Month: November 2020
Stevenson’s army, November 11
Honor veterans today!
I have long argued that the only thing election returns can tell is who won, who got more votes, not how or why it happened. That’s especially true this year when the two national exit polls had significant differences in the numbers of voters they found. Given that caveat, here’s a big collection of the data. And note that Nate Cohn of the NYT has a long story trying to tell why the polls were wrong.
David Ignatius reports a bitter interagency fight over declassifying some materials about Russia which Esper, Haspel & others warn would reveal key sources and methods.
This is new information which might explain why Esper was fired this week and Haspel may be.
Meanwhile, the national security community suffers more firings, resignations, and burrowing in of Trump loyalists.
WSJ explains the Biden-McConnell relationship.
I have a piece in The Hill urging the new administration to speed the naming of all the top 1200 nominees so they can start planning together.
As you know, it’s the season for think tanks to make their suggestions to a new administration, Here’s CFR on how to revitalize the State Dept.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Peace Picks | November 9 – November 13, 2020
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- The Future of Transatlantic Policy Towards Russia | November 9, 2020 | 9:00 – 9:45 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
Please join CSIS and the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding (CPRDU) for a conversation with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun and Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Przydacz on strengthening the transatlantic relationship amid today’s shifting geostrategic landscape of great power competition and a global pandemic in order to counter the foreign and security policy challenges posed by Russia.
This conversation begins a four-part series of discussions as part of the ninth annual Transatlantic Forum on Russia which will discuss the impact of geostrategic competition on the international system, growing domestic unrest in Russia, and the future of European energy security.
Speakers:
Stephen E. Biegun: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Marcin Przydacz: Polish Deputy Foreign Minister
Ernest Wyciszkiewicz: Director, Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding
2. Election 2020: State of Play and Implications | November 10, 2020 | 2:00 – 3:00 PM ET | Brookings Institute | Register Here
As many predicted, the 2020 election results were not finalized on Election Day. Voter turnout surged across the country, with record participation numbers that shattered levels from previous years. More than 100 million people voted early nationwide, and the country is on track for the highest turnout in more than a century.
Donald Trump and Joe Biden remain neck and neck in a handful of battleground states that have yet to declare a winner. Some House races across the country remain undecided, and control of the Senate hangs in the balance. Results have been trickling in slowly but mounting legal action and false accusations of voting fraud threaten to further delay the results.
On November 10, Governance Studies at Brookings will host a webinar examining the results of the 2020 election. Panelists will analyze state-by-state outcomes, voter turnout trends, election administration, implications for future policy implementation, and the stakes for American democracy.
Speakers:
Darrell M. West, moderator: Vice President and Director – Governance StudiesSenior Fellow – Center for Technology Innovation
Camille Busette: Senior Fellow – Economic Studies, Governance Studies, Metropolitan Policy ProgramDirector – Race, Prosperity, and Inclusion Initiative
John Hudak: Deputy Director – Center for Effective Public ManagementSenior Fellow – Governance Studies
Elaine Kamarck: Founding Director – Center for Effective Public ManagementSenior Fellow – Governance Studies
Molly E. Reynolds: Senior Fellow – Governance Studies
3. Myanmar’s Post-Election Future: A New Beginning? | November 10, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM ET | Stimson Center | Register Here
In Myanmar’s upcoming general elections, Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s ruling party, the NLD, is widely expected to emerge victorious. Nevertheless, since the party came to power in 2015, it has faced numerous international challenges.
During these pivotal times for Myanmar, join East Asia Program Co-Director Yun Sun, Ambassador U Aung Lynn, Dr. Aung Naing Oo, and Priscilla Clapp in a post-election virtual discussion unpacking the results and what they mean for the future of the peace process, the Rohingya crisis, and Myanmar’s relationship with the world.
Speakers:
U Aung Lynn: Ambassador to the United States from Myanmar
Dr. Aung Naing Oo: Executive Director of Center for Peace and Reconciliation
Priscilla Clapp: Senior Advisor, USIP; former U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Yangon
4. Election Cycle United States and Brazil: The Impact of the 2020 Elections for Brazil | November 10, 2020 | 4:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The American and municipal presidential elections in Brazil adapted to the new reality of COVID-19. In addition to voting by mail in the U.S. and changing the election date in Brazil, Brazilian municipal elections are also the first to follow changes established by the 2019 Electoral Reform and following historic presidential elections in Brazil in 2018.
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic recession and continuous polarization, what parallels can we establish between the American and Brazilian elections? How can the outcome of the American elections impact the future of bilateral relations with Brazil? How can these elections impact the Brazilian response to coronavirus and low economic growth?
Speakers:
Maurício Moura: President, Idea Big Data
Patrícia Campos Mello: Journalist, Folha de S. Paulo
Bruno Carazza: Professor, Ibmec and Fundação Dom Cabral;Columnist, Valor Econômico
Suelma Rosa: Director of Government Relations, Dow Brasil; President, Irelgov
Roberta Braga: Deputy Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
5. Running to Stand Still? The Impact of the United Nations in the Middle East, 75 Years On | November 11, 2020 | 4:00 – 5:15 PM ET | Brookings Institute | Register Here
In its 75th year, the United Nations (U.N.) faces immense challenges in its mission to promote peace and security around the world. During the September 2020 General Assembly meeting, the U.N. reaffirmed its commitment to multilateralism as a means to address the world’s problems. But is the U.N. Charter as relevant today as it was 75 years ago?
Preventing the illegal use of force and ensuring equality and dignity for all people are the cornerstones of the U.N. Charter. How has this mission fared in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region? What lessons have we learned from the U.N.’s role in conflicts such as those in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, and Syria? Is it still realistic to discuss Security Council reform? What impact would such reform have on conflicts in the MENA region?
Furthermore, there are a number of U.N. political missions and special envoys working on complex issues in countries including Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Their role has often been controversial. What alternatives must be considered to address conflict mediation in the MENA region? Does the U.N. still serve as an effective multilateral mechanism through which to pursue conflict resolution?
The Brookings Doha Center invites you to attend this webinar that discusses these questions and more. The panelists will critically reflect on the achievements, challenges, and potential trajectories of the U.N. in the MENA region, in light of the organization’s 75th anniversary.
Speakers:
Noha Aboueldahab, moderator: Fellow – Foreign Policy, Brookings Doha Center
Habib Nassar: Director of Policy and Research – Impunity Watch
Jakkie Cilliers: Chairman of the Board and Head of African Futures & Innovation – Institute for Security Studies
Lise Grande: United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator – Yemen
7. Ramifications of the US Elections for Change in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood | November 11, 2020 | 8:00 – 9:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
We have recently seen a period of US disengagement with Europe and its Eastern neighborhood. In this event, we explore changes in American foreign policy toward this region after the Presidential elections on November 3, the risks of a possible prolonged transition in Washington, and access the broader implications for the region, including those stemming from recent developments in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova as well as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
We have recently seen a period of US disengagement with Europe and its Eastern neighborhood. In this event, we explore changes in American foreign policy toward this region after the Presidential elections on November 3, the risks of a possible prolonged transition in Washington, and access the broader implications for the region, including those stemming from recent developments in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova as well as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
We will explore how a “more geopolitical Europe” will react to these changes, and whether European leaders can count on a more supportive administration in Washington as they deal with the growing number of crises and challenges to regional security, including an assertive Russia and Turkey.
Speakers:
Daniel S. Hamilton: Director, Global Europe Program; Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Distinguished Fellow
Cristina Gherasimov: Research Fellow, Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, DGAP
Stefan Meister: Head of Tbilisi Office, Heinrich Böll Foundation; Associate Fellow, DGAP
Milan Nič, moderator: Head of Program, Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, DGAP
8. What are Pakistan’s Aims in Afghanistan? | November 12, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:15 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Pakistan’s aims in Afghanistan are variously described as the chief obstacles to a peace process in that country, or as serving as an active partner with the international community in working for a political solution to the Afghan conflict. However, on one issue, there is ordinarily little dispute: Pakistan looks at the outcome in Afghanistan as critical to its security interests. Arguably, no outside country has more to gain and lose from what happens in Afghanistan. The Middle East Institute (MEI), in co-sponsorship with INDUS, is pleased to host a panel of experts to discuss Pakistani interests and aims in Afghanistan.
How relevant currently is the concept of “strategic depth”? What kind of regime would Pakistan prefer in Kabul? What is the nature of Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban and how much influence does it exercise over the insurgency’s political wing? How important to the course of the Afghan conflict today are Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan?
Speakers:
Madiha Afzal: David M. Rubenstein fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
Asad Durrani: Former chief, military intelligence and inter-services intelligence, Pakistan
Afrasiab Khattak: Former Senator, Pakistan; Pashtun political and human rights activist; analyst, regional affairs
Jawed Ludin: Former deputy foreign minister of Afghanistan; president, Heart of Asia Society
Marvin Weinbaum, moderator: Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI
9. US-Taiwan Policy in 2021 and Beyond | November 12, 2020 | 9:00 – 11:00 AM ET | Brookings Institute | Register Here
U.S.-Taiwan relations have advanced in recent years. At the same time, tensions have been rising in cross-Strait relations and in U.S.-China relations, raising concerns about Taiwan’s overall security. How will the results of the U.S. presidential election impact these developments? What issues relating to Taiwan should command the greatest attention from U.S. policymakers in 2021 and beyond?
On November 12, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution will host a group of policy experts to examine the future of U.S.-Taiwan policy. Panelists will participate in a cross-cutting discussion analyzing the next administration’s inheritance of U.S.-Taiwan relations and examining a range of issues critical to Taiwan’s future, including cross-Strait dynamics, Taiwan’s international space, economic security, technology issues, and security issues.
Speakers:
Ryan Hass, moderator: The Michael H. Armacost Chair Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China CenterInterim Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies
Richard C. Bush: Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center
Bonnie S. Glaser: Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project – Center for Strategic and International Studies
Syaru Shirley Lin: Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies
Eric Sayers: Adjunct Senior Fellow, Asia-Pacific Security Program – Center for a New American Security
10. The UN Nuclear Ban Treaty Enters Into Force in January: Then What? | November 13, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment of Peace | Register Here
Fifty countries recently signed and ratified the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which will take effect in January 2021. This marks a major milestone in international efforts to ban nuclear weapons, but notably, the United States, its allies, and all other nuclear-armed states refused to take part.
So what effect, if any, will the treaty have on international security and nuclear disarmament efforts? And how will treaty promoters attract additional states to sign and ratify it? Join Beatrice Fihn, Togzhan Kassenova, Zia Mian, and George Perkovich for a conversation on the future of the nuclear ban.
Speakers:
Beatrice Fihn: executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize-winning campaign coalition that works to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.
Togzhan Kassenova: nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
Zia Mian: physicist and co-director of Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, part of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.
George Perkovich: works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.
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America needs at least two years to cure itself
President Trump continues to resist admitting electoral defeat and has rallied most of the Republican party to his cause. Meanwhile Biden’s margins are increasing as the few remaining ballots are tabulated. Trump is fighting a losing battle. Why bother?
My guesses are these:
- to get concessions from Biden;
- to maintain his own relevance and retain control of the Republican party.
Trump is a transactional bargainer. He sees no reason to give up anything for free. Biden will soon hold the key to investigations of the Trump Administration. While Trump will be sure to pardon himself and his family members, he would be hard put to name all the loyalists who may have abused the public trust. He’ll try to get Biden to agree to go easy on them, exploiting the fact that Biden’s word, unlike Trump’s, is his bond. But I see no reason why Biden would offer it. Biden will have a hard time deciding how long to to focus on rooting out Trump’s malfeasance, but he is unlikely to agree to limit the prosecutorial efforts in advance.
Trump is more likely to be successful in maintaining his own relevance and control over the Republican party, whose leadership stands 100% behind him. Senator McConnell was of course correct in stating yesterday that the President is well within his rights to pursue all available legal avenues. But that doesn’t mean doing so is good for the country. The only upside I see of the hard-line resistance of the Republicans is that it will be marginally harder for them to claim that the election was stolen if all the allegations are determined in court to be unfounded.
There is little reason to be concerned about the impact of the delay so far. Biden has already begun his preparations, especially on Covid-19, and has an incredible stable of experienced people working with him. The funding Trump has blocked is minimal. The transition can be funded privately. The expertise available from Trump’s Cabinet is irrelevant. Throughout the US government, the civil service and foreign service officers will be preparing their memos and getting ready for the inevitable.
That doesn’t mean there won’t be hiccups however. The Trumpians haven’t found any good evidence of fraudulent votes or improper procedures. Some states with Republican legislatures could however try to certify slates of electors who did not win the popular vote. Some states might even withhold their votes on December 14, hoping to deny Biden the necessary majority in the Electoral College and throwing the selection of the next president into the new House of Representatives that will meet in January. It will have a majority of Republican-controlled state delegations, each of which gets a single vote. No doubt the Biden legal team has scoped out all these perfidies and designed appropriate responses.
The world, and my half of the American population, will watch this interregnum nervously. Can American democracy really survive such brutal assaults on the integrity of its electoral process? So far, the answer has been yes, but big challenges lie ahead. Perhaps the most significant is the double run-off for two Georgia senatorial seats on January 5. The Republican contenders there are already calling for the resignation of the Republican Secretary of State, whose only mistake has been to allow a free and fair election in a state where voter suppression has been developed to a fine art.
If Democrats win those two seats, which is unlikely but possible if everyone who voted Biden and then some come out to vote, they will gain control of the Senate and a commanding political position in Washington. The Republicans will then be compelled to do the hard job of figuring out how to become relevant again. Some may prefer the restraints of divided government, but given the gigantic challenges of restoring the US government to a modicum of dignity and respectability, I’m in favor: Biden needs at least two years with full Congressional backing to undo the damage Trump has wrought.
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Stevenson’s army, November 10
– The administration is deliberately refusing to allow the transition to begin.
– The president has abruptly fired the Secretary of Defense, installed an official with limted experience, while threatening also to fire the CIA director and FBI director. Esper is trying to defend himself.
– This is the season for “what Biden will do ” stories. Most are highly speculative, based on sources that may or may not have power in the new administration. I’m only going to send stories I think are soundly based, especially by reporters with very good sources. So pay attention to what Michael Gordon reports for WSJ and David Sanger for NYT.
– Armenia has lost the war, cut a deal.
– AEI scholar questions the way the combatant commands are run.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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This is not about organ trafficking
I’ve now had a chance to at least skim the charges against Hashim Thaci, Kadri Veseli, and other KLA leaders indicted by the Specialist Chambers in The Hague. While triggered by the Marty report, the Specialist Chambers have adopted an expansive definition of the crimes they were investigating. I can’t even be sure from the redacted indictment whether it includes charges related to the organ-trafficking Marty alleged without, he himself admitted, sufficient evidence to stand up in court. If those crimes at the “yellow house” in northern Albania are included in this indictment, they are a small part of the whole.
What the court has done is to charge the KLA leadership with being a joint criminal enterprise that intentionally committed many and widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity. The victims were non-combatant civilian “opponents,” whose ethnic identity is not specified but clearly include Albanians as well as Serbs.
There will be many people in Serbia and some in Kosovo who rejoice at this indictment. The crimes, sometimes according to the indictment itself committed in the aftermath of Serb abuses against civilians, were apparent at the time of the war and in its aftermath. What the prosecutor seeks to show is that the criminality was not spontaneous or undisciplined behavior but rather an organized, concerted effort directed by the top KLA leadership.
Many of the details are redacted in the public version of the indictment, but some will presumably become public as the court proceeds with witnesses and other evidence. The defense will deny the charges. We’ll then all have a chance to judge for ourselves the validity of the prosecutor’s portrait of the KLA,
But what is already clear is the one-sided character of this judicial effort. Holding people accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity has to be welcomed, but to do it for the KLA and not the Serbian security forces, which killed many more civilians than the KLA, is cockeyed. It is difficult not to see the current charges as part of a dramatic American tilt in Serbia’s direction and against Kosovo. While the Specialist Chambers pre-date President Trump, the current prosecutor was a Trump selection.
There were already three trials of Serbs at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia involving Kosovo. Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic died before his was completed. In the two others, six high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia were convicted. They too were charged with a joint criminal enterprise, one aimed against Kosovo’s Albanians that explicitly sought to change the ethnic composition of the population.
If I read the Specialist Chambers’ mandate correctly, it does have jurisdiction over Serbian perpetrators in Kosovo during the period 1 January 1998-31 December 2000, though the Serbian parliament, unlike the Kosovo Assembly, has not agreed. The prosecutor’s claim to being fair would be much stronger if he had filed charges as well against Serbian commanders active in Kosovo during that time. There are commanders who were directly responsible for war crimes in Kosovo, and for the murder of three American Albanians in Serbia shortly after the war, who are still enjoying prominent positions in Serbian politics and the security forces.
Whether Serb or Albanian, those charged are innocent until proven guilty, at least in court. But in the public mind the KLA will be tarred by these proceedings while the Serbs will be seen in Kosovo as getting off. Even those Albanians who opposed violence at the time–and were potential victims according to this indictment–will feel compelled to defend resistance to Serbian abuses. The political impact in both Serbia and Kosovo could be substantial. Let us hope it will be in favor of greater mutual understanding and reconciliation, but I have my doubts.
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Stay tuned, even if waiting is no fun
President Trump’s refusal to concede the election is causing a lot of angst in Washington, where concern about an orderly transition is paramount. I’m afraid though this is a prime example of “where you stand is where you sit.” The votes are still being counted and the race is still tight in several states, even if the eventual outcome is as close to certain as things can be at this stage. Trump and his supporters believe that his rallies proved he had popular backing. They won’t be satisfied until all his legal options are closed off. I’m in favor of his pursuing them, if only so that he and they will eventually face reality.
There are risks in this approach, especially in Pennsylvania. There the Republican state legislature could chose a slate of electors different from the one that wins the election. If they certify that slate before December 7, it could not be challenged. Only if they miss that date could the governor certify a different slate. His would then prevail in the Electoral College. But the margin in Pennsylvania is already up to 45,000, with perhaps another 140,000 votes still to be counted. It is more likely the margin will increase than decrease, which would make any shenanigans by the state legislature grossly abusive.
Besides, it is not clear that even with Pennsylvania, which put Biden over the 270 Electoral Vote margin required to win, that Trump would make it. He is losing at this point in too many battlegrounds:
E.V. | MARGIN | VOTE MARGIN | EST. REPORTED | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mich. › | 16 | Winner | Biden +3 | +147,897 | >98% |
| Minn. › | 10 | Winner | Biden +7 | +232,314 | >98% |
| Nev. › | 6 | Winner | Biden +3 | +34,283 | 97% |
| Pa. › | 20 | Winner | Biden +0.68 | +45,673 | 98% |
| Wis. › | 10 | Winner | Biden +0.62 | +20,539 | >98% |
| E.V. | MARGIN | VOTE MARGIN | EST. REPORTED | ||
| Fla. › | 29 | Winner | Trump +3 | +373,067 | >98% |
| Ohio › | 18 | Winner | Trump +8 | +460,582 | 95% |
| Ga. › | 16 | Biden +0.21 | +10,498 | >98% | |
| Ariz. › | 11 | Biden +0.51 | +16,985 | 98% | |
| N.C. › | 15 | Trump +1.4 | +75,407 | 98% |
Biden will proceed apace in preparing for the White House without a concession from Trump. He has a fantastically experienced and knowledgeable stable of people backing him as well as lots more willing to provide financing. The Federal money available once Trump allows it to be released is less than $10 million so far as I can tell.
There are real limits on what Biden can hope for from the Trump Administration. Some of its leaders are grossly incompetent. Others will follow the President’s lead in being unhelpful. There is little policy overlap on main issues like Covid-19 response, climate change, and foreign policy. Some of what Biden will prioritize–a new stimulus package, for example–will require Congressional action, not coordination with the Trump Administration.
The President himself is spending his time on his golf courses, where the Secret Service and other government officials run up big hotel tabs. He has said little of note except his unfounded claim that the election is being stolen. He is rapidly losing traction with the media, which has become noticeably blunter in pointing out his lies. Republicans in Congress are mostly silent or sticking by him. Comforted by their unexpectedly strong showings “down ballot,” they seem disinclined to indulge in any serious soul searching. I expect Senate Majority Leader McConnell to set up a hard opposition to whatever Biden tries to do.
The most important political question in America today is what Georgia will do on January 5, when it holds two run-off elections for Senate seats, which there require a candidate to get more than 50% of the vote. The Republican candidates have both missed by a hair. Mobilization for January 5 among both Republicans and Democrats will be massive. If somehow–against the odds–the Democrats can win both seats, they will gain control of the Senate and the real possibility of legislating Biden’s hopes–including a stimulus and Covid-19 response package, a public option for health care as well as shoring up Obamacare, and tax increases on the wealthy and corporations–into reality.
So we’ll have to wait a bit longer to know in which direction America will move and how fast. Stay tuned.
PS: Yes, stay tuned, as I realize there is a wrinkle here I somehow failed to see. Trump will be seeking from Biden guarantees in exchange for his concession. I won’t speculate on what those might be, but I hope Biden won’t concede anything in exchange for concession.
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