No closer to full normalization

Drilon S. Gashi* writes:

US-led, high stakes Kosovo-Serbia peace talks culminated Friday in an “economic normalization” deal signed at the White House. I had recommended that early, politically contentious discussions be replaced by a bilateral trade deal, but this agreement is less about trade and more about economic infrastructure, with notable extras. It is unclear whether it is binding, or will be implemented, which likely depends on President Trump’s re-election.

Nonetheless, Kosovo should follow through on the good, mitigate the bad, and better articulate its interests going forward—achieving Serbia’s recognition and tangible international subjectivity. Serbia would benefit from strategically aligning with the US and fully normalizing ties with Kosovo.

Political Adversaries

Kosovo and Serbia are political adversaries with important outstanding disagreements. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and actively undermines it. Kosovo retaliated in the past by levying tariffs on Serbian goods. The sides have different interpretations of the 1999 Kosovo war and real reconciliation is lacking. Serbia does not accept that it led a state-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo.

The sides began peace talks in 2011 under EU auspices, agreeing on many small deals but implementing few of them. Creative ambiguity allowed each to claim that the deals were in its interest—treating Kosovo as a state according to Pristina, and strengthening Serbia’s presence in Kosovo according to Belgrade. But without implementation the talks risked becoming never-ending.

Serbia and especially Kosovo welcomed renewed White House interest in a Balkan peace deal. A jolt of energy and new ideas was needed. Yet the heightened interest yielded little in new modalities for full bilateral normalization. Serbia did not budge from earlier negotiation positions. Kosovo elected new political leadership, but it quickly returned to a more traditional governing coalition.

The parties agreed on 16 points, organized around the below four main themes. 

Regional Cooperation

The parties agreed on:

• formalizing agreements on road, rail, and airline networks;
• Kosovo joining a “mini-Schengen” (border-free) zone with Serbia; Albania, and North Macedonia;
• recognizing each others diplomas and professional certificates; and
• opening and operationalizing an important border crossing.

Joint infrastructure projects between neighbors pursuing EU membership is commonsense. Kosovo should, however, consider whether this will enable it to expand its export markets in Serbia or elsewhere, or just increase imports from Serbia. The mini-Schengen idea was previously rejected by all Kosovo leaders, so it was a concession to accept it here. A much-needed reduction of bilateral non-tariff trade barriers was not agreed. Kosovo needs to guard against becoming more economically dependent on Serbia, which has undermined Kosovo sovereignty in energy, telecommunications, and other sectors.

• Cross-border issues

A contentious point states US government entities will work with the parties “on a feasibility study for the purposes of sharing Ujman/Gazivoda Lake, as a reliable water and energy supply.” Nearly 80 percent of the lake is in Kosovo and 20 percent in Serbia. Kosovo should not allow Serbia to meddle in its resource management. They agreed also to diversify energy sources, which may mean importing US gas, which is particularly interesting for Kosovo.

The deal touches on enhancing religious tolerance and calls for “implementing judicial decisions on the Serbian Orthodox Church.” It commits the sides to make progress on identifying the remains of missing persons, although it does not call out Serbia as the major perpetrator of war crimes, leading to nearly 2,000 missing persons from Kosovo.

• Foreign policy

Another controversial point places a 1-year moratorium on Kosovo applying to join international organizations. This was equated with Serbia halting its Kosovo de-recognition campaign, with both states and international organizations, for a year. Kosovo was strong-armed into agreeing to drop tariffs before this negotiation, although the earlier parallel was Kosovo tariffs on Serbian goods with Serbia’s de-recognition campaign. As an independent country seeking global recognition, Kosovo should not have to desist any attempts at achieving greater internal subjectivity.

Kosovo received the consolation of Israel’s diplomatic recognition, and also recognized Israel. This was the firmest outcome of the deal, and is symbolically important for Kosovo, Israel, and the US.

• Endorsing US foreign policy

Kosovo and Serbia agreed to support several items of US concern. This included:

• prohibiting 5G from untrusted vendors (a reference to Huawei);
• adopting strict US screening and information systems for airline passengers;
• encouraging decriminalization of homosexuality in the 69 countries that criminalize it; and
• designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

These are administration policy priorities and personal initiatives of Special Envoy Grenell. These and as well as Serbia and Kosovo locating their respective embassies to Israel in Jerusalem are US wins.

Full Normalization Still Needed

This deal is a lost opportunity for Kosovo, which needs a breakthrough on Serbian recognition and steps towards unlocking NATO and UN membership. Serbia made strides towards rapprochement with the US, achieving US infrastructure and energy assistance, and alignment with US foreign policy.

Serbia may continue to use Kosovo-Serbia normalization to normalize its US relations, and re-balance its partnerships with China and Russia. Kosovo needs to assure it gets real progress on recognition. It should also further diversify its international support base and not be overly reliant on one ally. Much of this deal may not stick.

Although it contains aspects that both parties may benefit from, Kosovo and Serbia still need to achieve full normalization. This deal does not get them close.

*Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.