Month: June 2021
NATO 2030: focus on cyber, Russia, and China
On June 4, the German Council on Foreign Relations together with the Brookings Institution hosted NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg for a keynote address on NATO in 2030. This address was held ahcommead of the NATO summit in Brussels on June 14, when a new policy paper will be published. The Secretary General provided an overview of NATO’s key challenges and opportunities, emphasizing. He emphasized NATO’s achievements and ambitions in the field of cyber security, as well as the new focus on China as a global competitor. In the Q&A, he acknowledged the differences between certain NATO allies on democracy and human rights, but stressed the alliance’s strength in finding common ground.
The speakers were:
John R. Allen (opening remarks)
President
Brookings Institution
Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook (introduction)
Designated Director and CEO
German Council on Foreign Relations
Constanze Stelzenmüller (moderator)
Fritz Stern Chair, Center on the United States and Europe
Brookings Institution
Jens Stoltenberg (keynote)
Secretary-general
NATO
The keynote: achievements, challenges, ambitions
Secretary General Stoltenberg acknowledged the challenges facing NATO today. While the Alliance leaving Afghanistan, its longest mission ever, it faces authoritarian threats from Russia and China. Russia threatens the Arctic Circle and perpetrates cyber attacks. China’s rise is obvious to all. It will soon be largest economy and already has the second largest military. Beijing doesn’t necessarily see NATO as an enemy. Cooperation on issues such as arms control or climate change is possible. Nonetheless, Beijing’s rise poses a challenge as it does not share NATO’s values of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty. None of NATO’s members can face these challenges alone, but Stoltenberg declared “the countries of Europe and North America are not alone. We stand together.”
He then proceeded to outline the key areas NATO will focus on in the next decade in nine points:
- NATO is the key theater in which to tackle transatlantic challenges such as Syria and Iran. Even if NATO does not intervene directly, its members still coordinate on such issues. After all, “NATO is not just a military alliance, but a political-military alliance.” It therefore has to resolve its differences and enhance cooperation.
- NATO will boost its collective response to threats and invest in modernizing and expanding its capacities.
- NATO members must strengthen their domestic resilience against outside interference. “Strong societies are our first line of defense.”
- Transatlantic innovation must be given a boost as well. NATO’s technological edge should be sharpened and gaps between allies need to be prevented. For this purpose, the Alliance will establish a Transatlantic Defense Accelerator in which members will cooperate in innovation.
- NATO will play its part in upholding the rules-based international order and speak with one voice to defend its values and interests. This means encouraging others to play by the rules; upholding freedom of navigation, as well as a safe and secure cyber space; and setting rules and standards for emerging technologies.
- NATO will continue capacity building in friendly neighboring states, as conflict in NATO’s periphery undermines its safety. Examples include Georgia and Iraq.
- NATO recognizes that climate change is a crisis multiplier and must confront its security implications. The Alliance will integrate climate change considerations into its operations. Sustainable technologies will be prioritized in procurement. NATO will work with industry to create climate neutral capabilities that eventually lead to net-zero emissions.
- NATO will develop its next strategic concept. It will recommit to its values and consider its changing purpose in a changing world.
- To achieve all this, NATO members will have to invest more. Developments on this front are on the right track, as defense spending has increased in seven consecutive years after decades of cuts. NATO will “not just invest more, but invest better,” doing so collectively, as NATO is a force multiplier. This increases efficiency, and sends a clear message of unity and resolve to adversaries.
The Q&A: overcoming internal challenges
Many of the public’s and moderator Stelzenmüller‘s questions focused on the apparent internal disunity in NATO. Stoltenberg made it clear that NATO is a group of 30 different nations and that it will never speak as one. These are democracies and their disagreements and internal discussions are part of their strength. That said, it is important that the allies remain unified on the main issues. They need to rally behind their core values and stand up to authoritarian encroachments by Russia, China, and others, as the regime plane hijacking in Belarus recently demonstrated. Ukraine is a key partner on this front. While the Secretary General shied away from giving explicit commitments, his main message to Kiev is to focus on domestic reform and combating corruption. These matters are valuable in themselves, but also key to eventual NATO accession.
Several questions addressed Turkey’s apparent disregard for NATO’s core democratic values. Stoltenberg has expressed his concerns on this front in Ankara, as have other allies, and he believes that NATO can also be a platform to have open discussions on such issues. However, Turkey remains a key member of the Alliance. It is the only state to border Syria and Iran. It plays a key role in combatting ISIS and the refugee crisis. NATO’s presence in the Aegean, where it provides a bridge between Greece and Turkey, showcasesits capacity for resolving and preventing conflicts when views diverge.
Cyber threats
NATO has explicitly refocused on cyber as a military domain. Cyber attacks can trigger NATO’s article 5 (which considers an attack on one of its members as an attack on all) in the same way as kinetic attacks. Stoltenberg was not explicit on the threshold, as this would only be a favor to adversaries. However, NATO’s message is clear: cyber warfare is warfare.
China and Russia
The Secretary General promised that the communiqué to be issued at the coming NATO summit will mention China more often and more explicitly than ever before. He considers this a major oversight of previous strategy papers. Cooperation with Pacific states such as Australia will be increased, as will resilience against the domestic threats that China poses to member states. NATO will not look to declare China an enemy. There are many fields in which cooperation and trade with China are possible and beneficial. The differences in opinion on such matters between, for example, the US and Germany, will not undermine the Alliance’s consensus or resolve. The same is true for Russia. NATO will continue to talk to Russia while challenging it. “There is no contradiction between being clear-eyed about the threat that Russia poses, and the need to talk to them.” At the core, NATO must acknowledge changing global power dynamics, which have real consequences for the Alliance.
Watch the event here:
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Conservative will likely win, but foreign policy will change little
Candidates in Iran’s presidential election scheduled for June 18 were vetted more heavily than before. Only seven were allowed to run out of some 500 applicants. Most are prominent conservatives. Judiciary chief Ibrahim Raisi is likely a shoe-in. If and how will these elections affect the negotiations in Vienna and Iran’s regional activities? How do Iranians view this process and what should we make of the predicted record low turnout?
A Chatham House panel convened June 9 agreed the election will consolidate the regime in a conservative direction. However, foreign policy and Iran’s activities in Syria, will change little, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have long been in firm control of those projects. The domestic implications of the elections are significant, not due to the results but rather to the vetting process and the public’s increasing apathy.
The speakers were:
Nazila Fathi
Independent journalist;
Non-resident scholar
Middle East Institute
Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst in Iran and Persian Gulf affairs
Congressional Research Service
Vali Nasr
Majid Kadduri Professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
Non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council
Raz Zimmt
Research fellow
Institute for National Security Studies
Sanam Vakil (moderator)
Deputy director and senior research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme
Chatham House
A predictable outcome, but nonetheless significant
The panel agreed that Rais is the likely winner, though Nasr warned that surprises are possible, as the 1997 and 2005 elections demonstrate. Nazila Fathi also pointed out that the greater freedom to criticize one another that exists among the candidates could hurt Raisi.
The real shock in this election cycle was the vetting process, according to Zimmt. The regime prevented any serious moderate or reformist candidates from running. Fathi pointed out that the reformists (such as former president Khatami) have been isolated and persecuted since the protest movement that followed Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent re-election in 2009. Rouhani was not considered part of the reformist camp. His transition towards more moderate viewpoints is what caused the regime to remove moderate and even some conservative candidates from the roster this year. A particular surprise was the exclusion of the conservative former speaker of the parliament Larijani, who the regime considered to be at risk of moderating, according to Fathi.
Rather than the winner, voter turnout might be an indicator of public sentiment. Vakil cited a recent poll that indicates turnout could be as low as 38%. This would be a record low for Iran, where turnout has never fallen below 50%. Fathi affirmed that disillusionment within Iran is high. Due to the impact of COVID and economic hardships, there were calls to boycott the election even before the vetting process was completed. The 2019 parliamentary elections also contributed, as the stringent vetting process then led to harshly repression of protests.
Nasr warned that voter turnout is a bigger issue to Western observers than to the Iranian regime. Engineering an election can be done after the vote (as in 2009), but this led to major resistance. This is why the regime used the vetting process this time, after testing the waters with the parliamentary elections of 2019. The deep state understands that a low-turnout election is advantageous to conservative candidates. Its primary goal is to end up with a reliable, and controllable president. Raisi is the ideal candidate for this purpose. He has few connections, as Rouhani had within the religious establishment in Qom and even within the IRGC.
The core issues for Iranians are economic. Runaway inflation and price hikes on primary goods force people to work multiple jobs. This hit the middle classes as much as the poor. According to Fathi Iranians only care about the JCPOA to the extent that it contributes to economic improvements. The candidates have failed to put forward any clear plans for solving these issues.
The role of the new president
As for the new president’s role and significance, the panel saw a clear divergence between domestic and foreign affairs. Nasr suggested Iran is on the cusp of a ‘Third Islamic Republic’ for three reasons:
- Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advanced age indicates that his decades-long rule might soon be over, potentially leading to a constitutional overhaul, as after Khomeini’s death.
- Iran is moving to relieve maximum pressure, which will lead to major changes in its economic and foreign outlook.
- The deep state is increasingly strengthening its grip on the country.
The IRGC is starting to look more like the Pakistani military, controlling key foreign policy agendas and exerting major influences on the political process. They are positioning themselves for the post-Khamenei era.
A new president will have little influence on Iran’s foreign policy. As Katzman warns “these elections are not for the ‘leader’ of Iran.” The real leader, Khamenei, has indicated that Iran will recommit to the JCPOA if the US does so. The negotiations in Vienna are not at risk. Nasr indicated that the key foreign policy dossiers are all in the hands of the IRGC. Iran’s regional activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen fall under IRGC control. The same is true for the Saudi-Iranian negotiations now underway in Baghdad, where the Saudis are talking with top IRGC brass, rather than the Foreign Ministry.
The view from Israel and Washington
According to Zimmt, the outcome of these elections matter little to Israel, which viewed Ahmadinejad as a wolf in wolf’s clothing, while Rouhani was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Israel is mainly concerned with the nuclear program, Iran’s regional activities (particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza), and its long-range missile capabilities. None of these issues are controlled by the government or president, but rather by the deep state.
For Israel a controversial, conservative president is preferable because it makes it easier to rally support against Iran. Ahmadinejad was Israel’s biggest asset, because he openly denied the Holocaust and the existence of homosexuals in Iran. Raisi’s controversial viewpoints and his involvement in the 1988 prison massacres could serve a similar purpose. Nasr also thought that a post-JCPOA Iran seeking to establish trade relations with the world might be served poorly by a controversial president.
The Biden administration does follow these elections with interest according to Katzman, who spoke in an official capacity. According to him, Iran is becoming a major regional and even supra-regional power. Its missile and drone capacities are extensive and sophisticated, and Tehran has extended them to allies and used them itself. The attacks on Saudi oil in Abqaiq, as well as the strike on the American al-Asad base in Iraq, were examples. Katzman called the strike on al-Asad “the most significant missile strike on American troops in American history.”
Iran’s serious capacities mean that they should be taken seriously by the US. Meanwhile, US sanctions have had no effect on Iran’s regional strategy or Iran’s regional influence. In 2014 Iran was under sanctions but became more involved in Syria and Yemen. When sanctions were lifted these policies continued. Iran’s regional activities are extremely inexpensive and sanctions don’t affect them significantly.
The key is to get some resolution to regional conflicts. Iran has expressed an interest in doing so. Iran won’t project power if there are no opportunities or interests that require it.
Watch the recording of the event here:
https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=197859625537872&ref=watch_permalink
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Stevenson’s army, June 11
– Russia is providing Iran with an advanced satellite.
– US is lifting some Iran sanctions, says not related to stalled negotiations.
– FP notes international law prohibits US interference with Iranian ships going to Venezuela
– House also has a compete with China bill.
-SAIS prof Mark Cancian notes surprises in Biden defense budget.
– In FT, Gillian Tett has insightful piece on the“Cornwall Consensus” on politics and economics.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 10
NYT says Pentagon plans air strikes from abroad to save Kabul if necessary.
DOD vaguely announces plans to counter China. Briefer has more details, including changes to PME.
Dan Drezner searches for a Biden doctrine.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 9
The Biden administration has released its first formal war powers summary report. It’s the first in a year, since the Trump administration failed to submit one as required in its final month in office. The report shows US troops equipped for combat in 16 countries. No surprises, but an important benchmark.
The White House also released a formal letter waiving a provision of last year’s NDAA forbidding troop cuts in Afghanistan unless the president submitted a huge report answering all kinds of questions about the situation there.
No report, but the law allows a waiver.
The Senate passed a 2400-page bill to counter China technologically. Anything that big and that popular becomes a catch all for special interest provisions. I haven’t seen a neutral analysis, but the Hill has a short “5 takeaways” on the measure.
CRS finally has its demographic summary of the 117th Congress
TNSR has a new piece on civilian control of the military.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 8
– Two Senate committees have issued a bipartisan staff report on the January 6 insurrection. Politico summarizes.
– FBI seizes most of the Bitcoin paid as ransom by Colonial Pipeline. [See, it’s a criminal matter, not national security retaliation.]
– FP reports internal dissent over Pacific basing plans.
– Biden overturns Trump plan to put Greenland under NorthCom.
Some of you may remember my stories about how Walmart, Microsoft, Apple all had DC offices with fewer than a handful of people in the early 2000s. Then they learned that what the govt did could affect their businesses. Now they — and Facebook and Amazon — have big DC offices. And they know how to grow their businesses. See what Amazon does.
A pro-foreign aid group [yes, it exists] has a summary of the administration budget.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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