Reversal of the progress for women and the press in Afghanistan is imminent

Nearly two decades ago, Bernard-Henri Lévy spent a month in Afghanistan shortly after Taliban rule had been removed and wrote an extensive report for the French government. In it he outlined the challenges, but more importantly the opportunities now available for modernizing and improving the lives of Afghans. Now, with the Western presence in Afghanistan drawing to a close, Lévy is publishing a book reflecting on the report and the years that followed. With an introduction by former US General David Petraeus, Lévy assesses the successes and mistakes that occurred in Afghanistan, and reflects on the threats facing it now that renewed Taliban rule seems imminent.

The Middle East Institute organized a seminar July 26 with Lévy, Petraeus and two discussants to discuss the origins of the report and to assess the last twenty years in Afghanistan. The panel agreed that much has been achieved in women’s rights, civil society, and the free press, but that all of these achievements will be reversed as the Taliban returns to power.

The speakers were:

Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus
Former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan;
former director
Central Intelligence Agency

Bernard-Henri Lévy
Philosopher, journalist, filmmaker, and public intellectual 

Javid Ahmad
Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates;
non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council

Marvin Weinbaum (moderator)
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies
MEI

Paul Salem (introduction)
President
MEI

Lévy’s report 20 years on

Lévy gave a behind the scenes insight into the origins of his remarkable 2002 assignment. “Even in France”, he emphasized, it isn’t normal for a philosopher to be tasked with making a report such as this. It came to be because Lévy had met with Afghan guerilla leader and later Minister of Defense Massoud several times since the 1980s, and had arranged for him to meet French president Chirac in 2001. Massoud was defending the Panjshir Valley from the Taliban at the time. At the last moment, Chirac decided not to meet with Massoud, and he instead met with the French Foreign Minister and spoke to the European Parliament. He warned of the ties between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and of their growing plans against the West. Five months later, Massoud was assassinated and two days later the 9/11 attacks on the United States took place. After victory against the Taliban was achieved, Chirac called on Lévy to write his report and outline how France could participate in building of a new Afghanistan. According to Lévy, this was partially due to his disappointment over failing to meet with Massoud before his death.

In the report, Lévy aimed to encourage France to take up an active role. In his introduction, Petraeus summarized the contents of the report. Its core recommendations were two-fold:

• Build a centralized state with institutions such as an army, a police force, and public agencies in order to counter the rule of warlords.
• Circumvent ‘stubborn mullahs’ by forming a sort of ‘Black Hussar’ corps made up of teachers, doctors, civil engineers, and other educated citizens. These should be sent out to the most remote provinces to spread republican values at the grassroots level.

Petraeus reflected that it is difficult to assess to what extent France followed Lévy‘s recommendations because the war effort in Afghanistan became entirely US-led, particularly by the time Petraeus took command in 2010. Nonetheless, his report tells us a great deal about what might have been done by both France and the US.

Missed opportunities and mistakes

All panelists agreed that the occupation of Afghanistan generated many mistakes. Lévy even went so far as to say they’re innumerable and decided to forgo naming them, focusing instead on the now threatened achievements, mentioned below. Ambassador Javid Ahmad did elaborate on two key dependencies established by the US that Afghanistan has been unable to shake to this day.

• A reliance on ‘warlords’. Ahmad emphasized that this is a broad term that today indicates most of the country’s organized crime, kleptocratic governance, and terrorist financing. In the early days, these warlords and power brokers were seen as the only option for effective governance in Afghanistan. This established an entrenched, toxic, kleptocratic power dynamic which is similar to the situation in the 1990s.
• Reliance on Pakistan. Ahmad considers this the core of the failure of the mission in Afghanistan. The US has failed to identify Pakistan as either a ‘fickle friend’ or even a ‘clever enemy’. Pakistani activity in Afghanistan consists of a large military force of which the Taliban are one part. It amounts to an effective invasion. Pakistan today doesn’t seek a political settlement. Instead, it aims for a military settlement that recognizes Taliban gains and then builds a political settlement.

Other minor mistakes include starting the training of Afghan forces late and focusing on quantity rather than quality. Additionally, Afghan forces were loosely modeled after the US forces, which rely heavily on air force. However, Afghanistan barely had an air force, and therefore became even more reliant on the United States for success.

Petraeus recognized several of these issues. The US effort failed in combating the Taliban efficiently. The enemy lacked urgency. It had sanctuary in Pakistan. There is a reason that the Taliban leadership is known as the Quetta Shura, not to mention the Peshawar Shura (named for cities in Pakistan). Petraeus describes this as the most challenging issue in the country. The US effort also lagged in resources because of the drain of Iraq. Only in 2010 did Afghanistan receive the appropriate resources.

Achievements

The panel all agreed that there have been many significant successes in Afghanistan. Petraeus emphasized that the original mission was to eliminate Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, which succeeded. Afterwards, the continued presence was partially aimed at preventing a return of that sanctuary, which was also successful.

Along with Lévy and Weinbaum, he emphasized the many civil advancements. Women’s rights and education improved massively, as did the spread of modern technology, healthcare, and infrastructure. Lévy is particularly struck by the strength of the Afghan press, particularly TOLOnews. He praised the brave journalists that use a freedom of speech and investigation that would have been unimaginable previously.

Imminent reversal

The key issue that kept returning, however, was that all of these achievements are now likely to be reversed at a rapid pace. The Western withdrawal from Afghanistan has already led to Taliban victories. The panel feared that much worse is to come. Petraeus lamented that America must learn that “endless wars do not end with a withdrawal or drawdown of American involvement.” In Afghanistan the fight is worsening. When fighting Islamic extremism, it is impossible to win in a traditional military sense. Instead, you need to keep pressure on even after the enemy is entirely destroyed. Petraeus therefore argued for a “sustained, sustainable position.” He believes that such a position had been achieved in recent years, and that the U.S. “will come to regret our decision to draw down our forces.” He fears “it will usher back in very violent civil war which will lead to millions of refugees, terrible loss of lives and bloodshed targeting those that helped us during our time in the country, and other challenges.”

Ahmad observed that Afghans tend to be optimistic about the achievements of the last decades. They see Afghanistan as a glass half-full. However, they fear that the glass half-full won’t matter if we’re going to throw the glass away as the Taliban advance. Lévy considers the withdrawal a betrayal by America and the West in general of its allies in Afghanistan. “The progress was considerable. The task well-achieved was huge. We were on the good road. We decided to erase all that and to quit.”

Watch the recording of the event here: