peacefare.net

Restoring individual rights and hope in Bosnia

I joined happily with knowledgeable colleagues in signing Fixing Dayton: A New Deal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, published yesterday by Dan Hamilton of the Woodrow Wilson Center. But my own thoughts go beyond that paper in some respects. Here is what I would advise the Biden Administration about what Dan Hamilton calls the “why, what, and how” of fixing Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Why: The Dayton agreements that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a striking US foreign policy success in 1995, but the country risks becoming a disaster in the 2020s due to growing inter-ethnic strife. State failure in Bosnia would spew refugees into the EU and bring an end to a successful NATO effort to protect a vulnerable Muslim population. Breakup of the Bosnian state would strengthen Russian-sponsored secessionists not only in the Balkans but also in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and cause further fraying of the NATO Alliance. The US needs to re-assert it leadership, in partnership with the EU, which is unable for now to proceed expeditiously with enlargement. Europe whole, free, and democratic is still a worthy vision, but the Europeans need America to help make it happen.

What: The objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a functional, effective, and united state within its current borders capable of meeting the requirements for entry into NATO and the European Union. This will require elimination of the elaborate governing architecture created at Dayton that froze in place the warring parties (Republika Srpska and the Federation) and rewarded their commitment to ethnically based control of territory. Bosnia and Herzegovina should be governed in the future by a government in Sarajevo capable of negotiating and implementing its obligations to the EU as well as municipalities delivering services to citizens, with equal rights for individuals and vigorous legal and judicial protection for minorities.

How:

1. Diplomatic: US/EU agreement on initiating a process of constitutional and other reforms, Zagreb and Belgrade convinced to support the effort, re-empowerment of the High Representative, deployment of additional NATO (read British and American) troops to Brcko to prevent either Serb or Muslim seizure of this vital chokepoint, pressure on Russia and Serbia to halt financial assistance Repubika Srpska.
2. Legal: preparation by Bosnians of a new constitution that eliminates or drastically curtails the entities, full implementation of European Human Rights Chamber and Constitutional Court decisions, professionalization of the judicial sector, restoration of international prosecutors and judges in the court system, and prohibition of heavily armed police and paramilitary forces.
3. Economic: an end to IMF and World Bank assistance to the entities and instead resources shifted to the municipalities and the “state” government (Sarajevo), vigorous enforcement of anti-corruption laws with European Union assistance, personal sanctions on corrupt officials levied by the US and EU in tandem, recovery and return to worthy causes of ill-gotten gains stashed in Europe or the US, strict conditionality on international financing requiring in response support for political and legal reform.
4. Political: reform of the electoral law to disempower the ethically based political parties, election in parliament of a single president and two vice presidents, strict limits on the vital interest veto and the power of the House of Peoples, adoption of a law rendering all financing of political parties transparent and requiring democratic procedures for election of party leaderships.
5. Public affairs: VoA/RFE/DW programming to counter Russian disinformation, redoubled international support to civil society and political forces that support serious reforms, diplomatic protection for citizens demonstrating against corruption and police abuse, and a concerted effort to publicize corruption among politicians and officials.

The obstacles to an effort of this sort are substantial. Those who govern today in Bosnia, who come to power in unfree and unfair elections conducted within a constitutional system that favors ethnic nationalists, have no interest in seeing serious reform or in preparing the country to become a serious candidate for NATO or EU membership. They will seek to use any reopening of the Dayton agreements as a means of increasing their own power and possibly breaking apart the state. The US and EU will need to be prepared to act vigorously against strong resistance by those who seek secession, ethnic separation, or ethnic domination by one group over others.

The rewards of success would be substantial. Making Bosnia into a serious candidate for NATO and EU accession would have a demonstration effect worldwide. It would restore American and European soft power, weaken ethnic nationalists in the Balkans and elsewhere, and illustrate the unmatched capacity of liberal democracy to govern effectively.