Month: September 2020
Landslide is the only solution
Bob Woodward’s confirmation that President Trump lied about the seriousness of Covid19 is no surprise. Anyone with a functioning brain knows that by now. But getting the admission on tape, along with the fact that the source of some of the information on contagiousness of the virus was Chinese President Xi, was a journalistic coup. It would have been even more so had Woodward published it earlier, but he claims he wanted to save it for his book because that afforded him the longer form to provide fuller context. It also of course helps him market his product.
In a rational world, Woodward’s revelation would end Trump’s ability to market himself. His “playing down” the virus cost more something like 150,000 lives, so far. Shutdowns, masks and social distancing earlier and more consistently would have saved about that many. People are still dying as a result of Trump’s neglect of the most important Presidential responsibility: to protect Americans. This appalling dereliction of duty has had real world consequences.
It is hard for me to imagine how anyone could vote for a President who did such a thing. His achievements are easy to list: appointing supposedly conservative but too often unqualified judges, a massive tax cut for the rich, and validation of white nationalism as a political force in the United States. His failures, in addition to his mendacious response to Covid19, take longer:
- Inability to cope with social justice protests in a productive way and encouragement of violence and threats of violence against peaceful protesters.
- A collapsed economy that even before the epidemic was growing no faster than in President Obama’s last three years.
- A ballooning budget deficit, again even before the epidemic hit.
- Unfounded attacks on the right to vote.
- Repeated efforts to deprive millions of Americans of the health insurance they obtained from Obamacare, without providing an alternative.
- Failure in the trade war with China, which has cost the US government many billions in agricultural and other subsidies to offset the export losses due to tariffs.
- Accelerated Iranian progress towards nuclear weapons, entirely due to Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the nuclear deal.
- North Korean refusal to give up their nuclear weapons, despite offers of massive economic assistance.
- Consolidation of President Maduro’s power in Venezuela.
Trump wants you to think that withdrawal of a few thousand troops from Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Israel/UAE deal were big achievements. Far from it: the US still has more troops in the greater Middle East than before he took office. The UAE/Israel deal only contributes to peace between two countries who have never been at war and have precious little reason to fight. It makes an Israel/Palestine deal more difficult, not less.
Even before the latest headlines, Jeffrey Goldberg had assembled the evidence of Trump’s disdain for the American military. That, too, was well-known to anyone paying attention to Trump’s mythical bonespurs and his public denunciation of John McCain, but the things Trump has said in private about the troops being “losers” and “suckers” compounded what some might have hoped to dismiss as misdemeanors into felonies. Polling of America’s troops suggests that they will be voting against a Republican for the first time in a long while.
The right thing for Trump to do now is resign and allow Pence to take over, hoping that would improve Republican prospects in the November 3 election. He could then re-assume the office and would be hard to fault for doing so, as the voice of the people would have been heard. He won’t do that, because he can’t afford to lose this election or even leave office for a few months. Both his finances and his freedom are at risk, because the Russians won’t continue anteing up and state Attorneys General will be indicting him on felony charges. So instead he will stay on the ballot and try to de-legitimize the election results, especially if they show him winning on election night but losing due to mail-in ballots a couple of days later.
The only way of preventing that is a landslide in favor of Biden, starting on election night. Even then, Trump may try to prevent Biden from getting a majority in the Electoral College by convincing Republican governors to withhold communication of their electoral votes. But a clear and unequivocal electoral vote victory, in addition to Biden’s all but certain popular vote margin, would do a great deal to save America from a chaotic outcome.
Stevenson’s army, September 10
The former head of DHS intelligence says he was pressured to withhold reports on Russia and white supremacy to avoid embarrassing the president. Here’s the formal complaint.
Peter Feaver of Duke warns the US military to retreat from the election battles. Here’s what the new Woodward book says about Trump and national security officials.
NYT on US troop cuts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What’s going on in the eastern Mediterranean?
Vox writer gives US sanctions policy a failing grade.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
IDPs protest in Iraq, but refugees not so much in Lebanon
Both Lebanon and Iraq are experiencing nationwide popular protests. Protesters are calling for an end to government corruption, greater economic opportunity, and more reliable public services. On August 21, 2020, the Middle East Institute convened a panel to discuss the role that refugees and displaced people play in political organizing in each country. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below.
Joyce Karam (Moderator): Washington Correspondent, The National
Sawsan Abdulrahmin: Associate Professor of Public Health, American University of Beirut
Noof Assi: Women’s Protection & Empowerment Coordinator, Emergency Response Team, International Rescue Committee; Co-Founder, IQ Peace
Background & Context
Lebanon and Iraq are both home to refugees, migrants, and/or displaced peoples. But the composition of each state’s domestic public is different.
Lebanon is home to approximately 1.7 million refugees. It hosts the greatest number of Syrian refugees per capita in the entire world, with 1.5 million. The remaining refugees are Palestinian and inhabit Lebanon’s southern region.
Iraq, by comparison, is home to few refugees, who reside in Iraqi Kurdistan. But one-third of all Iraqis, approximately 1.4 million people, are internally displaced. The majority of Iraq’s IDPs were displaced as a result of the Islamic State’s territorial campaigns. For the most part, IDPs live in camps in central and southern Iraq.
Political Organizing in Lebanon
For much of the last year, Lebanon’s economy has been in shambles. These issues pervade Lebanese society, affecting the middle class, the working class, and refugees as well. In response to the bleak economic situation and decades of government mismanagement, a protest movement emerged. Though refugees were adversely affected by the crisis, they played a minor role, if any, in the protest movement. Much of the protestors’ rhetoric was nationalistic. Only a minority of protestors had any interest in refugee rights.
On August 4, 2020, approximately 3,000 tons of ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port. The explosion devastated the city, and compounding the ongoing crisis. It rendered 300,000 people homeless and killed more than 200 people. The explosion’s effect was multinational and cross-class.
Immediately following the explosion, the Lebanese authorities published a list with the names of the individuals killed or rendered missing as a result of the blast. The list, however, was incomplete. It excluded the names of refugees and migrant workers. Approximately 40 Syrian refugees, 4 Bangladeshi migrant workers, and 2 Palestinian refugees were either killed or rendered missing as a result of the Beirut Port explosion.
Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. The media has begun to tell the stories of the refugees and migrant workers injured in the blast. Funds have been raised for Syrian refugees whose injuries required major surgery. Some television programs even recognized the Palestinian Civil Defense for its involvement in rescue operations.
Refugees did not have a major presence at the protests which followed the explosion.
Political Organizing in Iraq
Iraq is no stranger to political protests. That said, the October 2019 protest movement is unique. It is led by Iraq’s youth and does not have one single leader. The protesters are asking for the fulfillment of their basic needs. They have faced live ammunition, though they have been entirely nonviolent. Some participants have been kidnapped and even assassinated. Approximately 700 protesters have been killed, and another 25,000 have been injured. They refuse to be intimidated, however. According to Noof Assi, they have nothing to live for and, thus, nothing to lose.
Displaced peoples have had a major presence at the protests. Indeed, issues related to displacement played a role in the onset of the protests. The government has failed to make former ISIS territory inhabitable but has also evicted thousands of people from IDP camps. Many of Iraq’s 1.4 million displaced peoples have nowhere to return to and are reliant on aid from NGOs. They were compelled to act.
To watch the event in full, please click here.
Stevenson’s army, September 9
When I see a think tank or commission report that suggests better ways to make national security policy, I’m eager to share the ideas even if I’m skeptical of some of them. I spent 3 years working on the Project on National Security Reform, which produced an 800-page study with good ideas, only a few of which actually were put into place. I assign my spring course the excellent Process Makes Perfect report by Kori Schake and William Wechsler. And so when I saw the Less Art, More Science report by a group called FP21, I downloaded it for me and for you.
Since no authors were listed, I was curious and discovered FP21 is an offshoot of National Security Action, an organization of mostly careerist and Democratic appointees, many of whom I know and admire. The trouble with the Less Art, More Science report, however, is that it presumes that with more data and more strategic thinking, we will make better policy. I’m all for that approach, but I know from years of study that most big problems are too hard. The goals are multiple and priorities change and conflict [Strengthen the government but avoid corruption; build up the army and guarantee civilian control; punish human rights violators but don’t undermine US companies and their trade]. The report even had a template for policy memos that is sensible but could easily become a rigid checklist. Anyway, read it for the good parts.
Sen. Ben Sasse [R-Neb] has his own list of congressional reforms.
New America has report on “brain drain” of congressional staff.
FT says China is offering the Taliban roads for peace.
Australian insurgency expert says US is on brink of “incipient insurgency.”
Politico says USAID is shutting down its coronavirus task force; reasons unclear.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
A big hole in the IRGC
On January 3, 2020, a United States drone strike killed Major General Qassem Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. Soleimani was arguably Iran’s most powerful military leader, and his death marked a critical juncture in US-Iran relations. On August 6, the Middle East Institute convened a panel to discuss the impact of Soleimani’s death on the Islamic Republic. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below.
Alex Vatanka (Moderator): Director, Iran Program, Middle East Institute
Tarek Osman: Author & Broadcaster
Ariane Tabatabai: Middle East Fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund of the United States
Morad Vaisibiame: Journalist & Editor, Radio Farda, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Immediate Aftermath
Soleimani, like Iran itself, was received differently across the Middle East. Some revered him, some feared him, and others thought of him infrequently, if at all. His assassination, however, caught the attention of the entire region, and most people worried that US-Iran conflict was imminent.
Some days later, it became clear that violent conflict was unlikely. Iran’s response was relatively small in scale, and the US did nothing to further escalate tensions. To many, Tarek Osman included, this confirmed that the success that Iran had experienced over the last decade, epitomized by improved relations with parts of the Arab world, was over. Iran lacked the will or the means to retaliate proportionately for Soleimani’s assassination.
Long-Term Changes
In spite of its apparent weakness, Iran regularly confronts the United States, albeit in a less-than-noteworthy manner. Iran targets US forces and personnel on a weekly basis. Though these skirmishes rarely make the news, they are playing out in the Arab world, Iraq especially.
In Soleimani’s absence, the core of Iran’s national security strategy remains unchanged: the Islamic Republic wishes to preserve its influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. It achieves its objectives by working with co-sectarian forces, including the Shi’a in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen. Tabatabai posits that this will continue to serve as Iran’s modus operandi, as it is both inexpensive and fairly effective.
Observers who predicted the fall of the regime overestimated the role of individuals like Soleimani in the decision-making process, argues Tabatabai. Soleimani was an influential figure but ultimately not essential to the regime’s survival. When he died, the institutions to which he belonged simply found new leaders.
Morad Vaisibiame contends that, though the leadership structure is the same, the dynamic is markedly different. Qassem Soleimani was well-known, highly regarded, and thus quite influential; he was able to impact both domestic and foreign policy. His replacement, Ismail Ghani, is not as widely respected. Under his tenure, the Quds Force no longer has a particularly “special” relationship with the Supreme Leader. Ghani commands less respect from the other Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, as well as from his own subordinates. He also holds less influence over the commanders of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansar Allah in Yemen. In this sense, Qassem Soleimani’s absence is deeply felt.
To watch the event in full, please click here.
Peace Picks | September 8 – 11, 2020
- Election 2020: Challenges & Opportunities for U.S. Policy in the Middle East | September 8, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM EDT | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East is going through one of the most unstable periods in its recent history. Each country in the region faces its own unique challenges, but there are also cross-cutting issues ranging from proxy conflict and terrorism to climate change and water security that permeates throughout the region. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to launch Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East. The briefs in this book offer policy insights from MEI scholars on key issues in the Middle East and serve as a contribution to the broader discussion about the challenges and opportunities for US policy in the region.
What are the key issues the next administration must prioritize? In what ways can the US pursue and achieve its policy goals in the Middle East through diplomacy, conflict resolution, and military engagement? How can a concerted regional strategy address region-wide issues and their global impacts?
Speakers:
Amb. Gerald Feierstein (Moderator): Senior Vice President, Middle East Institute
Paul Salem: President, Middle East Institute
Randa Slim: Senior Fellow & Director, Conflict Resolution & Track II Dialogues Program, Middle East Institute
Gen. Joseph Votel: Distinguished Senior Fellow on National Security, Middle East Institute - U.S. Policy in the Middle East: A Conversation With Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker | September 9, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:15 AM EDT | Brookings Institution | Register Here
The United States has been very active diplomatically in the Middle East as of late, despite public focus elsewhere, on issues ranging from the crisis in Lebanon, to maritime tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, to U.A.E.-Israeli normalization of relations.
On September 9, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion with David Schenker, assistant secretary of Near Eastern affairs at the U.S. Department of State to examine the current state of U.S policy and diplomacy in the region and its future trajectory. Assistant Secretary Schenker will be returning from a mission to the region, which includes stops in Kuwait, Qatar, and Lebanon and will offer thoughts on his recent meetings. Natan Sachs, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, will moderate the conversation.
Speakers:
Suzanne Maloney (Introduction): Vice President & Director, Foreign Policy, Brookings
David Schenker: Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Natan Sachs: Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings - Rising Political Polarization in Southeast Asia | September 9, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:30 AM CEST | Carnegie Endowment | Register Here
Rising levels of political polarization are hurting democracy in many Southeast Asian countries. Drawing on a recent Carnegie Endowment report on the topic, this event will examine three critical cases—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—to gain a regional understanding of why polarization is increasing, its political effects, and how political and civic actors can take steps to address it.
This event is being held in collaboration with the Institute of Asian Studies.
Speakers:
Thomas Carothers: Senior Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment
Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: Associate Fellow, German Institute for Global & Area Studies
Naruemon Thabchumpon: Deputy Director for Research Affairs, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University
Eve Warburton: Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Asia Research Institute, National Research University of Singapore
Bridget Welsh: Honorary Research Associate, Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham Malaysia - A New Direction for U.S. Policy on North Korea | September 9, 2020 | 5:00 – 6:30 PM EDT | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register Here
Since the February 2019 Hanoi Summit failed to reach an agreement, the United States and North Korea have been mired in a diplomatic stalemate with minimal negotiations. At the same time, Pyongyang has continued to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs while reversing many of the inter-Korean tension reduction measures achieved in 2018. The next U.S. administration, whether Republican or Democratic, will have the opportunity to break this deadlock with a North Korean regime that is increasingly confident in its nuclear capabilities but still insecure about its longevity.
The next U.S. administration will encounter a North Korean regime that has promised to demonstrate a “new strategic weapon” in its nuclear weapons program and vowed to withstand the international sanctions campaign. The policy approach taken by the next administration will help determine whether Pyongyang will cling to its nuclear weapons or if the two countries will set a new course for building peace and reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Speakers:
Frank Aum (Moderator): Senior Expert, North Korea, U.S. Institute of Peace
Christine Ahn: Founder & Executive Director, Women Cross DMZ; Co-Founder, Korea Peace Network
Suzanne Dimaggio: Chair, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment
Markus Garlauskas: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Former National Intelligence Officer for North Korea, Office of the Director for National Intelligence
Van Jackson: Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington; Former Senior Defense Strategist, U.S. Department of Defense
Ankit Panda: Stanton Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment - Ecological Threats to Peace | September 10, 2020 | 1:00 – 2:00 PM EDT | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register Here
Global warming, extreme weather events, and rising sea levels are already adversely affecting food and water security throughout the world—leaving the least resilient countries with an increased risk of political instability, social fragmentation, and economic collapse. A more accurate measurement of levels of exposure to tomorrow’s ecological threats is key to helping these countries maintain peace today and can enable others to better prepare and adapt for the future.
The new Ecological Threat Register (ETR), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, synthesizes and visualizes data on environmental indicators to estimate which countries, regions, and areas are most vulnerable to environment-induced conflict. In particular, the ETR underscores that 141 countries are vulnerable to ecological threats, and that approximately 1.2 billion people could be displaced globally by ecological disasters in the next 30 years.
Speakers:
Tyler Beckelman (Moderator): Director, International Partnerships, U.S. Institute of Peace
Sagal Abshir: Nonresident Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
Michael Collins: Executive Director, Institute for Economics & Peace
Dr. Joseph Hewitt: Vice President for Policy, Learning, & Strategy, U.S. Institute of Peace - Jihadism at a Crossroads | September 11, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:00 PM EDT | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Almost 20 years after 9/11, jihadi groups are no longer in the spotlight. However, ISIS, al-Qaida, and al-Shabab remain active, and new groups have emerged. The movement as a whole is evolving, as is the threat it poses.
On September 11, the Center for Middle East Policy will host a virtual panel event to discuss the current status of jihadi groups. The panel will feature Thomas Hegghammer, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment and author of the new book, “The Caravan: Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad.”Other panelists will include Tricia Bacon, assistant professor at American University, and Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Brookings Senior Fellow Daniel Byman will moderate the discussion.
Speakers:
Daniel L Byman: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings
Tricia Bacon: Professional Lecturer, School of Public Affairs, American University
Thomas Hegghammer: Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
Bruce Riedel: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings