Month: April 2021
Advice from the classics for Washington, Beijing, and Moscow
Alexandros P. Mallias, Ambassador of Greece to the United States ( 2005-2009) writes:
Secretary of State Tony Blinken, a fine diplomat and a seasoned top national security official, followed the footsteps of several American Presidents. During his first trip in Europe, he paid an important and much anticipated visit to NATO’s Headquarters in Brussels. The top American diplomat reiterated the Biden’s Administration strong commitment to NATO, while expressing the expectation that the allies will remain committed to cope with the three main challenges/threats as reflected in NATO’s reports and joint declarations. Is that so?
The response is neither easy nor linear. Let’s elaborate:
- The unprecedented though foreseeable rise of China’s capabilities. China is a privileged commercial, economic, trade, shipping, financial, and investment partner for NATO’s European allies. She is also an indispensable enabler in addressing climate change and the COVID pandemic. A Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, swiftful rising China is a global antagonist and potentially a strategic challenge for American interests. China has been a major concern issue for Congress and the top foreign policy priority, with important domestic parameters, for the Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations.
China’s Asian-Pacific claims and interests as well as its global designs are supported by political, economic and increasing military capabilities, yet under a “soft power” cover. It is increasingly difficult to draw a clear line among cooperation, engagement and deterrence. Economic, energy, trade, and financial interdependence are the basic characteristics of China’s bonds with her leading global partners. It is now more difficult for the United States alone to prevent by coercive measures China’s ascent to primacy.
The 2500 years old “Thucydides trap” syndrome is now becoming a useful tool of analysis when examining US-China relations. Washington runs the risk of eventually projecting the image of a hegemon, like the city of Athens. But America’s soft power is colossal and global, much stronger than coercion. If hard power towards China and pressure on allies are the best policy option, then the probable product is a brotherhood of non-willing allies. A third powerful pole has already taken shape opposing US policies, including politico-military rapprochement among China, Russia and others .
2. Russia’s assertiveness and come-back policy under President Vladimir Putin, which includes prestige, self-confident power politics, and territorial ambitions. Russia, a big power, is today an important energy, trade, tourism and economic partner for many NATO allies, with whom it sided in the fight against international terrorism. Russia is also a key player albeit a hard power antagonist in Eurasian affairs.
The Russian Federation, also a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, is focusing on the European theater of energy, political, and military operations as well as on the greater Middle East (MENA).
Notwithstanding justified and legitimate opposition and apprehension among NATO allies and the European Union, Russia considers itself a shareholder of European cultural heritage, from the Atlantic to the Urals. But Russia’s invasion, occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing aggressive moves against Ukraine , in violation of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter for a New Europe are illegal. The status quo in Crimea cannot be tolerated. Russia has undermined its own role as an important stakeholder in European security and cooperation. US, NATO policies and EU sanctions are justified.
Notwithstanding the Russian Federation’s important fossil fuel resources, its economic and military capabilities at this stage may not sustain its superpower aspirations. A framework of a “principled (value based) cooperative engagement” is possible. Russia’s desire to become a big power player in Eurasia, MENA, and beyond should be matched by the Kremlin’s attachment to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles and values of the European legal, political and security post cold-war commitments and architecture.
There is a basic prerequisite before engaging with Russia. It pertains to NATO’s credibility, cohesion, and deterrence capability. Russia has managed to establish–against NATO’s interests–strategic defense procurement agreements and unprecedented confidential bonds with Turkey, a NATO member. The S-400 issue is a serious “intra muros” challenge undermining NATO diplomatically and politically. It is not an issue to be dealt with simply between Washington and Ankara. Further to Turkey’s provocative and aggressive policies against Greece and Cyprus, it poses a credibility problem for NATO as a whole and seriously affects Alliance security. It has to be addressed as a priority issue in order to preserve NATO’s credibility, restore intra-Alliance confidence, and revive the indivisible collective security axiom.
3. Preventing, countering and deterring hybrid threats. Often, the sources of these attacks directed against NATO members and institutions are also related or correlated to Moscow and Beijing. But it would be naive to attribute them solely to NATO’s two global antagonists. Cyberspace is the most difficult theater of operations for an undeclared global confrontation. More so, if associated with the possibility of rogue or failed states, authoritarian leaders, and non-state actors (terrorists, secessionist groups, etc.) getting access to nuclear weapons systems and/or long range ballistic capabilities. This is the 21st century nightmare scenario.
“Reset” global politics, starting with the UN Security Council
There is nothing new in stating that the world is characterized by power politics, rivalry between states and the promotion of state interests. Synergy is partial, alliances challenged, while the ecumenic symmetry is rather elliptic. The bipolar world order collapsed \; today, superpower monopoly is challenged. We should be in search of a new world order.
The Biden-Harris Administration’s much anticipated “reset” of multilateral diplomacy has a name: international cooperation, in particular within the United Nations and the Security Council. Multilateralism is the prerequisite for restoring the efficacy of the collective international security system: securing, shaping and reshaping the problematic world order.
It is a common secret that the United Nations is today unable to discharge its mission; synergy is missing among the five Permanent Members (P5) of the Security Council. The antagonism and conflict among the five stem both from a different hierarchy of values, attachment to human rights issues included, mostly though for geopolitical and economic reasons.
Attachment to the principles and purposes enshrined in the United Nations Charter has eroded. As long as the Security Council is unable to operate and act as mandated by the Charter, it will be impossible to reach the necessary consensus to prevent and counter threats against peace, stability, and security. The “veto” power prerogative should not be synonymous with idleness and inertia. The “zero sum game” equilibrium point cannot become the world order power equilibrium.
At times the United Nations Security Council was considered to be the refuge of the weak or the haven for weaker UN members. Now it is the indispensable condition for the P5 in resetting and restoring the much wanted world order.
In their legitimate search for common ground, the United States may wish to test the waters by hosting a ‘closed door retreat” of the P5 at Ministerial or Head of State level. Such a move could display of the American “smart power” (hard+ soft + principles and values) in reshaping the world order. Coping with the pandemic, climate change, and unity in fighting against terrorism could figure as the starting point of the agenda.
Engagement, negotiation, leadership: get advice from the Classics
What lessons can we draw from the ancient Greek classics that are relevant today? I refer to war and peace prototypes: Athens, Sparta, and Corinth were the three key city-states at the origins of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ History of that War remains by far the most complete handbook on strategy and tactics, on peace and war, on alliances and hegemony, on the cleavage between principles and interests, might and right, on negotiating of truces and treaties and definitely on leadership. We often use a famous quote from the Melian Dialogue:
…since you know as well as we do that right is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
Thucydides refers also to the argument used by the Athenian ambassadors warning the Spartans not to start the war by saying:
….Consider the vast influence of accident in war before you start it. For a long war as it continues for the most part ends in catastrophe… It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first and wait for disaster to negotiate…
Many scholars argue that we already move in the footsteps of the Peloponnesian War. I earnestly hope that the Athenian message will not be ignored by Moscow, Beijing or Washington.
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Stevenson’s army, April 15
– The administration this morning announced new sanctions on Russia for its cyber activities.
– There’s lots of news and commentary about the Afghanistan withdrawal announcement. I’ve just begun to read it. It’s best to start with Biden’s speech.
-One significant fact, Politico reports, is that Biden overrode military advice.
– Today the House Intelligence Committee has an open hearing with the IC leaders.Here’s the video of yesterday’s hearing before the Senate committee.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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It’s not over until the Afghans decide it is
I thought Laurel Miller of the International Crisis Group got Afghanistan right on Morning Edition today:
Like many decisions that get to the President, withdrawal from Afghanistan is a close call. It could give terrorists a chance to return there and use the country as a safe haven, but more likely post-US Afghanistan will be too unstable and violent to be attractive Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. The Americans can act from outside the country, especially if they manage to preserve at least some of their intelligence capabilities. Certainly, as Eliot Cohen argues, we owe to Afghans wanting to escape Taliban rule an open door to allow them to immigrate to the US, as we managed to do for the South Vietnamese after the North took over there.
The risks of withdrawal are real. The analogy with Iraq is imperfect, but we would do well to remember that withdrawal from there in 2011 led by 2014 to ISIS takeover of about one-third to the country. There is little question but that a consolidated Taliban regime in Kabul like the one that ruled there during the 2001 US invasion would be inimical to US interests and open to hosting international terrorists. It will now be up to Afghans to prevent the Taliban from consolidating power, a task that should be easier than ridding the country of their presence in the countryside, but one that will ensure conflict continues for years if not decades more.
That said, the two-decade US and allied military and civilian effort to build a viable, democratic, and self-sustaining state in Afghanistan has failed. President Ghani literally wrote a book on state-building that I use in my SAIS course. It hasn’t helped in Afghanistan. Two key obstacles, noted by Laurel and Jim Dobbins years ago, were never overcome: the resistance of local elites and the hostility of neighbors, in particular Pakistan but also Iran. The US effort was mainly a military one, but with a pretty strong civilian counterpart from the mid 2000s, when George W realized he wouldn’t be able to get out of Afghanistan without a serious stabilization effort. But Afghanistan was too poor, too illiterate, too fractious, too large, too violent, too religious, too remote, and too traditional to respond to Western formulas.
Two decades of effort–even if at times insincere or ill-conceived–will have to suffice. Afghans may still surprise us with their resourcefulness, either in reaching an agreement that stabilizes the country or in defeating the worst of the extremists. More likely, chaos will prevail for some time, as it did in the 1990s after the successful rebellion against the Communist regime until the Taliban imposed draconian order. The American role may be over, but the conflict is not. Now it is up to the Afghans to decide when the time comes.
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Stevenson’s army, April 14
– Senate Intelligence committee will hold its hearing with top IC officials Wed at 1000. NYT has a story on its unclassified report. And a link to the document.
-Breaking Defense reports on DOD efforts to prevent Chinese investments in US tech companies.
– Administration says US and allied troops out of Afghanistan by Sept 11.
– NYT says Capitol Police were told to hold back on Jan 6 protesters.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, April 13
– WSJ says Taliban pulled out of peace talks.
-G-7 expressed concern about Russia threats to Ukraine.
– Israeli openness about Natanz attack causes concern.
– GOP Senators say nominee Kahl disclosed classified information in tweets.
-Economist says war against money laundering is being lost.
– NYT profiles new CISA nominee.
– WaPo looks at cyber budget.
– Blinken talks about Taiwan, Russia
– Last week I sent around Ezra Klein’s analysis of Biden strategy, including his comment that the economists have lost power in the administration. Today I want to share Noah Smith’s careful parsing of administration economic thinking. He sees a big plan there.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Watch this space: 10 challenges Biden wishes he didn’t have
President Biden is preoccupied with domestic issues: the economy, COVID-19, race and inequality. But of course foreign policy waits for no president.
The current picture is gloomy:
- Russia has been threatening renewed hostilities against Ukraine. Moscow is claiming it is all Kiev’s faulty, but I suspect Putin is getting nervous about improved performance of the Ukrainian Army. Perhaps he thinks it will be easier and less costly to up the ante now. Besides a new offensive would distract from his domestic problems, including that pesky political prisoner and hunger striker Alexei Navalny.
- Iran and Israel are making it difficult for the US to get back into the nuclear deal. Israel has somehow crashed the electrical supply to Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Tehran has amped up the IRGC/Supeme Leader criticism of President Rouhani, making it harder for him to ease conditions for Washington’s return to the nuclear deal. A vigorous Iranian reaction to the Israeli sabotage would make the Americans hesitate.
- Peace talks between Afghanistan and the Taliban for a transitional power-sharing government are not going well. How could they? The Taliban want an Afghanistan in which President Ghani would have no place. Ghani wants an Afghanistan in which the Taliban would have no place. Powersharing requires a minimum of mutual tolerance that appears lacking.
- North Korea is renewing its missile and nuclear threats. President Trump pretty much poisoned the diplomatic well with Pyongyang by meeting three times with Kim Jong-un without reaching a serious agreement. Kim seems to have decided he can manage without one, so long as his nuclear weapons and missiles threaten South Korea, Japan, and even the continental United States.
- China is menacing Taiwan. I doubt Beijing wants to face the kind of military defense and popular resistance an invasion would entail, but ratcheting up the threat forces Taipei to divert resources and puts an additional issue on the negotiating table with Washington, which doesn’t want to have to come to Taipei’s defense.
- Syria’s Assad is consolidating control and preparing for further pushes into Idlib or the northeast. While unquestionably stretched thin militarily and economically, Damascus no longer faces any clear and present threat to Assad’s hold on power. He hasn’t really won, but the relatively liberal opposition has definitely lost, both to him and to Islamist extremists.
- Central Americans are challenging American capacity to manage its southern border. The increase of asylum seekers, especially children, presents a quandary to the Biden Administration: shut them out as President Trump did, or let them in and suffer the domestic political consequences. Biden has put Vice President Harris in charge, but it will be some time before she can resurrect processing of asylum seekers in their home countries and also get the kind of aid flowing to them that will cut back on the economic motives for migration.
- The Houthis aren’t playing nice. America’s cut in military and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE is giving their Yemeni adversaries a chance to advance on the last remaining major population center in the north still nominally held by President Hadi’s shambolic government. If the Houthis take Marib, the consequences will be catastrophic.
- Addis Ababa isn’t either. Africa’s second most populous country, Ethiopia, has gone to war against its own Tigray region, which had defied Addis’ authority on control of the military and holding elections. The Americans want Addis to ease up and allow humanitarian assistance and media in. Ethiopia’s reforming Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy is playing rope-a-dope with the Americans and keeping up the pressure on the Tigrayans.
- You haven’t heard much about it lately, but nothing good is happening in Venezuela, where President Maduro has survived efforts to oust him and now is enjoying one of what must be at least 9 lives.
Biden deserves a lot of credit for what he is doing domestically, and he is the best versed president on foreign affairs in decades. But the international pressures are building. It is only a matter of time before one or more of these ten issues, or a half dozen others, climb to the top of his to-do list. None of them are going to be easy to handle. Watch this space.
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