Month: May 2021
Peace Picks | May 24-28, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Africa Day at the Atlantic Council: A vision for the African Century | May 25, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
In celebration of Africa Day, which marks the founding of the African Union, and to introduce the new Africa Center team and vision under Director Ambassador Rama Yade, the Atlantic Council is launching its African Conversations Series. The series aims to shine a light on high-profile US officials’ connections to the continent and engagement with Africa policy.
High-profile US officials speak to US-Africa policy under the Biden administration, spotlighting Africa’s strategic importance and dynamic outlook.
Speakers:
The Hon. Dana L. Banks
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council
James L. Jones, Jr.
Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council
H.E. Hilda Suka-Mafudze
Ambassador to the United States, African Union
The Hon. Linda Thomas-Greenfield
Representative to the United Nations, US Department of State
Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council
Rama Yade (moderator)
Africa Center Director, Atlantic Council
2. Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance: A U.S. Strategy for Clean Energy Supply Chains| May 25, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | CSIS | Register Here
This event is a presentation and discussion of the new CSIS report Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance: A U.S. Strategy for Clean Energy Supply Chains. Asrenewable energy technologies mature and get deployed at scale, there is a greater need to think strategically about this system. Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance argues that the United States can apply some of the mental models, tools, and institutions used for conventional energy sources to think about supply chains in clean energy—and, in doing so, grow its economy and boost its national security.
Speakers:
Nikos Tsafos (Introduction)
Interim Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS
Sarah Ladislaw
Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS
Laszlo Varro
Chief Economist, International Energy Agency
3. In Search of Peace for Afghanistan: Historical Perspectives | May 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Last month’s announcement that all U.S and international troops will leave Afghanistan before September 11, 2021 has sparked intense debate over the country’s future after over four decades of near-continuous conflict. Deteriorating security conditions, uncertainty over the level of international engagement moving forward and political instability pose great risks to the fragile peace process and the prospects for a sustainable political settlement. Many analysts have compared the current moment to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, an alarming parallel given the years of civil war and Taliban rule that followed.
These issues are at the heart of a recently published book by the Kakar History Foundation and Heart of Asia Society titled In Search of Peace for Afghanistan: Historical Letters of President Najibullah and Dr. M. Hassan Kakar — A Collection of Essays. This essay collection considers the correspondence between the former Afghan president and one of the country’s leading scholars regarding Afghanistan’s post-Soviet future and the lessons that can be drawn as the country navigates the U.S. troop withdrawal. Several of the contributing authors to this book will reflect on Afghan politics and the country’s relationship with the international community as U.S. troops withdraw.
Speakers:
Amb. Lakhdar Brahimi (Keynote)
Former U.N. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Syria; former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria
Amb. Richard Olson (Introduction)
Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace; former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Belquis Ahmadi
Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
Robert Crews
Professor of History, Stanford University
Kawun Kakar
Executive Director, Kakar History Foundation
Amb. Janan Mosazai
Former Ambassador of Afghanistan to Pakistan and China; Co-Founder and Vice President, Heart of Asia Society
Omar Sharifi
Country Director, American Institute of Afghanistan Studies
Omar Sadr
Assistant Professor of Political Science, American University of Afghanistan
Dipali Mukhopadhyay (Moderator)
Senior Expert, U.S. Institute of Peace
4. Re-balancing U.S. Security Engagement with Arab States | May 26, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
The Biden administration’s desire to reduce the U.S. presence in the Middle East is just the latest attempt by an American president to pull out of the region, and yet the legacy of U.S. entrenchment in the Middle East continues to draw it in. To what extent has the heavily militarized nature of U.S. engagement with Arab states met its goals for regional peace and self-reliance? Can the United States draw down its military presence, reduce security assistance, and be more selective about arms sales without sacrificing critical interests and American jobs? What would less securitized U.S. policies mean for competition with China and Russia in the region?
Speakers:
Chris Murphy (Keynote)
Senator for Connecticut, US Senate; Member, Foreign Relations Committee; Chairman, Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism
Frederic Wehrey
Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Michele Dunne
Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Kim Ghattas
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
David Schenker
Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Jalel Harchaoui
Senior Fellow, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
5. Deal or No Deal: US-Iran Talks and Implications for the Middle East | May 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Most signs at the moment suggest that US-Iran nuclear negotiations are making incremental progress. There might be a deal, which would have to include the US lifting some of the sanctions on the country, while the government of President Hassan Rouhani is still in place. Alternatively, the talks can drag on for months more to come. What is undeniable is that the prospects of a revived nuclear agreement to be sustainable is best served by broadening the US-Iranian dialogue as quickly as possible. A number of issues will continue to pit American and Iranian interests against each other. On this list of disagreements, US-Iran competition in Iraq is among the most contentious.
Can Iraq provide a platform for the US and Iran to co-exist? What other high-stake regional areas of competition could be impacted depending on the outcome of the US-Iran negotiations?
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Rend al-Rahim
Co-founder and President, The Iraq Foundation; former Iraqi Ambassador to the US
Michael Rubin
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Ali Vaez
Senior Advisor to the president; Iran project Director, International Crisis Group
Alex Vatanka
Director, Iran Program, Middle East Institute
6. MEI Lebanon Policy Conference – Breaking the Lebanese Political Logjam | May 26, 2021 | 11:15 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
How can Lebanon overcome the domestic and international obstacles to forming a truly independent, reform-minded government? Is such a government even possible with the current political establishment? Which political scenarios are the most likely to unfold in the weeks and months ahead? How far has the Lebanese protest movement come since October 2019? How can an increasingly busy United States and international community support the people of Lebanon in their quest for real change? Where does Lebanon even fall on the international community’s list of priorities?
Speakers:
John Alterman
Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program, CSIS
Paul Salem
President, Middle East Institute
Maha Yahya
Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Christophe Abi-Nassif (Moderator)
Lebanon Program Director, Middle East Institute
7. China in the Middle East: What Lies Ahead? | May 27, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Watch Here
Conflict and instability in the Middle East show no signs of abating. Recent jousting between Israeli and Palestinian forces, the ongoing war in Yemen, and continued Saudi Arabia-Iran friction threaten to further destabilize the region. Though President Biden is attempting to restore coherence in the U.S. approach to the Middle East, his administration remains focused on responding to the pandemic domestically and on countering China in the international arena. Beijing, for its part, appears intent on playing a larger role in Middle Eastern affairs. It continues to foster stronger ties with regional countries through its Belt and Road Initiative and securing cooperation agreements, such as the twenty-five-year investment deal with Iran. How will China’s growing influence in the region affect the interests of the United States and other actors?
Speakers:
He Wenping
Professor at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Karim Sadjadpour
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Paul Haenle
Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy
8. Women and Iran’s Presidential Elections: What Role Will They Play? | May 27, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Iranian women emerged as a force of change in 1997 after they voted overwhelmingly for Mohammad Khatami, bringing to power a reformist cleric. Although candidates and political parties have issued plans to improve their status to win their votes, women have seen little improvement in their rights at home and in society. Many see the country’s civil code and constitution, which were written based on Islamic Law after the revolution, as the source of discrimination.
Nevertheless, women’s role in the presidential elections on June 18 remains crucial. Will they vote and who will they vote for? What are their concerns? Or, will they stay away from the polls in a sign of protest to create a legitimacy crisis for the regime?
Speakers:
Roya Boroumand
Executive Director, The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center
Fatemeh Haghighatjoo
CEO and co-founder, Nonviolent Initiative for Democracy; Iranian scholar; women’s rights advocate
Susan Tahmassebi
Director, FEMENA; women’s rights activist
Nazila Fathi (Moderator)
Non-resident scholar, MEI
9. The Gulf Cooperation Council at 40 | May 27, 2021 | 10 AM ET | The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | Register Here
As the GCC marks its 40th anniversary, what has been the organization’s real impact on its member states, the Gulf, and international relations? Is the GCC living up to its potential to foster regional economic integration? Can the organization still function as an effective forum for cooperation on defense and security issues, despite political divisions among its members? Will the January signing of the Al Ula agreement ending the crisis with Qatar help to build back trust and collaboration?
Speakers:
Abdullah Baabood
Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies and Visiting Professor, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University
Matteo Legrenzi
Professor of International Relations, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Emma Soubrier
Visiting Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kristin Smith Diwan (Moderator)
Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
10. Next Steps for U.S. Policy in the Ongoing Crisis in the Middle East | May 27, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Center for American Progress | Submit questions Here
The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas has had devastating human costs and exposed long-time vulnerabilities and inequities among Palestinians and Israelis. The Biden administration has stepped up its engagement to work toward ending the conflict, but what steps should the United States take to address the underlying conditions that led to this latest violence?
Speakers:
Ghaith Al Omari
Former Palestinian Authority adviser; Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ezzedine C. Fishere
Former Egyptian diplomat; Senior Lecturer, Dartmouth College
Brian Katulis
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Ofer Zalzberg
Director of the Middle East Program, Herbert C. Kelman Institute
Mara Rudman (Moderator)
Executive Vice President for Policy, Center for American Progress; former U.S. Deputy Envoy for Middle East Peace
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If you hijack an airplane, you are a hijacker
Belarus’ hijacking of a Ryanair flight crossing its territory in order to arrest a dissident journalist is a quantum jump in contemporary autocratic behavior. No doubt autocratic governments will justify it on the basis of exerting national sovereignty over their own air space. But it endangered close to 200 innocent people and set a precedent for future actions of this sort. The punishment in most countries is life imprisonment or death.
What can be done about Belarus’ perfidy? The objectives should be the freeing of the journalist and making it clear that there is nothing to be gained from state hijacking of aircraft. The US, EU, UK, and other willing countries should engage as quickly as possible with both Minsk and Moscow to determine if there is any possibility of an early release of the journalist and to convey their willingness to take further action if he is not released right away.
That effort may well fail, so here are a few ideas of next steps to pressure Minsk:
- The US, UK, and EU could expand their travel and financial sanctions on regime figures and institutions in Belarus. These could include SWIFT restrictions on transactions involving Belarusan banks.
- They could end EU, World Bank and International Monetary Fund grants, lending, and programs in Belarus.
- They could prevent Belavia, the national airline, from landing on their territory.
- They could recall their ambassadors for consultations, expel Belarusan diplomats, or break diplomatic relations with Minsk.
- They could pledge to detain for questioning about the incident Belarusan officials found on their territory, including but not limited to President Lukashenko (yes, I know heads of state are supposed to have diplomatic immunity).
- They can insist on an investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
While this hijacking was manifestly a threat to peace and security, convening the UN Security Council may not be useful, as Belarus can likely rely on Russia to prevent any serious action there, even a presidential statement. After all, that’s what the US did for Israel just in the past couple of weeks to prevent a statement on the Gaza war.
I am not advocating any of the above options, just pointing them out. The trick is to craft some reasonable combination of them and other ideas. Most important is that the US, EU, and UK act together. If they do, the message will be greatly amplified.
There is a real possibility that this is the beginning of the end of Belarusan independence. Russian President Putin, while nominally backing Lukashenko’s right to do what he did, might take the opportunity to defenestrate him (figuratively if not literally), knowing that the West won’t seriously object under current circumstances. Even before this incident, the Russians were taking over. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to complete the process?
President Biden now faces a second crisis situation he doesn’t want, following on the Hamas/Israel war. He looked reasonably adept in that instance. With Belarus, he should expect the EU to play a stronger role, but he has to be prepared to lead if need be. The world will notice if the West is unable to deal with state hijacking. Let’s see what Biden can do.
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Yes, it’s time, but only you can make it happen
I was up at 5 this morning to spend 6-8 on Zoom with Circle 99, the venerable intellectuals’ club in Sarajevo. The topic was “Is It Time for a post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina?” Here are the speaking notes I used:
- Let me first say that it is a great pleasure to be back at Circle 99. Yes, I’ve been there before, in late 1995 or maybe early in 1996.
- I was then Special Envoy for the Bosnian Federation, helping to construct its institutions and get them functioning, along with Michael Steiner, then a German diplomat.
- Bosnia and I have come a long way since then. When I sit with friends drinking a coffee in Sniper Alley, I find it impossible to agree with their frequent declarations that nothing has changed.
- Lots of things have obviously changed. I think what they mean is that they are disappointed in the changes.
- Also for me, Bosnian politics too closely resembles war by other means: ethnically defined forces fighting a zero-sum game, each trying to enlist the support of powers outside Bosnia.
- I’d like to start today by explaining why this is the case, then move on to my analysis of what is wrong and what needs to be done to set it right, despite the odds.
- Notoriously, the Americans imposed the Dayton agreement on the warring parties of the 1990s.
- That is true, but we imposed what the three warring parties wanted: a power-sharing arrangement among “constituent peoples,” one based on its own ethnically defined 49% of the territory and the two others sharing power in the remaining 51%.
- Here it behooves me to explain why there was no third entity at Dayton.
- After all, the Herzegovinian Croats were in a very strong position in 1995: they had the backing of Croatia, which had successfully retaken most of its Serb-occupied Krajina, commanded the HVO, and controlled the flow of arms to the Bosnian Army, which by August 1995 were advancing rapidly towards Banja Luka.
- But President Tudjman, no great enlightenment figure, did not want Herzegovina inside his state or separated from Sarajevo, which would necessarily have meant a radicalized rump Muslim republic in central Bosnia.
- He agreed with the Americans and Germans that was something to avoid. The Federation was the means of doing so.
- By late 1994, when I first met with Herzeg-Bosna officials, Tudjman and Croatian Defense Minister Susak had removed the previous more radical, secessionist leadership of the Bosnian Croats and were pressuring them hard to participate constructively in the Federation.
- I spent many days in Zagreb lining up the details of Tudjman’s and Susak’s support. They never asked for a third entity, which they realized was not in Croatia’s interest.
- Fast forward to today: is a non-viable, radicalized, rump Muslim state or entity in central Bosnia a better idea today than it was in 1995? I think not.
- It is no better an idea for Serbia than it is for Croatia, never mind for the many Bosniaks who identify as politically moderate Europeans, or the Americans, the UK, and the member states of the European Union.
- At Dayton, the representatives of the three constituent peoples made their peace within a single sovereign state and agreed not only to share power but also to distribute it in a way that makes it difficult for anyone to gain power without identifying unequivocally with one of the constituent peoples and foreswearing support from the other two.
- No wonder the ethnonationalist leaders were prepared to accept what the Americans imposed at Dayton: it was as close to a guarantee they could stay in power indefinitely as they could hope to get.
- And no wonder Dragan Covic and Milorad Dodik want to strengthen the ethnonationalist hold on power.
- So to those who are hoping for a post-Dayton Bosnia, my first word is one of warning: be careful of what you wish for.
- The various non-papers tell you precisely what Covic and Dodik want. And who is Izetbegovic to object to the Green Garden, which had some appeal to his father during the war?
- There are more ways of making things worse in Bosnia and Herzegovina than making them better, as the Mostar election agreement showed.
- Electoral reform is a dangerous trap, full of technical issues that really matter in determining the outcome.
- I’d much prefer to see constitutional reform first, in the direction of making Bosnia and Herzegovina a more liberal democratic state.
- During the war, the President of the Federation, Kresimir Zubak, called me into his office one day and read me the riot act: one man one vote, he said, will never work in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- He was correct in that moment. The war had convinced each of the constituent peoples that they would never get a fair shake from the other two.
- Which is why Bosnia today has three presidents, two entities, houses of peoples, vital national interest vetoes, and dozens of other guarantees of group rights over and above individual rights.
- But now it is more than 25 years later. Does Bosnia and Herzegovina need its elaborate and dysfunctional governing structures in order to protect Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs as groups, or could it begin to dismantle those structures in favor of individual rights?
- My answer would be yes. I think the group rights guaranteed at Dayton are now threatening the integrity and functionality of the state.
- What Bosnia needs now is a shift of power away from the entities and cantons towards Sarajevo for some things and towards the municipalities for other things.
- The “state” government in Sarajevo should have all the responsibility and authority required to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communautaire. It should set the rules of the game.
- The municipalities, many of which have Croat or Serb majorities, should be the main providers of citizen services, with the budgets and authority required to do so effectively and efficiently.
- The prerequisite for such a reform is to refocus the constitution away from protecting group rights and towards protecting individual rights.
- But I confess what I think really doesn’t matter. I’m an American who likes the fact that as a member of a minority group and descendant of immigrants I can claim exactly the same rights as any other citizen, without reference to my ethnic group.
- I interact much more often in my private life with my municipality, where my voice is more readily heard, than with the Federal government.
- But in Bosnia and Herzegovina 25 years after the war, the choice is yours, not mine.
- You can continue to fight your ethnic battles by political means for another 25 years, or you can choose to end what we call in English the consociationalism that has proven itself so dysfunctional in practice, even if it was necessary for peace.
- I would note here that you are not alone in facing that choice: Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel—each in its own way—is facing a similar choice, whether to continue with ethnically based governance or begin to reward competence.
- In all three of these Middle Eastern countries, people are taking to the streets to demand a change in the constitutional system in favor of individual rights and cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian political organization.
- Therein lies a lesson: it can only be done if the citizens demand it. It is not enough for you here at Circle 99 to analyze and criticize.
- Someone —one of you or someone else—needs to lead the way, backed by a mass movement of citizens demanding their voices be heard, organizing to ensure candidates emerge who represent them, and voting to end the monopoly power of the ethnic nationalists.
- I occasionally hear the rumbling of such mass movements and electoral coalitions across ethnic lines in Bosnia: after the floods, when the plenums convened, in the cries of Justice for David and Dzenan.
- So far though, they have failed so far to generate the required political weight, partly due to repression.
- But what happened to Milosevic in Serbia and to Gruevski in Macedonia can happen in Bosnia: a politician secure in his hold on power and his control of the state apparatus—so secure in Milosevic’s case that he called early elections—can fall to the popular will.
- It is high time for Bosnians who are tired of the ethnic state to try to create something better.
- So I conclude: yes, it is time for a post-Dayton, civic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But only you can make it happen.
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Stevenson’s army, May 23
NYT says risk of nuclear war in 1958 Taiwan crisis was much higher than once thought. Story based on document leaked by Dan Ellsberg. BEWARE: NYT has links to the declassified version and the still-classified sections. If you have a security clearance, you could be in jeopardy if you download and open the still-classified version.
– Iran blocks IAEA inspectors.
– Wired has long story about 2011 hack by China.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Eurovision needs better singers
A few quick comments on yesterday’s Eurovision song contest, which was won by an Italian heavy metal band. Some may think this out of my lane, but the event all too clearly reflected current international realities. San Marino and Australia are represented, but not Kosovo? Israel but not Palestine? No Turkey but Greece and Cyprus voting for each other? No Bosnia, because they haven’t paid their bills? It all sounds very familiar to me.
Then there was language. The hosts said “good evening” in the languages of many countries, but everyone spoke English except, of course, a French presenter. The accents were more American than British. That is understandable in the music world. The Europe Union communicates well in a language that is not native to any of its current members! Like much of the rest of the world.
What isn’t so understandable is how a heavy metal band wins in 2021. During ten years living in Italy I never once listened to heavy metal, which in any case strikes me as a throwback. Did today’s young Europeans really sit at home during the epidemic refining their taste for rock and roll in that direction?
I heard a lot of wonderful music in the 1970s, 80s and 90s in Rome, from Roberto Murolo to Luciano Pavarotti. If you don’t know who Murolo was, here is a sample:
If you don’t know who Pavarotti was, try this:
Neither would have had half a chance at Eurovision, but I guess that is beside the point.
Eurovision isn’t meant to be high art, either folk or operatic. We used to call its category “camp.” I suppose some will hear “Ziiti e Bouni” as “artifice, frivolity, naïve middle-class pretentiousness, and shocking excess,” which Wikipedia tells me is Susan Sontag’s definition of camp:
But it sounds more “noisy and terrible” to me. “Rock and roll will never die” the lead singer shouted when given the award. Or is it already dead?
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Stevenson’s army, May 22
– FT says China snubs SecDef Austin’s requests for mil-to-mil talks.
– NYT says Congress is disagreeing with the generals
– DefenseOne reports fights over what belongs in the Space Force.
– Defense experts say Congress should get more budget details.
– Rose Gottemoeller tells how hard it is for a woman to negotiate with the Russians.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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