Month: February 2021
Stevenson’s army, February 8
George Shultz, who served in 4 senior cabinet positions in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, including Secretary of State, died on Saturday. Dan Drezner has a fine appreciation, including links to other good articles.
Over the years, I’ve found several teaching points from Shultz’s career.
1. He explained how the policy process is never-ending, with fights recurring even after presidential decisions. Nothing ever gets settled in this town, a seething debating society in which the debate never stops, in which people never give up, including me.
2. He threatened to resign 14 times to gain leverage for his proposals — but never had to follow through.
3. The toxic relationship between him and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger pervaded State and DOD, making interagency cooperation nearly impossible for years. It was even worse than the Powell-Rumsfeld fights in the early 2000s. Reagan refused to choose between his two friends, so both continued to push contradictory policies. Weinberger, for example, wanted to limit the use of force to strategic enemies; Shultz insisted on fighting terrorists, calling Weinberger’s tests “the codification of the Vietnam syndrome.”
In other news, WSJ notes that China is winning the war of setting technical standards for new technologies.
– NYT sees a pattern in Biden’s trade appointments
-FP reviews a book about centrist diplomacy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Peace Picks | February 8 – February 12, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. Strengthening the Multilateral Order in a Nationalist Age | February 8, 2021 | 9:00 AM – 10:15 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Transnational problems such as climate change, economic volatility, and global health can most effectively be tackled by deep and structured cooperation via institutions, rules, and formal intergovernmental networks. Most European nations are committed to protecting and strengthening multilateral order in an increasingly nationalist world. While the case for multilateralism is well established, much less is known about how to establish an effective multilateral order. On Monday, February 8, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will host a panel discussion to analyze alternative pathways to increasing the net levels of multilateral cooperation.
Speakers
Bruce Jones (moderator): Director, Project on International Order and Strategy, Brookings Institution
Kai Sauer: Undersecretary of State for Foreign and Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs for Finland
Constanze Stellzenmüller: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
Thomas Wright: Director, Center on the United States and Europe
2. Empowering Youth on the Path to Conflict Resolution | February 8, 2021 | 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM ET | CSIS | Register Here
The world’s 1.2 billion young people make up 16% of the world population with half of them living in low-income and lower-middle income countries. Youth possess catalytic potential to help achieve global development goals and to promote stability, peace, and community resilience. In recent years, youth have been drivers of change through organizing climate movements, embracing digital transformation, and coordinating community pandemic responses. With concerted effort, youth in fragile contexts can realize their potential as peacebuilders and drivers of post-Covid-19 recovery.
Speakers
Erol Yayboke (moderator): Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Project on Prosperity and Development, CSIS
Guadalupe Cruz: Director of Training for Latin and Central America, Cure Violence Global
Sherizaan Minwalla: Chief of Party, Iraq Genocide Recovery and Persecution Response, MSI A Tetra Tech Company
Rachel Walsh Taza: Program Manager, Children & Youth, Search for Common Ground
Ambassador Lone Dencker Wisborg: Ambassador for Denmark to the US
3. Building a Viable Middle East Venture Capital Industry | February 9, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Startup investments in the Middle East are on the rise: in 2020, despite a global pandemic, venture capital funding amounted to over $1 billion and increased 13 percent from 2019 according to a MAGNiTT report. Still, significant barriers remain that prevent greater investment and stymie the region’s economic growth. The Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East will discuss how to boost the venture capital industry in the Middle East to drive sustainable funding for startups.
Speakers
Amjad Ahmad: Director, empowerME, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
Ahmad al-Naimi: Partner, Saudi Technology Ventures (STV)
Ahmed el-Alfi: Chairman and Co-Founder, Sawari Ventures
Noor Sweid: General Partner, Global Ventures
Christopher Schroeder (moderator): Venture Investor
4. Presenting the Belfer Center’s 2020 National Cyber Power Index | February 9, 2021 | 10:30 AM – 11:30 ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Only a handful of countries are well known for their cyber impacts: notable, US, Israel, Iran, China, Russia and North Korea. But cyber visibility can give a misleading picture of actual cyber power. The full range of capabilities, objectives, and actors are often left out of the story. The Belfer Center’s Julia Voo, Anina Schwarzenbach, Irfan Hemani, Simon Jones, Winnona DeSombre and Daniel Cassidy have proposed a novel and more complete way to measure a country’s cyber power.
Belfer’s 2020 National Cyber Power Index looks at the cyber capabilities of 30 countries across seven national objectives such as surveillance, defense, intelligence gathering and destruction. It then measures a country’s capability within each objective. The team hope that through developing the NCPI the discussion of cyber power is broadened to reflect applications beyond destructive capabilities.
Speakers
Anina Schwarzenbach: Postdoctoral Associate, University of Maryland
Julia Voo: Cyber Fellow, Belfer Center
5. The EU, Japan and the US in Indo-Pacific | February 10, 2021 | 5:30 PM – 6:45 PM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
In 2016, Japan published its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, underscoring the importance of a rules-based order in the region. Europe, on the other hand, has been more cautious in the adoption of this concept. But the pandemic has highlighted the need for Europe to recalibrate the status quo and actively expand its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. With France, Germany and the Netherlands, three EU countries have already published Indo-Pacific strategies and the need for a coordinated pan-European approach to the Indo-Pacific is growing. Toshimitsu Motegi, the Foreign Minister of Japan, has recently addressed the EU’s Foreign Affair Council to advocate for it, while The High Representative Josep Borrell expressed appreciation for Japan’s FOIP.
This conversation will discuss Japanese understanding of FOIP, the efforts to bring it about and potential for closer cooperation with Europe and the US. What does Japan’s FOIP strategy mean for Europe? How could a coherent and effective EU strategy on Indo-Pacific look like? What kind of expectations did the “European Indo-Pacific awakening” raise in the region? How can Europe, Japan and the US work together to maintain a rules-based order in the region?
Speakers
Janka Oertel (moderator): Director, Asia Programme, ECFR
Prof. Nobushige Takamizawa: Former Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament
6. A decade of protests: Why governance reform is critical in the Arab World | February 10, 2021 | 3:00 PM – 4:15 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Arab Spring, much attention is rightly being given to the broader governance trajectory of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond the public debate over democratic change, another long-standing struggle is taking place as many countries work to reform state institutions to make them more efficient, effective, and responsive. The MENA region is home to some of the largest public sectors in the world, yet the quality of service delivery is often poor. The region is also one of the few places globally that has lost ground in the past decade on indices for government effectiveness and control of corruption. The Brookings Doha Center and Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut are pleased to invite you to a webinar discussing the future of governance reform in the MENA region.
Speakers
Joseph Bahout (moderator): Director at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut
Hala Bsaisu Lattouf: Former Minister of Social Development, Government of Jordan
Rami Khouri: Director of Global Engagement, American University of Beirut
Robert P. Beschel, Jr.: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Tarik M. Yousef: Senior Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
7. The Security Environment in Western Pacific Waters | February 10, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 9:00 AM ET | Stimson Center | Register Here
The waters of the Western Pacific are the focus of intense interest for trade routes, for territorial disputes, and as ongoing case studies for international law. How do Japan and the United States approach the challenges of upholding international norms and the law of the seas in this important region? How can regional and global multilateral partnerships influence the security dynamics in these waters? Join us for a webinar with Japanese and U.S. experts to explore these complex issues.
Speakers
Emma Chanlett-Avery: Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service
Yurika Ishii: Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
Susumu Takai: President, Security Strategy Research Institute of Japan
Kathleen Walsh: Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, US Naval War College
7. A Nation in Transition: Political Polarization in Turkey | February 11, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Turkey’s activities in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean are well documented, casting a long shadow in the Middle East and beyond. But less reported are some of the trends and attitudes lurking beneath the surface that will likely shape how Turkey’s domestic politics, society, and foreign policy will evolve in the future. The Middle East Institute (MEI), in collaboration with IstanPol, an Istanbul-based research institution, is pleased to announce a series called Turkey Beyond: Trends and Drivers Shaping a Nation in Transition.
In the opening panel, the speakers will discuss the following questions and more: What are the drivers of ongoing political polarization in the Turkish electorate? How are political parties and actors responding to this increasing polarization? How is polarization influenced by gender, economic segmentation, and ethnicity? What has changed since the 2019 local elections?
Speakers
Gönül Tol (moderator): Director, Turkey Program, MEI
Edgar Sar: Co-founder and Chair, IstanPol
Seren Selvin Korkmaz: Co-founder and Executive Director, IstanPol
8. Diplomacy, Discord, and Turkish Politics since World War II | February 11, 2021 | 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
CRS Director Onur Isci will explore the history of Turkish diplomacy in the Cold War. Joining him are author and contributing writer at the New York Times, Suzy Hansen and Associate Director of the Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at New York University, James Ryan. The three experts of modern Turkish history will explore the major themes, issues, and lessons from Turkey’s diplomatic experiences in the Cold War.
Speakers
Christian F. Ostermann (moderator): Director, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center
Onur Isci: Assistant Professor, Bilkent University
Suzy Hansen: Author, New York Times
James Ryan: Assistant Director, Center for Near Eastern Studies, NYU
9. Ten Years After the Arab Spring: Middle East Writers Reflect on the Arab Uprisings | February 11, 2021 | 12:00 – 1:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The second book talk in our series features award-winning Egyptian writer Yasmine El Rashidi discussing her debut novel, Chronicle of a Last Summer. Through a young Egyptian woman’s recount of her personal and political coming of age, El Rashidi traces the fine line between survival and complicity, exploring the conscience of a generation raised in fear and silence.
Speakers
Yasmine El Rashidi: Author, Chronicle of a Last Summer
Jacki Lyden: Author, Board Member, Alan Cheuse International Writers Center
10. Transatlantic Policy Symposium 2021: Building Better Partnerships | February 12, 2021 | 9:00 AM – 5:00 PM ET | BMW Center for German and European Studies | Register Here
The Transatlantic Policy Symposium (TAPS) is an annual conference fully organized by the graduate students of the BMW Center for German and European Studies in the Walsh School of Foreign Service. The conference brings together academics, students, and professionals from around the world to discuss pressing issues at the heart of the transatlantic relationship.
Speakers
W. Gyude Moore: Senior Policy Fellow, Center for Global Development
Dr. Tilla Antony: Senior Officer, Global Partnerships, International Monetary Fund
Dr. Anne-Marie Gulde: Deputy Director for Asia and Pacific, International Monetary Fund
Eric Kite: Deputy Director, Caribbean Affairs, United States Agency for International Development
Helga Flores Trejo: Vice President, Global Public Affairs International Organizations, Bayer AG
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Requiem for Syria, but some hope for US diplomacy
Pro-democracy protests began in Syria nearly 10 years ago. In response, the government escalated violence, which sparked the Syrian civil war. The subsequent humanitarian catastrophe has killed almost half a million people and displaced an estimated 12 million others.
On February 4, Brookings Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi, research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, discussed their new book, Syrian Requiem, which details the long-developing divisions in Syrian politics, surveys the various actors who fought in Syria directly or through proxies, and examines the policy choices that the conflict currently presents to the United States and others. The speakers at the event are listed below:
Speakers:
Susan Maloney: Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
Steven Heydemann (moderator): Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Itamar Rabinovich: Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy
Carmit Valensi: Research Fellow and Syria Program Manager, Institute for National Security Studies
Origins of the Crisis
Both structural and proximate factors have contributed to the ongoing crisis in Syria. Rabinovich identified flaws in US foreign policy under both Obama and Trump as some of the key proximate causes for the depth of the crisis in Syria. In particular, he argued that Obama’s refusal to arm the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2012 and 2013 severely hampered the opposition’s ability to combat the regime. Jouejati similarly identified the failure to arm the FSA as a critical mistake, while also arguing that Obama should have responded more forcefully when Assad crossed his infamous red line regarding the use of chemical weapons. Jouejati pointed to this sign of weakness as a clear signal to Russia that the US would allow Moscow free reign in Syria to dictate the outcome of events.
Rabinovich also noted several structural factors that he believes will continue to generate instability in Syria. First, the artificial borders originating from the notorious Sykes-Picot agreement have created an inherently flawed state. Second, the autocratic nature of the Syrian state under Assad will continue to foster reciprocal resistance and violence. Valensi pointed to Assad’s continued use of violence and repression in reclaimed territory, as well as his focus on strengthening the state security apparatus prior to reconstruction, as evidence that the Assad regime will continue to engender opposition.
Assad’s Prospects
With substantial support from Russia and Iran, Assad has made significant military advances since 2015. However, all of the panelists believe that Assad’s prospects for consolidating control over the country remain dim. Valensi points to three key signs that Assad will struggle to bring the entire country back into the fold. First, even after the military successes of the past few years, Assad still only controls 60% of the territory. Second, both his military success and his ability to maintain control over conquered territory is largely predicated on either physical or monetary support from Russia and Iran. Should that support begin to wane, Assad’s ability to control territory will diminish. Finally, Assad does not have the resources to reconstruct the country, and both Russia and Iran are unlikely to have the necessary capacity or willingness to provide enough financial support.
Jouejati added another critical sign of Assad’s long-term instability. The COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse of the Lebanese economy have severely exacerbated the economic crisis in Syria. Even in the heart of regime-controlled territory, state subsidies for bread have decreased and people complain of long lines for fuel. As a result, Assad is currently witnessing a worrying decline in support from even his most loyal followers.
Paths Forward
The multitude of stressors on the Assad regime suggests that the US may have some leverage to promote an end to the Syrian civil war. However, while all of the panelists believed that the US has more leverage in Syria than has commonly been acknowledged, they differed on precisely where the US should apply pressure. In particular, the panelists debated which actor is the most promising for asserting influence on the Assad regime. Valensi argued that the new Biden administration should attempt to boost the UN diplomatic process through UN Resolution 2254, despite Heydemann’s critique of the UN process as the example of “zombie diplomacy” par excellence. Jouejati favored US support of a Russian-led diplomatic process, arguing that Russia has indicated a softening of its support for Assad. Heydemann, however, expressed concern that Russia has sent these signals before without ever in fact wavering in its support for the Assad regime.
However, the panelists did agree that the limited US military presence remaining in Syria provides significantly more leverage than many people have recognized. However, they did not advocate for a more expansive military presence, instead arguing that even limited presence and military action can be used strategically. Valensi pointed to Trump’s limited strikes in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons as evidence that limited engagement need not necessarily be a prelude to full intervention.
To watch the event in full, please click here.
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Stevenson’s army, February 6
– Bloomberg says Biden administration wants to give economic incentives to Iran without lifting sanctions.
-SecDef Austin announces global review.
– FP deconstructs Biden foreign policy speech.
-Lawfare reviews Biden’s history on war powers.
– NYT reports “muddled intelligence” hindered police response to Capitol attack. See also their reporting on organized groups involved.
Ya gotta love the Senate [as I do]. It takes unanimous consent in order for Senators and staff to use electronic devices in the chamber. Hence this UC, which was adopted: Congressional Budget Resolution–Agreement: A unanimous-consent agreement was reached providing that for the duration of the Senate’s consideration of S. Con. Res. 5, setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2021 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2022 through 2030, the Majority and Republican managers of the concurrent resolution, while seated or standing at the managers’ desks, be permitted to deliver floor remarks, retrieve, review, and edit documents, and send email and other data communications from text displayed on wireless personal digital assistant devices and tablet devices; provided further that the use of calculators be permitted on the floor during consideration of the resolution; and that the staff be permitted to make technical and conforming changes to the resolution, if necessary, consistent with the amendments adopted during Senate consideration, including calculating the associated change in the net interest function, and incorporating the effect of such adopted amendments on the budgetary aggregates for Federal revenues, the amount by which the Federal revenues should be changed, new budget authority, budget outlays, deficits, public debt, and debt held by the public
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Stevenson’s army, February 5
The WH website now has the presidential order setting up the Biden administration’s NSC system. Notable is the number of people now regularly allowed to attend,including “as appropriate” people from mostly domestic agencies and the Special Envoy for Climate [John Kerry]. The new administration will call its national security documents “National Security Memorandum” and its assistant secretary working groups “Interagency Policy Committees” [IPC]
NSA Jake Sullivan answered questions at a WH briefing before the president’s speech.
The WH promised additional NSMs on other issues, including the national security workforce sent around earlier.
Charlie put this out earlier:
The NSC system is busy although the organizing order has yet tp be released. Axios reports that a Principals Committee [cabinet level but without the president] will hold a meeting today on Iran policy. They’ll consider a paper from Thursday’s meeting of the Deputies Committee. [I wonder who attended, since most departments still lack confirmed deputies.]
President Biden gave his first major foreign policy address at the State Department. It was basically “I’m not Trump,” reversing many positions of the previous administration. He also issued a formal order to review personnel policies for the “national security workforce.” That could hopefully lead to revised rules for recruitment, training, and promotion of careerists.
Biden also gave a morale-boosting talk to State employees, but got pushback in the NYT from people who complain the administration is hiring too many political appointees for jobs often filled by careerists in the past.
FP sees the big speech, not surprisingly, as reflecting Jake Sullivan them of a populist “foreign policy for the middle class.”
The Senate this morning approved the budget resolution that opens the way for a filibuster-avoiding reconciliation bill for Covid relief. There were 15 hours of votes that were symbolic since the measure never goes to the president or becomes law. House has to pass the measure again because of minor amendments.
FYI, there’s an S-400 problem with India.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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America is back, but where and how is not yet clear
President Biden today in two appearances at the State Department–one for the staff and one to address foreign policy–was anxious to say that America is back to diplomacy, to the defense of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and to cooperating with allies. His foreign policy will, he said, benefit Americans, whose security and welfare will be primary goals.
He is clear enough about Russia and China. He’ll be much tougher on the former than Trump, calling out its repression and even murder of dissidents and countering cyberhacking and election interference, while seeking areas of common interest like the already extended limits on strategic nuclear weapons. On China, the policy will be similar to Trump’s in aiming to compete as well as cooperate, but with more attention to human rights and less inclination to trade wars, though the tariffs don’t appear to be coming down yet.
In the Middle East, Biden was clear about one thing: he wants a negotiated end to the war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen and will cut off American support to the Saudis and Emiratis. So much materiel has already been transferred that this make take some time to have a logistical impact, but the psychological impact will be immediate. The Hadi government the Saudis and Emiratis have backed is going to have to cut a deal or step aside so someone else can. It is unclear what the Houthis will be willing to yield, as they currently have the upper hand in much of the fighting, but we’ll find out soon enough.
Biden has also made it clear he is prepared to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal) if Tehran does likewise. But the sequencing of the respective returns, and precisely what they amount to in terms of sanctions relief and nuclear reversal, are still unclear. So is any future nuclear agenda: the Iranians have so far refused widening, deepening, or prolonging the JCPOA.
On the rest of the Middle East, Biden has left things unclear. He has said little or nothing about:
- Syria, where the US still has forces pursuing ISIS, protecting oil wells, and cooperating with Kurdish-led insurgents regarded as terrorists by NATO ally Turkey,
- Palestine, though he has renewed diplomatic contacts with the Palestinian Authority and will presumably return to the two-state goal Trump tried to obliterate,
- Iraq, where US forces were drawn down to 2500 by his predecessor,
- Libya, where the UN has been making some apparent progress on ending the civil war.
- Egypt, where President Sisi has imposed a renewed autocracy at least as ferocious as either of his two immediate predecessors.
Each of these countries is at least as important to the United States as Yemen, but it is unclear what “America is back” means to them. Americans are tired of these longstanding messes, whose resolution is hard to tie directly to American security and welfare, even if we know that withdrawal from them could be costly.
America is really good at getting in, especially if can be done with warplanes and troops. It is much harder to get out, which requires diplomacy. But at least we now have a president who believes in diplomacy and is prepared to back America’s diplomats.
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