Month: July 2020
What Lebanon needs
“Lebanon is going through one of the most acute crises in its modern history. A complex economic collapse is driving hundreds of thousands into poverty and the risk of hunger, and shuttering an already wounded economy. A large cross section of the population revolted in October of last year and has created a standoff with a corrupt and sectarian oligarchy. The government is unable to chart and implement a way out of the crisis, and state institutions stand on the brink of failure. The multiple crises have threatened all sectors, including the critical education sector, previously one of the success stories of the country; universities, like other institutions, have been hard hit.” On July 10, 2020, the Middle East Institute hosted an online discussion on possibilities for a way forward in Lebanon. The event was moderated by Paul Salem and featured three speakers:
Ishac Diwan: Chairperson, Socio-économie du Monde Arabe, Paris Sciences et Lettres
Fadlo Khuri: President, the American University of Beirut
Maya Yahya: Director, the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut
Paul Salem (Moderator): President, Middle East Institute
Economics
The beginnings of the Lebanese economic collapse can be traced back to 2016. Diwan believes that although the Lebanese political elite knew the needed economic reforms, they did not implement them. Now nine months into the current Hassan Diab-led government, Lebanon remains plagued by inaction on the part of its leaders. To stabilize the economic situation, Diwan recommends:
1. Reduction of the source of the problem—less government deficit and less corruption
2. Devaluation of the Lebanese pound
3. Reduction of debt to make the state credit worthy
4. Restructuring of the banking sector
5. Dissolution of losses in a socially acceptable manner
To Diwan, the only way to stop this economic collapse right now, without deep structural reform, would be to starve the economy of cash until credible reforms bring back confidence.
Politics
Yahya highlights that the October 17 revolution movement remains at an impasse. Today, different groups have begun to organize themselves as nascent political parties. More recently, increasing initiatives for the formation of a coherent government able to pass real economic reform have occurred. Going forward, Yahya believes it remains crucial that these coalitions present a unified front capable of challenging the current political elite. Yahya also recommends the continuation of street protests to further voice popular dismay.
Education
Khuri warns that higher education in Lebanon continues to endure an acute crisis. As the president of the American University of Beirut, Khuri includes his institution in this determination. Since the opening of the airport in Beirut, many of those who are regarded as the “pillars” of Lebanon– doctors, lawyers, engineers, and artists– have fled the country. Khuri predicts many universities in Beirut will be forced to close due to the current economic climate. Going forward, the government must invest in the higher education of its citizens. Hope for the end of the current crisis lays in the hands of Lebanon’s educated youth.
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Stevenson’s army, July 15
In presidential election years, think tanks produce numerous reports suggesting an “Agenda for the Next Administration .” I send links to many of them, some because they’re representative of a school of thought, others because they seem interesting and worthwhile. AEI’s Derek Scissors, for example, has clear suggestions on how a partial economic decoupling from China might work.
This week, I’ve noticed a lot of big reports that strike me as job hunting in a possible Biden administration. Remember, there are a lot of smart people who expected to work in a Hillary Clinton administration who are now jockeying for jobs with Biden. Michelle Flournoy at CNAS has a comprehensive defense strategy, and she’d like to be SecDef. Bill Burns is obviously marketing himself for Secretary of State. There are already inner and outer circles of foreign policy advisers to Biden, so watch for the stream of published articles to burnish their resumes. Pete Buttigeig now has a piece in FP.
In other news, I was troubled to see this academic article on civil-military relations citing polls which show that opinion on basic questions now lines up with partisanship. With Trump as president, Democrats believe presidents should do whatever the military recommends; when Obama was president, the parties switched on military advice.
There’s a bidding war for Space Force HQ — 26 states! Decision due in Jan 2021 — before or after the 20th??
Dan Drezner reviews Trump’s economic statecraft.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Dating Game: Israel and the Gulf
In the last decade, the Gulf Arab states have grown steadily closer to Israel. Regional experts attribute this shift to changes in the strategic landscape, as well as shared antipathy toward Iran. Though collaboration was initially confined to the security sphere, it has expanded dramatically in recent years. On July 7, the Atlantic Council hosted an online event on this topic, entitled Israel’s Growing Ties with the Gulf Arab States. Speakers examined the potential for growth in the relationship, as well as some possible challenges. Their names and affiliations are listed below:
Dr. Gawdat Baghat: Professor of National Security Affairs, National Defense University
Jonathan H. Ferziger: Former Chief Political Reporter for Israeli & Palestinian Affairs, Bloomberg News
Ambassador Anne W. Patterson: Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Ambassador Marc J. Sievers: Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Why Israel?
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the local balance of power shifted. Once powerful regional actors Egypt, Iraq, and Syria stagnated or declined. In their place rose non-Arab states Iran, Turkey, and Israel. According to Baghat, the Arab Spring only made this shift more severe. After the Arab Spring, Gulf Arab states increasingly perceived Israel as a potential ally rather than an enemy. Israel was a wealthy state with an advanced economy, great civilian and military technology, and a common enemy. The Gulf Arab states eventually approached Israel out of a desire to collaborate on anti-Iran initiatives.
Baghat explains that many Arab leaders believe that “the road to Washington is paved through Jerusalem.” Opportunistic Gulf Arab states may have changed their tune on Israel to curry favor with the United States. Even so, it is highly unlikely that Israel’s proximity to the United States was the sole or even the most important reason for the establishment of these new relationships. Gulf-Israeli cooperation is more organic, genuine, and locally-driven than ever, argues Sievers.
Since the Gulf States began their engagement with Israel, the Palestine issue has been largely on the back burner. Ferziger remarked that the issue has been conveniently ignored.
Arab-Israeli Cooperation
At its outset, cooperation was confined to the security sphere. Today, however, cooperation is far more robust. Ferziger happily notes that the Gulf Arab states work closely with Israel on economic issues, medical research, and even religious initiatives.
Israel’s advanced economy and many start-ups make it an attractive partner for the oil-rich Gulf states. Indeed, Saudi and Emirati sovereign wealth funds frequently invest in Israeli companies. Moreover, many Arab companies have long-lasting relationships with their Israeli counterparts. Ferziger cites Dubai World Ports and ZIM Integrated Shipping Services as an example.
Further, COVID-19 provided a platform for more open commercial relations between the Gulf states and Israel. On July 3, Israel Aerospace Industries and the UAE’s Group 42 signed a collaboration agreement. The agreement outlined their commitment to jointly fighting COVID-19, focusing on medical research and security technology. This was a major step in Gulf-Israel relations. Though the UAE and Israel do not have formal diplomatic relations, Ferziger believes that this agreement could lead to formal partnerships in other fields.
Somewhat unexpectedly, Ferziger argues that religious ties have paved the way for improved relations between the Gulf and Israel. Dubai has an active Jewish community, and the UAE has commenced a number of interfaith initiatives. In Abu Dhabi, for example, the Higher Committee on Human Fraternity commissioned an interfaith complex. This complex, the Abrahamic Faith House, will house a mosque, church, and synagogue.
The above are merely three areas of collaboration between the Gulf states and Israel. They do not constitute an exhaustive list.
Potential Challenges
In Baghat’s eyes, one major flaw in the nature of the Gulf-Israel relationship is that it is elite-driven. Relationships exist at the governmental level, between members of Gulf royal families and Israeli leaders. This is particularly troublesome, Baghat argues, because it means that the relationship can be easily reversed. He believes that cultural exchange is essential to the growth and success of the Gulf-Israel relationship.
Patterson notes the generational divide among Gulf leaders. Rapprochement is championed by younger leaders like Mohammad Bin Salman. These younger leaders can be overruled by more established members of the ruling dynasty. The relationship may be less stable than it appears.
Other challenges to the Gulf-Israel relationship are more immediate. The speakers agreed that Israeli annexation on the West Bank could impact the growing relationship, though they remained divided on the extent of its impact. Ferziger, a Jerusalem-based journalist, minimized the prospect of annexation and, in so doing, implied that its effect would be limited. Conversely, Ambassadors Patterson and Sievers expressed serious concerns about West Bank annexation. If the Gulf Arab states were to passively accept Israeli annexation, they argued, relationships with Arab states like Jordan could be negatively impacted. Ultimately, this is all speculation; Israel has not yet annexed the West Bank, nor has it announced any concrete plans.
Here is the video of the event:
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Be prepared
After the calamitous failure of the Trump Administration’s attempt to take over the economic aspects of dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, the European Union reasserted its primacy in a flurry of meetings last week between Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti with French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel, and EU High Representative Borrell. Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak is putting the dialogue, which aims at achieving in months rather than years comprehensive normalization between Serbia and Kosovo, back on track within the European context, which is where it belongs. The Europeans are open to working in tandem with the US, which is necessary for success.
But haste can make waste. Preparation for negotiation is often more important than what is said at the negotiating table. I see lack of preparation in all four major capitals: Pristina, Belgrade, Brussels, and Washington.
Pristina
With President Thaci sidelined by a pending indictment, the Prime Minister will lead Kosovo’s negotiating team. His government has a razor-thin majority in parliament. It needs to strengthen that to more than two-thirds, and preferably 75%–before engaging seriously with Serbia. That would ensure that whatever he agrees in Brussels can be implemented in Pristina. It will also blunt the role of the Serb representatives, who are controlled by Belgrade, and enable election of a new President, if the indictment is confirmed and Thaci resigns.
Hoti has laid out a reasonable platform for his opening position, but I haven’t seen signs yet of serious preparation on the many issues that will be on the agenda, including major political items: will Kosovo aim for bilateral recognition by Serbia, or will it be content with UN membership? How can that be achieved? Will Kosovo allow formation of an Association of Serb Municipalities in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s requirements? How will disputes over property issues be settled in the aftermath of normalization? How will Serbs, Serb religious sites and other property in Kosovo be protected?
Belgrade
President Vucic has what Hoti lacks: more than two-thirds support in parliament, thanks to an election boycott by most of his opposition. He dominates the media and the courts in ways that any autocrat would admire. He also has an enviable best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA): he can live with the status quo, at least until the EU decides to make it painful for him or presents a more attractive alternative.
But he is trapped in that comfortable position. While most Serbs care far more about jobs and Covid-19 than Kosovo, Vucic has done nothing to prepare his citizens for acceptance that Kosovo is lost. He has instead repeatedly suggested that he would only give up Kosovo, which is no longer his, if he gets something in return. There isn’t much to be given. When former Finnish President Ahtisaari wrote the plan that led to Kosovo’s independence declaration, he gave Serbia everything it really wanted, because he thought Belgrade would recognize the new state.
Vucic, or some future leader of Serbia, needs to set out to convince its citizens that they would gain more from good, normalized, neighborly relations with Kosovo than from the current situation. Belgrade’s current stance–that Kosovo may not be under its control but that is no reason to give it up–is counter-productive for the Serbian economy and Serbia’s EU ambitions.
Brussels
Brussels has helped to kill the idea of a land and people swap between Belgrade and Pristina, which is what Vucic was hoping for. Now it needs to think about what it can offer as either carrots or sticks to get Vucic out of his comfortable stance. The carrots could include Covid-19 recovery aid, Green Deal funding, and a regional reconciliation fund. I can also imagine sticks: Serbia’s progress in accession talks with Brussels should be strictly conditional on its performance in the dialogue with Pristina, including implementation of existing agreements, renewal of prosecutions of war criminals, and willingness to accept essential elements of normalization like cooperation with the Kosovo army and intelligence services.
On the Pristina side of the equation, Brussels also has a lot of work to do:
- Resolve member state objections to admitting Kosovo into the EU’s visa waiver program, the conditions for which Pristina long ago satisfied.
- Invent a serious mechanism, if possible jointly with the US, to monitor and ensure implementation of existing and future agreements emerging from the dialogue.
- Convince the five EU members that have not recognized Kosovo to pledge to do so not on accession, which is far in the future, but rather on achieving candidate status.
These moves would give Brussels the kind of credibility it needs, and currently lacks, in Kosovo. Of course it would lose that credibility quickly if any carrots offered to Belgrade are not also provided to Pristina.
Washington
Richard Grenell, still President Trump’s special envoy for the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue, is not a credible interlocutor for either Europe, which he has gone out of his way to offend on numerous occasions, or Kosovo, whose territory he would have happily traded away. He may continue his parallel, mostly uncoordinated effort to achieve economic agreements between Belgrade and Pristina, but the odds are long for anything substantial. He is already refocusing his attention on the election campaign, which all along was one of his motives in pursuing a diplomatic spectacular with Pristina and Belgrade.
Vice President Biden has made clear that he would return the United States to its normal posture in the Balkans: support for democracy, the rule of law, Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and normalization between Pristina and Belgrade. While Biden is far ahead in current polling, there are still more than three months left before the election, and six before inauguration day. It is hard for me to picture anything good coming from official Washington before Trump is out of office, though participation in an implementation monitoring mechanism should be feasible. Brussels, Belgrade, and Pristina should all be trying to ensure that if Biden is elected, they will be ready to welcome more serious American engagement.
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Stevenson’s army, July 14
– WSJ first reported US rejection of Chinese claims in South China Sea. Here’s Pompeo statement
–North Korea rejects more talks with US.
– Britain bans Huawei from 5G.
-Gun lobbyist delivers.
Here’s summary of biggest House-Senate differences in NDAA.
– US has closed 5 more bases in Afghanistan.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, July 13
– The Taliban launched a major attack in Northern Afghanistan.
– Congress seems to be backing off acting in response to reports of Russian bounties to the Taliban to kill US soldiers.
– China is sanctioning Sens. Cruz, Rubio and others because of their support for the Uighurs.
– The Trump WH is putting out an”oppo dump” critical of Dr. Fauci. Analysis from Dan Drezner.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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