peacefare.net

Serbia’s turn East

The indicators are multiple:

• A financial crackdown on civil society and media organizations, not including the nationalist ones
• Control over conventional print and electronic media as well as abusive use of social media
• Purchase of major military equipment from Moscow and China
• Signature of a free trade agreement with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and refusal to align with EU Ukraine-related sanctions on Moscow
• Courting of Chinese investment and inordinate praise for Beijing’s help in response to coronavirus
• Refusal to prosecute known war criminals
• Failure to make substantial progress on independence of the judiciary
• Growing capture of the state for purposes of grand corruption

Aleksandar Vucic, one-time Information Minister to Slobodan Milosevic and now in his second term as President of Serbia, was always an unlikely vehicle of democratization and Europeanization. But some of us (that means me too) thought it possible he would do the right thing, if only because nothing else really makes sense and his credibility with Serbia’s nationalists was high. Serbia’s road to prosperity and security, we thought, lies in Brussels, not Moscow. Nixon to China and all that.

We had it wrong. Prosperity and security are not Vucic’s real concerns. His own hold on power is. Vucic has been centralizing power, aided by an inept and divided political opposition. Like his Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, he is far more comfortable with the Russian and Chinese autocracies than with Washington and Brussels. He has undermined independent media and slow-rolled judicial reform. Separation of powers is a joke–Vucic holds all of them. He allies himself with the Belgrade Church and its right-wing supporters. He has become palsy with Milorad Dodik, despite his understandable distaste for Dodik’s ambition to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, since that would put Serbia in a dicey situation.

Vucic is no longer “sitting on two stools.” It is amusing to see that some people imagine that they can still convince him to opt for the West. He has chosen the East, but we are not in the midst of the Cold War. The Balkans is no longer a major arena for great power competition. It barely rates as a minor one. Tito’s nonaligned fence-sitting served Western purposes. There is no fence now. The EU and the US shouldn’t care if Vucic goes East, and we shouldn’t try to buy him off. We need to be patient for the day when there is a Serbian leader who truly believes in liberal democracy and is prepared to sacrifice to take his country in that direction.

What does this mean for Kosovo? It means patience. Prime Minister Hoti is in no position to make territorial or other major concessions, as he faces real opposition in parliament. At least some Serbs are drifting in the right direction. Vucic, given his strong political position inside Serbia, could recognize Kosovo now with little impact on his re-election prospects in 2022. But if he doesn’t I can hope someone will emerge to challenge him precisely on this point: do you want a friendly southern neighbor, or a hostile one? Do you want Serbs to be safe in Kosovo or in danger? Do you want to qualify for EU membership faster or slower?