Arms trafficking: more breach than observance
An event at the Atlantic Council on February 4 discussed the measures and mitigation techniques for illicit transfer of arms and weaponry around the world. The event was prompted by a report published by the Atlantic Council, authored by investigative journalist Tim Michetti, which followed materiel procurement by a network of militants operating in Bahrain, specifically activities carried out by Iran. The report can be read here. The prompting questions for the discussion were based on how to prevent and disrupt the flow of international illicit weapons flows as well as strengthening arms embargos. Further topics of discussion analyzed specific examples of illicit transfers of weapons in different regions, as well as the policy implications and a road map to alleviate these weapon flows.
Speakers:
Time Michetti: Investigative Researcher on Illicit Weapon Transfers
Rachel Stohl: Vice President for Conventional Defense, Stimson Center
Jay Bahadur: Investigator, Author and Former Coordinator of the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia
David Mortlock: Nonresident Fellow, Global Energy Center
Norman Roule (Moderator): Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Challenges:
Moderator Norman Roule opened the discussion noting that the major concern revolves around Iran’s transfer of illegal weaponry throughout the Middle East, while also noting the consequences for regional geopolitical relations, reaching East Africa as well. Iran has provided weapons to Syria, which provoked a sort of “forever war” with Israel, as well as provided precision weapons and missiles to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Tim Michetti’s report on Illicit Iranian Weapon’s Transfers analyzes the mode of entry, either by land or by maritime means. The report analyzed the weapons in comparison to those that were taken from regional conflicts in order to trace the materiel back to Iran. This work established a guide for how materiel from different regions could be traced back to actors based on their characteristics, which are unique to each country that they are manufactured in. Michetti’s report on Bahrain is one of many examples of the illicit weapons flows in the Middle East and sets the stage for future investigations on how the linkages between illicit weapons and where they end up can be made.
Jay Bahadur discussed an illicit weapons seizure by the Saudi Arabian navy in the Arabian Sea in June 2020 that discovered Chinese- made assault rifles and missiles, along with other weaponry that was believed to be manufactured in Iran. This seizure was not the first of this type, as the Saudis have intercepted multiple ships in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea since 2015, many of which have been traced back to Iran, where the weapons originated. These weapon transfers have exacerbated the conflict in Yemen, while also potentially destabilizing East African countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea.
Historically, disrupting commercial trafficking of small arms and light weapons has been a secondary priority to counterterrorism, but according to Jay Bahadur this approach ignores the overlap that often exists between arms trafficking and terrorism.
International Regulation
According to Rachel Stohl, the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol form the international legal framework for weapons transfers. Several voluntary groups and committees exist as well, in the United Nations and elsewhere. Synergy among these groups and treaties can improve transparency and responsibility in the global arms trade. The treaty mechanisms are only meaningful if they are implemented and signatories held accountable. In the Middle East and Horn of Africa, fewer than than 20 percent of countries are parties to the international treaties. Stohl emphasized the need to hold countries and industry actors accountable, as the consequences of illicit weapons transfers coincide with other illicit activities such as terrorism, trafficking, and illegal trading of goods.
David Mortlock noted that the international systems in place to combat illicit weapons transfers depend on member-state governments to uphold them. Sanctions should be considered to hold governments accountable. They can increase the operational costs for groups transferring weapons illicitly, but the UN and European Union have not wanted to sanction Iran to the extent the United States has. As noted by Roule, the United States, particularly the Trump Administration, had a vastly different perspective on countering Iran compared to the rest of the international community.
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