it. They both know he won’t deliver on any overblown economic packages and are likely, and wisely, looking past him to the day President Biden takes office.
Lebanon near collapse
“While the unprecedented mass demonstrations that began in October 2019 succeeded in pressuring the government of then-prime minister Saad Hariri to resign, they have yet to lead to the radical change that many protestoers were seeking. As Lebanon continues to flatten the coronavirus curve and as the country opens up again, the protest movement is expected to make a comeback, with protesters again voicing demands for an independent judiciary, accountability, early parliamentary elections, and financial reform—among others.” On June 17, 2020, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Center hosted a virtual panel discussion on the Lebanese protests’ resurgence and the prospects for real reform in Lebanon. The discussion featured four speakers:
Maha Yahya: director of the Carnegie Middle East Center
Lara Bitar: founding editor of The Public Source.
Alia Ibrahim: founding partner and chairwoman of Daraj.
Jean Kassir: co-founder and managing editor of Megaphone
Current Crisis
Bitar underscores that for the last thirty years, Lebanon has endured paramount social, economic, and environmental crises. Yahya regards Lebanon’s current situation as the most significant crisis it has faced since the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War.
1. The Lebanese political power sharing model remains on the verge of collapse. Lebanon possesses a “sectarian-confessional governmental system” in which high-ranking offices are reserved for members of specific religious groups. The President must be a Maronite Catholic, the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Parliament must be a Shi’a Muslim, and the Deputy Speaker of Parliament must be Eastern Orthodox Christian. This system is based on the last census of the Lebanese population in 1932 and in theory, is intended to deter sectarian conflict and fairly represent the demographic distribution of Lebanon’s recognized religious groups.
2. The Lebanese economic model of banking and tourism has collapsed, and Yahya predicts that there will be an exodus of Lebanon’s remaining middle class professionals.
3. The Lebanese pound has lost 50-60% of its value. The World Bank predicts that poverty in Lebanon could rise to 50% if the economic situation worsens. In addition, the World Bank estimates that unemployment, especially among youth, may sharply rise.
4. The Lebanese government says that Lebanon’s public debt has reached $83 billion. Businesses within Lebanon continue to collapse and in January 2020 alone, it has been estimated that nearly 200,000 Lebanese citizens lost their jobs.
5. COVID-19 lockdowns have highlighted structural inequalities and socio-economic disparities in Lebanon.
Lebanon since the October 17th revolution
Bitar believes that the prominent feelings of euphoria felt by Lebanese citizens at the start of the October 17th (2019) thawra, or revolution, has disappeared and future prospects remain grim. In addition to the nearing financial collapse, Lebanese face the constant prospect of shortages of medical supplies, food, and petrol. Bitar highlights that in the last few weeks, domestic migrant workers have been abandoned on the streets of their consulates in Beirut.
Kassir stresses the increasing role of young Lebanese citizens in political discourse. Kassir believes that young people have traditionally felt alienated by the ways in which politics have been conducted in Lebanon. Since the beginning of the October 17th revolution, Lebanon has witnessed a rise in anti-establishment sentiment among its youth.
Ibrahim underscores the increasing restrictions placed on the independent press in Lebanon since October 17. The Lebanese judiciary has recently allowed the prosecution of those critical on social media of the Lebanese President, Michel Aoun. Going forward, Ibrahim believes that much work must be done to ensure the legal protection of those working in the independent media. In co-founding Megaphone, Kassir attempts to create space in which one can think critically about economic and social issues. Furthermore, Kassir aims to provide a platform for the amplification of the voices of Lebanon’s most marginalized groups. These groups include women, refugees, and migrant workers.
Stevenson’s army, June 22
– While the national security adviser writes in WSJ that “no formal announcement has been made,” he then explains that US troops will leave Germany and why.
-NYT explains the lapses in vetting that allowed the Saudi pilot to kill in Pensacola.
— NYT also explains how Amb. Grenell seized control of Kosovo policy.
-Bolton blames many policies on “the split between Trump and Trump.”
–Bolton has more harsh words in ABC interview. Transcript here.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
What can Grenell produce?
I’ve done three interviews in the last week on the Serbia/Kosovo talks to be held in Washington next weekend. Here they are:
Fitim Gashi (Koha Ditore)
Q: President Trump’s envoy for Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, Richard Grenell, has reignited the engines to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. He received confirmation from governments in Pristina and Belgrade that they will respond the invitation for a meeting in Washington on June 27. How do you comment on this?
A: It’s a bad idea whose time has come. No one should be negotiating anything important with an American Administration that could lose power in less than 5 months.
Q: The meeting in Washington, came at a time when EU Commissioner Miroslav Lajcak visited Pristina and Belgrade with the aim of setting future dates of the dialogue? Do you see EU-US conflict of competence in terms of dialogue?
A: Yes. The US is aiming to upstage the EU. This is juvenile, but so is President Trump.
Q: The lack of coordination EU-US, how much harms the process and the quality of potential agreement?
A: Lack of EU-US common purpose is bad: the US needs EU leverage to get good things done in the Balkans, and the EU needs US prestige with both Belgrade and Pristina. Together they can achieve something good. Separately they can do far less and may cause serious harm.
Q: Regarding EU-US division, how much has contributed developments within Kosovo, where we have President Thaci contesting the mediating role of Lajcak?
A: The President is siding with Grenell against Lajcak, who will have to try to deal with Prime Minister Hoti. Hoti has stated a clear and compelling position on negotiations with Belgrade, but his government is weak and President Thaci seems uninterested in what it says and wants.
Q: Do you see attempt to rush for an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, before the US presidential election?
A: Yes. Grenell is trying to deliver a diplomatic show-piece for Trump before November 3.
Q: What is the risk of signing an agreement that does not contribute to long-term stability in the region? Significant: despite their denials, the Americans have opened the door Belgrade’s partition ideas, which would be bad not only for the region but also for many other places, especially Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Only Presidents Putin and Vucic could be happy with partition.
Q: What compromises should make both sides, and what must be done if there is an attempt to reach an agreement that implies border changes?
A: I can’t decide what compromises they should make, but there is lots to do in removing trade barriers, opening direct contacts between the two armies, encouraging people-to-people contacts, implementing the existing “technical” agreements, ensuring protection of property rights in both countries, and ensuring that Albanians in Serbia and Serbs in Kosovo have comparable rights and status.
Q: Will Kosovo be able to reject a bad agreement, if it is signed in Washington?
A: The government, parliament, and people of Kosovo have all made clear their opposition to partition. But if the two Presidents were to agree to it, people in both northern Kosovo and southern Serbia would start moving, creating facts on the ground that would be hard to reverse. The results will be disastrous for human rights and a triumph for ethnic nationalist ideology.
Q: Mr. Grenell on several occasions has mentioned the intention for Kosovo and Serbia to reach a peace agreement through useful economic measures. Can this be done?
A: Economic measures can help to pave the way. They are the most important thing to do now. But Grenell has talked he talk. He hasn’t walked the walk.
Q: Can all the open problems between Kosovo and Serbia be solved, which would lead to mutual recognition?
A: Yes, eventually, but I doubt it at present. President Vucic seems uninterested in that proposition, unless and until he gets territory.
Q: Do you expect Russia to be involved in the process?
A: The Russians don’t have to be involved in a partition process, because it will fulfill their dreams without any effort on their part. Eventually, they will need to be on board with Kosovo membership in the UN.
Q: What will happen to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue if Russia is included, can this process it end up in Security Council of UN?
A: The Security Council will have to approve Kosovo membership in the UN, without a veto from Russia or China. Putin will demand a high price for that: likely US recognition of the “independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as Russian annexation of Crimea. I doubt the Americans, even under Trump, will agree to even the first half of that, but Trump is unreliable and volatile. You never know, because he understands little and cares less.
Besnik Velija (Gazeta Express)
Q: In yesterday’s interview for our newspaper, Grenell said that the meeting in Washington will be only for economic issues. As he declared, the Phase II (political one) belong to Europe. What are your expectations for such a meeting in the White House and do you really believe that Kosovo and Serbia will travel to Washington to discuss economic issues?
A: I’ll be happy to see the Washington meeting focus on economic issues, including non-tariff trade barriers as well as unimplemented “technical” agreements between Belgrade and Pristina. You’ll have to ask the Presidents whether they are traveling for that purpose. Grenell says they are.
Q: Traveling to Washington, Serbia and Kosovo have been forced to give up pure political issues such are the derecognition campaign and seeking membership in international organizations. Why would this be necessary, if only economics will be discussed on the White House?
A: The suspension of the derecognition campaign and seeking membership in international organizations are confidence-building measures of little consequence, since they were initially announced to last only until the meeting. I am not convinced extending them would be a good idea. If Serbia wants to demonstrate that it is a friendly neighbor, it should be sponsoring Kosovo for membership in international organizations.
Added to this, Vucic one day before traveling to White House will meet Vladimir Putin in Moscow.
Q: Does this mosaic of previous meetings and events deny Grenell’s declarations for an “Economic Meeting” in the White House?
Q: You’ll have to ask President Vucic. He is certainly making it clear that he will not abandon his coziness with Putin in favor of a Western alignment. Playing Moscow against the West is classic non-aligned hedging behavior that will prevent Serbian membership in the EU.
Q: One last question about land-swap. Richard Grenell on his recent interview for FOX News declared that territorial details were policy of John Bolton, trying to create a gap between Trump and such an idea. Do you see this as a strategic election campaign move from the Trump side?
A: I do think Grenell may have realized that partition was a bad idea, which would be good if true. But truthfulness is not a value of this Administration. We’ll have to wait and see what the Washington meeting produces.
Veljko Nestorović (Dnevne novine):
Q: What do you expect to be the topic of conversation, economics as announced by Grenell or something else?
A: We’ll have to wait and see. I’ll be glad if they discuss economic issues like elimination of non-tariff trade barriers and implementation of the technical agreements already reached between Pristina and Belgrade.
Q: Richard Grenell said that the idea of correcting the border was John Bolton and not president Trump. Your comment?
A: If this is an effort to end the talk of border changes, my compliments to Mr. Grenell for recognizing partition as a bad idea. But this Administration is not known for its truthfulness. We’ll have to wait and see what happens.
Q: Can an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina follow by the end of this year?
A: Sure, you can have all sorts of agreements between Belgrade and Pristina before the US election, which is what Grenell wants. But there is unlikely to be an agreement on mutual recognition and entry into the UN, which are the big issues.
Q: What if Trump loses the election, does that change the US approach to the Kosovo problem?
A: Yes. Mr. Biden, whom I have testified in front of a number of times, will be a committed opponent of any border changes to accommodate ethnic differences in the Balkans and elsewhere. He will be a far stronger supporter of Kosovo sovereignty and territorial integrity than Mr. Trump has been, and he will vigorously support Serbia’s candidacy for EU accession as well as close US cooperation with the EU in the Balkans and elsewhere.