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Better jaw jaw than war, but the strategic risks are real

Former IAEA Inspector Pantelis Ikonomou writes:

The sixth round of the Vienna negotiations aimed at restoring the multilateral Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA) were halted last week. At the same time, the temporary technical agreement between the IAEA and Iran, intended to enable the revival of the Iran deal, expired. Iran denies any obligation to provide an answer on the fate of this accord. Stalemate or death of JCPOA? Will this open the door to an additional de facto nuclear weapon state?

Judging intentions is difficult. Learning from  facts has mostly proven wise. Some relevant facts are outlined below.

The development of the current North Korea and Iran nuclear challenges show similarities. The key common shortcoming of the world powers in dealing with these two challenges is that we (ineffectively) talk but they (strategically) continue.   Equivalent lessons could also be learned from the earlier “peaceful” nuclear explosion of India in 1974 that has led to about 140 nuclear warheads in its arsenal today and to approximately the same number in Pakistan.

As for North Korea:

I1. n the period 1994–2002 of the “Agreed Framework” implementation, great attention went to terminating the possibility of plutonium production in the Yongbyon reactor while the country’s potential in enriching uranium was neglected.

2. During the years 2003–2009 of the “Six Party Talks,” the US linked other issues to the negotiations instead of concentrating on the main nuclear objective: how to curb fissile material acquisition.

3. Keen observers note the North Korean nuclear program “nuclear progress slowed significantly during times of diplomacy and accelerated during times of isolation, sanctions and threats.”

Result: Creation of an additional de-facto nuclear weapons state, North Korea, with an estimated number of 20 to 30 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, including thermonuclear capacity.

As for Iran:

1. The crisis began in 2003 when IAEA inspectors identified a possible military dimension in Tehran’s civilian nuclear program. From 2003 to 2012, despite twelve IAEA and two UNSC resolutions culminating in trade and economic sanctions, Iran continued its non-compliance with obligations under the international Safeguards Agreement. Tehran regarded nuclear activities as its inalienable national right.
2. This dangerous escalation was halted by the JCPOA in July 2015, after almost a decade of  complex and sensitive diplomatic negotiations between the six world powers (the five UNSC permanent members plus Germany) and Iran. This Agreement  stipulated obligations on both sides: termination of critical nuclear activities as well as limits to certain installed equipment, material stockpiles and uranium enrichment levels in Iran in exchange for lifting of sanctions.
3. This honeymoon period lasted until May 2018 when US withdrew from the JCPOA and started reimposing sanctions. In January 2020, after the killing of Iran’s General Qasem Soleimani, Tehran changed its stance towards JCPOA. Progress achieved through the Agreement was then reversed.
4. In February 2021, Iran’s parliament passed a law on terminating the JCPOA, including the associated voluntary implementation of the rigorous Additional Protocol (AP) to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

Result: Increased instability and volatility in the region.

“What is next?”  is the justified question. A few practical reflections:

1. An eventual positive conclusion of the Vienna talks on the revival of JCPOA will not automatically bring definitive relief. The damage done after 2018 to the Iran deal cannot be verifiably restored quickly. Notwithstanding the professionalism and objectivity of the IAEA, restoration of the Agreement will require enormous effort, high additional costs, as well as the continuous and smooth cooperation of Iran’s competent authorities.
2. For the successful revival of JCPOA the recently expired temporary arrangement between Iran and the IAEA needs to be extended immediately. Re-establishing the inspectors’ continuity of knowledge of Iran’s nuclear program is sine qua non for the IAEA to be able to draw the necessary broader conclusions on the exclusively peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program.   
3. In case the JCPOA is not renewed, monitoring Iran under its IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement without the AP in place would perpetuate unresolved issues relating to questionable findings of materials, locations and activities. This unfortunate situation would create problems not only with Iran but also with other states in the region, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, who are being called to satisfy the same universal safeguards criteria.

The omens for stability and security of the world are not encouraging while the responsibility of the parties involved is growing larger.