Engagement with armed groups is necessary, “good” or “bad”

The Crisis Response Council and the Brookings Institution’s Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors June 3 convened a discussion on challenges posed by armed groups to security sector reform (SSR) in the Middle East and beyond. Panelists agreed that SSR too frequently views armed groups from a unidimensional perspective. Militias are not inherent spoilers whose power is limited to the security sector. They are more often politically or socially embedded potential power brokers. State monopolies on violence are an anomaly in post-conflict states. Armed groups can contribute positively to SSR and governance.

The speakers were:

Vanda Felbab-Brown
Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors; Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Brookings Institution

Frederic Wehrey
Senior fellow, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Bernadetta Berti
Head of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General
NATO

Yaniv Voller
Senior Lecturer in the Politics of the Middle East
University of Kent; Stanford University

Ranj Alaaldin (moderator)
Visiting Fellow – Brookings Doha Center; Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institution

The present: thriving and misunderstood

Vanda Felbab-Brown highlighted the Corona pandemic’s effect on armed groups around the world. The associated economic downturn has pushed some states to their limits. 200 million people have been pushed into poverty, and many of those will be forced to engage in criminal activities to scrape together a living. Under these conditions, armed groups thrive. Hundreds of millions of people already live under total, partial, or shared control by armed groups. As state spending on social welfare, but also security provision, shrunk, armed groups moved in to fill the gaps.

Wehrey discussed the case of Libya, where armed groups have thrived in part because they were misunderstood by outsiders. Emerging after the fall of Gadhafi, they were useful security providers, but politicized and prone to state capture and corruption. The Libyan case could have ended more positively if the ‘prizes’ for militias had been placed under better oversight. Oil revenues, ministerial positions, ports, airports were targets for militia competition. Protection of such prizes could have prevented the militia growth that Libya has seen.

Multiple efforts to “train and equip” a Libyan army from scratch have failed. Such an effort takes years and the security vacuum that exists before its completion is sure to be filled up by someone. Furthermore, in Libya new armies have often recruited from specific tribal, communal, or political backgrounds. These are less national armies and more new militias. This is something Wehrey sees happening now with Turkish support for the Tripoli-based armed forces. The current effort to defer security issues while working on political unity is reminiscent of 2012. The outcome might be similar: a relapse into violence.

The panel agreed that armed groups are not anomalies and they will not go away. Ahram suggested states do not necessarily want to be centralized. There are many examples of leaders deliberately fragmenting power. Militia fighters are not unlucky souls whose dream is to join the regular army and leave the militia life behind them. These groups are an embedded part of their communities and not easily fixable aberrations.

What makes an armed group “good” or “bad”?

The exact drivers of armed groups are poorly understood by academia and policy makers. Voller focuses his research on the question of why certain pro-government militias act predatorily, while others do not. Rather than an inherent inclination to violence, he believes that a core determinant is whether an armed group acts in a theater where its constituency is present. The predominantly Shia PMF in Iraq became predatorial when they entered the Sunni northwest in the fight against ISIS, while the Kurdish Peshmerga refrained from doing so as they always operate among their Kurdish communities. Felbab-Brown countered that other factors must also be important, as there are plenty of examples of armed groups acting predatorily among their own communities. She posits that any armed group gets feedback from its community, even if it is only by means of resistance to violence. If a community lacks social cohesion, this feedback can be unclear or weak, allowing greater predatory behavior.

Wehrey warned against an overly economic focus when it comes to controlling militias. Paying off armed groups to steer them, or turning off their incomes to force their hand, only treats part of the reality. These groups are embedded in and motivated by communal identity, religion, and history. Ahram agreed. He added that armed groups are also not merely political, as there are many cases of armed groups engaging in negotiations or elections and still continuing their armed struggles. Normative motivations are also part of the equation, as local norms, national laws, and even international law (and the fear of a Hague tribunal) are all considered by militias. Ahram believes that the onus is on researchers to identify which of these different levers matter under which circumstances, and how they can be used effectively.

Berti joked that she would enjoy this academic exercise, but that the policy maker in her called for a different course of action. She warned that all of these tools are highly context specific. What works best in practice is a willingness to enter a long-term commitment to a peace building effort. An intervening power needs to engage in a dynamic relationship with local power brokers and be willing to deal with new actors and change course when the situation calls for it.

Policy makers’ task: flexibility and pragmatism

The panel agreed that thinking in terms of “good” or “bad” militias is a fruitless exercise. Voller emphasized once more that militias are embedded in their communities. He used the example of Syrian militias that might align with Assad and engage in repression in order to protect their own constituencies. We might not call these actors “good”, but we can understand what motivates them. Felbab-Brown explained that it is better to think in pragmatic terms of available alternatives. An armed group might be odious, yet be the best option in terms of service provision, behavior, and accountability. Local populations as a rule adapt to harsh and illiberal actors if they provide stability and security.

The task that faces policy makers is a daunting one, as current tools and theories are poorly equipped to deal with the realities. The key is to be flexible and to accept militias as an embedded part of society. Berti and Ahram underlined this. We often speak of ‘allowing’ armed groups to exist or participate in a society. In practice, however, we usually have little influence over their existence. Voller emphasized that engaging with a militia directly as the state, rather than condemning and ignoring it, is usually the best way to have a positive influence on its behavior. Using the example of the Lebanese Hezbollah, however, Berti warned us to beware of who’s steering whom in these dynamics.