Month: June 2021
Engagement with armed groups is necessary, “good” or “bad”
The Crisis Response Council and the Brookings Institution’s Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors June 3 convened a discussion on challenges posed by armed groups to security sector reform (SSR) in the Middle East and beyond. Panelists agreed that SSR too frequently views armed groups from a unidimensional perspective. Militias are not inherent spoilers whose power is limited to the security sector. They are more often politically or socially embedded potential power brokers. State monopolies on violence are an anomaly in post-conflict states. Armed groups can contribute positively to SSR and governance.
The speakers were:
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors; Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Brookings Institution
Frederic Wehrey
Senior fellow, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bernadetta Berti
Head of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General
NATO
Yaniv Voller
Senior Lecturer in the Politics of the Middle East
University of Kent; Stanford University
Ranj Alaaldin (moderator)
Visiting Fellow – Brookings Doha Center; Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institution
The present: thriving and misunderstood
Vanda Felbab-Brown highlighted the Corona pandemic’s effect on armed groups around the world. The associated economic downturn has pushed some states to their limits. 200 million people have been pushed into poverty, and many of those will be forced to engage in criminal activities to scrape together a living. Under these conditions, armed groups thrive. Hundreds of millions of people already live under total, partial, or shared control by armed groups. As state spending on social welfare, but also security provision, shrunk, armed groups moved in to fill the gaps.
Wehrey discussed the case of Libya, where armed groups have thrived in part because they were misunderstood by outsiders. Emerging after the fall of Gadhafi, they were useful security providers, but politicized and prone to state capture and corruption. The Libyan case could have ended more positively if the ‘prizes’ for militias had been placed under better oversight. Oil revenues, ministerial positions, ports, airports were targets for militia competition. Protection of such prizes could have prevented the militia growth that Libya has seen.
Multiple efforts to “train and equip” a Libyan army from scratch have failed. Such an effort takes years and the security vacuum that exists before its completion is sure to be filled up by someone. Furthermore, in Libya new armies have often recruited from specific tribal, communal, or political backgrounds. These are less national armies and more new militias. This is something Wehrey sees happening now with Turkish support for the Tripoli-based armed forces. The current effort to defer security issues while working on political unity is reminiscent of 2012. The outcome might be similar: a relapse into violence.
The panel agreed that armed groups are not anomalies and they will not go away. Ahram suggested states do not necessarily want to be centralized. There are many examples of leaders deliberately fragmenting power. Militia fighters are not unlucky souls whose dream is to join the regular army and leave the militia life behind them. These groups are an embedded part of their communities and not easily fixable aberrations.
What makes an armed group “good” or “bad”?
The exact drivers of armed groups are poorly understood by academia and policy makers. Voller focuses his research on the question of why certain pro-government militias act predatorily, while others do not. Rather than an inherent inclination to violence, he believes that a core determinant is whether an armed group acts in a theater where its constituency is present. The predominantly Shia PMF in Iraq became predatorial when they entered the Sunni northwest in the fight against ISIS, while the Kurdish Peshmerga refrained from doing so as they always operate among their Kurdish communities. Felbab-Brown countered that other factors must also be important, as there are plenty of examples of armed groups acting predatorily among their own communities. She posits that any armed group gets feedback from its community, even if it is only by means of resistance to violence. If a community lacks social cohesion, this feedback can be unclear or weak, allowing greater predatory behavior.
Wehrey warned against an overly economic focus when it comes to controlling militias. Paying off armed groups to steer them, or turning off their incomes to force their hand, only treats part of the reality. These groups are embedded in and motivated by communal identity, religion, and history. Ahram agreed. He added that armed groups are also not merely political, as there are many cases of armed groups engaging in negotiations or elections and still continuing their armed struggles. Normative motivations are also part of the equation, as local norms, national laws, and even international law (and the fear of a Hague tribunal) are all considered by militias. Ahram believes that the onus is on researchers to identify which of these different levers matter under which circumstances, and how they can be used effectively.
Berti joked that she would enjoy this academic exercise, but that the policy maker in her called for a different course of action. She warned that all of these tools are highly context specific. What works best in practice is a willingness to enter a long-term commitment to a peace building effort. An intervening power needs to engage in a dynamic relationship with local power brokers and be willing to deal with new actors and change course when the situation calls for it.
Policy makers’ task: flexibility and pragmatism
The panel agreed that thinking in terms of “good” or “bad” militias is a fruitless exercise. Voller emphasized once more that militias are embedded in their communities. He used the example of Syrian militias that might align with Assad and engage in repression in order to protect their own constituencies. We might not call these actors “good”, but we can understand what motivates them. Felbab-Brown explained that it is better to think in pragmatic terms of available alternatives. An armed group might be odious, yet be the best option in terms of service provision, behavior, and accountability. Local populations as a rule adapt to harsh and illiberal actors if they provide stability and security.
The task that faces policy makers is a daunting one, as current tools and theories are poorly equipped to deal with the realities. The key is to be flexible and to accept militias as an embedded part of society. Berti and Ahram underlined this. We often speak of ‘allowing’ armed groups to exist or participate in a society. In practice, however, we usually have little influence over their existence. Voller emphasized that engaging with a militia directly as the state, rather than condemning and ignoring it, is usually the best way to have a positive influence on its behavior. Using the example of the Lebanese Hezbollah, however, Berti warned us to beware of who’s steering whom in these dynamics.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | June 07-11, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Ultimate Authority: The Struggle for Islamic Institutions in the Arab World | June 08, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Carnegie’s Middle East Program convenes this seminar to mark the launch of its new edited volume which examines the interplay between religious establishments and governance in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco. Arab rulers are increasingly asserting control over Islamic institutions with administrative and coercive tools. These top-down policies are framed by authoritarian regimes as “reforms,” but are often calculated attempts to eliminate potential sources of dissent in ministries, seminaries, mosques, and other religious entities. At the other end of the spectrum, Islamic institutions in conflict-wracked Arab states have become prizes for competing factions to bolster their authority and popular support. Understanding these dynamics has important implications for countering violent extremism and resolving conflict, as well as appreciating evolving state-society relations across the Arab world.
Speakers:
Nathan J. Brown
Professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University
Annelle Sheline
Research fellow in the Middle East program, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
Journalist; non resident fellow, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies
Laila Alrefaai
Writer and researcher specializing in religious affairs
Frederic Wehrey (moderator)
Senior fellow in the Middle East Program, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
2. International Relations and the Middle East: US, China, and Regional Powers | June 08, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
This event marks the launch of the sixth wave of the Arab Barometer. It will bring together experts from the US and Middle East alongside Michael Robbins, Director of Arab Barometer, to delve into the results as they pertain to regional rivalries, great power competition, and prospects for regional cooperation and conflict deescalation. How has a year of global lockdown and ongoing conflict shaped regional attitudes about conflict deescalation and the need for conflict resolution channels? How do Arabs see external powers such as China, Russia, and the US as playing a future role in their countries? Have new opportunities or challenges arisen in the last year?
Speakers:
May Darwich
Lecturer of International Relations of the Middle East, University of Birmingham
Michael Robbins
Director, Arab Barometer
Randa Slim
Senior fellow and director of the Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues program, MEI
Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein (moderator)
Senior vice president, MEI
3. Untapped Potential: Women, Leadership, and Water Diplomacy in the Middle East | June 09, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
The Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program and Middle East Program, with co-sponsor EcoPeace Middle East, organize this discussion on the inclusion of women in water leadership and diplomacy in the Middle East. A panel of experts will speak on the enhancement of regional diplomacy and a movement for inclusive resource decision-making. Women play a critical role in water resource management and decision-making at the community level. Yet, they are often absent from high-level water-related negotiations and agreements. By excluding women from the decision-making processes, the sustainability and effectiveness of these agreements—which are essential to broader peace and security—is undermined. What steps can country leaders and stakeholders take to ensure that women’s leadership is realized in water diplomacy?
Speakers:
Maysoon Al-Zoubi
International water and water diplomacy expert, Arab Dar Engineering Company
Natasha Carmi
Lead water specialist, Geneva Water Hub
Dalit Wolf Golan
Deputy Israel director and regional development director, EcoPeace Middle East
Martina Klimes
Advisor on water and peace, Stockholm International Water Institute
Merissa Khurma (introduction)
Program director of the Middle East Program, Wilson Center
Lauren Herzer Risi (moderator)
Project director of the environmental change and security program, Wilson Center
4. Iran’s presidential election: Domestic and international implications | June 09, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Chatham House | Register Here
The next presidential election in Iran set for 18 June 2021 takes place in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and worsening economic conditions due to fiscal mismanagement and sanctions imposed by the United States. It will also be held during ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran over the future the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) also known as the Iran nuclear agreement. Against this backdrop voter turnout is expected to be a significant factor impacting the outcome of this election.
In this Chatham House seminar, experts discuss Iran’s political map ahead of the 18 June presidential election and the ballot’s regional and international implications.
Speakers:
Nazila Fathi
Independent journalist; Non-resident scholar, Middle East Institute
Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst in Iran and Persian Gulf affairs, Congressional Research Service
Vali Nasr
Majid Kadduri Professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Non-resident senior fellow, Atlantic Council
Raz Zimmt
Research fellow, Institute for National Security Studies
Sanam Vakil (moderator)
Deputy director and senior research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
5. Sectarian Identities and the Rise of Nationalism in the Middle East | June 09, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | Register Here
In recent years, there has been increasing promotion of nationalist identities over sectarian schisms. In Lebanon and Iraq, anger at the prominence of sectarian identities prompted the emergence of protest movements cutting across sectarian lines, united by chants such as “all of them means all of them.” In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has sought to promote a Saudi nationalism inclusive of previously marginalized Shia communities. In this joint AGSIW-SEPAD webinar, panelists will discuss these issues and more.
Speakers:
Geneive Abdo
Visiting fellow, AGSIW
Simon Mabon
Chair in international politics, Lancaster University; Director, Richardson Institute; Director of the sectarianism, proxies and de-sectarianisation project, AGSIW
Maha Yahya
Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Kristin Smith Diwan
Senior resident scholar, AGSI
6. Iran’s Arab Strategy and American Policy Options | June 10, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Since 1979, the foreign policy focus of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been disproportionately on the Arab World. It is also in the Arab World – in countries like Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen – where the United States and Iran have over the years competed for influence and often engaged in a zero-sum game contest for regional power. Meanwhile, the costs of Iran’s interventions in the Arab World are significant both in direct and indirect terms. Can Iran stay the course? What is the impact of Iran’s Arab policy on Arab countries? Finally, what policy challenges does Tehran’s commitment to maintaining a strong hand in the Arab World represent to Washington? MEI organizes this panel to discuss these issues.
Speakers:
Hanin Ghaddar
Friedmann fellow in the Geduld Program on Arab Politics, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Nader Uskowi
President, Sagewood Consulting; non-resident senior fellow, Atlantic Council
Mohsen Sazegara
Iranian journalist and political activist
Alex Vatanka (moderator)
Director of the Iran Program, MEI
7. Migration in Perpetuity: Yemeni Voices from the Diaspora | June 10, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
the Middle East Institute Arts and Culture Center hosts this panel exploring migration and relocation through the photography and art practice of three of the most exciting young Yemeni contemporary women artists practicing today; Shaima Al-Tamimi, Thana Faroq, and Yasmine Nasser Diaz, who are joined by the New York City-based Yemeni chef/storyteller Akram Said.
The exposition Migration in Perpetuity: Yemeni Voices from the Diaspora provides a rare exploration of a war-torn country, through the beautiful work of four vibrant Yemeni contemporary artists, as they navigate their complex relationship to the homeland and the tensions of growing up in diaspora.
Speakers:
Shaima Al-Tamimi
Artist
Thana Faroq
Artist
Yasmine Nasser Diaz
Artist
Akram Said
Artist
Lila Nazemian (moderator)
Independent curator; Special Projects Curator, ArteEas
8. Israeli Politics in the Post-Netanyahu Era | June 10, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
After four elections in two years, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid, head of the centrist Yesh Atid party, has agreed to form a broad-based, national unity government with Naftali Bennett’s far-right Yamina party, likely putting an end to the political stalemate of the last two years as well as the 12-year reign of Benjamin Netanyahu, the longest-serving prime minister in Israel’s history. Under the terms of the agreement, the ultra-nationalist Bennet will serve as premier for the first two years—assuming the coalition holds up that long—before handing the premiership to Lapid. The new “change government” includes an unprecedentedly diverse set of parties ranging from the pro-two state solution Meretz Party on the left to the pro-annexation Yamina on the far right, and will for the first time include an Arab party, Mansour Abbas’s United Arab List, in the ruling coalition.
How durable will the new coalition government be? What does a Naftali Bennett premiership mean for the future of a two-state solution and the Israeli occupation? How will Netanyahu deal with his new role as Israel’s opposition leader? MEI hosts this panel discussion to address these issues.
Speakers:
Thair Abu Rass
Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland
Dr. Shira Efron
Senior research fellow, Institute for National Security Studies; Special advisor on Israel, RAND Corporation; Adjunct scholar at the Modern War Institute, West Point
Paul Scham
Director of the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies, University of Maryland; Professor of Israel Studies, University of Maryland; Non-resident fellow, MEI
Khaled Elgindy (moderator)
Senior fellow and director of the Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs, MEI
9. Report Launch: Shifting Gears: Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition | June 11, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The Atlantic Council Global Energy Center marks the launch of its new report Shifting Gears: Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition. Driven largely by technological advancements and policies aimed at decarbonization, the prospect that oil demand will peak in the not-too-distant future has become a topic of debate in energy circles over the past several years. So-called “peak demand” would have significant geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences for oil-producing and importing nations alike. Shifting Gears examines major geopolitical questions related to the prospect of a peak in oil demand that include the likely redistribution of oil market share between major producers; the potential for failed states or material internal political instability in major oil-producing countries; and the geopolitical impact of peak demand on major oil-consuming nations.
Speakers:
Randolph Bell (opening remarks)
Director of the Global Energy Center and Richard Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security, Atlantic Council
Robert Johnston (keynote and moderator)
Managing director of Energy, Climate, and Resource, Eurasia Group; Nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council
Håvard Halland
Senior economist, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Amy Myers Jaffe
Research professor and managing director of the Climate Policy Lab at the Fletcher School, Tufts University
10. Iran in an Emerging New World Order: A Book Talk with Ali Fathollah-Nejad | June 11, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
MEI hosts author Ali Fathollah-Nejad to discuss his new book, with Professor Anoush Ehteshami joining him on the panel as a discussant. Accounting for both domestic factional politics and the international balance of power, Ali Fatollah-Nejad’s book examines the drivers behind Iranian foreign policy since 9/11. He also examines Iran’s relations with non-Western great powers and offers a critique of the “Rouhani doctrine” and its economic and foreign-policy visions. What can we detect about Iranian geopolitical imaginations and what do we know about the competing visions of various foreign policy schools of thought in Iran? Why was Rouhani’s so-called neoliberal-inspired developmental model doomed to fail? Will the “Look to the East” political faction deepen Tehran’s pursuit of its interests in regards to ties to China in the post-Rouhani period? What does this all mean for American policy calculations vis-vis-Iran in the coming years?
Speakers:
Ali Fathollah-Nejad
Political scientist, analyst, author; non-resident senior research fellow, Afro-Middle East Centre (AMEC)
Professor Anoush Ehteshami
Director for the Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham University
Alex Vatanka (moderator)
Director of the Iran Program, MEI
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, June 5
NYT says Iranian proxies are using drones against US in Iraq.
WSJ reports problems among US drone operators.
FP says Taiwan has lots of problems.
FT’s numbers man, Tim Harford, has wise comments about groupthink.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, June 4
Reuters says Justice Dept will elevate ransomware investigations. [Good & right because these are criminal not military matters.]
Another proper assignment: Biden shifts Chinese investment oversight from Defense to Treasury.
NYT says autonomous lethal drone strike may have occurred in Libya.
Former Senate staffer urges filibuster reform.
How do people get their news? CJR has an interesting report.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Border changes should be ruled out of bounds
In this interview with Radio Television Kosova (RTK) Wednesday, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Palmer had this exchange with an interviewer (start at 14:28 in the video):
Q: Is still alive idea for changing borders?
A: I don’t think that’s on the agenda. It’s not up to me to identify the redlines in this process. It’s up to the parties. The Kosovo side has been pretty clear about that issue.
This answer is unwise, counterproductive, and inconsistent with stated Biden Administration policy.
Unwise
The question of border changes in the Balkans has been thoroughly aired, including in discussions between Serbian President Vucic and former Kosovo President Thaci, not to mention in a raft of papers and nonpapers. Vucic and Thaci failed to come to an agreement: each wanted territory in the other’s country but wasn’t willing to give up the territory required to cut a deal. Leaving the door open to further discussion is foolish, because it has already been tried and failed. Putting the burden of killing the idea on Kosovo is unfair, as it absolves Serbia of responsibility, though it is true that no parliament in Kosovo, including the current one with a wider majority governing coalition than usual, could approve a “land swap,” which would also suffer a resounding defeat in a referendum.
Leaving the door open is also foolish because of the regional and international implications. Any change of Kosovo’s borders would lead to demands for changing Bosnia’s borders by secession of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-controlled 49% of its territory. How do we know? The de facto autocratic leader of the RS, Milorad Dodik, has promised it. In addition, Russian President Putin would demand the same for Russian-controlled portions of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Every illiberal politician worldwide would feel free to unleash irredentist sentiments, which exist throughout Asia and Africa. There is no quicker way of killing the Biden Administration’s hopes for a revival of democracy than leaving the door open to border changes in the Balkans.
Counterproductive
The purpose of Matt’s trip to Kosovo and now Serbia is to display solidarity with the European Union in pursuing a Belgrade/Pristina dialogue that has been unproductive for the better part of a decade. The EU is now aiming to revive it. The lead EU negotiator, Miroslav Lajcak, has been firm in ruling out border changes, which several EU countries have indicated they will not accept, most notably Germany. Each EU member has a veto on this question, since accession of any new members requires all existing member states to agree. Solidarity with the EU requires clarity on this point, not a wishy-washy statement that leaves it up to Pristina. That approach is precisely what got the Trump Administration into several years of unproductive friction with the EU in the Western Balkans. If Washington really wants the dialogue to produce anything, it needs to be crystal clear in public and private that it will not accept border changes.
Inconsistent
Biden, both as candidate and president, has unequivocally supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries of the Western Balkans, including both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the right position for a liberal democrat who believes in liberal democracy, that is democracy based on individual rights of citizens protected by the rule of law.
The problem is that sincere liberal democrats are still few and far between at the leadership level in the Western Balkans. Ethnic nationalists dominate, especially in Serbia but also elsewhere. President Vucic and his minions have been touting what he calls a “Serbian home,” which is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia whose pursuit led Slobodan Milosevic into four or five wars (depending on how you count). Prime Minister Kurti has sometimes aspired to a referendum in Kosovo on union with Albania. RS President Dodik has the same aspiration, for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some Bosnian Croats share the aspiration for themselves.
None of these propositions is consistent with aspirations for EU membership and should be ruled out of bounds both by the EU and the US.
PS: In case anyone wonders whether the video above was a slip-up, here is Matt declining again the same day, during an appearance with Lajcak, to rule out landswaps and saying that it is not up to the EU or the US to identify the compromises but up to “the parties determine the contents of the talks” (start at 6:14, apologies for the sound quality):
PPS: Then in Belgrade, Matt led out change of borders for Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not for Kosovo:
The borders of BiH and North Macedonia are fixed. Nobody talks about changing he borders of BiH, nobody talks about changing the borders of North Macedonia. That’s out of the question.
When it comes to Kosovo, Matt puts the burden entirely on Pristina:
When it comes to borders and territories, I do not see this as an issue that Kosovo is ready to engage on.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The future of the “French initiative” in Lebanon
The Middle East Institute (MEI) May 25 and 26 hosted the first two days of their inaugural Lebanon Policy Conference. In collaboration with the American Task Force on Lebanon and LIFE, this two-part series looks to tackle the urgency and potential paths for Lebanon’s current political, financial, and humanitarian crises. On Wednesday May 26, MEI hosted three events: The Future of US Policy Toward Lebanon: A Conversation with Senator Tim Kaine and Ambassador David Hale, Breaking the Lebanese Political Logjam, and Lebanon Amid Evolving Regional and International Dynamics. On Thursday May 27, MEI hosted two events: The Future of the “French Initiative”: A Conversation with Ambassador Pierre Duquesne, and The Final Countdown: How to Manage Lebanon’s Transformational Economic Crisis and Avert Total Collapse.
What is the future of the “French initiative” and how has the role of French and European diplomacy evolved in recent months? Ambassador Pierre Duquesne’s keynote speech for The Future of the “French Initiative” emphasized the need for international collaboration and pressure in continuing to promote the French initiative towards political reform in Lebanon. The speakers were:
Ambassador Pierre Duquesne
Ambassador in charge of Coordinating International Support to Lebanon, French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs
Charbel Abou Charaf (Moderator)
Partner, White & Castle LLP; Member, LIFE Advocate
LIFE Advocate Program:
Charaf explained that LIFE Advocates was created with regards to the unprecedented existential crisis currently taking place in Lebanon. The program aims to channel LIFE’s significant collective expert resources and goodwill to influence economic policymaking in Lebanon and support economic and financial development.
Background on the French initiative in Lebanon
Duquesne began his keynote speech discussing the primary initiatives launched by France and President Macron following the August 4, 2020 port explosion. While Macron advocated a French initiative to kick-start discussions to form a government, there has been no movement on that front. At present, the French initiative has shifted from promoting the formation of a new government at any cost to promoting a government dedicated to reforms. However, each roadmap released by Macron has been postponed due to the Lebanese political class.
Duquesne cited four reasons why the French initiative is still relevant:
- to increase confidence within the Lebanese polity in its ability to create and sustain a functioning government;
- to push the political class to act by supporting public opinion, suggesting action in the short term, and pushing the international community to participate;
- to sustain French efforts that have taken place throughout Macron’s four years in office;
- to promote the implementation of an IMF program to push reforms forward and treat the current banking crisis.
In his statement, Duquesne emphasized the relevance of Lebanese development, drawing attention to the need for methods and reforms to remain current and applicable. The French initiative’s fight against corruption was indispensable, but it would not be sufficient to establish a new and stable governing body.
Hezbollah as a key obstacle
The Lebanese people and government, according to Duquesne, have always promoted the dissociation of Lebanon from regional crises. Duquesne argued that if the country does not engage in dynamic reform then it may be the object of confrontation by regional actors. He claimed dissociation is essential for reforms and reforms can promote dissociation. In his discussion of Hezbollah, he emphasized the need to distinguish between the military and political wings of Hezbollah, clarifying the condemned nature of the militant wing while remembering the party’s political power. It is impossible to ignore Hezbollah, and it is essential to interact politically with the group. This is not to promote support for the organization, however. As Senator Tim Kaine explained in his statements on the future of US foreign policy towards Lebanon, Duquesne reiterated the need for the international community to support the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Concluding thoughts:
Duquesne concluded his statement with a call to action towards the international community. He reminded viewers that France granted 86 million euros last year and 60 million euros this year towards reconstruction and relief efforts. However, he also warned of indifference, emphasizing the risk of fatigue that comes from extended political unrest without significant change. However, in a conclusion to his talk, Duquesne quoted President Macron stating “Je ne vous laisserai pas” (I will not abandon you), a statement by Macron to the Lebanese people. Duquesne reminded participants and viewers that the international community is needed in handling and finding solutions to the current crises facing Lebanon.
RSS - Posts
