Day: March 5, 2021

Stevenson’s army, March 5

-WSJ has a partial tick-tock on Biden’s first use of force.

WH says Biden is willing to have new AUMF.

Vox reports on internal Afghanistan debate.

David Sanger assesses Biden’s MO. 

Colin Kahl hearing report.

Just Security gets  troop numbers declassified. Even more here.

Lots of numbers and new reports at Cost of War project.

Fed blocked Myanmar fund transfer.

Naval War College prof opposes NSA/Cyber Command split.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Reviving refugee resettlement in the US: ethics, policy, and implementation

Here are the remarks I made at today’s Johns Hopkins webinar on “Reviving Refugee Resettlement: Moral, Policy, and Implementation Issues,” in which colleagues and I presented and discussed our published paper on the subject.

  1. I collected the data on which our assessment of moral, policy and implementation issues was largely based.
  2. It’s one of the few times in my mostly internationally focused career that I’ve exploited my diplomatic skills to hear American views.
  3. The people I interviewed were all familiar with resettlement issues: as government officials, as think tankers following the issues, as NGO or international officials with relevant responsibilities.
  4. The range of political views was wide and included people working in the Trump Administration, but not Steven Miller or others in his inner circle.
  5. They either did not answer multiple requests for interviews or bluntly refused to talk with me.
  6. I did however talk with people inside government as well as outside generally sympathetic with the Administration’s views, especially on immigration.
  7. Ethical issues were not foremost in the minds of most of these people but on questioning all agreed on the moral imperative of helping resettle at least some refugees.
  8. All believed, for example, that the US should resettle Afghans, Iraqis, and others whose lives were in danger due to assistance they had afforded Americans during invasions.
  9. There was no dissent from “the duty to repair” in those circumstances.
  10. There was also general agreement on thinking about refugee resettlement as a human rights and humanitarian issue, albeit one that had to be limited by practical and financial considerations.
  11. But priority to the needy and non-discrimination, in particular based on religion were universally accepted. This was after the Trump Administration had prohibited visas for people from some Muslim countries.
  12. There was less agreement on the broad humanitarian imperative—partly because in its boldest form it rejects practical and financial considerations. Some also thought keeping people close to their original homes was more likely to enable returns, which they regarded as preferable in principle to resettlement and far less costly, enabling more people to be assisted.
  13. Personally, I think that trade-off is a serious issue: resettlement vs. aid in place, because of cost considerations.
  14. There was also less agreement on the contribution refugee resettlement makes to foreign policy and the legitimacy of the state system. Some insisted on this point unhesitatingly. Those closer to the Trump Administration rejected it as an exaggeration, but mainly I think because they were unconcerned with what others term the “rules-based order.”
  15. There was concern from some about implementation issues, including possible fraud or other malfeasance in the selection process, the capacity of the US government and non-governmental organizations to handle refugee resettlement (especially when the Obama Administration bumped up the numbers in its final year), and admission of people whose attitudes on gender and other issues might make their adaptation to American mores and law difficult.
  16. Some issues commonly discussed in the public sphere at the time were not very important in discussions with these experts, on the left or right. None thought there was more than a proportional and therefore small security risk from resettled refugees. Most thought they represented a far lesser threat than immigrants of other sorts and native-born Americans.
  17. My overall conclusion is that there is more room for consensus across the political spectrum on resettlement than on immigration more broadly. So long as due diligence is faithfully conducted and the numbers can be capably handled by the resettlement agencies and welcomed by local communities, few saw a big problem with the numbers, so long as they do not go up or down precipitously. The limits are more practical than ethical, even if the imperative is ethical.
  18. But reaching and maintaining this consensus across the political spectrum would likely depend on keeping the issue of refugee resettlement separate from the general issue of immigration, especially at the southern border. I’m not sure that can be done, or that everyone would want to keep the two issues separate. But doing so would be best from a refugee perspective.
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