Month: October 2020
The emerging tetrapolar mad world
Pantelis Ikonomou, former nuclear IAEA inspector, writes:
Nuclear weapons are a vital but latent dimension of the growing geopolitical competition. Nuclear capabilities continue to constitute a prime source of power in shaping global power relations amid dangerous non-nuclear conflicts and military confrontations. New power balances are forming.
The main emerging poles are two well-established ones, the United States and Russia, and two emerging ones, China and Europe (led by France as the EU’s last remaining nuclear power post-Brexit). The US and Russia have failed in efforts to engage China in new nuclear and ballistic missile agreements. France is trying to exercise leadership in Europe and the Mediterranean. French President Emmanuel Macron has offered to open a “strategic dialogue” with willing European states prepared to accept the central role of France. He pointed out that “Europe should reinforce its strategic autonomy in the face of growing global threats and stop relying solely on the United States and the Transtlantic Alliance for its defense”
Any excited system will sooner or later reach a state of equilibrium. A tetrapolar structure is emerging around the leading nuclear weapon states: the US, Russia, China and France. These four nuclear powers are flanked by others based on criteria of pragmatism and strategic necessity. The whole process is guided more by bilateral agreements than existing treaties and international institutions. The new tetrapolar world order appears as follows:
- Around the US superpower stand nuclear UK as well as Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and several European NATO states. The connecting force within this pole is American geopolitical primacy and its ambition to strategically control East and South Asia.
- Around Russia will stand India, several former Soviet states, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and sometimes Turkey and Egypt. This pole’s source of cohesion is nuclear deterrence against the Chinese threat, as well as geopolitical influence in the Middle East region.
- Around China are Pakistan, North Korea and the majority of the developing countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In this nuclear pole the predominant parameter is China’s nuclear deterrence of its US, Russian, and Indian adversaries as well as Chinese economic, military and political assistance.
- France would be flanked by several southern European, Middle East and African states (and occasionally by Israel). The prevailing link in this alliance, besides historical and cultural references, is strategic influence on the wider region and security against a rising adversary, Islamic extremism.
Once a stable equilibrium is achieved, this new tetrapolar nuclear world order might allow the leading nuclear powers to realize the vast global threat they pose to humankind through their bilateral standoffs. Nuclear disarmament as requested by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, Art. VI) and emphatically repeated by the international community in the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty of July 2017 should be a top priority. De-escalation of the current nuclear race and terminating weapons “modernization” ought to be the initial objectives of the world powers aiming eventually to complete and irreversible global nuclear disarmament.
The current nuclear threat to humanity arises from the suicidal so-called MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) nuclear strategy, It ought to be abolished. The threat of a nuclear apocalypse, whether by intent, accident, or miscalculation, will be at its highest level ever so long as MAD prevails in this tetrapolar world.
* This article draws on the author’s book “Global Nuclear Developments – Insights of a former IAEA nuclear inspector,” Springer, May 2020.
Peace Picks | October 5 – October 9, 2020
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
1. Oil, Arms, Drones, and Regional Tensions: The Second Berlin Conference on Libya and Crafting a New Interim Government | October 5, 2020 | 2:00 – 3:00 PM EDT | Middle East Institute | Register Here
With the War for Tripoli won in the late Spring by the defenders and a new mutually hurting stalemate taking hold around Jufra and Sirte over the course of the summer, the arena of Libya’s Wars of Post-Gaddafi Succession have shifted to cyberspace and the negotiating table. Amid a flurry of influence operations, attempts to manipulate media optics, and the Prime Minister pledging to go into retirement if a suitable successor is found, the last weeks of September witnessed a flurry of internationally-hosted mediation dialogues on Libya taking place in Morocco, Egypt, Geneva, and Russia. On October 5, a second virtual Berlin Conference is slated to tackle the interlocking issues of oil production, distribution of revenues, the arms embargo, mercenaries and the increasingly polarization among NATO allies with France and Greece on one side and Turkey on the other.
What are the possible trajectories of Libya’s conflict from here? What sort of entity might replace the GNA? What is the future of Libya’s economic system as new mechanisms for the distribution of oil revenues now being debated? How can international actors cooperate to prevent spoilers from scuppering progress?
Speakers:
Deborah Jones: Former US Ambassador to Libya
Wolfgang Pusztai: Former Austrian Military attache to Libya
Jason Pack: Founder, Libya-Analysis LLC; non-resident scholar, MEI
Jonathan Winer, moderator: Non-resident scholar, MEI; former US Special Envoy to Libya
2. Foreign Policy and the 2020 Election: Implications for Europe | October 5, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:15 AM EDT | Brookings Institute| Register Here
With the 2020 election looming amidst a trend of U.S. disengagement with Europe, both the American presidency and the future of Europe are on the ballot in November. What are the implications of the presidential election for the trans-Atlantic relationship and for U.S. foreign policy toward Europe? Would a second Trump administration follow through on threats to abandon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), leaving Europeans to their own devices on matters of security and defense? Would a Biden administration seek to rebuild bridges with its European partners, reverting even partially to a pre-Trump conception of America’s role in the world? And how would a geo-political Europe react to these changes?
On October 5, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings will convene a panel discussion on the implications of the 2020 election for U.S. foreign policy, in particular toward Europe.
Speakers:
Célia Belin: Visiting Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
William A. Galston: Ezra K. Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow – Governance Studies
Fiona Hill: Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
Thomas Wright, moderator: Director – Center on the United States and EuropeSenior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy
3. Has Trumpian populism succeeded? | October 5, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM EDT | American Enterprise Institute | Register Here
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 brought a populist into the White House. With the president’s first term nearing completion, what is the verdict? Has populism been a force for good in economic policy during the Trump years? Will populism be a force for good in economic policy going forward? And what about populism on the political left?
University of Chicago economist Casey Mulligan sees success, as described in his new book, “You’re Hired!: Untold Successes and Failures of a Populist President” (Republic Book Publishers, 2020). AEI economist Michael R. Strain has a different view, presented in his new book, “The American Dream Is Not Dead: (But Populism Could Kill It)” (Templeton Press, 2020). Join them to discuss.
Speakers:
Casey Mulligan: Professor in Economics, University of Chicago
James Pethokoukis: DeWitt Wallace Fellow, AEI
Michael R. Strain: Director of Economic Policy Studies, AEI
4. What Does the Taliban Want? | October 6, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:30 AM EDT | Wilson Center | Register Here
Peace talks have begun between the Afghan government and the Taliban. One major question is how the Taliban, which is often vague about its goals beyond getting foreign troops out of Afghanistan, views key issues related to the peace process. This online-only event, organized by the Wilson Center’s Asia Program in partnership with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, will assess what we know–and don’t know–about the Taliban’s position on political systems, women’s rights, international terrorism, and its relationship with Pakistan; what this all may tell us about the Taliban’s future decisions and actions; and what the implications are for the peace process..
Speakers:
Ibraheem Bahiss: Independent Analyst
Malalai Bashir: Senior Journalist, Radio Azadi, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Afghan Service
Dr. Orzala Nemat: Director, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Rahimullah Yusufzai: Resident Editor, The News International
Abraham Denmark: Director, Asia Program
Michael Kugelman, moderator: Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia
5. Online Event: Supporting Marginalized Groups amid Lebanon’s Cascading Crises | October 6, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:00 AM EDT | CSIS | Register Here
Lebanon has been home to vulnerable communities for centuries, most recently becoming home to perhaps a million refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict. Now, as the country reels amid compounding economic, public health, and political crises, refugees join expatriate domestic workers and others among Lebanon’s most marginalized communities in facing heightened risk.
Sahar Atrache, Yasmin Kayali, and Banchi Yimer will join us for a discussion of the threats facing Lebanon’s most vulnerable communities, and what stakeholders can do to support and empower them. Throughout the event, participants are encouraged to submit questions to the guests and host, Jon B. Alterman, via the provided link.
Sahar Atrache is the senior advocate for the Middle East at Refugees International. Prior to joining Refugees International, Sahar was the senior advocacy officer at the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) and a senior analyst on the Middle East and North Africa at International Crisis Group.
Yasmin Kayali is the co-founder and CCO of Basmeh & Zeitooneh, a non-profit organization launched in 2012 that seeks to empower Syrians in exile to live lives of dignity. Basmeh & Zeitooneh designs and delivers effective relief, education, and livelihood and protection services to marginalized communities from six centers across Lebanon.
Banchi Yimer is a former domestic worker who lived in Lebanon for nearly a decade. Alongside fellow Ethiopian migrant workers, she founded Egna Legna (“Us for Ourselves”), a community-based organization working on migrant domestic workers’ issues and women’s issues in Lebanon and Ethiopia.
Speakers:
Sahar Atrache: Senior Advocate for the Middle East, Refugees International
Yasmin Kayali: Co-founder and CCO, Basmeh and Zeitooneh
Banchi Yimer: Founder and Director, Egna Legna
6. Public Opinion, Annexation, and Normalization: A 2020 Zogby Research Poll | October 7, 2020 | 12:00 – 1:00 PM EDT | Middle East Institute | Register Here
In 2019 and 2020, Zogby Research Services polled in several Arab countries and Israel to assess attitudes on a number of topics related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab Peace Initiative, and the desirability of normalization before a final resolution of the conflict. The findings collected were surprising and instructive of a nuanced change in attitudes.
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel of experts to discuss the polling data and the potential implications they have on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Speakers:
Khaled Elgindy: Director, Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs, MEI
Lara Friedman: President, Foundation for Middle East Peace
James Zogby: Managing director, Zogby Research Services; founder and president, Arab American Institute
Paul Salem, moderator: President, MEI
7. Ten Years of Pan-Arab Protests: Understanding the New Dynamics of Change | October 7, 2020 | 2:00 – 3:15 PM EDT | Wilson Center | Register Here
In 2019 and early 2020, the Middle East and North Africa witnessed widespread protest movements in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq marking a decade since the Arab uprisings started in 2010. As the COVID-19 pandemic spread, these movements largely subsided under strict, temporary lockdowns. However, the coronavirus exacerbated socioeconomic conditions and inequalities, thus provoking renewed street demonstrations in Lebanon and Iraq as well as other countries across the region such as Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan. As MENA governments grapple with the adverse economic impact of the pandemic and the deterioration of public services, more popular unrest is likely to erupt. In this timely discussion, former Wilson Fellow, analyst and journalist Rami Khouri, offers an in-depth comparative analysis of the 2019 protest movements in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq in dialogue with Middle East Program fellow Marina Ottaway and Bard College professor and Jadaliyya co-editor Ziad Abu Rish.
Speakers:
Rami Khouri: Former Public Policy Scholar; Director of Global Engagement, American University of Beirut, columnist, Agence Global Syndicate, USA, and The New Arab, London and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School
Marina Ottaway: Middle East Fellow, Former Senior Research Associate and Head of the Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Ziad Abu-Rish: Co-Director, MA Program in Human Rights and the Arts, Bard College; Co-Editor, Jadaliyya
Merissa Khurma, moderator: Program Manager, Middle East Program
8. From the Sidelines of Nagorno-Karabakh: Georgia, Russia, and Turkey | October 7, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:30 AM EDT | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has faced its largest eruption of fighting since a 1994 ceasefire partially brokered by the United States. Previous escalations between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have been smothered within a few days. However, the current hostilities continue to escalate and the possibility of a large scale war between the two states is becoming more likely. Russia has historically supported Armenia while maintaining close relations with both former Soviet republics. On the other hand, Turkey has announced its unconditional support of Azerbaijan and appears to be ready to provide military capabilities to the Azeris. Georgia has always maintained close neighborly relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan and now has expressed its willingness to facilitate a peaceful resolution.
What are the regional consequences of a full out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan? What role do Turkey, Russia, and Georgia play in the conflict? What are the factors that inhibit long-standing peace? Why does the conflict concern the United States?
Speakers:
Neil Hauer: Non-resident scholar, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Victor Kipiani: Chair, Geocase
Maxim A. Suchkov: Non-resident scholar, Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program, MEI
Gonul Tol, moderator: Director of Turkey Program; senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
9. Lessons from Africa: Building Resilience through Community-Based Health Systems | October 8, 2020 | 9:30 – 11:00 AM EDT | Wilson Center | Register Here
COVID-19 has revealed shortcomings in the health systems of countries all over the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, the health crisis threatens to severely curtail already limited public health services and exacerbate fragility. Yet, despite immense hurdles, past crises have shown that innovative decision-making and locally-led interventions can go a long way in improving the resilience and responsiveness of health systems. Please join the Wilson Center, in partnership with the Population Institute, for a discussion with experts on the role of trust in enabling crisis response and how a more holistic approach to access to services in addition to healthcare, like girls’ education and maternal health, ultimately increases the resilience of at-risk communities.
Speakers:
Mohammed Abdulaziz: Head of Division, Disease Control and Prevention, Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention
Uzma Alam, PhD: Researcher, Africa Institute for Health Policy Foundation; Senior Program Officer, Africa Academy of Sciences
Juliet Nabyonga-Orem, PhD: Team Lead, Health Financing and Investment, Universal Health Coverage/Life Course Cluster, World Health Organization
Dr. Raj Panjabi: CEO, Last Mile Health; Assistant Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School and the Division of Global Health Equity at Brigham & Women’s Hospital
Ambassador Deborah R. Malac: Former U.S. Ambassador to Uganda and former U.S. Ambassador to Liberia; Career Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State; Senior Fellow, Population Institute
Sarah B. Barnes, moderator:Project Director, Maternal Health Initiative
10. Can Teaching Students Real Debate Reduce Political Polarization? | October 9, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM EDT | Brookings Institute | Register Here
In the midst of a highly polarized election, with an already polarized electorate, it may seem there is little hope for bridging the deep divisions in American society.
Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Robert Litan argues that teaching middle school and high school students the principles of competitive debate will make for more informed citizens and voters. Litan’s new book, “Resolved: How Debate Can Revolutionize Education and Help Save our Democracy,” makes the case for teaching middle school and high school students how to have reasoned debates where the participants use evidence and reason to constructively engage in civil discourse.
On October 9, Litan will be joined by Darrell West, vice president and director of Governance Studies at Brookings, and Norman Ornstein, AEI resident scholar, to explore how the principles of competitive debate can improve students’ lifelong work skills while making them more informed and demanding voters, and whether an engaged electorate will in turn change the way political candidates campaign for the better, improving–and maybe even saving–our democracy.
Speakers:
Robert E. Litan: Nonresident Senior Fellow – Economic Studies
Norm Ornstein: Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute
Darrell M. West: Vice President and Director – Governance Studies, Senior Fellow – Center for Technology Innovation
Bullying won’t win in a landslide
Reuters reports: WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF SAYS “THE PRESIDENT IS DOING VERY WELL. HE IS UP AND ABOUT AND ASKING FOR DOCUMENTS TO REVIEW. THE DOCTORS ARE VERY PLEASED WITH HIS VITAL SIGNS”
I don’t believe a word of this, not least because the same White House Chief of Staff had previously said that the next 48 hours would be critical. But also because this White House doesn’t often tell the truth. The President himself is incapable of it. And he certainly isn’t asking for documents to review.
The fact is Trump and his campaign are in trouble. Overweight and 74 years old, the President can barely walk down ramp. Even before his illness, his campaign was already lagging in both the 538 and Economist projections. These two best in class forecasts agreed that he had less than a one in five chance of winning the Electoral College and virtually no chance at all of winning the popular vote. Now Trump is out of commission, likely for at least a week more. Unless Joe Biden also gets sick, that would put Trump at a disadvantage until three weeks or so before Election Day, by which time a significant percentage of Americans will already have cast their ballots by mail and in “early” voting.
Trump’s illness will not cut into his “base.” Something like 40% of the country has proved loyal to him through 3.5 years of domestic and international failure, including his inept response to Covid19, his tax cuts for the wealthy, the collapse of the economy, his defense of white supremacists, his threats of violence against peaceful citizens, his defense of abuse by police, his nonpayment of income taxes, his disdain for American troops, and his destruction of America’s international standing.
But Trump has done nothing to expand beyond his base, which explains why he is running against the election rather than against Biden. The pre-and Election Day part of this strategy consists of two parts:
- Cast doubt on whether the election will be free and fair (to him);
- Suppress the Democratic vote, especially in “battleground” states like Pennsylvania, using court cases, social media (including Russian bots), robocalls, threats of intimidation, poll watchers, interference by state legislatures in the balloting, and election disinformation.
The post-Election Day part of this strategy will be fought out mainly in court, by challenging the validity of votes and tabulations while white supremacists with guns “stand by” to protect the streets. Republican-controlled state legislatures will look for opportunities to intervene wherever the voting is close to seize the initiative and cast the state’s electoral votes for Trump, which is theoretically possible under the Constitution if the outcome appears ambiguous.
Trump’s illness won’t have much effect on this effort to determine the election result. The apparatus to accomplish this strategy is already deployed and active. The President’s role is to provide leadership and cover for it. The Democrats will of course mount a defense in depth, but by far the best way of avoiding a messy aftermath of Election Day is a definitive and uncontestable victory on November 3. The odds of that are rising. Trump’s debate performance last week, which he regards as a plus, has taken big toll on his numbers.
That will only cause Trump’s supporters to double down on the strategy outlined above. They are going to try to bully their way to an Electoral College victory. But it can only work if he avoids a landslide that is looking increasingly likely.
Stevenson’s army, October 3
– Lawfare has a historical article on how earlier presidents concealed their illnesses.
– CRS has a background report on presidential disability.
– Law prof John Yoo argues that Speaker Pelosi is not “an officer of the United States” and thus cannot legally be in line for the presidency after the VP.
– Ezra Klein of Vox, whose analyses I often find excellent, has a thorough case against the Senate’s fiibuster.
I still disagree. Ending the filibuster would reinforce the tendencies toward making Congress like a parliament rather than a separate institution.
– WSJ says Russia has rejected latest US arms control proposals.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Civilians at risk, sovereignty is the objective
Crisis Group’s reporting on the military and diplomatic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh seems to me on the mark. Azerbaijan has the advantage and is pressing it with Turkish assistance and Israeli weapons, despite the mountainous topography, impending winter, and Russia’s alliance with Armenia.
The only real questions are how far Baku and Yerevan are willing and able to go. Will Baku stop short of completely retaking its sovereign territory, or try to go all the way to Stepanakert and even the Armenian border? Will Yerevan throw its main forces into the fight, with or without Russian support?
The implications for civilians could be dramatic. Something like 145,000 people live in Nagorno-Karabakh, almost entirely Armenians at this point. They are unlikely to stick around if Baku presses forward. They might even be called out by Armenia, which regards them as its citizens, if Yerevan decides to put its forces into the fight, in order to clear the battlespace. Self-cleansing of this sort is common. It could well lead to a dramatic demographic shift if Baku were to prevail.
Azerbaijan, a secular autocracy whose population is overwhelmingly Muslim, has long nurtured the ambition of retaking all of its sovereign territory. Baku isn’t likely to be too careful about its wartime obligations to Armenian civilians. It views the Nagorno-Karabakhis and the secessionist republic they have supported for three decades as the enemy, not least because they ethnically cleansed Azerbaijanis in past conflicts. The difference this time is that Baku is far stronger than it was even at the time of the last major clash in 2016.
Whether Azerbaijan is strong enough this time around to re-establish its internationally recognized sovereignty is not yet clear. Few details are coming from the conflict zone. But Baku’s current lack of interest in a ceasefire and Yerevan’s desire for one tell us what we need to know about how the clashes are going. Let’s hope however that Armenian civilians do not end up paying a high price for the failure of negotiations and compromise all these years.
Here is what Azerbaijani President Aliyev has to say. And here is Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan’s version.
Stevenson’s army, October 1
Happy New Year, 2021. US Government has money until Dec 12.
NYT has long report on GOP efforts to build case for voter fraud and weaponize it during and after the election.
Atlantic reports on right-wing militias.
WSJ says DNI overruled objections to declassifying unverified Russian reports on Hillary Clinton.
House Intelligence Committee says IC doesn’t have enough info on China.
HASC hearing has bipartisan criticism of Administration NATO troop plans.
Conservatives tell of safe ways to cut DOD budget.
WOTR has good ideas on improving US-Chinese crisis management.
RAND has a board game for doing strategy. Should I try it in class?
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).