A big potential success at risk
The International Crisis Group, the Organization of the African Unity, and others are rightly focused on preventing a humanitarian disaster in Tigray, where Ethiopian forces are threatening to take the regional capital Mekelle from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Tens of thousands have already fled the Tigray Region into Sudan and many other civilians may suffer horribly if the regional capital is assaulted. Reports of atrocities by both sides are rife.
My students and I met last January with TPLF officials and party members during our 12-day study trip to Ethiopia, when we were focused on the full range of ethnic conflicts brewing not only in the far north but also in the Oromo and Amhara regions as well as in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region. Ethiopia, a country of more than 80 different and often intermingled ethnic groups, has enormous potential for internal ethnic conflict:
But the current conflict, severe as it is and could become in Tigray, is not really about Tigray. It is about Addis Ababa and who holds power there. The TPLFers we met with made it absolutely clear that they did not regard Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s Nobel-Prize winning Prime Minister, as legitimate. In the Tigrayan view, he had usurped power by taking control of the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and then moving its resources to his own Progress Party without the required consultation with the Tigrayans, who had in the past dominated the leadership not only of the EPRDF but also the army and other key institutions.
In September the TPLF insisted on holding elections in the Tigray region despite Abiy Ahmed’s postponement of national elections due to the Covid-19 epidemic. Ninety-eight per cent voted for the TPLF. Then, according to the Prime Minister, the TPLF attacked Ethiopian government forces stationed in the region. The message was clear: the TPLF wanted to control its own region without interference or presence from the Addis Ababa government. It is not surprising Abiy Ahmed reacted to the challenge to his authority.
It is going to take more than a ceasefire and accommodation of some sort in the Tigray region to settle things down, though that is the vital first step. The Ethiopian government, which frames the whole matter as a law enforcement issue, wants to arrest and try the TPLF leadership. The TPLF, with overwhelming support in its own region, wants at least autonomy if not (constitutionally guaranteed) secession, though some Tigrayans might be bought off with power-sharing of some sort in Addis Ababa. Certainly the Tigrayan loss of power there is strongly felt, not least because Abiy Ahmed’s much-vaunted agreement to end Ethiopia’s hostilities with Eritrea requires Tigrayan forces to withdraw from territory they have occupied for more than 20 years.
Even if the Tigray conflict is resolved, Ethiopia faces half a dozen other internal conflicts that might and do lead to so far localized violence. And its dispute with Egypt over control of the Blue Nile remains unresolved. Ethiopia is filling the lake behind the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, but at a rate that for now will not drastically affect the flow of the Nile downstream. With more than 100 million people, Ethiopia is the second largest in Africa. Its success would be a big contribution to stability in the Horn and prosperity in much of the continent. But the risks are real.
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