20 Years of Backward Progress
In July of 2000, Israelis and Palestinans met at Camp David. Their goal was to negotiate a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Predictably, the negotiations failed to produce a settlement. Twenty years later, on June 21, 2020, the Carnegie Endowment convened a panel to evaluate the Camp David Summit’s legacy and determine what the future holds for U.S.-mediated negotiations. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below.
Aaron David Miller: Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Shlomo Ben Ami: Former Foreign Minister of Israel
Nabil Shaath: Former Foreign Minister of Palestine
Tamara Cofman Wittes: Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
Where Did It All Go Wrong?
The panelists began by debating the summit’s legacy. Miller was quick to deem the negotiation a failure, as it obviously did not end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his view, Ehud Barak’s expectations were too high and Yasser Arafat was never genuinely interested in the negotiations.
Ben Ami cast doubt on Miller’s prescriptions. The former Foreign Minister argued that, even in the absence of a negotiated settlement, the Camp David Summit was a crucial step in the peace process. It emphasized the importance of multilateralism and equity in the negotiating process, and it notably provided a framework for the Clinton Peace Parameters. The Clinton Peace Parameters, in turn, served as the basis for Ehud Olmert’s famous 2008 peace offer.
A Bleak Present (& Equally Bleak Future)
Twenty years later, however, Ben Ami lamented that “the two state solution has never been so far.” By his own admission, the peace camp in Israel is dwindling, and the electorate has shifted farther right. Against this backdrop, and under the direction of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli government expanded its West Bank settlements, doggedly avoided negotiations, and largely ignored the Palestinian question. The sincerity of Israel’s commitment to a two state solution is doubtful at best. Shaath, for one, believes that it is impossible to earnestly support a two-state solution while expanding settlements and threatening annexation. In brief, neither side feels confident that the other is a true partner for peace.
According to Cofman Wittes, the collapse of the Oslo Process is at least partially responsible for this phenomenon. Oslo’s gradualism, intended to bolster prospects for coexistence, actually undermined them. Over time, Palestinians grew suspicious and began to wonder whether gradualism was simply an excuse for Israeli inaction.
In the post-Oslo and Camp David world, Cofman Wittes believes that the United States must drastically alter its approach to mediation. Rather than force policies and summits upon the Israelis and Palestinians, whom she believes are not prepared to negotiate, the US must re-enter the pre-negotiation phase. Only after the United States understands each side’s position, its goals and red lines, can it even attempt to resolve the conflict. It is also worth noting that Cofman Wittes and Shaath each recommended that future negotiations involve multiple regional and international stakeholders.
Cofman Wittes’ suggestions unlikely to change the current administration’s course, which seems intent on destroying the United States’ credibility as a mediator. To quote veteran American diplomat Aaron David Miller, “no one has ever lost money betting against success in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.”
To watch the event in full, click here.