Month: July 2021
Good riddance, Afghanistan, you deserve better but aren’t likely to get it
President Biden has it half right. There is no longer any point in US troops remaining in Afghanistan. There hasn’t been much point for the past decade. The Americans killed Bin Laden, our primary reason for invading Afghanistan, in 2011. By then we had already spent the better part of a decade trying to rebuild Afghanistan into something resembling a modern state. It wasn’t easy. Desperately poor and isolated, Afghans were also largely illiterate and already brutalized by decades of civil war. The warlords who ran much of the poppy-based economy had no interest in a modern state. Nor did their most important neighbors–Iran and Pakistan–want us to succeed. They provided safe haven and support to multiple Afghan forces resisting the state. Willing local elites and cooperative neighbors are two vital ingredients for successful state- and peace-building. Afghanistan had neither.
But Biden is also half wrong. There is a real possibility the Taliban will retake not only the provincial centers they are already seizing but also Kabul, though little likelihood they can do so without facing serious resistance both before and after. Neither ordinary Afghans nor the warlords are going to like the return of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan any better than they liked the nominally Westernized state that Presidents Karzai and Ghani have produced. Much better armed and organized than in the past, warlord armies will likely clash among themselves as well as with the Emirate. The outcome of civil war will be more civil war, without the Americans and other NATO forces tilting the balance toward Kabul.
This terrifying outcome will be particularly bad for those Afghans who tried to help the American project. That includes not only the thousands of interpreters the US Army required, but also many more thousands of civil society and activists, many of them women who fear the return of Taliban discrimination and abuse. Many are now desperately trying to leave, along with their extended families. The US State Department has nowhere near the resources needed to process them all before the end of August when the troops will all be gone, so evacuation to third countries where they can await visa decisions seems likely. That evacuation will cause panic among a wider circle of Afghans, people who were not necessarily directly associated with the American project but who sympathized with it. The Taliban won’t treat them well either.
We may not see–I hope we will not see–anything like the helicopters evacuating the US Embassy in Saigon at the end of the Vietnam war. It is precisely to avoid such a scene that Washington continued the fruitless war until President Trump decided on a conditions-free withdrawal. Now Washington is planning a force of 600 or so troops to protect the Kabul Embassy. But the diplomats in that Embassy, who haven’t gotten out much in the past 20 years, will get out a lot less. If the Emirate takes over, President Biden will need to reconsider. Does he want to keep an Embassy in a capital taken by a force that has failed to abide by the agreement it reached with the US, or does he want to close that shop and wait for more propitious circumstances?
The Taliban agreement with the US required negotiations with the Ghani’s government for a political solution as well as a clean break with terrorists prepared to operate internationally. Gaining on the battlefield, the Taliban have been unwilling to negotiate seriously with the Kabul government. Even Biden, the man with the rose-colored aviators, would find it surprising if there were anything like a serious negotiated solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. In Moscow yesterday the Taliban declared they would not allow terrorist operations against other countries from bases in Afghanistan. They are rivals of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State and no doubt hope for international assistance, so they have some incentive to at least appear to rein them in. But will the Taliban risk the wrath of Al Qaeda and ISIS once the Americans are gone?
Afghanistan deserves better. There are lots of well-intentioned Afghans who merit the peaceful, prosperous, democracy they worked to construct for two decades. I met more of that variety in Kabul than in many other conflict capitals, where ethnic, linguistic, and religious fervor is far more prevalent. Afghanistan doesn’t lack good intentions. It lacks the capacity to translate good intentions into reality. It’s the old story: if you want to go someplace good, you shouldn’t start from here. Hope is not a policy, but I do hope Afghanistan someday recovers. In the meanwhile, the Americans have little reason to stay and most will be prepared to say “good riddance.”
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Peace Picks | May July 05-09, 2021
- The Gaza Ceasefire: What’s Next? | July 06, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program invites you to this seminar on the recent conflict in the Gaza Strip and the tenuous ceasefire that continues to hold by a thread. The panel will discuss the perspectives from Egypt, the Biden administration, as well as those of Israel, Palestine, and the broader Middle East region.
Speakers:
Amb. Motaz Zahran
Ambassador of Egypt to the United States
Joey Hood
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State
David Makovsky
Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute; Director, Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations
James F. Jeffrey
Chair of the Middle East Program, Wilson Center; Former Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
Amb. Mark Green (introduction)
President, Director & CEO, Wilson Center
Merissa Khurma (moderator)
Program Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center
2. The Future of U.S.-China Proxy War | July 06, 2021 | 3:00 PM ET | Foreign Policy Research Institute | Register Here
How will great power military competition between the U.S. and China evolve in the coming years? FPRI’s Aaron Stein and Dominic Tierney will address the possibility of Washington and Beijing aiding rival actors in an intrastate conflict and the future of Sino-U.S. competition.
Speakers:
Dominic Tierney
Senior Fellow, Program on National Security, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Associate Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College
Aaron Stein
Director of Research, Director of the Middle East Program & Acting Director of the National Security Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute
3. Report launch: Reimagining the US-India trade relationship | July 07, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Despite the well-documented growth in commerce between the United States and India in the past decade, efforts to reach a bilateral trade agreement in the last three years have grown increasingly strained. Longstanding and new disagreements over market access, intellectual property protection, and India’s new data governance frameworks, among other issues, mar attempts to reach even a mini trade deal and highlight the need to find common ground amid an evolving strategic relationship and COVID-19 woes.
How has the US-India trade relationship evolved under the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations? What mechanisms can be implemented to move forward, whether a mini trade deal or FTA negotiations? What challenges still remain?
The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosts a conversation on US-India trade and a path forward to mark the launch of the Center’s latest report, Reimagining the US-India trade relationship.
Speakers:
Amb. Robert Holleyman
Partner, President & CEO, Crowell & Moring LLP
Amb. Jeffrey Gerrish
Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates
Susan Ritchie
Vice President, Trade & Technology Policy, US-India Strategic Partnership Forum
Sahra English
Vice President, Global Public Policy, MasterCard]
Mark Linscott (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center
Irfan Nooruddin (introduction)
Director, Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center
4. The Future of Humanitarian Operations: Aid and Politics in Syria | July 07, 2021 | 9:30 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
While humanitarian access and sovereignty have clashed in other crises, the savviness of aid manipulation has been unprecedented in scale and scope in Syria. What are the larger implications of debates at the Security Council on humanitarian access? How can the aid community adhere to humanitarian principles and not do harm? Should there be red lines?
As we approach the expiration date of the UN mandate to provide cross-border assistance to Syria, our panel of experts will delve into these questions and assess the consequences of business as usual for the aid sector and for long-term stability.
Speakers:
Jake Kurtzer (introduction)
Humanitarian Agenda Director and Senior Fellow, CSIS
Dr. Jon B. Alterman (moderator)
Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Middle East Program Director, CSIS
Dr. Zaher Sahloul
President and Co-Founder, MedGlobal; Associate Professor in Clinical Medicine, University of Illinois
Charles Petrie OBE
Former Assistant Secretary-General, UN
Natasha Hall
Senior Fellow with the Middle East Program, CSIS
5. The Next Chapter in U.S.-Pakistan Relations | July 07, 2021 | 12:30 PM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
As U.S. troops leave Afghanistan, the regional landscape that has dominated the last two decades of U.S.-Pakistan relations is shifting significantly. The Biden administration’s focus on competition with China and increasing climate concerns — coupled with the Pakistani government’s desire to shift focus to geo-economic ties with the United States — offer potential new parameters for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Meanwhile, both countries remain vested in the outcome of the Afghan peace process and regional peace and security in South Asia. Can the United States and Pakistan move beyond the persistent challenges in the bilateral relationship to cooperate on the priorities they share?
Speakers:
H.E. Dr. Asad Majeed Khan
Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States
Amb. Richard Olson (moderator)
Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace
6. The U.S. Legacy in Afghanistan: Past, Present, and Future | July 07, 2021 | 13:00 PM ET | CSIS | Register Here
Two decades after the 9/11 attacks and the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the United States is withdrawing its military forces from Afghanistan. But the war is far from over. Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Transnational Threats Project on Wednesday, July 7 for a conversation on the U.S. legacy in Afghanistan, the current U.S. withdrawal, and the future trajectory of the war.
Speakers:
Carter Malkasian
Former Special Assistant, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Author of The American Way of War in Afghanistan
Gina Bennett
Senior Counterterrorism Advisor, National Counterterrorism Center
Seth G. Jones (moderator)
Senior Vice President, Harold Brown Chair, and Director of the International Security Program, CSIS
7. Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean | July 08, 2021 | 4:00 AM ET | International Crisis Group | Watch the seminar here
The Eastern Mediterranean has always been an important political and cultural region. The most recent additions include the findings of natural gas and the internationalization of the Libyan civil war. In combination with political shifts, these developments sparked a new escalation between Turkey and its neighbors, namely Greece and Cyprus. After reaching a peak in 2020, the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean have most recently decreased and international actors hope to return to a more constructive partnership.
The panel will discuss the tensions between Turkey and Greece, the roles of the EU and the US in the region, and the regional dimensions of energy competition and disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Speakers:
Tareq Baconi
Senior Analyst for Economics of Conflict, International Crisis Group
Alissa De Carbonnel
Deputy Program Director for Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group
Charles Ellinas
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Ioannis Grigoriadis
Senior Research Fellow, Head of Turkey Programme, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
Berkay Mandıracı
Analyst for Turkey, International Crisis Group
8. Reconstruction in Gaza: Between Israel’s Siege and the Politics of International Funding | July 08, 2021 | 9:30 AM ET | Arab Center Washington DC | Register Here
This webinar will focus on the current situation in Gaza and reconstruction efforts following the recent Israeli attacks. Speakers will discuss the continuous cycle of destruction and reconstruction in Gaza, the challenges to rebuilding and development programs, the effects of the 14-year Israeli blockade, and the politics of international funding.
Speakers:
Yara M. Asi
Non-Resident Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC; Post-Doctoral Scholar, University of Central Florida
Sean Carroll
President and CEO, American Near East Refugee Aid (Anera)
Joseph P. Saba
Senior Adviser, Fragile and Conflict States, The World Bank; Adjunct Professor, Rule of Law for Development Program, Loyola University Chicago
Khalil E. Jahshan (moderator)
Executive Director, Arab Center Washington DC
9. Paper launch: How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state | July 08, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | Chatham House | Register Here
Hezbollah is a hybrid actor, enjoying state legitimacy in Lebanon and operating both within and outside the state without being accountable to the state.
A new Chatham House paper on How Hezbollah Holds Sway over the Lebanese State provides insight into Hezbollah’s journey to power and argues that it has achieved this by consolidating control through elite pacts and by taking advantage of weaknesses in the Lebanese state system and infrastructure.
At this webinar, panellists explore the paper’s findings and consider what the future may hold for Hezbollah, particularly in the context of rapid deterioration in Lebanon and the renewed drive by Western policymakers to achieve reform in the country.
Speakers:
Joseph Daher
Visiting Professor, University of Lausanne
Lina Khatib
Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Adviser, U.S. Institute for Peace
Emile Hokayem (moderator)
Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, IISS
10. Rural/urban divide: A call for action | July 09, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Panel discussion on the economic divide between rural and urban populations. If the post COVID-19 recovery is to be truly inclusive, then it is critical to understand the geographical distribution of growth, an issue which still receives less attention than other dimensions of inequality. Economists, international financial institutions, governments, and think tanks all need to devote more resources to identifying policies that lift the fortunes of “forgotten” places. These panelists will discuss policy options to address this critical global issue.
Speakers:
Timothy J. Bartik
Senior Economist, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Era Dabla-Norris
Division Chief, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund
Martin Mühleisen
Special Advisor to the Managing Director, International Monetary Fund
Andrés Rodriguez-Pose
Princesa de Asturias Chair and Professor of Economic Geography, London School of Economics
Dr. Nicole Goldin (moderator)
Managing Principal, NRG Advisory; Nonresident Senior Fellow at the GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council
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Lift every voice to the star spangled banner
Just going to leave this here, even if it is a day late:
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Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
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Hamas’ position improved, but Palestinians need unity
Violence once again erupted between Israel and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in May. A tenuous ceasefire emerged after 11 days of fighting that left hundreds of Palestinians, as well as dozens of Israelis, dead and many more injured. The Palestinian Authority has become increasingly unpopular, and Palestinians have come out in protest against the PA and its leader Mahmoud Abbas since the conflict. Meanwhile, Hamas’ legitimacy has only increased with its handling of the recent crisis. Negotiations to unite the PA’s Fatah and Hamas and to organize new elections in all Palestinian territories ended when Abbas refused to go forward over Israel denied permission for elections in East Jerusalem.
The Middle East Institute organized a panel to take account of Hamas and Gaza’s current situation. How should we see the most recent war? What are perspectives for future peace and stabilization in Gaza and Israel-Palestine in general? How, if at all, can the West, the PA, and Israel engage Hamas in a more constructive way? The panel agreed that a new impetus is needed for the Palestinian national movement to move forward again.
The speakers were:
Aaron David Miller
Senior fellow
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mouin Rabbani
Co-editor
Jadaliyya
Celine Touboul
Co-executive director
Economic Cooperation Foundation
Khaled Elgindy (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs
MEI
Taking stock of the most recent conflict
Rabbani summarized the events of May. He thinks this conflict was significantly different from previous bouts. Palestinians had become increasingly divided territorially and especially politically, with different factions concerned with their own local interests. This time Palestinians from different groups came together for issues that weren’t necessarily local. The initial outbreak started because of Israeli Palestinians protesting expropriations in Sheikh Jarrah. Islamic Jihad and Hamas were the first to engage Israel, but not over issues related to Gaza, for the first time since 2006. Then, in response to the Gaza violence, a mass mobilization emerged in the West Bank focused on a national agenda. That has not happened for a long time.
Miller, disagreed. Without downplaying the suffering in the most recent conflict, he remarked that it was remarkably similar to the three previous rounds of fighting. Nor does he believe that it will transform the Palestinian-Israeli conflict going forward, despite the largest incidence of racial violence in Israel since its inception.
External powers
As for the role of the US, Miller indicated that the Biden administration has one priority: domestic economic and political recovery. Biden’s efforts in Israel-Palestine are minimal. During the conflict he took three steps:
- avoided placing the US in the center of the conflict;
- supported Israel, at least initially;
- then applied limited pressure for a ceasefire.
Among the Arab states, Egypt remains the main interlocutor. The Abraham Accords might seem significant, but Egypt’s geographical proximity continues to place it front and center. The primary Gulf state involved is Qatar, because of its extensive financial support for Hamas.
Both Miller and Rabbani emphasized that third parties tend to engage with Israel and/or Palestine mainly because of US incentives. Egyptian President Sisi hopes to prove his importance as a US partner as he has come under increasing criticism from the Biden administration for domestic repression. The normalization treaties between Israel and several Arab states were primarily deals with the US, with Israeli normalization as one of the bargaining chips.
Miller lamented that there is no international ownership of Gaza right now. No one is currently willing to take ownership of this issue and coordinate its solution. As long as this remains so, he is skeptical of the chances for progress.
Perspectives for lasting peace?
Moderator Elgindy remarked that none of the underlying issues have been resolved, making the current ceasefire highly unstable, as witnessed by recent renewed attacks between Gaza and Israel. Rabbani hesitated to make a definite statement. “Last time, in 2014, nothing changed and we were warned that a new confrontation would erupt quickly, but the ceasefire held for seven years.” It’s possible that Hamas’ role will now change and it will become a leader of the Palestinian cause, because of Mahmoud Abbas’ unpopularity. Alternatively, the current actors could muddle through indefinitely. Or the conflict could erupt again next week. It’s very hard to predict.
Touboul remarked that the new Israeli government could provide an opportunity for further peace talks. The former government focused on the separation of Gaza and the West Bank. It had a schizophrenic policy towards Hamas, on the on hand not acknowledging it and aiming to weaken it military, but on the other fearful that weakening it too much would lead to a power vacuum and end Hamas’ ability to continue the ceasefire. Israel essentially vetoed the reunification of Fatah and Hamas by blocking elections in East Jerusalem. New Israeli policy could make a unified Palestinian government possible. For this to happen, she believes the Israeli government should be challenged to formulate a transparent and coherent policy towards Gaza, rather than leaning on the ‘zero risk-tolerance’ policy previous governments have employed.
Rabbani warned that “initiatives that try to achieve something while remaining under occupation are futile”. The same is true for reconstruction in Gaza while the blockade continues. “You’re basically talking about humanitarian band-aids being put on a very serious hemorrhage.”
Engaging Hamas and bringing the PA into Gaza
Meanwhile, the issue of Palestinian political unification remains fraught. Touboul outlined three key characteristics that any effort should have:
- The PA cannot accept steps that will only benefit Gaza without benefiting the situation in West Bank and Jerusalem.
- It needs to be gradual and supported by a broad coalition, including the US and Israel.
- Hamas as well as Fatah need to see benefits in cooperating with the other. Their cooperation cannot focus on deterrence alone. Key to this will be the gradual transformation of Hamas into an unarmed political entity in the long term.
However, Miller clarified that US engagement with Hamas through official channels remains entirely impossible legally and politically. As long as Hamas has a terrorist wing, it will have to engage through back doors. Israel does engage with Hamas in its own way (prisoner swaps, ceasefires), as Netanyahu needed Hamas to continue the de-facto ‘three-state solution‘.
A future for the Palestinian national movement?
Miller ended by emphasizing the need for unification of the Palestinian national movement, without which it will be impossible for the Palestinians to argue their case. Rabbani concurred. He believes it is time for a revival. The core requirement for this is that Palestinians need to start setting aims that further Palestinian interests, rather than appeal to outside parties, who have shown they do not have Palestine’s best interests at heart.
Rabbani doesn’t believe that strengthening the PA is necessary. Perhaps the PA should be weakened further after its failures and unpopularity. Strengthening the PA in favor of Hamas or others is in the US and EU’s interest, but not that of the Palestinians. Thirty years afer Oslo, Palestinians should start putting their own interests and rights first. If the Palestinians establish a unity government that includes Fatah and Hamas, Rabbani believes that the world would quickly adapt to the only game in town.
Watch the recording of this event here:
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Impunity spawns carelessness, the time for accountability is nigh
Donald Trump and his minions are shocked. New York State has indicted the Trump Organization for tax fraud. A Federal grand jury has indicted about 500 of the people who stormed The Capitol on Trump’s instructions January 6. There is now a real possibility that they and their leader will be held accountable for their criminal behavior. How did this happen?
The January 6 rioters have mostly indicted themselves. Their own cell phone videos and social media communications will constitute a lot of the evidence presented at trial. They felt they were immune from prosecution. After all, they were following the President’s instructions and defending their version of democracy, in which the votes of black people and immigrants don’t count. Some thought they were entitled to arrest members of Congress for certifying the electoral votes of the 50 states. Such “citizens arrests” are legal in DC during commission of a felony, though it is not clear to me that applies on The Capitol grounds. I’d be astonished if it were permitted for members of Congress. Only people intoxicated with the impunity that white privilege bestows could imagine they would get away with it.
The Trump Organization is similar. It apparently kept detailed records of the off-the-books perqs with which it compensated selected employees, who didn’t pay taxes on the implicit income. New York State alleges they got away with it for 15 years, but I imagine it is closer to 50. This is just the tip of the iceberg. The prosecutors have filed these charges in part to turn the CFO of the organzation into a cooperating witness. If ever they succeed, there will be far more tax fraud revealed. Even without that, Trump’s gaming of the value of his properties–high for the banks when seeking a loan but low for the tax authorities–is sure to get the company, if not Trump himself, into big trouble. The impunity white privilege bestows is beginning to evaporate.
It will not be hard to show that Donald Trump approved the tax returns of the Trump Organization, just as it is easy to show that he approved and even encouraged the storming of The Capitol on January 6. But showing that he intended to commit tax fraud and intended the demonstration to turn violent will be harder. Trump has always avoided written communications. His style is that of organized crime groups: everything is done orally, and often implicitly rather than explicitly. Trump did not explicitly tell the rioters to be violent, only to “stop the steal.” He also stood by and watched on TV while they entered and trashed The Capitol, but that only implies intent.
Still there will be consequences for Trump personally. What bank would be interested in renewing his loans, hundreds of millions of which are coming due soon? Who would want his name attached to their property? The value of much of his own real estate has likely declined during the epidemic and may not recover for years. He can of course use bankruptcy as a shelter, but this time around it may be his personal bankruptcy rather than his all too often used corporate bankruptcy. This man is in financial trouble.
Trump’s supporters remain fervent, but there is growing evidence they are a fraction of the Republican Party. A declining percentage of Americans is identifying as Republican or independents leaning Republican. Trump has still managed to hold on to his leadership in the Party, largely by raising a lot of money and threatening those who don’t toe his line with primary competition. But the Democrats are also raising a lot of money and winning primaries doesn’t necessarily get you a seat in Congress. The Democrats have only a thin majority in both Houses right now, and it will not be easy to expand it. But Trump’s strength in the Republican Party will help them with independents and disenchanged Republicans.
The best hope of the Republicans is to limit the number of people, especially the poor and minorities, who can vote. They are pursuing that objective brazenly, and with support from the Republican majority on the Supreme Court, by imposing restrictions on voting in the states they control. That works because of the over-representation of those states in the Senate and in the Electoral College. This strategy too is careless, as success requires that people don’t react by coming out in even greater numbers to vote. They appear to have done that in the 2020 election.
This is where the Democrats need to find a solution, by reducing barriers to voting and the gerrymandering of Congressional districts, as well as admitting at least two new states to the Union. The Douglas Commonwealth (aka DC) and Puerto Rico as states would help to offset the gross inequity of representation in Congress, where the Democratic Senators represent tens of millions more people than the Republican Senators and House seats are engineered by state legislatures to favor Republican candidates.
2022 will be a crucial year for Trump, his organization, and his supporters. If they are all held accountable and the Democrats retain control of the Congress, accountability really will be night.
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