Month: February 2021
Toward a critical C/PVE perspective
Terrorism and violent extremism represent some of Africa’s greatest security threats in 2021. Local groups with international terror links are embedded in East, West, and Southern Africa. They exacerbate local conflicts and enable organized crime rackets—destabilizing an already fragile political landscape. Meanwhile, years of government-led security force interventions, many supported by the US and European governments, have not dislodged the insurgents. On February 24, the United States Institute of Peace convened a panel in conjunction with the RESOLVE Network to discuss local approaches that incorporate tactics beyond kinetic counterterrorism. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below:
Dr. Alastair Reed (opening remarks): Senior Expert, US Institute of Peace; Executive Director, RESOLVE Network
Dr. Akinola Olojo: Senior Researcher, Lake Chad Basin Program, Institute for Security Studies
Dr. Phoebe Donnelly: Research Fellow, International Peace Institute; Member of the RESOLVE Research Advisory Council
Dr. Joseph Sany (moderator): Vice President, Africa Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Bethany L. McGann (closing remarks): Program Officer, Program on Violent Extremism, US Institute of Peace; Research and Project Manager, RESOLVE Network
Framing Violent Extremism
All of the panelists acknowledged the importance of beginning any discussion of countering/preventing violent extremism (C/PVE) methods with an examination of the definitions that undergird these policies. Olojo stressed that counterterrorism is often a particularly problematic term. State actors, particularly in Africa, have frequently exploited the concept of counterterrorism to abuse their political power. By shifting to discussions of preventing violent extremism rather than counterterrorism, policymakers and scholars can begin to focus on risk factors, early warning mechanisms, and root causes, as opposed to security responses to violence.
In addition to the effect for high-level actors, definitions and terms matter for local actors. As Donnelly noted, women’s groups in particular have raised concerns about threats they have received due to their association with counterterrorism and counterviolent extremism programming. Moreover, Western groups frequently engage with African countries with a preconceived idea of what constitutes the most significant security threats, while ignoring contradictory information from local groups. As a result, Sany emphasized that local actors must own the framing of C/PVE programming.
The COVID-19 pandemic and violent extremism
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a significant development in the evolution of violent extremist organizations in Africa. Olojo pointed to two groups in Africa in particular: Boko Haram and al-Shabab. Since the onset of the pandemic, Boko Haram has pushed narratives that the pandemic is a punishment from God. Through these narratives, the group has sought to capitalize on the crisis to aid their recruitment strategies. In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabab established a COVID-19 prevention and treatment center. The group’s decision to form this center highlights both how the pandemic has exacerbated governance failures. Violent extremist organizations are exploiting these failures to increase their standing.
Community-oriented C/PVE
Discussions of community-oriented C/PVE methods and the role of gender dominated much of the panel’s discussion. Olojo identified four key ideas regarding the inclusion of communities in C/PVE programming. First, community voices ought to be included because they bear the brunt of violence from these groups. Second, research on communities should not simply focus on gathering data, but should also allow communities to express their views. Third, emphasis should be placed on developing a shared vision across communities, which is ultimately a prerequisite to successful dialogue. Finally, policymakers and scholars should remember that their ultimate responsibility lies with enhancing the welfare of these local communities.
Donnelly remarked on the importance of including women’s voices–and a discussion of gender more broadly–in engagements with local communities. She delineated three particularly pressing issues along these lines for Africa in 2021:
- Deep concern about the upcoming elections in Somalia and the prospects for election violence perpetrated by al-Shabab. In particular, she fears that an election crisis could sideline the activism of women.
- Frustration that PVE policy and programming has continued to fail with respect to the re-integration of women participants in violent extremist organizations. Re-integration programming to date has focused almost entirely on male participants in these organizations, despite the fact that women experience unique barriers to re-entering society.
- Societies have not reckoned with the reality of child members of these organizations. Many children were either born into these groups or have been integrated into them, and as a result many children have now been imprisoned due to their connections to Boko Haram.
To watch the event in full:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | March 1 – March 5, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
- Breaking the Tie: Security and Stability in Belarus | March 1, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council| Register Here
For the past six months, Belarusians protesting for free and fair elections across the country have faced growing repression as strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka attempts to cling to power. The opposition has demonstrated staying power and growing political capital, but the army and the security services remain loyal to Lukashenka. This domestic stalemate also presents a strategic problem for the Kremlin, which seems to have no new ideas beyond some monetary support for Lukashenka’s regime. Meanwhile the US and Europe have responded with modest financial sanctions against the discredited president and his cronies.
Do Lukashenka or Moscow have any new cards to play? Does the opposition? How will the situation in Belarus end and how will Washington, Brussels, and Moscow react?
Speakers:
Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer
Columnist with Novaya Gazeta,
David Kramer
Senior Fellow at Florida International University’s Vaclav Havel Program for Human Rights and Diplomacy
Valery Kavaleuski
Foreign Affairs Adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
Dr. Marie Mendras
Professor at Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs
Ambassador John Herbst (Moderator)
Director of the Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
2. Red Flags Report Launch | March 2, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Center for Strategic International Studies | Register Here
China’s political and economic influence in the Western Balkans is on the rise, fueled in part by a regional demand for infrastructure which is satisfied by opaque deals in the ICT, energy, and transportation sectors. These projects present risks to good governance, economic growth, environmental sustainability, and digital security. Join CSIS for a virtual discussion of a new CSIS report which describes tools and actions critical for stakeholders to objectively evaluate and respond to these risks. The report concludes a three-part series which examined the nature and impact of Chinese economic influence in the Western Balkans and its implications for the region’s stability and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Speakers:
Matthew D. Steinhelfer (Keynote)
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, CSIS
Jonathan E. Hillman, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reconnecting Asia Project, CSIS
Valerie Hopkins (Moderator)
South-East Europe Correspondent, The Financial Times
3. Lebanon: Challenges and Future Prospects| March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
The Middle East Institute is pleased to invite you to a panel to launch its Lebanon Program, focusing on Lebanon’s current state of affairs and potential US foreign policy options going forward. The months-long political stalemate and the unaddressed financial crisis keep pushing Lebanon further into chaos and uncertainty. In parallel, the new Biden administration is redefining the US stance vis-à-vis Iran and reassessing some of its bilateral relations in the region. Many of these changes will have direct implications for Lebanon. This distinguished panel will address these local and regional developments, think through ways US foreign policy towards Lebanon can be more nuanced and constructive, and highlight themes and signals that are worth paying attention to in the coming months.
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO, American Task Force on Lebanon
May Nasrallah
Chairwoman, Lebanese International Finance Executives
Paul Salem
President, MEI
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Advisor to the Vice President of Middle East and North Africa, United States Institute of Peace
Christophe Abi-Nassif (Moderator)
Lebanon Program Director, MEI
4. Agent Sonya: Moscow’s Most Daring Wartime Spy | March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Please join the Intelligence Project for a discussion with Ben MacIntyre on his latest book, Agent Sonya. This true-life spy story is a masterpiece about the Soviet intelligence officer code-named “Sonya.” Over the course of her career, she was hunted by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Nazis, MI5, MI6, and the FBI—and she evaded them all. Her story reflects the great ideological clash of the twentieth century—between Communism, Fascism, and Western democracy—and casts new light on the spy battles and shifting allegiances of our own times.
With unparalleled access to Sonya’s diaries and correspondence and never-before-seen information on her clandestine activities, Macintyre has conjured a page-turning history of a legendary secret agent, a woman who influenced the course of the Cold War and helped plunge the world into a decades-long standoff between nuclear superpowers.
Speakers:
Ben Macintyre
Author and Journalist, The Times
5. Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe | March 3, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Wilson Center| Register Here
In the wake of unprecedented domestic terror and national security threats in the form of mass shootings and insurrection in the nation’s capital, former Congresswoman & Wilson Center Director, President, and CEO Jane Harman offers her new book Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe (St. Martin’s Press; May 18, 2021), which chronicles how four consecutive administrations have failed to confront some of the toughest national security issues and suggests achievable fixes that can move us toward a safer future.
Please join Congresswoman Harman and New York Times national security correspondent and senior writer David Sanger for an in-depth conversation on the book and a discussion on better processes and more sound policy for the next generation of elected officials and the new administration.
Speakers:
Jane Harman
Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center
David Sanger
Former Distinguished Fellow, National Security Correspondent and Writer, the New York Times; Author, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age
6. Religion, Ethnicity, and Charges Of Extremism: The Dynamics Of Inter-Communal Violence In Ethiopia| March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | European Institute of Peace| Register Here
In recent months, the conflict in Tigray has dominated most analyses of Ethiopian politics. The scale of the Tigray crisis makes this understandable, but in its shadow, inter-communal tensions and conflicts have persisted across Ethiopia. In recent years there were numerous violent incidents, such as the Amhara regional ‘coup’ attempt of June 2019, the violence across Oromia in October 2019, and incidents around Timkat in Dire Dawa and Harar in January 2020.
A team of Ethiopian and international researchers – Terje Østebø, Jörg Haustein, Fasika Gedif, Kedir Jemal Kadir, Muhammed Jemal, and Yihenew Alemu Tesfaye – studied two incidents of inter-communal violence: the attacks on mosques and (mostly) Muslim properties in Mota, Amhara region in December 2019 and the violence and destruction of properties in Shashemene and other towns in Oromia in July 2020. They will present their findings in this event, followed by discussion and Q&A.
Their research shows that in Ethiopia religion and ethnic violence overlap and interact with one another in complex ways. Given the current emphasis on ethnicity in Ethiopian politics, the role of religious affiliation is often overlooked, yet it is here that the accusation of “extremism” is most frequently and most consequentially raised: the mere expectation or accusation of extremism has sufficed to generate inter-communal violence and deepened a climate of mistrust.
Speakers:
Terje Østebø
University of Florida
Jörg Haustein
University of Cambridge
Sandy Wade (Moderator)
Senior Advisor, European Institute of Peace
7. COVID-19 and Cooperation in Libya | March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace| Register Here
Libya is at a turning point after the U.N.-sponsored Libyan Political Dialogue Forum elected a temporary executive authority in February to unify the country and move toward elections by year’s end. However, sustainable peace cannot be achieved with only an agreement at the national level. And the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated economic challenges, strained the country’s health infrastructure, and added a new layer of complexity to the country’s conflict. Local-level cooperation—and linking these efforts to the national-level peace process—is of utmost importance to achieve a cohesive and peaceful country.
And despite a difficult year, there have been bright spots for Libya on this front. The COVID-19 pandemic yielded many examples of local-level initiatives where Libyans came together in challenging conditions to cooperate for a common goal. The hope is that these successes can lead to longer and more enduring areas of cooperation.
Join USIP as we host Libya’s ambassador to the United States and Libyan civil society leaders for a look at stories of positive community cooperation during the current crisis—as well as a discussion on how Libyan and international organizations can build off these successes to navigate Libya’s complex conflict and ensure a peaceful future for the country.
Speakers:
Wafa Bughaighis (Keynote speaker)
Libyan Ambassador to the United States
Ahmed Albibas
Director, Moomken Organization for Awareness and Media
Abdulrahman A. S. Elgheriani
President and CEO, Tanmia 360
Craig Browne
Program Policy Officer, World Food Programme
Nate Wilson (Moderator)
Libya Country Manager, U.S. Institute of Peace
8. Unraveling the Conflict in Syria March 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
In 2012, as the conflict in Syria continued to smolder, then-president Barack Obama made clear that any use of chemical weapons by the Bashar al-Assad regime would constitute a “red line” for U.S. engagement. Yet in the aftermath of a sarin attack outside Damascus just a year later, the Obama administration seized the opportunity to work with Russia on an ambitious plan to hunt down and remove chemical weapons rather than go to war. A decade later, the tangle of “heroes and villains” involved in that particular scenario is clearer.
Speakers:
Joby Warrick
Author of Red Line
Maha Yahya
Director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
9. The Future of ISIS March 4, 2021 | 11:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
On October 27, 2019, then-US President Donald Trump announced that the leader of the so-called Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in Syria in an American special operation, striking a blow against an already weakened organization.
What ISIS accomplished during the period of its rise and growth represents a “quantum leap” in the ideology, strategies, and operating theories of terrorist groups, and requires deep analysis of the organization’s expected future trajectory. The Politics and Society Institute in Amman, Jordan, and the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in Washington, DC, are pleased to co-host this expert discussion. This panel will shed light on what opportunities exist for policymakers to deal with the legacy of ISIS detainees and returnees, as well as on strategies against a potential resurgence in Iraq and Syria.
Speakers:
Mohammed Abu Rumman
Expert, Politics and Society Institute
Former Jordanian Minister of Youth and Culture
Borzou Daragahi
Journalist and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Andrew Peek
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq
Mara Revkin
National Security Law Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center
Banan Malkawi (Moderator)
Jordanian-American Researcher and Lecturer
10. Strategic nuclear modernization in the United States| March 4, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Brookings Institutions| Register Here
What: As with prior administrations before it, the Biden administration is preparing to undertake a major review of the U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program. Though the U.S. arsenal has decreased in accordance with the New START treaty, new delivery systems are still being developed.
Supporters of the current program argue that implementation is critical for the United States’ ability to deter adversaries and reassure allies. Opponents argue that the current program is well in excess of deterrence requirements and is not affordable over the long term. During the review period, Congress will examine the current program as well as requested funding for these systems.
On Thursday, March 4, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host a panel to discuss how the Biden administration will – and should – approach negotiations regarding the future of the strategic modernization program.
Speakers:
Tom Collina
Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Madelyn R. Creedon
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Center for Security, Strategy and Technology
Franklin Miller
Principal, The Scowcroft Group
Amy Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service
Frank A Rose
Co-Director and Foreign Policy Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Restore humanitarian access in Ethiopia!
Michael Thomas Knaak, a first-year Conflict Management master’s student at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, writes:
CSIS February 22 convened a discussion of restoring humanitarian access in Ethiopia’s Tigray province, the scene of recent fighting between local forces and the Federal government. Panelists included:
Judd Devermont, Director of the CSIS Africa Program
Daniel Bekele – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Chief Commissioner
Catherine Wiesner – Head of External Engagement at the UNHCR Regional Bureau for East Africa, Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes
Jan Egeland – Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council
Jacob Kurtzer – Director of the Humanitarian Agenda at CSIS, who moderated
Key Points
- The humanitarian crisis in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia is substantial, chaotic, and unlikely to improve without increased access for humanitarian personnel.
- There is a general dearth of detailed information on the situation in Tigray, as access to humanitarian personnel and journalists is severely restricted.
- Such access is currently being denied due to a lack of political will in the Ethiopian government and in international state-level or higher actors.
- Significant civil-military and Federal-regional governance coordination problems are further hindering access by humanitarian assistance personnel.
Judd Devermont
The humanitarian crises is one of many problems afflicting Ethiopia, but is the most acute flashpoint at this time. Other sources of conflict include the significant governance reforms ongoing within the Federal government, the government’s apparent mistreatment of dissidents, the contentious redrawing of political borders, and the formation and growth of unregulated militias. The continuation of the humanitarian crises complicates the overall political landscape within Tigray and across states.
In addressing the crises, the main difficulty is political will, rather than technical issues or capacity. Rectifying the limited accessibility to the region by humanitarian aid workers is critical. One idea towards this end might be appointment of a US special envoy. The envoy would need to have a close relationship with the State Department and have access to real power and resources, enabling her or him to own the process and act as a main driver for US action in the region.
Daniel Bekele
There are three key points that need immediate attention. First, local governance and administration must be reestablished to secure the restoration of critical services within the region. Second, restrictions on media access must be removed to allow for a free flow of valuable information reported in a timely manner. Third, the bureaucratic and political hurdles delaying humanitarian assistance must be overcome.
On this third point there is at least engagement between the Ethiopian government and aid organizations on the need for civilian protection and the applicability of international humanitarian law. However, they disagree on implementation of civilian-military coordination. The government lacks the will to permit regional access to assistance personnel.
Increased United Nations access and involvement through a special rapporteur has been floated as an idea for addressing the crisis. While such a step might be viewed positively, it would be important for the international community to recognize that the international process should complement rather than displace existing national processes, institutions, and efforts. A “fly-in and fly-out” type effort could fail to be coherent with the domestic Ethiopian led response.
Catherine Wiesner
Scattered reports and satellite imagery confirm that two refugee camps were assaulted by armed militants, and many thousands of refugees and IDPs are now unaccounted for. Migration from the destroyed camps to new ones has strained capacity in safe spaces. Other priority needs are unaccompanied children, restoration of basic services, and food aid.
Civil-military coordination is lacking, and the threat of violence against aid workers limits their efforts. Sudan and Djibouti have helped ease the crisis by keeping their borders open to refugees, though particularly in Sudan the border area is remote and suffers from poor infrastructure, complicating the process of moving aid staff and materiel.
Early financial appeals to address the crisis were 70% funded, but the original plan was limited in size and scope. The revised plan addresses the whole of Ethiopia in 2021 rather than just the Tigray region, and is 50% funded ($150 million), which is enough to continue operations through June. But aid efforts will have limited effectiveness without access to the areas worst hit by the crisis.
Jan Egeland
Impeding the humanitarian response is surprising coming from Ethiopia, which has a long history of generosity towards refugees. With the sudden restriction of access, agencies lost contact with numerous staff members. The trickle of information coming out of the region describes massacres and populations fleeing for their lives. Additional information remains scarce, but firsthand accounts remain horrific.
More international pressure is required to convince the Federal government to allow humanitarian workers access to the restricted areas. There are hundreds of volunteer workers prepared, with significant quantities of resources warehoused and ready for deployment. It would be helpful if the UN, US, or the African Union could secure the needed access to get aid where it is needed most, including to opposition-held areas. Federal and regional governance coordination needs improvement, as aid organizations find permission to intervene from Federal authorities can be blocked by local authorities, and vice versa.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
New Postdoc Opportunities for 2021-2022 at JHU SAIS
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Brzezinski Postdoctoral Fellowships
The Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) is pleased to announce two postdoctoral opportunities for outstanding scholars to conduct research under the auspices of its Foreign Policy Institute. During the academic year 2021-2022 two post-doctoral fellowships will be awarded for a twelve-month period from September 1, 2021 to August 31, 2022.
A division of Johns Hopkins University, SAIS is a global institution that provides interdisciplinary professional education to prepare a diverse student body for internationally related positions of responsibility; to foster research, scholarship and cross-cultural exchange; and to contribute knowledge, expertise, and leadership to the global community.
The SAIS Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) unites the worlds of scholarship and policy in the search for realistic answers to international issues facing the United States and the world. To this end, it organizes research initiatives and study groups, and hosts leaders from around the world as resident or non-resident fellows in fields including international policy, business, journalism, and academia.
To recognize Dr. Brzezinski’s legacy, Johns Hopkins SAIS and its Foreign Policy Institute have established the Brzezinski Initiative, a unique set of academic programs that build on the school’s strengths as a leading center for training graduate students in international policy and relevant academic research. This recognition comprises both immediate programming and longer-term plans, which together will equip a new generation of policy experts capable of the authoritative analysis, strategic vision, and active diplomacy that were hallmarks of Dr. Brzezinski’s role as a scholar, policy advisor, and statesman.
The inaugural Brzezinski Postdoctoral Fellowships enables two exceptionally promising scholars working in the field of American foreign policy or foreign and international security policy to spend a year affiliated with the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute. Fellows are expected to contribute to the intellectual life of FPI and SAIS more broadly.
The Brzezinski Postdoctoral Fellowship in American Foreign Policy
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski taught American Foreign Policy at SAIS from 1989 to 1998. Thanks to the generosity of SAIS alumni, this postdoctoral fellowship recognizes his critical contribution to intellectually significant policy relevant research in the area of American Foreign Policy.
Selected post-doctoral fellows should be within seven years of having completed their doctorate at the time they submit their application and will be expected to be at the stage when they are preparing their dissertation for publication as a book.
The Brzezinski Postdoctoral Fellow in American Foreign Policy will receive an annual stipend of $62,000 and $4,000 in research funding during the appointment (budget submissions required to account for funds). Fellowship recipients are eligible for Johns Hopkins University health benefits.
The Brzezinski Postdoctoral Fellowship in Foreign and Security Policy honors the legacy of Dr. Brzezinski’s farsighted analysis of trends shaping the international policy environment.
Selected post-doctoral fellows should be within seven years of having completed their doctorate at the time they submit their application and will be expected to be at the stage when they are preparing their dissertation for publication as a book.
The Brzezinski Postdoctoral Fellow in American Foreign Policy will receive an annual stipend of $62,000 and $4,000 in research funding during the appointment (budget submissions required to account for funds). Fellowship recipients are eligible for Johns Hopkins University health benefits.
Please contact Carla Freeman , cfreeman5@jhu.edu or Virginia Rosell, vrosell1@jhu.edu if you have any questions.
Qualifications
To qualify for consideration, candidates must have completed all requirements of their doctoral degree no earlier than March 15, 2014 and no later than March 12, 2021. If a successful applicant has not earned a Ph.D. at the time of application, the applicant’s advisers must submit a formal letter confirming that the applicant has completed all the requirements for the Ph.D. by May 21, 2021.
Fellows must be prepared to devote themselves full-time to their research during the period of their fellowship and therefore must agree they will not hold other employment during their fellowship.
Application Instructions
- The deadline to submit applications is 11:59p.m. (EST) Monday, March 15, 2021.
- Applications must be submitted via Interfolio: https://apply.interfolio.com/83965.
- Candidates may not apply for both fellowships.
- Required application documents: A one-page cover letter describing your interest in the selected fellowship, your background, a brief description of your research project, and what you will accomplish during the period of your postdoctoral fellowship; a current CV; two examples of your scholarly writing; graduate-level transcripts (unofficial are acceptable); two letters of reference; other relevant documents, such as evidence of English proficiency.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, February 27
– Earmarks are returning. More background from CRS.
– Administration releases ODNI report on Khashoggi killing but stops short of punishing MBS.
– WSJ reports new US rules to fight China technology threat.
– Pentagon releases materials for countering extremism in the ranks.
– VP Harris more active in foreign policy.
– New push on war power rules.
– Lawfare on how new cyber director is supposed to work.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
One more problem in Lebanon, but now may not be the time to solve it
Samin Mirfakhrai, a first-year Conflict Management student at SAIS, writes:
The Carnegie Middle East Center February 19 held a discussion of inequality in Lebanon. Panelists were:
- Lydia Assouad, El-Erian Fellow, Carnegie Middle East Center; PhD Candidate, Paris School of Economics
- Haneen Sayed, Human Development Specialist, World Bank Group
- Toufic Gaspard, Former Senior Economic Advisor to the Lebanese Minister of Finance; Advisor, IMF
- Gregg Carlstrom as moderator, Middle East Correspondent, The Economist
Key Points
Income and wealth inequality have been a cornerstone of the Lebanese economy for decades; the existing disparity has grown more extreme since 2005. The political elite have long upheld a system rooted in clientelist institutions and policies. The political culture has exacerbated economic inequalities to benefit the ruling elite and forego creating opportunities in upward mobility for the middle and lower classes.
The state of the political economy is dire. Without the proper reforms, financial collapse is imminent. Within the scope of fiscal policy, implementing a general and progressive income tax, increasing top marginal tax rates, and instituting an annual wealth tax are recommended to increase the national revenue.
Economic reform must be coupled with political form. Long-term programs that increase human development, continue economic subsidies, and offer cash assistance can lower inequality rates, yet the financing needed for such measures is unavailable. Panelists agree that real change cannot be achieved without political reform.
Figures
The richest 10 percent of the population hold approximately 70 percent of total wealth in the country.
Extreme poverty in Lebanon has nearly doubled since 2012.
The lower poverty line, classified as anyone who cannot provide their daily caloric needs, is at 22 percent.
The Human Capital Index in 2018 was 0.52, meaning a child born in Lebanon can expect to be 52 percent as productive as he/she could be upon reaching the age of 18.
Summary
This event was organized around Lydia Assouad’s research on economic equality in Lebanon. Her recent paper for the Carnegie Middle East Center entitled “Lebanon’s Political Economy: From Predatory to Self-Devouring” focuses on assessing income and wealth inequality at the apex of several converging crises. Income inequality has been a ubiquitous aspect of Lebanon’s socioeconomic sphere since the state was formally established in 1943. While it isrecognized that inequality has persisted since the decades before Lebanon’s civil war erupted in 1975, data is lacking.
Inequality has grown more severe as the country faces various crises that have combined to beget a serious humanitarian crisis. In 2019, a massive protest movement responded to decades of policies that have sustained and exacerbated levels of economic inequality that are considered some of the highest in the world. Since then, a number of events, including a protracted banking crisis, coronavirus, and the Beirut port explosion, have compounded on a dire situation.
Assouad’s research first tackled the dearth of data on economic inequality in Lebanon. There is little data available on the phenomena prior to 2005, the year Syrian forces left Lebanon after nearly three decades of occupation. The data since then is incomplete. Her novel methods of collecting micro-fiscal data allowed Assouad to delve into the nature of inequality in the country and deliver a sober message that economic amelioration must be coupled with political reform. The political elite are often the country’s wealthiest individuals, who continue to take part in kleptocratic and corrupt practices lacking in political accountability and integrity.
Assouad’s recommendations emphasize the need for tax reform in order to generate government revenue. Specifically, she advocates a progressive income tax that would combine all sources of income as one, instead of considering them separately. Additionally, an exceptional wealth tax of 10% on billionaires would collect approximately 2-3% of the national income.
Panelist Gaspard criticized Assouad’s focus on tax reform, suggesting that a progressive tax would not be feasible for a developing economy like Lebanon’s because fiscal management and administrative systems are underdeveloped. He further expanded that while fiscal policy has caused the collapse of the exchange rate, it is monetary policy that brought the collapse of the banking system. Attendees also questioned the ability to tax a wider base when public trust in institutions is so low.
All panelists agreed that economic reform would need to be coupled with massive political change in order to reverse Lebanon’s collapse, but major reforms are difficult during stability, let alone during the country’s current crisis. Such changes require strong leadership, political consensus, public engagement, and tough measures—a combination not to be found in Lebanon today.
RSS - Posts
