Restarted, but…

With the US initiative for White House talks between Serbia and Kosovo aborted, the European Union last week reconvened its own dialogue with Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President Vucic participating. They reportedly discussed two things: accounting for missing people and economic issues.

This was wise. The talks had to be convened quickly, in order to maintain momentum and EU credibility. But neither side is ready to discuss the tough political issues that the dialogue aims to resolve.

Missing people is an issue that concerns both Belgrade and Pristina, as both governments are under pressure to show that there is some tangible benefit to talking with the adversary. It should have been done long ago, but that doesn’t make it less necessary now. Families on both sides want the identification and return of the remains of their loved ones. Completing that process requires extensive collaboration that can increase confidence and open up further issues for joint action.

The economic issues are more fraught. Vucic has already got what he wanted: an end to the tariffs Kosovo had levied on Serbian goods in retaliation for its so-called “de-recognition” campaign. Hoti has a long list of economic issues he wants discussed: “compensation for war damage, succession [of ownership of former Yugoslav property], state debt, pensions, savings in banks, the lost wages of laid-off workers, damage to private property and other issues.” Vucic isn’t interested in discussing those items. No doubt he’ll have his own list of damages and debits when the time comes.

The talks are now adjourned until September. That’s also wise, not only because Europe takes August off but also because no one is really ready for serious progress on the big issues. I’ve written recently about the preparations that have not yet been put in place. To summarize:

1. The EU needs to make sure its member states are more unified and provide the visa waiver for which Kosovo is qualified by September and at least a pledge of diplomatic recognition by five non-recognizing member states at the conclusion of the dialogue. A statement to that effect from the five is in order.
2. The US needs to get back into a supportive role, which won’t be possible so long as the American negotiator is a vocal critic of the EU interested only in President Trump’s reelection prospects. Ric Grenell, who has failed at more jobs in the last year or two than anyone should have, needs to go.
3. Kosovo needs a broader government that backs Hoti and can implement in parliament what is agreed in Brussels.
4. Serbia needs a decision to drop its “sitting on two stools” (East and West) policy and go hell bent for EU accession, with willingness to pay the price of normalization with Kosovo.

Those vital pieces to a political solution are not in place. Nor are they likely to be in place by September, by which time American attention will have refocused on the November 3 election.

That’s not the only problem. The EU seems still unwilling to do the right thing on the visa waiver, and Serbia seems uninterested in committing to good neighborly relations, which would include a clear commitment to Kosovo membership in the United Nations as well as exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives. Ironically, Kosovo has the best chance of meeting the preconditions: whatever happens in the dialogue, it will need a stronger majority if President Thaci resigns in order to choose his replacement.

So it was good to restart the dialogue process, but it is going to have a hard time proceeding apace. Berlin’s ambition of concluding before the end of Germany’s EU presidency is likely to be disappointed. Unless someone comes along with a bundle of money to settle Hoti’s economic claims and Vucic’s equally ample appetite, things are likely to stall. My recommendation: spend the next 5 months preparing for serious talks in 2021, starting on January 21. That prospect should concentrate minds in Belgrade, which has the most to lose from a new US Administration committed to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It might even lead to earlier movement on Belgrade’s part.