Month: September 2020
Civil resistance requires stamina
In June, U.S. Institute of Peace Program Officer Jonathan Pinckney published From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Traditions. The book centers upon political transitions brought about by civil resistance, and attempts to explain why certain resistance movements result in democratization while others do not. To review the book’s core assertions, as well as gauge its applicability to ongoing resistance movements, the US Institute of Peace convened a panel of the following:
Maria Stephan (Moderator): Director, Nonviolent Action, US Institute of Peace
Erica Chenoweth: Berthold Beitz Professor in Human Rights & International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Zachariah Mampilly: Marxe Chair of International Affairs, City University of New York
Hardy Merriman: President & CEO, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
Jonathan Pinckney: Program Officer, Nonviolent Action, US Institute of Peace
Huda Shafig: Program Director, Karama
Civil Resistance in Writing
Since World War II, there have been more than 300 political transitions. Of these transitions, 78 were brought about by civil resistance. Pinckney’s book examined all of the aforementioned transitions, albeit some in greater detail than others. Pinckney studied three cases closely: Brazil in 1984, Zambia in 1991 and Nepal in 2006.
He found that political transitions initiated through civil resistance were three times more likely to result in democratization than other types of political transitions. Nevertheless, civil resistance transitions were not certain to result in democratization. He identified two key challenges to the onset of democracy: mobilization and maximalism.
Pinckney stressed the importance of maintaining mobilization, as successful resistance movements require targeted and consistent activism. He also cautioned would-be protestors against adopting an all-or-nothing attitude. Instead, Pinckney advocated for moderation and dialogue. Civil resistance is the most direct road from authoritarianism to democracy, but its success is determined by how effectively a resistance movement mobilization is maintained and maximalism is avoided.
Civil Resistance in Theory
In recent years, the prevalence of civil resistance has increased dramatically. Its efficacy, however, has decreased. Chenoweth attributes this unfortunate shift to the manner in which resistance movements currently manifest. Contemporary resistance movements are intent on achieving quick results and consequently lack the ability to organize, engage in negotiations, and ultimately herald a political transformation. Digital organizing and street demonstrations are important but not at the expense of capacity-building, Chenoweth argues.
According to Merriman, movements can address this issue by setting clear expectations. The average civil resistance movement takes three years to conclude, and many resistance movements persist for far longer. The vast majority of participants, however, expect to see results in as little as 3-6 months time. When participants understand the scope of their commitment, Merriman asserts, they are better equipped not only to dismantle existing institutions but also to build new ones.
Civil Resistance in Practice
This is certainly the case in Sudan, where a popular resistance movement has been active for upwards of seven months and succeeded in effecting political change. Despite Sudan’s rich history of citizen protest, the protests were only able to trigger a political transition last year.
In Shafig’s eyes, the ongoing movement has been successful because it is unlike its predecessors. It began outside of Sudan’s capital, Khartoum; participants share a commitment to non-violence; the movement is well-coordinated, with common policy goals; and the movement’s de-centralized nature allows for local leaders to immerse themselves in the movement and tailor it to their respective needs.
In a nod to Pinckney’s book, Shafig also notes that Sudan’s resistance movement has maintained participant mobilization well. Participants engage in continuous activism via neighborhood-based resistance committees. These local committees engage in joint-planning talks with other committees across Sudan, ensuring that support for the transition is widespread. Perhaps Sudan can serve as a model for future civil resistance movements.
To watch the event in full, click here.
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Stevenson’s army, September 7
What better proof that the US is far from a socialist country than the fact that we celebrate labor day, honoring workers and unions, in September, while much of the rest of the world does it on May 1st. Since I like to remind you of the availability of CRS reports on many topics, see this on the evolution of federal holidays.
[There’s other good stuff there, such as these short reports on export control reforms and China and coup-related restrictions on US foreign aid.]
Rosa Brooks reports on the election wargames she helped run that warn of enormous public unrest.
WaPo notes that the new 117th Congress will have freshman members from the political extremes of both parties.
Legal analyst disagrees with DOD IG report saying border deployments did not violate Posse comitatus act.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No closer to full normalization
Drilon S. Gashi* writes:
US-led, high stakes Kosovo-Serbia peace talks culminated Friday in an “economic normalization” deal signed at the White House. I had recommended that early, politically contentious discussions be replaced by a bilateral trade deal, but this agreement is less about trade and more about economic infrastructure, with notable extras. It is unclear whether it is binding, or will be implemented, which likely depends on President Trump’s re-election.
Nonetheless, Kosovo should follow through on the good, mitigate the bad, and better articulate its interests going forward—achieving Serbia’s recognition and tangible international subjectivity. Serbia would benefit from strategically aligning with the US and fully normalizing ties with Kosovo.
Political Adversaries
Kosovo and Serbia are political adversaries with important outstanding disagreements. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and actively undermines it. Kosovo retaliated in the past by levying tariffs on Serbian goods. The sides have different interpretations of the 1999 Kosovo war and real reconciliation is lacking. Serbia does not accept that it led a state-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo.
The sides began peace talks in 2011 under EU auspices, agreeing on many small deals but implementing few of them. Creative ambiguity allowed each to claim that the deals were in its interest—treating Kosovo as a state according to Pristina, and strengthening Serbia’s presence in Kosovo according to Belgrade. But without implementation the talks risked becoming never-ending.
Serbia and especially Kosovo welcomed renewed White House interest in a Balkan peace deal. A jolt of energy and new ideas was needed. Yet the heightened interest yielded little in new modalities for full bilateral normalization. Serbia did not budge from earlier negotiation positions. Kosovo elected new political leadership, but it quickly returned to a more traditional governing coalition.
The parties agreed on 16 points, organized around the below four main themes.
Regional Cooperation
The parties agreed on:
- formalizing agreements on road, rail, and airline networks;
- Kosovo joining a “mini-Schengen” (border-free) zone with Serbia; Albania, and North Macedonia;
- recognizing each others diplomas and professional certificates; and
- opening and operationalizing an important border crossing.
Joint infrastructure projects between neighbors pursuing EU membership is commonsense. Kosovo should, however, consider whether this will enable it to expand its export markets in Serbia or elsewhere, or just increase imports from Serbia. The mini-Schengen idea was previously rejected by all Kosovo leaders, so it was a concession to accept it here. A much-needed reduction of bilateral non-tariff trade barriers was not agreed. Kosovo needs to guard against becoming more economically dependent on Serbia, which has undermined Kosovo sovereignty in energy, telecommunications, and other sectors.
- Cross-border issues
A contentious point states US government entities will work with the parties “on a feasibility study for the purposes of sharing Ujman/Gazivoda Lake, as a reliable water and energy supply.” Nearly 80 percent of the lake is in Kosovo and 20 percent in Serbia. Kosovo should not allow Serbia to meddle in its resource management. They agreed also to diversify energy sources, which may mean importing US gas, which is particularly interesting for Kosovo.
The deal touches on enhancing religious tolerance and calls for “implementing judicial decisions on the Serbian Orthodox Church.” It commits the sides to make progress on identifying the remains of missing persons, although it does not call out Serbia as the major perpetrator of war crimes, leading to nearly 2,000 missing persons from Kosovo.
- Foreign policy
Another controversial point places a 1-year moratorium on Kosovo applying to join international organizations. This was equated with Serbia halting its Kosovo de-recognition campaign, with both states and international organizations, for a year. Kosovo was strong-armed into agreeing to drop tariffs before this negotiation, although the earlier parallel was Kosovo tariffs on Serbian goods with Serbia’s de-recognition campaign. As an independent country seeking global recognition, Kosovo should not have to desist any attempts at achieving greater internal subjectivity.
Kosovo received the consolation of Israel’s diplomatic recognition, and also recognized Israel. This was the firmest outcome of the deal, and is symbolically important for Kosovo, Israel, and the US.
- Endorsing US foreign policy
Kosovo and Serbia agreed to support several items of US concern. This included:
- prohibiting 5G from untrusted vendors (a reference to Huawei);
- adopting strict US screening and information systems for airline passengers;
- encouraging decriminalization of homosexuality in the 69 countries that criminalize it; and
- designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
These are administration policy priorities and personal initiatives of Special Envoy Grenell. These and as well as Serbia and Kosovo locating their respective embassies to Israel in Jerusalem are US wins.
Full Normalization Still Needed
This deal is a lost opportunity for Kosovo, which needs a breakthrough on Serbian recognition and steps towards unlocking NATO and UN membership. Serbia made strides towards rapprochement with the US, achieving US infrastructure and energy assistance, and alignment with US foreign policy.
Serbia may continue to use Kosovo-Serbia normalization to normalize its US relations, and re-balance its partnerships with China and Russia. Kosovo needs to assure it gets real progress on recognition. It should also further diversify its international support base and not be overly reliant on one ally. Much of this deal may not stick.
Although it contains aspects that both parties may benefit from, Kosovo and Serbia still need to achieve full normalization. This deal does not get them close.
*Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.
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Trump disdains the US military
I’m just going to leave this here for a while:
I’ll leave this here as well, also from Fox News:
I think I’ll leave this here too, as he not only disdains the US but also its citizens:
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Failure in the Oval Office
Emil Kerenji@EmilKerenji· A joke currently making rounds in Serbia. What do a Serb and an Albanian say to each other when taking leave? Next year in Jerusalem!
That’s the best local commentary I’ve seen on yesterday’s non-normalization agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. But I’ve had some other local comments worth recording, along with my own reactions.
Kosovars are relieved that the agreement implies no ethnically-based exchange of territories. Even the suggestion to study joint management of Gazivoda, the lake that crosses the border/boundary with Serbia, has aroused a vigorous, sovereignty-based protest from former Prime Minister Haradinaj, an essential participant in Prime Minister Hoti’s governing coalition.
Everyone is noticing the lack of serious implementation mechanisms as well as the degree to which the agreement gives the Americans what they want. The most important of these goodies is the movement of the Serbian embassy to Jerusalem, a provision that appears to have taken President Vucic by surprise and displeased him:
Some in Serbia think the country has enough problems without sticking its nose into the Middle East. Others will criticize Vucic for caving to Jewish demands.
Prime Minister Hoti won some prestige over internal rivals from the last couple of days in Washington, but at a price. Kosovo has also committed to establishing its new embassy in Jerusalem, a move that some Kosovars think will make its relations with the Arab countries more difficult. Designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization could also be risky, as is the anti-Huawei G5 provision for relations with China, but more for Serbia than Kosovo.
Many Balkanites welcome what they view as the renewed commitment of the United States to the Balkans, but that is smoke and mirrors. There is really nothing in the agreement that suggests a stronger American commitment, and its failure to deal with the vital issue of Serbian recognition of Kosovo sovereignty and independence suggests the US did not use its full weight on the issue.
I asked two well-read and well-informed Americans this morning whether they had heard of the signing yesterday. They had not. The only thing that has attracted any (minimal) media attention here is Israel’s recognition of Kosovo and the commitment of Pristina to have its embassy in Jerusalem. I suppose there are some evangelicals out there who will take notice, but Grenell’s effort to boost the re-election campaign with a Balkans spectacular has failed.
Here is another good commentary on the President’s performance yesterday:
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Much ado about nothing
President Trump today claimed to have done what no one else has ever done before: negotiated an historic agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. He said: “this is a historic day. It took decades as there was no one to get it done.”
This is false. History is littered with agreements between Serbia and Kosovo, many of them unimplemented or only partially implemented. The more technical agreements culminated in the 2013 Brussels agreement on normalization, which among other things acknowledged that Serbia and Kosovo would qualify for and accede to the European Union separately, each at its own pace. That was an implicit recognition of Kosovo sovereignty, since only sovereign states can accede to the EU.
The agreement signed at the White House today is nowhere near as dramatic as that. It is basically an agreement to agree on a series of economic steps that some think will eventually lead to progress on the political front, with a few bells and whistles added for Trump glitter purposes. The economic steps are good ones, as far as they go. But they are unlikely to transform the relationship between Serbia and its one-time autonomous province, now an independent state recognized as such by about 100 other states but not a member of the United Nations.
If there is any big news in the announcement today, it is that Israel has agreed to recognize Kosovo, which must really gall President Vucic as Serbia has long cultivated its relationship with Israel. The other, modest, news is a mutual one-year moratorium: Kosovo agrees to suspend its effort to enter international organizations in exchange for Serbia agreeing to suspend its “de-recognition” campaign. That is renewal of an earlier agreement on a shorter timeline.
Serbian President Vucic explicitly rejected recognizing Kosovo during the talks at the White House. This move came when the Americans, who had repeatedly pledged to focus the White House meetings exclusively on economic issues, put in front of him a draft containing recognition language. He dismissed it out of hand and in public. I hope no one in the Administration expected anything different.
It may even have given Vucic some political room to agree on the economic issues, which are however a bit a yawn. The first part is just promises to implement existing transportation and border agreements. Then comes joining “mini-Schengen,” which is still more aspirational than actual, and mutual recognition of diplomas and professional certificates, which I believe has been agreed in the past but I’ll have to check. Then comes a non-agreement to work with the US Department of Energy for arrangements on Trepca and Gazivoda, again more aspirational than actual for now.
Switch channels to things Washington insisted on: blocking Huawei provision of 5G, tougher airport screening, and commitment to freedom of religion as well as implementation of judicial decisions on church property (which is a reference to a longstanding dispute over the quiet zone around Decani monastery in Kosovo). Plus decriminalization of homosexuality and treating all of Hizbollah as a terrorist group.
Along the way there is a pledge to work on missing people from the 1999 war and its aftermath, something that should have been done long ago and has been pledged many times. It is a human issue, not an economic one, but the more explicit language hopefully portends more implementation than in the past.
I am not seeing President Vucic’s signature on the document I picked up on Twitter from Agron Bajrami. I hope it is there. If not, this isn’t really an agreement but rather an unilateral pledge by Kosovo, which would make it an even less impressive achievement.
Even with the Serbian President’s signature, it’s okay, but a long way short of historic. One might even say much ado, about nothing.
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