Month: August 2020
Stevenson’s army, August 18
– Bipartisan report from Senate Intelligence Committee details [966 pages!] Russian interference in 2016 elections. Here’s the document.
– Daily Beast says Trump secretly promised to sell F35s to UAE as part of agreement with Israel. Congress voted to block such sales in May, but Trump vetoed.
-WOTR details lots of foreign fighters in Sub-Saharan Africa.
– DHS official after 2 years under Trump details politicization of DHS.
-Is this an election year? Trump rejects proposed cuts in DOD health care.
– Future of JCPOA: Politico has explainer. FP says Europeans can keep agreement alive unti November.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Déjà vu all over again
Miodrag Vlahovic* writes:
Campaigning for the August 30 parliamentary elections in Montenegro is entering its final stage. A déjà vu impression is inevitable. The main-stream political battle has remained in the same trenches from 1997 until this day. Political differences and distinctions have been defined along the same lines in both presidential or parliamentary elections. Even most local elections follow the same pattern and reflect the same issues.
Milo Djukanović won the presidency in 1997 on the basic question of whether Montenegro should follow Milosevic’s Serbia by any means and in any situation. Montenegro opted not to follow, by a tiny margin. That result had direct and decisive influence on the position of Montenegro as a country during the NATO 1999 intervention and afterwards.
This led to the peaceful and democratic referendum on independence in May 2006, as well as to Montenegrin accession to NATO in 2017. The opponents of this strategic orientation and political course remain the same: political parties and para-political structures commonly known as “pro-Serbian.” Their internal divisions and constellation have evolved from the late 1990s, and especially after their “grand defeat” in 2006, but the core content of their political agenda has been changed only slightly.
The pattern of their ideology is still the same: Montenegro should not be independent, or, at least, it should not exercise its independence in a way that conflicts with the positions and interests of Serbia and/or Russia. Montenegro’s membership in NATO should be abolished, not only because “the Alliance is dead” and “criminal” – but also because NATO remains the strongest Montenegrin bond with the Atlantic community and the best insurance against border and other Balkan-type changes.
Representatives of the opposition political block (now represented by two main “pillars” – Democratic Front and Democrats – together with one “auxiliary” smaller group – “URA” coalition) formally accept EU membership as an option, but it is very distant and unlikely for years to come. At the same time, they are reluctant to make any statement or action that would defend Montenegrin interests when opposed to those of Vučić’s Serbia or Putin’s Russia.
The same applies to the whole range of important issues concerning the origins, responsibilities, and consequences of the last Yugoslav war. The Srebrenica genocide is a non-issue for them: not “a genocide” at all. This pro-Serbian opposition regards Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo independence as “treason.” In the sphere of cultural and identity issues, they think Montenegro cannot have an identity and history outside “Serbdom” (“srpstvo”). That is at the bottom of all “pro-Serbian” political programs in Montenegro. Montenegrins, Muslims/Bosniaks, Albanians, and other citizens should comply and obey.
The new element is open involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the electoral campaign. Or, to be more precise: its dramatic and aggressive involvement. The Serbian church as an “umbrella organization” for the opposition. Not only do the leaders of Democratic Front publicly express their subordination and servitude to Serbian priests, but both Democrats (fully supporting the Serbian Church in the matter of the new Law of Religious and Freedom of Opinion) and URA (“non-interference” position; “the Law is controversial”) have also acknowledged the Serbian Church as their political leader and political partner. The latest expression of that mixture of “faith” and politics are the so-called “religion processions” organized in cars and boats, where Serbian and Serbian Church flags are the dominant insignia. Difficult to describe to those who have not seen that charade ever.
So, elections in Montenegro are déjà vu all over again, in Yogi Berra’s immortal phrase. Same runners, same result. An opposition not loyal to its own country makes this inevitable. It should not be so hard to understand, even if the country is hidden away in the Balkans.
*Montenegrin ambassador to the Holy See and a former foreign minister of Montenegro. The views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the official Montenegrin positions.
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Peace Picks | August 17 – August 21, 2020
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- A Conversation With Former US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton | August 17, 2020 | 12:00 – 12:45 PM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Please join the Atlantic Council on Monday, August 17, 2020, from 12 p.m. to 12:45 p.m. EDT for a conversation featuring former US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Secretary Clinton’s experience from the Department of State, Senate, and the campaign trail makes her ideally suited to ponder the top foreign policy priorities in the next four years for the next presidential administration. The discussion will focus on America’s role in the world in the new decade and the future of US leadership, at an inflection point in history.
This special edition of the #ACFrontPage event series, launches the Atlantic Council’s Elections 2020: America’s Role in the World, a series of conversations on the top foreign policy priorities for the next four years, featuring the most prominent voices shaping the national dialogue. From the Conventions to the Elections, the series will explore key questions concerning America’s role and interests in the world, bringing a foreign policy perspective to the conversation and addressing the most critical issues at the intersection between the domestic and international spheres.
Speakers:
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton: Former Secretary of State, United States of America
Fredrick Kempe: President & CEO, Atlantic Council - Afghanistan’s Future: Regional Perspectives on the Road Ahead | August 18, 2020 | 8:30 – 10:00 AM EST | Stimson Center | Register Here
Future outcomes in Afghanistan will be shaped for years to come by two key milestones: the withdrawal of U.S. troops and negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban representatives. In this virtual panel discussion, contributors to a recent series on the future of Afghanistan in South Asian Voices, Stimson’s online magazine, will come together to share perspectives from across the region and explore how Afghanistan, the United States, Pakistan, India, and Iran might respond to a range of future scenarios.
Speakers:
Bismellah Alizada: Co-Founder, Rahila Foundation; Deputy Director, Organization for Policy Research & Development Studies (DROPS)
Fizza Batool: Doctoral Candidate, International Relations, University of Karachi
Neha Dwivedi: Research Analyst, Janes
Jumakhan Rahyab: Fulbright Graduate Fellow, University of Massachusetts
Saurav Sarkar: Research Associate, Center for Air Power Studies (New Delhi); South Asian Voices Visiting Fellow, Stimson Center
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Senior Fellow & Deputy Director of the South Asia Program, Stimson Center - Has Belarus Reached a Point of No Return? | August 18, 2020 | 11:00 – 11:45 AM EST | Center for Strategic & International Studies | Register Here
Following a stolen election which allowed 26-year strongman ruler Alexander Lukashenko to claim a landslide victory, tens of thousands of Belarusians have taken to the streets across more than 30 towns and cities to demand his resignation and new elections. Met with shocking brutality, armed police and interior ministry troops have been deployed by the thousands, indiscriminately attacking protestors and journalists with live and rubber bullets as well as flash grenades. Despite the violence, massive protests have continued into the week even as authorities disabled internet connections in the evenings and, as of August 12, detained more than 6,000 protestors.
The situation remains dynamic. Opposition challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya has fled to neighboring Lithuania under duress after conceding defeat in what appeared to be a forced televised address. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin, one of the first leaders to congratulate Lukashenko for his victory, hinted in his message that Moscow’s support for the embattled president may be contingent on Belarus’ further integration with Russia. The United States and European Union have condemned the crackdown, and EU foreign ministers are set to meet on August 14 to discuss targeted sanctions.
Has Belarus passed the point of no return where Lukashenko’s leadership is no longer tenable? Can the opposition movement inside the country continue without a leader? How might Russia respond in the event of an escalation in protests and Lukashenko’s departure? What are the implications for European security? How should the United States and European Union respond to these developments?
Speakers:
Valery Tsepkalo: Former Ambassador to the United States, Belarus; Candidate for President (2020), Belarus
Vladislav Inozemtsev: Non-Resident Senior Associate, CSIS
Heather A. Conley: Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, & the Arctic, CSIS - The Status of the Fight Against ISIS | August 18, 2020 | 12:00 PM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
ISIS has lost its territory in Syria and is no longer able to conduct large-scale internal or external attacks. Nonetheless, the organization has been able to regroup, continues to generate funds through its illicit activities, and has resumed low-level operations.
The United States and its partners must solidify gains against ISIS, particularly as the possibility looms of a further drawdown of US troops in Syria. Active combat against the group is winding down. It is now necessary to prevent a future ISIS resurgence by finding ways to keep up the pressure while also tackling the root causes of the wider unrest. What challenges remain for US and European policymakers in order to eliminate an ISIS revival? What support is still needed for local partners and communities to ensure they are not at risk from ISIS again?
Speakers:
Jomana Qaddour (Moderator): Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
Jasmine El-Gamal: Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Atlantic Council
Christopher Maier: Director, Defeat ISIS Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense
Robert Rhode: Ambassador for Negotiations on Syria & Head of Division for Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, & Anti-ISIS Strategy, German Federal Foreign Office - How the United States Can Use Force Short of War | August 19, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM EST | Brookings Institution | Register Here
In their new book “Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy,” co-authors and Stimson Center experts Barry Blechman, James Siebens, and Melanie Sisson argue that during the Cold War, U.S. efforts to coerce other states using non-violent methods short of war failed as often as they succeeded. But unlike the Soviet Union, whose economy was stagnant and technology behind the West, in the coming years, the United States must contend with far more capable competitor powers. The book generates insight into how the U.S. military can be used to achieve policy goals. Specifically, it provides guidance about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, U.S. armed forces can work in concert with economic and diplomatic elements of U.S. power to create effective coercive strategies.
Speakers:
Michael E. O’Hanlon (Moderator): Director of Research, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution
Barry Blechman: Distinguished Fellow, Stimson Center
Melanie Sisson: Non-Resident Fellow, Stimson Center - The Kashmir Conflict: A Year of Tumult | August 20, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:00 AM EST | Stimson Center | Register Here
Join USIP and the Stimson Center for a conversation, featuring Stimson South Asia Program Director Sameer Lalwani, focused on the tensions between India and Pakistan and prospects for resolving the bilateral dispute, as well as the domestic Kashmiri resistance and both the violent and non-violent movements within Kashmir that may challenge Indian attempts to reshape Kashmir’s status.
Speakers:
Happymon Jacob: Associate Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Sameer Lalwani: Director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center
Tamanna Salikuddin: Director, South Asia Program, U.S. Institute of Peace - Protest Movements & Refugee Inclusion in Civil Society | August 21, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM EST | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Protests in Iraq and Lebanon have drawn global attention as protestors advocate for political and economic reform and an end to corruption, especially in the wake of the Beirut blast and Lebanon’s disaster response. These countries also face economic crisis and socio-political challenges relating to the millions of refugees and IDPs within their borders and the lack of sustainable policies to address displaced people’s needs. In Lebanon and Iraq, refugees and IDPs face discrimination and lack of access to educational and public health resources in addition to the widespread economic pain and disenfranchisement that these countries protest movements aim to confront.
How have refugees in these countries been active in or left out of these movements? How can access gaps and discrimination be overcome to integrate refugee rights into these protest movements? How do protest movements reflect a desire to integrate refugees and IDPs into the social fabric of these countries?
Speakers:
Joyce Karam (Moderator): Washington Correspondent, The National
Sawsan Abdulrahmin: Associate Professor of Public Health, American University of Beirut
Noof Assi: Women’s Protection & Empowerment Coordinator, Emergency Response Team, International Rescue Committee; Co-Founder, IQ Peace
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Stevenson’s army, August 17
– Speaker Pelosi is calling the House back from recess to vote to “save the Postal Service.” This is mostly for show, of course, because the House has already passed, in May, the HEROES Act, with $25 Billion more for USPS. The Senate has never taken up the House bill.
– SecDef Esper ordered DOD planners to cut $2.2 billion in defense health care costs.
– Joint Doctrine planners envision a future battlefield with no lines on the map.
– Planned trade review talks with China were cancelled.
– Putin is ready to help Belarus.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Serbia’s turn East
The indicators are multiple:
- A financial crackdown on civil society and media organizations, not including the nationalist ones
- Control over conventional print and electronic media as well as abusive use of social media
- Purchase of major military equipment from Moscow and China
- Signature of a free trade agreement with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and refusal to align with EU Ukraine-related sanctions on Moscow
- Courting of Chinese investment and inordinate praise for Beijing’s help in response to coronavirus
- Refusal to prosecute known war criminals
- Failure to make substantial progress on independence of the judiciary
- Growing capture of the state for purposes of grand corruption
Aleksandar Vucic, one-time Information Minister to Slobodan Milosevic and now in his second term as President of Serbia, was always an unlikely vehicle of democratization and Europeanization. But some of us (that means me too) thought it possible he would do the right thing, if only because nothing else really makes sense and his credibility with Serbia’s nationalists was high. Serbia’s road to prosperity and security, we thought, lies in Brussels, not Moscow. Nixon to China and all that.
We had it wrong. Prosperity and security are not Vucic’s real concerns. His own hold on power is. Vucic has been centralizing power, aided by an inept and divided political opposition. Like his Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, he is far more comfortable with the Russian and Chinese autocracies than with Washington and Brussels. He has undermined independent media and slow-rolled judicial reform. Separation of powers is a joke–Vucic holds all of them. He allies himself with the Belgrade Church and its right-wing supporters. He has become palsy with Milorad Dodik, despite his understandable distaste for Dodik’s ambition to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, since that would put Serbia in a dicey situation.
Vucic is no longer “sitting on two stools.” It is amusing to see that some people imagine that they can still convince him to opt for the West. He has chosen the East, but we are not in the midst of the Cold War. The Balkans is no longer a major arena for great power competition. It barely rates as a minor one. Tito’s nonaligned fence-sitting served Western purposes. There is no fence now. The EU and the US shouldn’t care if Vucic goes East, and we shouldn’t try to buy him off. We need to be patient for the day when there is a Serbian leader who truly believes in liberal democracy and is prepared to sacrifice to take his country in that direction.
What does this mean for Kosovo? It means patience. Prime Minister Hoti is in no position to make territorial or other major concessions, as he faces real opposition in parliament. At least some Serbs are drifting in the right direction. Vucic, given his strong political position inside Serbia, could recognize Kosovo now with little impact on his re-election prospects in 2022. But if he doesn’t I can hope someone will emerge to challenge him precisely on this point: do you want a friendly southern neighbor, or a hostile one? Do you want Serbs to be safe in Kosovo or in danger? Do you want to qualify for EU membership faster or slower?
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Stevenson’s army, August 15
– Slate lists ten scary scenarios that might disrupt the elections.
– Now that GAO has ruled that top officials at DHS were illegally appointed, Lawfare explains the situation.
– NYT says China is tamping down nationalist fervor.
– Pompeo signs deal moving US troops to Poland.
– US lost Iran vote in UNSC.
– CNAS has collection of reports on export controls
– CFR has materials on Kamala Harris foreign policy views.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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