Month: July 2020
Stevenson’s army, July 10
– WSJ says the HHS official in charge of preparedness planning for pandemics expected a war or bioterror, not a pandemic, and thus misplanned.
– NDAA conference will face competing plans for Navy — ships or subs.
– Japan has a robust office planning for economic statecraft. [I wish we had one.] BTW, the full article, from IISS’s Strategic Comments publication, can be viewed via SAIS library.
– In Pakistan, the Army is even stronger over the civilian government now.
– In a first, House Democrats have released their Caucus rules. GOP did so years ago. Both available here.
– NYT has good summary of Esper-Milley hearing.
– A law prof has found proof of legislative logrolling that undermines claims of Originalist lawyers that Congress endorsed a Unitary Executive in 1789.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Kosovo and Serbia need a better process
Drilon Gashi writes:
Kosovo should set up a technocratic government to counter the dual health and economic crises created by the Coronavirus. Serbia should reevaluate its aims for the “normalization” talks. US and EU facilitators should outline a Kosovo-Serbia deal framework, before serious negotiations begin.
Peace talks between Kosovo and Serbia have rarely had more attention. Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti met with French President Macron today, and the two of them will meet with German Chancellor Merkel and Serbian President Vucic on Friday via videoconference. A planned Washington summit was cancelled last month due to the announcement of a proposed indictment of Kosovo President Thaci on war crimes charges. In Washington the parties were allegedly to discuss a US-led economic agreement, to be followed by a EU-led political agreement in Paris.
There are important economic issues to be resolved. Reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers between the two countries, supporting bilateral industry linkages, and discussing business, trade, and academic coordination would be mutually beneficial. But issues of sovereignty abound in both economic and political talks, and politically contentious topics have often dominated the discussion and eliminated hopes for a Kosovo-Serbia deal. The economic talks are allegedly to discuss co-ownership of Kosovo’s mining assets in Trepca, in its north, and a unique arrangement between Kosovo and Serbia customs.
This would not be bilateral economic cooperation; it would be Serbian incursion into Kosovo’s economic sovereignty. Swapping or partitioning economic assets is no better—perhaps, even worse—than swapping or partitioning land. It would, in the worst case scenario, make independent Kosovo economically defunct—precisely what an ethno-nationalist Serbia government may desire.
Technocrats for Kosovo
The announcement on war crimes charges has embroiled Kosovo politics at a challenging moment. If the charges are confirmed, Thaci has vowed to step down. The current government will find it difficult to elect a new President, as it has a thin majority and lacks public support. Kosovo, Serbia, and several other Balkan countries are witnessing alarming increases of COVID cases and deaths. Not only will their vulnerable health systems come under immense pressure, but the economies of the region will face deepening recession.
Kosovo needs a new, technocratic government, empowered to elect (in parliament) a new President as well as deal with the health and economic impacts of Covid-19 for 6-9 months. This will require political compromise between Hoti’s political party (LDK) and the one that led the previous government (Vetevendosje), which is soaring in the polls and wants elections sooner rather than later. A technocratic government would require support by a grand coalition of parties ministers with public health and economic recovery experience. It should continue anti-corruption efforts, while leaving the more contentious Kosovo-Serbia talks to a newly elected, politically legitimate government.
Serbia needs a rethink
President Vucic is in a much more comfortable position than Prime Minister Hoti. He recently won 75% of the seats in parliament due to an opposition boycott. Serbia’s government has been pushing to keep the talks going as it attempts to leverage its current diplomatic advantage over Kosovo.
Serbia above all is seeking concessions on territory and economic assets, especially the Trepca mine in northern Kosovo. Those ambitions lie far from its citizens primary concerns about democratic rights, economic progress, and faster European Union accession. Protests in Belgrade yesterday show that the Serbian public is concerned with its government’s COVID response and backsliding in the country’s democracy. Rather than pressing his diplomatic advantage, President Vucic should be using his strong position to ensure a fair compromise with Prime Minister Hoti.
The process needs improvement
The only way to strike such a deal is for Kosovo and Serbia to be treated as equal negotiating parties coming together to improve their bilateral relations. For years the EU has affixed all kinds of asterisks and footnotes on Kosovo’s status to appease Serbia and its own non-recognizers. That won’t work if Kosovo and Serbia are to enter a process intended to achieve a sustainable, mutually beneficial deal.
An equal process needs high-level support, but more importantly requires that US and EU facilitators spell out the main framework of a deal before it is negotiated. There has been little transparency about what Brussels and Washington are seeking, and even less about what Pristina and Belgrade want. It is time for the negotiating process to open up to public scrutiny.
*Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He has spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.
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Stevenson’s army, July 9
– Supreme Court finishes announcing decisions for the year at 1000. Follow it on Scotusblog.
-HASC has 1pm hearing with SecDef Esper and CJCS Milley. Expect questions about Lafayette Square operations and Vindman retirement.
– Hopkins has new tracker of school reopening policies nationwide.
– Big clash over who controls NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) budget. SASC gave DOD more power in its authorization bill, but House Appropriators forbid that in their Energy approps bill. It’s a lot harder to resolve disagreements that can’t come up in a conference committee because of the different legislative vehicles.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Palestinian State at Risk
On May 28, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his intention to annex portions of the West Bank. Netanyahu’s announcement sparked intense debate about whether peace in the form of a two-state solution remains possible. In the eyes of many observers, annexation is the nail in the coffin of a dilapidated Oslo Process. On July 1, the proposed annexation date, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a livestream entitled The Way Forward for Palestine: A Conversation with Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh. The names and affiliations of all speakers are listed below. Since this event, Netanyahu has hesitated. No new annexation has yet occurred.
Mohammad Shtayyeh: Prime Minister, Palestinian National Authority
Marwan Muasher: Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment
Aaron David Miller: Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment
Zaha Hassan: Visiting Fellow, Carnegie Endowment
The annexation plan was drafted by the Trump Administration and unveiled in January 2020. In brief, it sanctioned the Israeli annexation of up to 30% of the West Bank. The Trump-Netanyahu plan was not well received, and it triggered local, regional, and international objections. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) firmly rejected annexation and vowed to end all cooperation with Israel. Jordan opposed annexation on the basis that it posed an existential threat to Jordanian security, and most other Arab states opposed it on moral grounds. The European Union (EU) warned that EU-Israel relations would be negatively impacted by annexation.
Implications of Annexation
The immediate consequences of annexation would be dramatic. According to Shtayyeh, annexation will hinder the PNA’s efforts to generate the infrastructure, socio-political institutions, and state capacity necessary for statehood. If the PNA is poorly equipped for self-government, the national liberation movement will fail.
Annexation also has the potential to derail the peace process. Shtayyeh argues that annexation “erodes the geographic base of the eventual Palestinian state.” If annexation occurs, Israel will control large swaths of territory claimed by Palestinians, and it will become difficult for Palestinians to win back control in future negotiations. In Muasher’s eyes, annexation poses an existential threat to the realization of a two-state solution; if anything, annexation pushes the conflict toward a so-called “one state reality,” in which Palestinians and Israelis do not enjoy equal protection under the law.
According to Shtayyeh, July 1 would not be the first instance of Israeli annexation. In his opinion, Israel has engaged in a “creeping annexation” of the Palestinian territories since 1967. Shtayyeh argues that settlement construction and land expropriation effectively constitute annexation.
The Future of Palestine
Shtayyeh is not hopeful about the prospect of peace with Israel in light of the planned annexation. In response to a question, he noted that the debate within Israel is no longer about whether to annex but how much and what to annex. Nevertheless, Shtayyeh resisted Muasher’s various attempts to get him to renege on his support for a two-state solution. He repeatedly affirmed the PNA’s commitment to a two-state solution.
The PNA’s goal is the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital and pre-1967 borders. To accomplish this, Shtayyeh believes that there must be incremental expansion of Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank, until the vast majority of the territory is considered Area A and only “final status” issues remain.
Citing the history of failed negotiations and the United States’ long standing relationship with Israel, Shtayyeh argues that a new framework for negotiations is necessary. He and the PNA believe that the most appropriate course of action is multilateral negotiation, facilitated by the Quartet (European Union, United Nations, United States, Russia).
To watch the Carnegie Endowment’s livestream in full, click here.
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A Tale of Two Refugee Groups…
In light of a recent Amnesty International claim that refugee camps “will become new epicenters” of the coronavirus, the Wilson Center hosted a webcast entitled Refugees and COVID-19 on June 24. The webcast examined the effect of coronavirus on two distinct refugee groups: the Rohingya and Syrians. Featured speakers included humanitarian leaders, Asia experts, and Middle East experts. Speakers’ names and affiliations are listed below.
Merissa Khurma (Moderator): Program Manager, Middle East Program, Wilson Center
Manzoor Hasan: Executive Director, Center for Peace & Security, BRAC University
Omar Kadkoy: Policy Analyst, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
Matthew Reynolds: Regional Representative for the United States of America & the Caribbean, UNHCR
Jennifer Poidatz: Vice President for Humanitarian Response, Catholic Relief Services
Background & Context
The Rohingya are an Indo-Aryan ethnic group, native to Rakhine State, Myanmar (Burma). They have suffered decades of repression at the hands of the Burmese government. Tensions escalated in 2017, when the Burmese military launched a violent campaign against the state’s Rohingya population. This particular campaign is infamous for the military’s perpetration of mass atrocity crimes. Approximately one million Rohingya now reside in refugee camps in Bangladesh.
Unlike the Rohingya, Syrian refugees span different ethnic and religious sects. They are citizens or permanent residents of Syria, who have fled or become displaced in the nine years since the onset of the Syrian Civil War. There are approximately 6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, 5.5 million of whom live in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.
Excepting the fact that they have each been the subject of mass atrocity crimes, Rohingya and Syrian refugees are largely dissimilar. According to Reynolds, the Rohingya fit a “classic” model for refugee populations. Rohingya almost exclusively reside in densely-populated refugee camps, isolated from the citizens of their host country. In comparison, Kadkoy put the percentage of Syrian refugees in refugee camps at 2%. That is to say: more than 90% of Syrian refugees reside in urban areas, alongside the citizens of their host countries. Accordingly, Rohingya and Syrian experiences with coronavirus differ dramatically.
COVID-19 & the Rohingya
Due to their relative isolation, the Rohingya have had few encounters with COVID-19. According to Reynolds and the UNHCR, there are only 45 documented cases in the refugee camps, and fewer than 5 Rohingya have died of coronavirus. Even so, COVID-19 presents unique challenges. For one, the pandemic poses a threat to the Rohingya’s economic well-being. Because the refugees are so isolated from the Bangladeshi mainstream, many rely on aid to survive. Hasan estimates nearly half have no income to supplement the aid that they receive, monetary or otherwise, from NGOs. Because aid delivery has been disrupted, many Rohingya are at risk of falling into debt.
Moreover, Hasan argues that there is widespread distrust. Many Rohingya are skeptical of coronavirus testing and treatment; they are even hesitant to schedule medical appointments. Hasan believes that this trust deficit can be ameliorated through the provision of 4G Internet and the implementation of local trust-building measures. Finally, and critically, the population density of the refugee camps renders the Rohingya ill-prepared should coronavirus appear. Social-distancing is virtually impossible, according to Reynolds, and the Rohingya do not have enough Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to effectively combat the virus’ spread. The Rohingya are an incredibly vulnerable population; if/when coronavirus appears, they are sitting ducks.
COVID-19 & Syrians
Syrian refugees, by comparison, have been afflicted with the Coronavirus in relatively high numbers. They are overwhelmingly poor and exist on the margins of urban society; when coronavirus appeared, Syrian refugees were hit first and hardest. According to Kadkoy, Syrian refugees in Turkey are struggling to cope with the economic standstill brought on by the pandemic. Because refugees generally work in informal labor markets, their labor is perceived as disposable, and they have lost jobs at a rate four times higher than Turkish citizens. Even Syrians who retained their jobs have reported decreases in wages. Refugees’ health and financial security are both tenuous. Without relief, aid, or intervention, the situation is unlikely to change.
To watch the Wilson Center’s webcast in full, please click here.
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Stevenson’s army, July 8
– American Prospect notes how many former Biden staffers have come together in a “strategic consulting” shop, WestExec. Look at this Who’s who.
-The firm says they don’t do lobbying, which could be technically correct if they don’t personally contact officials. You may recall that Obama barred lobbyists from his administration, with a few case-by-case exceptions. Trump allowed lobbyists and appointed a great many, but imposed post-government limits, which Politico says are widely circumvented.
-Who’s winning [losing?] in the pandemic, look at these comparisons.
–What else could possibly go wrong? Politico suggests: Trump drops out, fires Pence; Biden gets sick…
-Duterte has a new law that looks as bad as China’s.
– National Interest says Zelensky is failing
– China calls for US to cut nukes.
– NYT has book review of 1948 book — but it’s Hans Morgenthau’s classic, Politics Among Nations. You may recall I often quote his line that “the tools of a diplomat are logic, bribes, and threats.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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