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Deal likely, but can it go any farther than rollback?

This discussion of the possible return of the US to the Iran nuclear deal was convened by the Middle East Institute May 26, as US-Iranian talks in Vienna entered their fifth round. Participants analyzed the prospects for a deal between the US and Iran and its implications for the region’s security. The panel discussed the possibility of expanding on the original JCPOA, as well as broader regional security dynamics and specifically their implications for Iraq. They agreed a new JCPOA seems to be imminent. However, the question remains whether it can be used to reduce Iranian influence in the region and if it should.

The speakers were:

Amb. (ret.) Rend al-Rahim
Co-founder and President
The Iraq Foundation;
former Iraqi Ambassador to the US

Michael Rubin
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute

Ali Vaez
Iran project Director
International Crisis Group

Alex Vatanka (moderator)
Director, Iran Program
Middle East Institute

A mutually beneficial deal?

All speakers agreed that a deal appears imminent. Ali Vaez pointed out that sequencing will remain an issue, but that the largest problems will likely be solved at the 11th hour. Iranian or Israeli brinkmanship is unlikely to derail the negotiations. This was shown by their continuation after the attack on the Natanz facility and Iran’s announcement that it would start enriching to 60%. Rubin believes Congress should be asked to ratify the agreement. Congress might prove more concerned about brinkmanship than the negotiators in Vienna. Ali Vaez expects that the deal will be announced right after the Iranian presidential elections. In this way, the result will not influence the popularity of conservative candidates. At the same time, Rouhani would still be responsible for the deal’s implementation, meaning he can serve as a scapegoat for any of its shortcomings: a win-win for conservatives in Iran.

The speakers disagreed on whether more than the original JCPOA should be on the table. Ali Vaez argued that a return to the original deal is needed to build trust after the unwarranted American abandonment of the deal under president Trump. Ambassador al-Rahim, however, said she does not believe that any further progress can be made after this deal. Just like after the initial JCPOA’s conclusion, no further deals – for example on ballistic missiles – will be forthcoming. Michael Rubin argued that some important issues need to be addressed. In this ‘JCPOA+’ framework, attention needs to be paid to the role of the IRGC in Iran’s economy. Rubin emphasized that any easing of sanctions could go to the IRGC’s economic wing, rather than benefiting the Iranian people in dire need of economic relief. In fact, lifting sanctions without addressing the IRGC’s entanglement in the economy would only aid in its projects throughout the region.

Thinking about a new Middle Eastern security arena

This brought the discussion to the second point of disagreement: the level of Iranian influence that is desirable. Ambassador al-Rahim outlined the difference in strategic visions between Iran and the US. According to her, the US fails to use its potential in the region (for example through the Iraqi Strategic Dialogue). Instead it focuses on disengaging and setting up a post-US strategic order. The US needs to consider whether it is content with leaving Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon under Iranian influence, with an Israeli-Gulf alliance hegemonous over the rest of the region. Iran, as Rubin pointed out, meanwhile sees itself as a pan-regional power, not merely Shia. It is unlikely to accept such a limited sphere of influence. He emphasized that there are ways of resisting Iranian influence without major US investments. Regional countries need to be armed to do so themselves.

Ali Vaez also sees these problems, but challenges the US to consider how much Iranian influence is acceptable. If the US and its allies are content only when Iranian influence in Iraq is zero, then the goal is simply unrealistic. Should we consider influence in a country like Iraq as zero-sum, as Israel and the Gulf appear to do? Also, can we expect Iran to disarm while we are arming its neighbors to the tune of billions of dollars? A regional détente with concessions from all sides is his preferred means of lowering tensions. Ambassador al-Rahim contends that Tehran sees its influence as zero-sum too. If it is allowed to have any influence, it will aim for total influence. Furthermore, she contends that Iran did have zero influence in Iraq before 2003. Its entanglement in Iraqi power structures is not unavoidable she thinks. She and Vaez agree that both Washington and Tehran should agree that Iraq needs to be allowed to be its own sovereign country. Recent Shia protests in Iraq show that the population shares this desire.