Day: July 4, 2021
Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
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Hamas’ position improved, but Palestinians need unity
Violence once again erupted between Israel and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in May. A tenuous ceasefire emerged after 11 days of fighting that left hundreds of Palestinians, as well as dozens of Israelis, dead and many more injured. The Palestinian Authority has become increasingly unpopular, and Palestinians have come out in protest against the PA and its leader Mahmoud Abbas since the conflict. Meanwhile, Hamas’ legitimacy has only increased with its handling of the recent crisis. Negotiations to unite the PA’s Fatah and Hamas and to organize new elections in all Palestinian territories ended when Abbas refused to go forward over Israel denied permission for elections in East Jerusalem.
The Middle East Institute organized a panel to take account of Hamas and Gaza’s current situation. How should we see the most recent war? What are perspectives for future peace and stabilization in Gaza and Israel-Palestine in general? How, if at all, can the West, the PA, and Israel engage Hamas in a more constructive way? The panel agreed that a new impetus is needed for the Palestinian national movement to move forward again.
The speakers were:
Aaron David Miller
Senior fellow
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mouin Rabbani
Co-editor
Jadaliyya
Celine Touboul
Co-executive director
Economic Cooperation Foundation
Khaled Elgindy (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs
MEI
Taking stock of the most recent conflict
Rabbani summarized the events of May. He thinks this conflict was significantly different from previous bouts. Palestinians had become increasingly divided territorially and especially politically, with different factions concerned with their own local interests. This time Palestinians from different groups came together for issues that weren’t necessarily local. The initial outbreak started because of Israeli Palestinians protesting expropriations in Sheikh Jarrah. Islamic Jihad and Hamas were the first to engage Israel, but not over issues related to Gaza, for the first time since 2006. Then, in response to the Gaza violence, a mass mobilization emerged in the West Bank focused on a national agenda. That has not happened for a long time.
Miller, disagreed. Without downplaying the suffering in the most recent conflict, he remarked that it was remarkably similar to the three previous rounds of fighting. Nor does he believe that it will transform the Palestinian-Israeli conflict going forward, despite the largest incidence of racial violence in Israel since its inception.
External powers
As for the role of the US, Miller indicated that the Biden administration has one priority: domestic economic and political recovery. Biden’s efforts in Israel-Palestine are minimal. During the conflict he took three steps:
- avoided placing the US in the center of the conflict;
- supported Israel, at least initially;
- then applied limited pressure for a ceasefire.
Among the Arab states, Egypt remains the main interlocutor. The Abraham Accords might seem significant, but Egypt’s geographical proximity continues to place it front and center. The primary Gulf state involved is Qatar, because of its extensive financial support for Hamas.
Both Miller and Rabbani emphasized that third parties tend to engage with Israel and/or Palestine mainly because of US incentives. Egyptian President Sisi hopes to prove his importance as a US partner as he has come under increasing criticism from the Biden administration for domestic repression. The normalization treaties between Israel and several Arab states were primarily deals with the US, with Israeli normalization as one of the bargaining chips.
Miller lamented that there is no international ownership of Gaza right now. No one is currently willing to take ownership of this issue and coordinate its solution. As long as this remains so, he is skeptical of the chances for progress.
Perspectives for lasting peace?
Moderator Elgindy remarked that none of the underlying issues have been resolved, making the current ceasefire highly unstable, as witnessed by recent renewed attacks between Gaza and Israel. Rabbani hesitated to make a definite statement. “Last time, in 2014, nothing changed and we were warned that a new confrontation would erupt quickly, but the ceasefire held for seven years.” It’s possible that Hamas’ role will now change and it will become a leader of the Palestinian cause, because of Mahmoud Abbas’ unpopularity. Alternatively, the current actors could muddle through indefinitely. Or the conflict could erupt again next week. It’s very hard to predict.
Touboul remarked that the new Israeli government could provide an opportunity for further peace talks. The former government focused on the separation of Gaza and the West Bank. It had a schizophrenic policy towards Hamas, on the on hand not acknowledging it and aiming to weaken it military, but on the other fearful that weakening it too much would lead to a power vacuum and end Hamas’ ability to continue the ceasefire. Israel essentially vetoed the reunification of Fatah and Hamas by blocking elections in East Jerusalem. New Israeli policy could make a unified Palestinian government possible. For this to happen, she believes the Israeli government should be challenged to formulate a transparent and coherent policy towards Gaza, rather than leaning on the ‘zero risk-tolerance’ policy previous governments have employed.
Rabbani warned that “initiatives that try to achieve something while remaining under occupation are futile”. The same is true for reconstruction in Gaza while the blockade continues. “You’re basically talking about humanitarian band-aids being put on a very serious hemorrhage.”
Engaging Hamas and bringing the PA into Gaza
Meanwhile, the issue of Palestinian political unification remains fraught. Touboul outlined three key characteristics that any effort should have:
- The PA cannot accept steps that will only benefit Gaza without benefiting the situation in West Bank and Jerusalem.
- It needs to be gradual and supported by a broad coalition, including the US and Israel.
- Hamas as well as Fatah need to see benefits in cooperating with the other. Their cooperation cannot focus on deterrence alone. Key to this will be the gradual transformation of Hamas into an unarmed political entity in the long term.
However, Miller clarified that US engagement with Hamas through official channels remains entirely impossible legally and politically. As long as Hamas has a terrorist wing, it will have to engage through back doors. Israel does engage with Hamas in its own way (prisoner swaps, ceasefires), as Netanyahu needed Hamas to continue the de-facto ‘three-state solution‘.
A future for the Palestinian national movement?
Miller ended by emphasizing the need for unification of the Palestinian national movement, without which it will be impossible for the Palestinians to argue their case. Rabbani concurred. He believes it is time for a revival. The core requirement for this is that Palestinians need to start setting aims that further Palestinian interests, rather than appeal to outside parties, who have shown they do not have Palestine’s best interests at heart.
Rabbani doesn’t believe that strengthening the PA is necessary. Perhaps the PA should be weakened further after its failures and unpopularity. Strengthening the PA in favor of Hamas or others is in the US and EU’s interest, but not that of the Palestinians. Thirty years afer Oslo, Palestinians should start putting their own interests and rights first. If the Palestinians establish a unity government that includes Fatah and Hamas, Rabbani believes that the world would quickly adapt to the only game in town.
Watch the recording of this event here:
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