Month: July 2020
Peace Picks | July 13 – July 17, 2020
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- COVID-19 in the Middle East: An Opportunity to Improve Public Health? | July 13, 2020 | 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed fault lines in public health systems in the Middle East, where public health institutions vary widely. In Gulf states, citizens receive high quality health care, but the same is not true of foreign worker populations. Middle income countries in the region offer good health services to those who can afford them, while those who cannot have less or no access. In countries like Yemen and in Syria’s worn torn towns, nothing resembling a functioning health system, public or private, exists. The difficulty of supplying health services to refugees and displaced persons presents yet more difficulties. All this is not new, but the COVID crisis has afforded an opportunity to examine how access to health care plays out in a crisis. More importantly, the crisis can help guide domestic policymakers and international partners toward immediate and longer-term actions to improve public health delivery and prepare for the next crisis.
The Rafik Hariri Center and the United Nations Development Program’s Regional Bureau for Arab States are pleased to co-host a virtual discussion with experts who will not only discuss why the response to the pandemic has met with varying degrees of success, but will also address how policymakers and other stakeholders can better confront public health challenges of all kinds.
Speakers:
Dr. Adel Abdellatif: Deputy Regional Director, Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Development Program
Dr. Lina AbiRafeh: Executive Director, Arab Institute for Women
Dr. Ali Mokdad: Director of Middle Eastern Initiatives and Professor of Global Health, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington - The United States, Russia, and China in the Time of Pandemic | July 13, 2020 | 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM EST | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
The United States’ unipolar moment in the world—if it ever truly existed—is long gone. Instead the United States confronts a rising China and resentful Russia, both determined to check, if not roll back, U.S. influence regionally and globally. The pandemic will reinforce these trends and likely usher in a period of even greater competition and tension.
How should the United States respond to overt and covert challenges from Moscow and Beijing? And how important is growing strategic China-Russia cooperation on economic and security in this equation? Competition and tension seem all but inevitable, pushed forward by the domestic drivers of foreign policy. But are there prospects for détente or even meaningful episodic cooperation between the United States, China, and Russia on the issues that divide them?
Speakers:
Evan A Feigenbaum: Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment
Eugene Rumer: Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment
Susan Thornton: Senior Fellow, Yale Law School
Aaron David Miller: Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment - COVID-19’s Economic Impact on Women | July 13, 2020 | 4:00 PM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
COVID-19 is a crisis like no other – and it is having a calamitous effect on women’s economic well-being. Please join the Atlantic Council for a conversation on how the coronavirus is disproportionately impacting women’s earning and income and worsening economic inequality around the world. Our experts will look at how COVID-19 is devastating women’s employment and entrepreneurship, as well exacerbating workplace and household challenges such as education, wage gaps, informality, childcare and domestic violence. During the panel the experts will discuss how policy options or business practices could mitigate these adverse consequences and promote greater gender equality as nations recover and rebuild.
Speakers:
Gina E. Wood (Welcoming Remarks): Vice President, Foundational & Institutional Giving, Atlantic Council
Raj Kumar (Moderator): President & Editor-in-Chief, Devex
Ambassador Kelley E. Currie: Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues, U.S. Department of State
Dr. Nicole Goldin: Senior Fellow, Global Business & Economics PRogram, Atlantic Council
Henriette Kolb: Head, Gender Secretariat, International Finance Corporation, World Bank - Status and Priorities for Lebanon’s Political Transition | July 14, 2020 | 12:00 – 1:00 PM EST | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Lebanon is on the brink of collapse due to its domestic economic and political crises, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Another failed state in the Middle East would negatively impact strategic US interests. Lebanon requires a thorough reorientation towards stability and renewed socio-economic sustainability, which entails fundamental domestic reforms and targeted international support led by the US. The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the American Task Force for Lebanon (ATFL) are pleased to co-host the public launch of a joint policy paper, Recommendations for a Sustainable Bilateral Relationship.
What are the strategic interests the US has in Lebanon’s stability, and how can the US support Lebanese prosperity? Is the Lebanese government’s new financial recovery plan sufficient for the US to initiate support for the government? In what ways can the US best support a strong future for Lebanon?
Speakers:
Ambassador Edward Gabriel (Co-Moderator): President & CEO, American Task Force for Lebanon
Paul Salem (Co-Moderator): President, Middle East Institute
Jean AbiNader: Policy Director, American Task Force for Lebanon
Congressman Darin LaHood: U.S. House of Representatives, Illinois’ 18th District
Paul Raphael: Founding Chair, Lebanese International Finance Executives
Mona Yacoubian: Senior Advisor to the Vice President of Middle East & Africa, United States Institute of Peace - Election Integrity & Security in the Era of COVID-19 | July 17, 2020 | 2:00 – 4:15 PM EST | Brookings Institution | Register Here
The threats that disinformation and foreign interference in U.S. elections pose are not new phenomena. In 2016, Russian interference exposed critical vulnerabilities in the United States’ digital election infrastructure, and its information operations sowed political divisions across America. Now, modifications to democratic processes due to the coronavirus pandemic make the task of safeguarding the integrity and security of the 2020 presidential election even more crucial.
How will inevitable adjustments to voting practices, due to COVID-19, affect the security of U.S. elections? What measures should we pursue to dissuade our adversaries from attempting to interfere? Are we adequately prepared to counter new tactics, techniques, and procedures they might employ? And what can the federal government do to ensure that every state and county has the means to conduct a fair and secure election?
Speakers:
Keynote
Christopher C. Krebs: Director, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Panel 1: Safeguarding Election Security
Fiona Hill (Moderator): Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution
David Becker: Executive Director, Center for Election Innovation & Research, Brookings Institution
Mark Harvey: Former Special Assistant to the President & Senior Director for Resilience Policy, National Security Council
Susan Hennessey: Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings Institution
Panel 2: Adapting to New Disinformation Tactics
Chris Meserole (Moderator): Deputy Director, Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Initiative, Brookings Institution
David Agranovich: Global Threat Disruption Lead, Facebook
Alina Polyakova: President & CEO, Center for European Policy Analysis, Brookings Institution
Laura Rosenberger: Senior Fellow & Director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund of the United States
Gavin Wilde: Senior Analyst, Department of Defense
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Kosovo’s worries
A Kosovar friend writes:
I believe this is where all the problems started: by the narrative that Kosovo is about to die soon as it does not have a final deal with Serbia! This is where all lobbyists for dialogue at any cost have brought the narrative, claiming that we depend on Serbia’s willingness to recognize us. They want us to devote all our energy to a deal.
Yes, dealing with Serbia is important, but not at any cost. The technical dialogue in Brussels had a perverse effect: it stopped recognition of Kosovo, as some in the international community felt they should wait for the results. The dialogue also eliminated the authentic Kosovo Serb parties who accept the Kosovo state. That was done because Serbian President Vucic in the dialogue made a lot of promises and accepted a lot of responsibilities (as he always does). It seemed to the internationals logical to allow him to have his own Kosovo Serb politicians organized in the Lista Srpska. That enables him to control even Kosovo’s internal political life.
Had we devoted our energies after the Ahtisaari plan (2007) and the International Court of Justice decision (2010) advisory opinion about our independence to a real state-building agenda, we would have been in much better position. Instead we depended on the dialogue, which solidified the impression that the Kosovo story was still unfinished. We are where we are and the world has not changed in our direction. But, still I oppose the logic that Kosovo’s future depends on Serbia’s consent.
The ingredients for success in the dialogue do not lay entirely with us. We need Washington and Brussels to have a more supportive approach. Vucic is not going to sacrifice anything for the dialogue. He wants carrots that reward Serbia. Kosovo had to play in the dialogue, as he did. But now the pending indictment of our President and other Kosovo Liberation Army leaders by the Specialist Chambers have made it far more difficult for us.
What is alternative? I am not Nostradamus. Now the situation is more difficult and more complex than ever before.
The Specialist Chambers might drag on for many years. It will damage our image and put at risk our functionality and statehood. The Kosovo political opposition thinks only of how to take power at any cost. We could even end up with two of the worst outcomes: partition without recognition. I am afraid of negative scenarios offering us only a status akin to that of Palestine or union with Albania.
I am speaking as a worried friend and I hope you understand.
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Stevenson’s army, July 12
– NYT says China is signing deals with Iran for trade and military cooperation.
– Trump discloses covert cyber attack on Russia — see WaPo and NYT followup.
-Some minor but useful congressional reforms listed.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, July 11
– CNBC says USAID is being politicized by new political appointees.
– NYT has similar complaints about DHS.
-David Sanger et al. have more details about attack on Iran nuclear facility and likely future acts by Iran and US.
– So what’s the difference between a commutation and a pardon? The bland lawyer explanation is this. But Kevin Drum adds this:
Someone who gets a pardon can no longer invoke the Fifth Amendment as a justification for refusing to testify in court. If Stone were called in some other case, he’d be required to spill any beans he had. But if I understand the law correctly, a commutation is more limited. The conviction stands, and the possibility of putting yourself in further jeopardy remains. Thus your Fifth Amendment rights stand.
So if you wanted to help out a buddy, but you also wanted to make sure he couldn’t be forced to provide dangerous testimony in the future, commutation sure seems like the best bet, doesn’t it?
– I love mayonnaise, so I was intrigued by WSJ article on its history.
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Biden on Kosovo/Serbia
Vice President Biden knows which way is up in the Balkans. He issued this statement today:
I have been a longtime and vocal supporter of peace and reconciliation in southeastern Europe, and the decision by Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to restart dialogue on the normalization of relations between their countries is a vital step forward in this critical region. A comprehensive settlement that will lead to mutual recognition, preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both states, and strengthen their democratic institutions is essential for Kosovo and Serbia to move forward. [my bolding] It would enhance both countries’ security and prosperity, advance their aspirations for membership in the European Union and other multilateral institutions, and support the enduring aim of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
Reaching this goal requires transatlantic cooperation. History teaches us that when the United States and Europe lead together, we can succeed in ending conflicts and ushering in new opportunities for peace and prosperity – in southeastern Europe and beyond. This partnership is as necessary today as it has ever been, and it requires all parties to work together toward our shared goal. It requires American leadership and partnership. Yet, the Trump administration failed to coordinate with the European Union’s envoys — who have facilitated a dialogue between the two countries for nearly a decade — in planning a White House meeting with the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia last month. While the meeting was ultimately cancelled, the message to our EU partners was still loud and clear. The United States should be working together with our European partners, not turning our back on them. [again my bolding] That’s our best hope to facilitate a sustainable resolution that can unlock a more peaceful, prosperous, and European future for both countries. And if I am elected president, my administration will facilitate peace and security in southeastern Europe and work in tandem with our EU partners to make that dream a reality.
I encourage the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo to approach these talks with a spirit of compromise and reconciliation, knowing that they have the full support of the American people.
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The odious route to peace in Syria
A bit after 34 minutes in this briefing on US Syria sanctions, Faysal Itani asks two important questions of Joel Rayburn, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary: 1) what conditions would Syria have to fulfill to get relief from sanctions and more normal relations with the US? 2) what do we do if the sanctions cause collapse of the regime?
Joel responds that there are six Trump-approved conditions Assad or any Syrian government would have to meet :
- Cease sponsorship of terrorism;
- Severe its military relationship with Iran and Iranian proxies;
- Cease hostility to regional neighbors;
- Surrender weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cease its WMD programs in a sustainable way;
- Create conditions for refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) to return safely;
- Hold war criminals accountable, or allow the international community to do so.
Rayburn was at pains to point out that the first four were problems even before 2011. Only the last two stem from the war since then.
On regime collapse, Joel just shifts the responsibility to Syrian President Assad.
Both these answers are problematic.
The six conditions (which somehow become seven when Joel refers to the Caesar Act) are tantamount to regime change in Syria. There is no way Assad would survive numbers 5 and 6, especially as he himself is a prime candidate for war crimes accountability. 1-4 are less obviously connected one-by-one to regime change, but they amount to the same thing. It is a radically different Syria that could agree to meet these conditions.
The trouble is that we are nowhere near getting any of these conditions fulfilled. There is little likelihood that even the strict sanctions now being implemented will get us there any time soon. In the meanwhile, the sanctions will make life harder for many innocent Syrians and give the regime the foreign bogey-man it needs to blame for conditions it itself created. We need to do much more to ease humanitarian relief and remittances into areas the regime does not control and to prevent the regime from targeting UN agency relief, much of which we pay for, to its supporters.
The longer-term question is when can we hope that negotiating relief from sanctions with Assad will get us a worthwhile fraction of the conditions we have set? That’s how sanctions really work: you get something in exchange for relief from them, not in response to imposing them.
The prospect of regime collapse is what limits how long we can wait. It would mean risking revival of the Islamic State and resurgence of Al Qaeda or some 3.0 version of them, with all the harm that implies for US forces in Syria, the neighboring countries, and for Americans elsewhere in the world. It’s a judgment call, but it would be a serious mistake to wait too long. A year–at the outside two–of Caesar sanctions should be enough to tell us whether we have reached the point of diminishing returns.
It is profoundly odious to contemplate talks with Assad, and particularly difficult to do so if it looks as if his regime might be on the verge of collapse. His first priority in such talks would be self-preservation. But that is what we need to contemplate, unless we are willing to invest much more blood, treasure, and weapons in enabling an alternative to Assad that could take over quickly, avoid state collapse, and govern in a way more to our liking. I see no sign whatsoever that Americans–and certainly not Donald Trump–have the stomach for such a state-building commitment in Syria.
Joel and Syria Special Envoy Jim Jeffrey are hoping that Russia will save us from this conundrum. It would be nice if, as they often suggest, Moscow decides Assad is no longer their man. The Russians tell any American who will listen that they are unhappy with him. Some think Moscow could defenestrate Assad and find a more pliable proxy, in order to gain access to World Bank reconstruction funding, but they haven’t done it through a decade of rebellion and war.
A main factor here is money: if Moscow is willing to continue to bail out the Syrian economy, it is hard to imagine Assad crying “uncle.” But if Moscow–which is feeling the pinch of both Covid-19 and low oil prices–decides it is time, then a serious negotiation about Syria’s political future without Assad might begin. The Iranians–also pinched by Covid-19 and low oil prices–are a far less important financial factor.
The problems with relying on Russia to get rid of Assad are many. Moscow’s primary purpose there is to prevent regime change, not cause it. This is both a question of principle and interest, as it protects a fellow autocrat and the Russians’ biggest footprint in the Mediterranean. Moscow enjoys the discomfort Assad causes the West as well as the use of Syrian naval and air force facilities. Putin has taken good advantage of the situation in Syria to drive a wedge into NATO and pry Turkey loose, though not quite out.
All-in-all, Syria has been a winning wicket for Moscow. They talk smack about Assad to entertain the Westerners, but they aren’t likely to risk losing it all by unseating him until they can be sure the replacement will be at least as useful.
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