The Dating Game: Israel and the Gulf

In the last decade, the Gulf Arab states have grown steadily closer to Israel. Regional experts attribute this shift to changes in the strategic landscape, as well as shared antipathy toward Iran. Though collaboration was initially confined to the security sphere, it has expanded dramatically in recent years. On July 7, the Atlantic Council hosted an online event on this topic, entitled Israel’s Growing Ties with the Gulf Arab States. Speakers examined the potential for growth in the relationship, as well as some possible challenges. Their names and affiliations are listed below: 

Dr. Gawdat Baghat: Professor of National Security Affairs, National Defense University

Jonathan H. Ferziger: Former Chief Political Reporter for Israeli & Palestinian Affairs, Bloomberg News

Ambassador Anne W. Patterson: Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

Ambassador Marc J. Sievers: Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

Why Israel?
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the local balance of power shifted. Once powerful regional actors Egypt, Iraq, and Syria stagnated or declined. In their place rose non-Arab states Iran, Turkey, and Israel. According to Baghat, the Arab Spring only made this shift more severe. After the Arab Spring, Gulf Arab states increasingly perceived Israel as a potential ally rather than an enemy. Israel was a wealthy state with an advanced economy, great civilian and military technology, and a common enemy. The Gulf Arab states eventually approached Israel out of a desire to collaborate on anti-Iran initiatives. 

Baghat explains that many Arab leaders believe that “the road to Washington is paved through Jerusalem.” Opportunistic Gulf Arab states may have changed their tune on Israel to curry favor with the United States. Even so, it is highly unlikely that Israel’s proximity to the United States was the sole or even the most important reason for the establishment of these new relationships. Gulf-Israeli cooperation is more organic, genuine, and locally-driven than ever, argues Sievers.

Since the Gulf States began their engagement with Israel, the Palestine issue has been largely on the back burner. Ferziger remarked that the issue has been conveniently ignored. 

Arab-Israeli Cooperation
At its outset, cooperation was confined to the security sphere. Today, however, cooperation is far more robust. Ferziger happily notes that the Gulf Arab states work closely with Israel on economic issues, medical research, and even religious initiatives. 

Israel’s advanced economy and many start-ups make it an attractive partner for the oil-rich Gulf states. Indeed, Saudi and Emirati sovereign wealth funds frequently invest in Israeli companies. Moreover, many Arab companies have long-lasting relationships with their Israeli counterparts. Ferziger cites Dubai World Ports and ZIM Integrated Shipping Services as an example.

Further, COVID-19 provided a platform for more open commercial relations between the Gulf states and Israel. On July 3, Israel Aerospace Industries and the UAE’s Group 42 signed a collaboration agreement. The agreement outlined their commitment to jointly fighting COVID-19, focusing on medical research and security technology. This was a major step in Gulf-Israel relations. Though the UAE and Israel do not have formal diplomatic relations, Ferziger believes that this agreement could lead to formal partnerships in other fields. 

Somewhat unexpectedly, Ferziger argues that religious ties have paved the way for improved relations between the Gulf and Israel. Dubai has an active Jewish community, and the UAE has commenced a number of interfaith initiatives. In Abu Dhabi, for example, the Higher Committee on Human Fraternity commissioned an interfaith complex. This complex, the Abrahamic Faith House, will house a mosque, church, and synagogue. 

The above are merely three areas of collaboration between the Gulf states and Israel. They do not constitute an exhaustive list. 

Potential Challenges
In Baghat’s eyes, one major flaw in the nature of the Gulf-Israel relationship is that it is elite-driven. Relationships exist at the governmental level, between members of Gulf royal families and Israeli leaders. This is particularly troublesome, Baghat argues, because it means that the relationship can be easily reversed. He believes that cultural exchange is essential to the growth and success of the Gulf-Israel relationship. 

Patterson notes the generational divide among Gulf leaders. Rapprochement is championed by younger leaders like Mohammad Bin Salman. These younger leaders can be overruled by more established members of the ruling dynasty. The relationship may be less stable than it appears. 

Other challenges to the Gulf-Israel relationship are more immediate. The speakers agreed that Israeli annexation on the West Bank could impact the growing relationship, though they remained divided on the extent of its impact. Ferziger, a Jerusalem-based journalist, minimized the prospect of annexation and, in so doing, implied that its effect would be limited. Conversely, Ambassadors Patterson and Sievers expressed serious concerns about West Bank annexation. If the Gulf Arab states were to passively accept Israeli annexation, they argued, relationships with Arab states like Jordan could be negatively impacted. Ultimately, this is all speculation; Israel has not yet annexed the West Bank, nor has it announced any concrete plans. 

Here is the video of the event: