Month: June 2020
Peace Picks | June 22-28
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live-streaming.
- Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves | June 22, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
Algerian officials in the northeastern border area between Algeria and Tunisia continue to permit the cross-border smuggling of petrol and other commodities. In turn, smugglers have participated in the authorities’ efforts to neutralize security threats, even as they continue to engage in the illicit trade. The two ostensibly adversarial parties effectively complement each other. In her new paper, Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves, Algerian political scientist Dalia Ghanem examines such paradoxes and argues that state formation remains an evolving process in the country.
Speakers:
Dalia Ghanem: resident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Max Gallien: political scientist at the Institute of Development Studies.
Isabelle Werenfels: senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
- Assessing the Implications of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act | June 22, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On June 17, the long-awaited Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into force, imposing the most comprehensive set of sanctions against Syria’s Assad regime to date. Aimed principally at preventing further war crimes by preventing any foreign investment into the Syrian regime, the sanctions will almost certainly have a consequential impact on Syria’s politics and economy. As the act comes into force, Syria is already beset by a spiraling economic crisis, the effects of which have generated unusually defiant and persistent anti-regime protests in the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda and rising levels of discontent within regime-held territories. Southern Syria faces an expanding insurgency, ISIS is slowly resurging in the central desert, Turkey is doubling down on a permanent presence in the northwest and for now, U.S. troops appear to be staying.
How will the Caesar Act’s sanctions be enforced and with what goals in mind? What effect are they likely to have within today’s context? Does a policy of escalating pressure on the Assad regime promise diplomatic progress or humanitarian suffering?
Speakers:
Amb. James F. Jeffrey: Special Representative for Syria and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
Rime Allaf: Syrian writer and commentator; board member, The Day After Project
Qutaiba Idlbi: Non-resident scholar, MEI; Syria fellow, International Center for Transitional Justice
Charles Lister (Moderator): Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs, MEI
- U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East | June 22, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
While prominent voices in Washington have argued that U.S. interests in the Middle East are dwindling and will require the United States to “do less” there, Jake Sullivan argued in a recent Foreign Affairs article that the United States should be more ambitious using U.S. leverage and diplomacy to promote regional stability.
Speakers:
Jake Sullivan: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Geoeconomics and Strategy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Jon B. Alterman: Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program
- Iranian Kurds: Challenges, Existence, and Goals | June 23, 2020 | 11:00 AM | Washington Kurdish Institute | Register Here
With 12 million people, the Iranian Kurds make up the second largest population of the Kurds in the greater Kurdistan. Similar to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the Iranian Kurds have been struggling for decades for freedom under the current Iranian regime. The Kurdistan region of Iran (Rojhelat) has the highest rate of political prisoners in the country. The regime’s discriminatory economic policies in Rojhelat have resulted in poverty and poor living conditions for the Kurds, which led many to become border porters known as Kolbars. Hundreds of Kolabrs are victims of the Iranian border guard attacks and executions every year. The dire political, economic, and security situation of Rojhelat continues under the current regime that has been suppressing its citizens on an ethnic and sectarian basis.
As the first founders of the Kurdish nationalism and political parties in greater Kurdistan, the panel will discuss the current situation of the Iranian Kurds and their goals. The panel will also discuss the Iranian Kurdish relations and cooperation with other opposition groups in Iran and potential future understandings.
Speakers:
David L. Phillips: Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights
Arash Salih: Representative of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan to the United States.
Salah Bayaziddi: Representative of the Komala Party to the United States.
Kamran Balnour: Representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party to the United States
- The World Economy After COVID-19: A Conversation with President Romano Prodi | June 23, 2020 | 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register Here
Join Johns Hopkins SAIS for a conversation with Romano Prodi, Former President of the European Commission (1999-2004); Former Prime Minister of Italy (1996-1998; 2006-2008). The event is moderated by Justin O. Frosini, Adjunct Professor of Constitutional Law, SAIS Europe; Director of the Center for Constitutional Studies and Democratic Development and Associate Professor, Bocconi University.
- The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division | June 24, 2020 | 7:00 AM – 8:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
The 2011 uprising in Syria totally transformed the religious establishment in Damascus. The regime sent into exile many prominent, influential religious figures who, forced to work from abroad, formed a religious opposition group called the Syrian Islamic Council. The regime also restructured what remained of the capital’s competing religious institutions. This robbed the religious establishment in Damascus of the financial and administrative independence that had been its key privileges. But it also presented new Sunni clerics from the capital’s hinterland with opportunities to enter the competitive religious arena — as well as posing a major challenge to the SIC, obliged to operate in exile. In her latest paper, The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division, Laila Rifai mentions how the religious sphere in Rural Damascus Governorate is poised to become a political battleground as both the regime and the exiled opposition seek to court a new rising group of religious leaders.
Speakers:
Laila Rifai: writer and researcher, specializing in Syrian religious affairs.
Thomas Pierret: senior researcher at CNRS-IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence.
Muhammed Mounir Al Fakir: fellow at the Omran Centre for Strategic Studies.
- Turkish-Israeli Relations: Prospects for Improved Diplomacy | June 25, 2020 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Over the past decade Israel-Turkey relations have been strained. There have been recent positive signs, however. Israel’s decision not to sign a statement by France, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and Egypt condemning Turkey’s actions in the eastern Mediterranean and a tweet posted by Israel’s official Twitter account praising its diplomatic relations with Turkey raised hopes. Turkish analysts saw the moves as a sign of both countries’ willingness to cooperate when it comes to eastern Mediterranean energy but tensions remain.
How does Israel and Turkey’s involvement in Syria and increasing opportunities for economic cooperation affect the prospect of improved bilateral relations? How will Israel’s plans for annexation and Turkey’s public support for the Palestinians affect diplomatic relations? Are there enough incentives to normalize Israel-Turkey relations or will the barriers be insurmountable?
Speakers:
Nimrod Goren: Founder and head of Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Karel Valansi: Political columnist, Shalom Newspaper
Gönül Tol: (Moderator): Director of Turkey Program and Senior Fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
- The Broader Implications U.S. Disentanglement from Afghanistan| June 26, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On 29 February, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban designed to allow for an orderly withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan by next spring if not sooner. Coming after many months of difficult negotiations, the decision carried a promise from the Taliban to deny to any terrorist group or individual the use of Afghan soil to undertake an attack on the United States or its allies. The accord also carried a Taliban commitment to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue quickly aimed at a peaceful resolution of the civil conflict. American policy for Afghanistan must be seen as well on a broader canvas of continuing U.S. diplomatic, political and military disengagement regionally. As in Afghanistan, withdrawal leaves unanswered many questions about how American national security interests may be affected, particularly at a time of increased great power competition.
What might be the impact of a full U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan on the course of the civil war and prospects for peace talks? What would the United States do if after departure the Taliban broke the terms of their agreement or threatened the survival of the Afghan state? How would the end of an American military presence affect relations with Pakistan? And is the United States prepared to accede to strongly increased Iranian, Russian, or Chinese influence in Afghanistan and the region?
Javid Ahmad: Nonresident fellow, Atlantic Council
Ronald E. Neumann: President, The American Academy of Diplomacy
J. Alexander Thier: Senior advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Senior fellow and deputy director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center
Marvin Weinbaum (Moderator): Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI
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Nuclear reminders
Former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Pantelis Ikonomou writes occasionally for peacefare.net. We have never met in person, or even spoken on the phone, but his unequivocal commitment to containing and reducing nuclear risks, combined with his technical expertise, has been more than enough reason for me to open the blog to his always welcome contributions.
He has now written and published with Springer a wonderful comprehensive volume modestly titled Global Nuclear Developments: Insights from a Former IAEA Inspector. It is a first-rate primer on:
- the technology required to make a nuclear weapon,
- how the current international regime to control nuclear weapons evolved and how it functions,
- how major nonproliferation crises have been handled in North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, Romania, and the former Soviet Union,
- possible future proliferators, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan, and South Korea,
- nuclear incidents/accidents, and
- the nuclear weapons states, both within the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty–US, Russia, China, UK, and France–and outside it–India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.
Throughout, Pantelis demonstrates his excellent and dispassionate command of the details while also offering practical and well-founded guidance for the future. North Korea, he thinks, will not be giving up nuclear weapons but its program might be frozen, given the right incentives. The US, he thinks, made a colossal error in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA) and thereby shortening the time required for Tehran to obtain the material needed to build a nuclear weapon. He understands that the deal in which Libya gave up its military nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief was a good one, but Qadaffi’s ultimate end will have strengthened North Korean resolve not to do likewise. I found his discussion of the South African and Israeli pursuit of nuclear weapons particularly interesting.
Pantelis is proud of the work of the IAEA, but blunt about the shortcomings of the regime it administers. He regards its Additional Protocol as adequate to limiting the possibility of hiding a military nuclear program within a civilian one, but he also notes that it is not universally and unconditionally accepted, most notably by Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (which accepts it only within the context of JCPOA) as well as Israel, which remains outside the NPT. He also underlines the tensions between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states over the reluctance of the former to deliver on nuclear disarmament, which contributed to the failure of the 2015 review conference and what he feared would be the likely failure of the 2020 edition before it was postponed this spring.
In the end, Pantelis speculates on the emergence of a new “tetra”-polar equilibrium among nuclear weapons states:
- US and UK;
- Russia and India;
- China, Pakistan, and North Korea;
- Israel and France.
I am not sure how he comes to this conclusion. Even if 1. and 3. are historically well-rooted, I’m not convinced that India will ally with Russia or that today’s France is interested in allying with Israel, even if Pantelis is correct that France helped Israel develop its nuclear weapons in the past. Nor do I see why this configuration should be stable. It seems to me that two-party nuclear standoffs (US/USSR, India/Pakistan, US/China) are far more likely to be stable than anything with four corners to it.
Pantelis reserves his final enthusiasm for an epilogue in which he pleads with the world’s scientific community to convince the nuclear weapons states, especially the US and Russia, to engage seriously in nuclear disarmament rather than their current race to modernize and proliferate nuclear weapons, which is intensifying. I wouldn’t fault him there at all. The craziness of pursuing weapons that can never be used without sealing your own country’s destruction has not been lost on most of the world’s states. Lowering the level of mutual assured destruction could free up a lot of resources for more useful things. It is fortunate we have well-informed observer/participants like Pantelis to remind us of what we should be doing.
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Fizzle
Donald Trump last night in Tulsa tried to excite his extremist base with a lot of red meat about Democratic radicals, denunciations of burning of the American flag and toppling of statues, suggestions that less testing for Covid-19 would reduce attention to it, and blatant racism. I suppose the crowd liked it, but the arena was half empty and not even his enthusiasts were enthused.
Trump can no longer hide his failures. Covid-19 is growing exponentially in states that he owns. The economy is still moribund, despite a dip in unemployment claims. Most Americans support Black Lives Matter and other “radicals” whom Trump deplores. Trump’s base, which is the only part of the population he cares about, is clearly in the minority, making voter suppression a vital part of his re-election strategy. States run the presidential election, so Republican-led states are aggressively purging voter rolls, reducing the number of polling places, and limiting mail-in ballots.
Trump is however still trying to hide his personal malfeasance and the misdeeds of his pals. That is the short version of why he fired the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) this week. But he did it so sloppily that he is ending up with the career deputy acting in the position, instead of the toady he wanted. That is a great good fortune. SDNY is notoriously independent and likely has the goods on Rudy Giuliani if not on Trump himself, who is reputed to have pressured the prosecutors not to go after a Turkish bank at President Erdogan’s behest.
Trump’s situation is no better abroad. North Korea and Iran continue to defy Trump’s nuclear demands. Both have made significant progress on missiles and nuclear technology in the past 3.5 years. Venezuelan President Maduro remains in office. China is filling the vacuum wherever “make America great again” retreats. Russia has offered Trump nothing for his many efforts to court Putin. The “deal of the century” for the Palestinians has turned into a green light for Israeli annexation of a big chunk of the West Bank. Even that however might not come off, as the Israelis are getting a lot of pressure not to proceed in order to protect their relations with Sunni Arab countries.
The only thing working for Trump right now is Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority leader. He is proceeding apace with confirmation of unqualified Federal judges Trump dutifully nominates. But they don’t always behave the way McConnell and Trump might like. Despite the Administration’s opposition, the Supreme Court has extended equal protection of the law to LGBTQ people and prevented Trump from reversing the Obama program that protected people brought illegally to the US as children from deportation.
The Trump Administration is still capable of doing astoundingly bad things. But it is losing its grip on the popular imagination of most Americans. Joe Biden, who hasn’t yet been campaigning vigorously, is rising markedly in the polls, including in swing states crucial to Trump. The Electoral College could still save him from defeat, but the odds of that are declining. With four months to go before Americans start to cast their ballots, Trump is fizzling. May it last.
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There is more than one bad idea
The Trump Administration is bringing Kosovo and Serbia Presidents Thaci and Vucic to Washington June 27, in an effort to hammer out some sort of agreement the American President can boast about at a Rose Garden ceremony before the November 3 election. Speculation about the substance has focused on the apparent willingness of both Vucic and Thaci to consider land/people swaps on an ethnic basis: Serbs in northern Kosovo would be traded to Serbia in exchange for Albanians in southern Serbia.
This is a spectacularly bad idea, against which I and others have argued vigorously, as it would destabilize the Balkans as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Only Vladimir Putin could like it. Maybe Trump’s special envoy Richard Grenell has been listening, as he has now let it be known that his Washington conclave will focus on economic agreements while the more sensitive political issues will be settled in talks the European Union hosts.
If we accept this division of labor at face value, it is certainly odd: economics is the specialty of the EU. The US–not the EU–will have to deal with Russia on the bigger political issues like diplomatic recognition and UN membership. But I trust the EU a whole lot more to oppose partition of the two countries (which is what a land/people swap amounts to), as Germany is solidly against it and the five countries within the EU that do not recognize Kosovo also have good reasons to oppose partition, along with several other EU members.
It is of course possible that Grenell is prevaricating. The Trump Administration tells more lies in a day than most recent American administrations tell in a year. Consistency is to Trump and Grenell “the hobgoblin of small minds.” I’m afraid they agree with the American poet Ralph Waldo Emerson: “With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do.” If it is partition they really want, they won’t let their prior statements interfere.
Fortunately, in both Serbia and Kosovo the idea of a land/people swap is getting a Bronx cheer. President Vucic still wants it, and after Sunday’s parliamentary election he might have the kind of super majority in parliament that would go along. But it is doubtful that he can get it approved in a constitutional referendum, which would require not only 50% to agree but 50% of registered voters to vote. The second part of the double majority would be particularly difficult. In Kosovo, Prime Minister Hoti has declared his opposition, and there is nothing like a 2/3 majority in parliament that would approve it, never mind 50% of the population.
Of course that doesn’t mean they won’t try it anyway. Once written down with a map that shows on which side of a new border Albanians should be and on which side Serbs should be, the ethnic cleansing and self-cleansing will start, including pressure to move to Kosovo on Albanians all over Serbia and pressure on Serbs all over Kosovo to move to Serbia. This would also ignite an independence move in the Serb half of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and possibly a similar move by Albanians in Macedonia. The chaos would destroy two landmark Clinton achievements: peace in Bosnia and Kosovo.
But let’s assume Grenell is being honest. There are certainly things that need doing on the economic front. He has already supposedly negotiated agreements on air and rail travel between Kosovo and Serbia, but there is no visible sign of implementation. Getting that moving would be a good idea. The Serbian and Kosovo chambers of commerce have a good understanding of the non-tariff trade barriers on both sides of the border. Removing those would help to improve economic conditions in both countries and attract international investment, as would implementation of the many “technical” agreements already negotiated between Pristina and Belgrade.
So there are lots of good things Grenell can do, if he focuses as declared on the economic issues. But there are also bad ideas other than the land/people swaps. One thing on which Pristina and Belgrade seem fully agreed is amnesty for their respective bigwig war criminals. De facto that already exists for Serb commanders in Serbia and Albanian commanders in Kosovo. Neither country seems inclined to punish its war criminals any more than Donald Trump wants to see American war criminals punished. Amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not permitted under international law, but that is just one more norm Trump might like to puncture. It would be truly ugly, but not unthinkable, if renewed American engagement in the Balkans came in the form of letting mass murderers go free.
There is more than one bad idea in the Balkans, and fending them off requires constant vigilance.
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Stevenson’s army, June 19
In class I make a big deal about legal authorities and bureaucratic processes. They matter. I also mention the Administrative Procedures Act that sets rules for how government can change its regulations. That was the basis for the Supreme Court ruling yesterday on DACA. The Chief Justice, writing for the 5-4 majority didn’t say DACA was legal, just that the Trump administration was arbitrary and capricious in trying ti void it.
Process matters in national security, too. The president may want to reduce US troop levels in Germany, but he hasn’t signed an order.
And I remain puzzled about the pandemic vaccine program called Operation Warp Speed. I still haven’t seen any authorities for its operation. And testimony yesterday from a 4-star who is supposed to be heading it says he’ll direct report to the Defense Secretary. Huh?
Meanwhile, Politico says there’s a loyalty purge going on in the Pentagon [corrected link]
Vox says Steve Bannon wants to turn VOA into a propaganda ministry.
NYT says Trump has regularly undermined his own China policy.
Keeping hope alive, several national security professionals are now running for Congress.
FYI, DOD has released its newest Defense Space Strategy.
And a new civ-mil prof has a good piece on keeping the military apolitical.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 18
– You don’t have to buy the 592-page book. The media have excellent summaries of the lowlights. Here’s WaPo; now NYT; Vox has a good checklist. BTW, NYT book reviewer calls it “tedious.”
– Trump gave WSJ an interview to rebut Bolton.
-In what I see as a preemptive leak to protect Lt.Col. Vindman, somebody told the Post he would be on the O-6 promotion list and said they were worried that the President might strike his name.
Two curious articles about Israel’s dalliance with China — in FP and in Lawfare.
– Prof. Thornhill has piece on civil-military relations.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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