Month: May 2021
Stevenson’s army, May 17
– Jonathan Swan of Axios has Politishocking story of how, right after the election, President Trump used his personnel office to prepare a memo ordering US troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Somalia, Germany, Iraq & Syria by January 20. The memo, never shown to NSA O’Brien or WH Counsel Cipollone, was sent to newly installed acting SecDef Miller. Pushback from O’Brien and CJCS Milley led to a meeting where Trump agreed to less drastic withdrawals.
-NYT reports that Biden, in private meetings, is often deliberative, temperamental, demanding of information, slow to decide. Sounds pretty normal to me.
-Politico questions whether Biden has too many Special Envoys.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | May 17 – May 21
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. Migration and Displacement in Libya: Converging Challenges and Pathways Forward | May 18, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Mohamed Abu Araba: Program Manager, Bawader Foundation
Malak Edoudi: Livelihoods officer, Danish Refugee Council
Mohamed Hmouma: Program manager, Almotawaset Organization for Migration and Relief
Mohamed Saad: Lecturer, faculty in Chemical Engineering, University of Sirte
Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux (moderator): Director and co-founder, NAPI
This event will feature several of NAPI’s Young Policy Leaders and NAPI affiliates, who will discuss their research on the impact of migration and forced displacement in Libya. There are currently an estimated 12.4 million displaced people across the MENA region: a tremendous humanitarian emergency that is compounded by various environmental and governance factors. In Libya, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) accounted for 245,000 IDPs in February 2021, and over 620,000 returnees since 2016. Together, they make up close to 900,000 displaced Libyans in five years, which is approximately 14% of the Libyan population. In addition to IDPs, IOM tracked 576,000 migrants in Libya in February 2021, although these do not include migrants in movement and those in the hands of people traffickers. The speakers’ research spans intersections such as the economic recovery of people impacted by conflict, the state of migrant detention centers, the rights of migrant workers, the experiences of IDPs in establishing livelihoods, and the connection between climate change and displacement.
2. The Marine Corps and the future of warfare | May 18, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Gen. David H. Berger: Commandant, Marine Corps
Michael E. O’Hanlon (moderator): Director of Research, Foreign Policy
The Marine Corps is pursuing significant changes to address the realities of great power competition, including implementing a new force design. Evolving technology, uncertainty about the budgetary and fiscal environment, and accelerating innovation by America’s emerging competitors have forced the Marine Corps to adapt by reconfiguring itself to better address the nation’s future defense outlook. Much work, though, remains to be done. On May 18, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Commandant of the Marine Corps General David H. Berger to discuss Marine Corps modernization, the budgetary environment, and the challenges of great power competition.
3. After the pandemic: Health security and multilateralism at work | May 19, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 9:30 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Werner Baumann: CEO, Bayer
Gunilla Carlsson: Vice-Chair, Global Fund Strategy Committee
Sergio Dompé: President of Dompé Farmaceutici
Anthony Dworkin: Research Director and Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR
Alessandro Speciale (moderator): Rome Bureau Chief, Bloomberg
The covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, but it has also created a new sense of urgency behind the need for multilateral action, which has been shown to be directly connected to the health and well-being of individuals in every country.
4. What is the road ahead for Colombia? | May 19, 2021 | 9:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Speakers
Adriana Mejía Hernández: Vice Minister of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Colombia
Jason Marczak (moderator): Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Amid the third peak of the pandemic, over 400,000 people took to the streets in Colombia to protest a now-withdrawn tax-reform bill proposed by the government to address the country’s economic crisis. In some cities, protests were permeated by criminal acts, vandalism, and blockades. What steps is the Colombian government taking to address social and political tensions? How will Colombia stabilize its fiscal deficit and public debt? How can the United States support its longstanding ally at this critical moment?
5. Yezidis in Iraq & Syria: Genocide, Recovery & Geopolitical Challenges | May 19, 2021 | 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
James F. Jeffrey: Chair, Middle East Program
Amy Austin Holmes: Public policy fellow, Harvard University
Pari Ibrahim: Executive Director, Free Yazidi Foundation
Murad Ismael: President, Sinjar Academy
Nadine Maenza: Commissioner, US Commission on International Religious Freedom
Merissa Khurma (moderator): Program Director, Middle East Program
The Biden Administration must develop policies for Iraq and Syria that prioritize Yezidi and minority rights and must ensure that Yezidis do not suffer persecution and further marginalization even after the military defeat of ISIS. This panel will discuss the challenges and opportunities for Yezidis, the geopolitical terrain, and possible paths forward for the United States.
6. Economic Security of the Black Sea Region: Internal and External Challenges | May 19, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Altay Atli: Founder, Atli Global
The emerging market economies of the Black Sea – including Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia – are facing significant economic challenges, amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic. Such challenges are impacting the overall security of these countries, and the security of the wider region. The Middle East Institute’s (MEI) Frontier Europe Initiative is pleased to host a panel event to explore these challenges. What are the internal economic dynamics of Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia? How can they adequately manage a post-pandemic recovery, both as individual states and through cooperation with regional neighbors?
7. Calibrated Resistance: The Political Dynamics of Iran’s Nuclear Policymaking under Trump | May 20, 2021 | 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Speakers
Abolghasem Bayyenat: Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow
Drawing parallel with domestic and international conditions leading to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015, this research seeks to put Iran’s nuclear policymaking during the Trump administration into perspective and explain why Iran pursued the strategy of calibrated resistance, how this strategy became possible, and why alternative policies became unthinkable or impossible.
8. Elections and crises in Somalia and Ethiopia | May 20, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Abdirahmen Aynte: Co-Founder, Laasfort Consulting Group
Bronwen Morrison: Senior Director, Dexis Consulting Group
Lidet Tadesse: Policy Officer, European Centre for Development Policy Management
Vanda Felbab-Brown (moderator): Director, Initiative on Non-State Actors
For over a year, Somalia and Ethiopia have faced severe crises in governance and security. As Ethiopia heads into elections in early June, the Tigray insurrection against the central government has metamorphosed into an entrenched insurgency, even as external powers such as Eritrea have reinforced the Ethiopian military. Dangerous tensions have also escalated between Ethiopia and Sudan. In Somalia, an effort by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed to delay presidential and parliamentary elections and extend his rule has brought the country to the edge of a civil war. Intersecting with complex rivalries in the Red Sea region and the Middle East, tensions between Somalia’s federal government and federal member states risk wiping out a decade of stabilization efforts. Meanwhile, the terrorist group al-Shabab has been growing stronger over the past four years. On May 20, Foreign Policy at Brookings will convene a panel to discuss these internal crises, their regional complexities and repercussions, and June elections in Ethiopia and Somaliland — a state within Somalia. After their remarks, panelists will take questions from the audience.
9. The Role of Integrated Air and Missile Defense for Strategic Deterrence | May 21, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM ET | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
Speakers
LTG Daniel Karbler: Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Tom Karako: Senior Fellow, International Security Program and Director, Missile Defense Project
Please join the CSIS Missile Defense Project on Friday, May 21 for a conversation on the U.S. Army’s space and air and missile defense plans with Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
10. After Navalny’s Arrest: Whither the Russian Opposition | May 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Leonid Volkov: Head, Network of Regional Headquarters for Alexei Navalny
Matthew Rojansky (moderator): Director, Kennan Institute
The return to Russia and subsequent imprisonment of Alexei Navalny represents a possible turning point in Russian domestic politics. Navalny’s reappearance on the Russian stage sparked a series of large protests and a predictable sharp reaction from authorities. Can the opposition remain organized and united in light of this crackdown, or will Putin’s authoritarian turn be sufficient to maintain his grip on power?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
It’s not only about Montenegro
Colleague Mike Haltzel has a lot to say about Montenegro:
Hard for me to disagree with any of this, but I might have put more emphasis on Russia’s and Serbia’s efforts to undermine Montenegro’s independence. It has been their troublemaking, including through the Serbian Orthodox Church, that has made it difficult for a pro-EU opposition to emerge in Montenegro. President Djukanovic has had a virtual monopoly on liberal democratic ideals because the main serious political alternative has been Serb ethnic nationalist.
Now Montenegro is in a kind of ethnic security dilemma: anything Montenegrins do to preserve their identity is perceived as attacking Serbian identity and the Serbian state; and anything Serbs in Montenegro do to preserve their identity is perceived as an attack on Montenegrin identity and the Montenegrin state. Perhaps the biggest losers in this have been minorities, whom the Serbs see as devotees of President Djukanovic because they have consistently participated in governing coalitions with his political party. With no apparent way of winning them over because Serb identity excludes them, self-identified Serbs in Montenegro are hoping to intimidate and chase out Bosniaks, other Muslims, and Albanians while enfranchising as many ex-patriot Serbs as possible.
Russia and Serbia are strong supporters of Serb ambitions in Montenegro, not least because the former aim to undermine NATO and the latter to pursue the latest Serb fantasy, the “Serbian Home.” That’s the updated moniker for Greater Serbia, a single state that incorporates parts of neighboring states that Serbs inhabit (i.e. part of not only Montenegro but also Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia). It isn’t going to happen, but Serbia is aiming at least to re-impose its hegemony on its neighbors, even if that means destabilizing them, slowing their progress towards the EU, or undermining their credentials as NATO allies.
I’ve never quite understood a country that wants unstable neighbors, but in a zero-sum world it would make sense. Whatever I gain will come at my neighbors’ expense. The world since the financial crisis of 2007/8 has been close to zero sum, especially in Europe. Unwelcome migration, Brexit, the Greek financial crisis (and the threat of other financial crises), slow economic growth, and nationalist populism have undermined the attraction of the EU and provided Moscow and Belgrade with opportunities to project their more autocratic alternatives. The availibility of Chinese money has compounded the incentives to turn East rather than West, though Montenegro’s own billion-dollar loan is already going south. It should be a warning to others.
The US has already begun its post-pandemic economic expansion. Europe has not. Let’s hope it comes sooner rather than later, not only for Montenegro’s sake.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, May 13
– WH released a 34-page executive order on cybersecurity. And a shorter fact sheet. And the transcript of a press briefing. Now you know what I know.
– 3 defense think tanks released a defense budget simulator. But it doesn’t seem to be working yet. Bookmark for later.
-Experts released a plan to prevent the next pandemic.
-Peter Feaver asseses the old officers’ screed.
-DOD refuses to discuss Afghan relocation in open session.
– And Politico says the Afghan blame game is on.
Note: I’ll be away for a few days but a neighbor will save my papers. I’ll have more news next week.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, May 12
– Are the Russians conducting microwave attacks against Americans? Or is that implausible?
– Are retired officer attacks on Biden beyond the pale?
– Do we need a new ICBM? [My view: if the costs are low enough, it makes sense to force an enemy to have to worry about taking out ICBMs as well as other nuclear capable systems.]
– WSJ says US tariffs have sharply cut US imports from China
– CFR has new backgrounder on Taiwan.
– Lawfare writer doubts private sector owns 85% of US critical infrastructure
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What it’s not about, and what it is about
Framing is important, both at home and abroad.
At home, the Republicans are trying to focus on voter fraud. They all know that is not even remotely a problem. There is no evidence that fraud affected the outcome of the 2020 election in any state. But defining voter fraud as a major issue provides the excuse Republicans need to limit voting in hope of favoring their own candidates. Making voting harder, they think, will reduce the numbers of minority citizens, especially Blacks, who bother to turn out. Liz Cheney was voted out of her House leadership position because she refused to go along with the Big Lie about voter fraud, which is the ultimate test of loyalty to Donald Trump and the objectives of the January 6 insurrection on Capitol Hill.
Abroad, the Israeli government is focusing on Hamas rocket fire from Gaza, ignoring the evictions of Palestinians from their homes in East Jerusalem and the brutal repression of Muslim demonstrators on the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif that initiated the current frictions between Palestinians and Jews. The former Netanyahu would prefer to define as “real estate” disputes; the latter he defines as law enforcement against militants. Having lost his bid to form still another government, Netanyahu hopes to prevent Yair Lapid, the current holder of the mandate, from doing so. War with Hamas is a convenient amplification of a pre-existing crisis, one that might bring Netanyahu the support he was lacking, extend his caretaker status, or precipitate still another, likely inconclusive, Israeli election.
So where do real solutions lie?
At home, the Republican Party has shrunk to 25% of the electorate. Most of what remains is loyal to Trump and the Big Lie. This will guarantee that most of its candidates in 2022 come from his white supremacist corner. That is not the worst thing that can happen for Democrats, who have a good chance of going in to the next Congressional election with the epidemic under control and the economy restored at least to its prior 2% or so growth path. Predicting the outcome of elections is a fool’s errand, but even if Republican-majority state legislatures succeed in limiting minority voting, Democratic prospects could still be good. Control of the House and Senate will come down to a very few seats in even fewer states. A focused, unified effort could produce continued Democratic majorities in both Houses.
In the Middle East, prospects are not so good. Hamas is figuring it will gain political support from its “resistance” rocket fire, at least in the West Bank if not in Gaza. The bombardment will move Israelis in a more militant direction, especially as it appears to have ignited strife between Jews and Arabs inside Israel proper. Insecurity is a powerful political incentive that does not favor moderation. The only realistic alternative to a right-wing government in Israel is one with Arab support, but that has never happened and isn’t likely in the aftermath of the current fighting. Netanyahu may not survive, but his siege politics will, especially if the current covert war with Iran continues.
Ilan Goldenberg suggests the US has a supporting, not primary, role to play in ending the current fighting between Hamas and Israel. The UN and Egyptians he says should lead. That may well be so, but I still think it good that Secretary Blinken said today:
Israelis and Palestinians need to be able to live in safety and security, as well as enjoy equal measures of freedom, security, prosperity, and democracy.
This points clearly in the direction of equal rights, whether in one state or two. That is what the Israeli government needs to understand: its current policy of “mowing the grass” and maintaining a regime of unequal rights, both inside Israel and in the West Bank (not to mention Gaza!) is not sustainable. Israel cannot be both democratic and Jewish without allowing creation of a Palestinian state. Netanyahu doesn’t care, because he isn’t a democrat. He is as much a Jewish supremacist as Trump is a white supremacist. But Israel is rapidly losing support among Democrats in the United States, most of whom are committed to equal rights at home and abroad. That is what it is really all about.
RSS - Posts
