Radicalization thrives as French Muslims lack a coherent identity

The position of French Muslims has become increasingly controversial. The experience of several terrorist attacks and the proliferation of Salafism met a government response.  A new “Islamist separatism” bill, which would further expand separation of church and state, is currently being passed through the French parliament. It would prohibit any civil servant or contractor for the public sector from wearing religious symbols. Although the bill does not explicitly mention Islam as such, many fear that it could unfairly target and further alienate Muslims in France.

The Wilson Center June 16 held a seminar on the position of French Muslims in the French state. The panel agreed that the current bill is an attempt by President Macron to appeal to right-wing voters. He faces reelection in 2022. Extreme right-wing candidate Marine Le Pen is polling well. France’s “Muslim Question” emerged from the political tradition of laïcité, which enforces strict separation of church and state, and decades of marginalization and exclusion of French Muslims. If French society doesn’t find better ways to engage this community, radicalization will continue. Nonetheless, the panel conceded that internal discussions in the Muslim community to find alternative Islamic narratives are also needed.

The speakers were:

Amel Boubekeur
Sociologist
EHESS (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales)

Steven Philip Kramer
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Professor of National Security Studies
Eisenhower School, National Defense University

Hakim El Karoui
Senior Fellow
Institut Montaigne
Senior Partner & Paris Office Head
Brunswick

William Drozdiak (moderator)
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Author of “The Last President of Europe: Emmanuel Macron’s Race to Revive France and Save the World”

A history of laïcité

Drozdiak introduced the tradition of ‘laïcité’ (secularism) in French politics. He mentioned that it is central to French political life, as it is enshrined in the first article of the constitution since 1905. It is more far-reaching than the separation of church and state in most democracies, and essentially relegates religious affiliation to the private sphere. Today it is a controversial topic. To some it is the glue that allows the French to live together despite their religious differences, but to others it has become an anti-religious tool used to discriminate against Muslims in France. El Karoui further nuanced this controversy. To him there are three visions of laïcité:

• Laïcité as an essentially legal term: the separation of church and state, a core democratic right.
• Laïcité as a historical battle between the Catholic church and the state that some think is being waged today between Islam and the state.
• Laïcité as a tenet of the Enlightenment. Here the discussion is cast in terms of reason as opposed to religion. The protection of the rational political process requires the exclusion of religious considerations.

Failed integration of Muslims in France

Muslims today often feel disconnected from the French state and society. Kramer outlined five historical reasons for this based on his forthcoming book:

• The shadow of colonialism and harsh decolonization processes scarred and uprooted huge populations of Muslims in the 20th century. Around a million Muslims left for France from Algeria alone. The atrocities of colonialism left deep impressions on these migrants.
• The historical timing of Muslim migration to France also affected their integration. The major wave of immigration came during the industrializing boom after World War II. Muslim men migrated to France to work and eventually brought their families. After this initial boom, however, the economy slowed down and began to deindustrialize, leaving many Muslims unemployed and marginalized.
• French urban policy also pushed Muslims to the fringes. During the boom period, massive social housing projects were set-up on the peripheries of cities. Many French natives left these areas when mortgages became more easily attainable in the 1970s, leaving behind Muslim ghettos in the ‘banlieues’.
• Kramer sees laïcité as part of the issue as well. He believes that opposition to public religiosity has turned anti-religious ideas against Muslims in particular. This is worsened by the Rassemblement National party, which was founded by returning white settlers from North Africa and has always held anti-Islamic sentiments.
• Most recently, the impact of Islamic terrorism on the Western world and in France has led to a mutual cycle of distrust and alienation between French society and its Muslim members. This has also pushed politicians such as Macron into security-based thinking surrounding Islam to counter the political rise of his main rival, Marine Le Pen.

The position of Muslims today and the new law

Boubekeur and El Karoui then spoke on the current issues the Muslim community in France faces. Boubekeur believes that the way the French state engages with Muslim communities has been entirely unsuccessful. It focuses on using appointed representatives of the Muslim community to speak for Muslims. However, this treats French Muslims as believers, rather than citizens. Furthermore, these representatives (often foreign Imams) lack local legitimacy. Their inability to address Islamophobia in France has left young Muslims disillusioned with their leadership.

Further adding to Muslims’ alienation is the fact that the state’s relationship to them has always been led by political agenda:

• In the 1970s, this meant Islam was seen as an immigration issue (not French, but migrants);
• In the 1980s and 90s it was seen as a banlieue issue;
• In the 2000s it has become securitized and linked to threats of radicalization and terrorism.

El Karoui identified three main issues among the current Islamic community in France:

• There is now a real Muslim middle class (10% hold a Master’s degree or higher, 1/3 a Bachelor’s) but there remains an undereducation problem among Muslims.
• A portion of young Muslims are looking for an identity. They don’t feel fully French, but also don’t feel Algerian, Tunisian, etc. They have increasingly started to identify primarily as Muslims, and some have made a very conservative interpretation of Islam their identity.
• Other Muslims feel that there are no adequate representatives for them in society. They are not tied to foreign states, nor do they identify as Muslims (i.e. they don’t want the Islamic community leaders to represent them). If this group cannot be represented and engaged, Islamism will continue to be an issue and the far right will continue to abuse it.

New ways to engage Muslims and new narratives to counter radicalization

The panel offered some solutions. Boubekeur focused on the ways in which the French state interacts with Muslims. El Karoui emphasized the need for new, authentic, Islamic counternarratives.

Boubekeur said the state has two options:

• Let Muslims engage in discussions with the French state as citizens (whomight have certain special needs, e.g. their desire to wear the veil in public spaces) or;
• Stick to a neutral, secular state, and let French Muslims express themselves without the weight of being associated with terrorists. Also allow them to organize themselves better, which is now frustrated in the name of countering Islamist networks.

According to El Karoui, the current proliferation of Salafist and Islamist ideologies can only be solved if Muslims find their own solutions in the struggle between Salafism, Islamism, and faith. The solution is in their hands. Muslims need to create symbols against Salafism and alternative narratives of Islam that appeal to young people.

Watch the recording of the event here: