Not too long ago, Turkey and Israel had a good working relationship. That changed with the rise of Erdogan in Turkey and the increasing focus on Turkey’s intended leadership of the Islamic world. After 2010, the two countries no longer have diplomatic relations, and recently discussions of Eastern Mediterranean gas pipelines became a new potential stumbling block. However, these two countries are key US allies. The importance of their cooperation only increases now that the US is slowly withdrawing from the Middle East. A recent call between Israeli president Herzog and Turkey’s Erdogan could signal a new opening.
The Atlantic Council convened a panel of diplomats and academics to discuss these issues and their implications for the future. The experts saw potential for future cooperation, but this will depend on the states’ ability to understand each others security red lines, and to compartmentalize their relationship.
The speakers were:
Jonathan H. Ferziger
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs
Atlantic Council
Former Middle East Correspondent
Bloomberg
Amb. Mithat Rende
Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OECD
Prof. Brenda Shaffer
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center
Atlantic Council
Amb. Matthew J. Bryza (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council in Turkey; Global Energy Center & Eurasia Center,
Atlantic Council
Defne Arslan (introduction)
Director, Atlantic Council in Turkey
Atlantic Council
How we got here
Bryza explained that Israel and Turkey had what amounted to a strategic partnership until relatively recently. He and co-panelist Rende lobbied at that time to realize an Israeli-Turkish gas pipeline. With the rise of Erdogan to power this all changed. His increased focus on Islamic solidarity drew him away from Israel, which he criticized for its treatment of Palestinian rights. The relationship reached a low point with the ‘Mavi Marmara Incident’ also known as the Gaza Flotilla Raid in 2010. Turkey was attempting to break the Israeli blockade on Gaza in Ferziger‘s words, by sending a shipment with aid to the enclave by boat. Israel responded by raiding the boat, leading to the deaths of nine Turkish nationals. Afterwards, Erdogan severed diplomatic relations.
In recent times, there have been cautious signs of improvements. Most notable is the call between Erdogan and Herzog on July 12. Ferziger reminded that Herzog’s role is largely ceremonial in Israeli politics, meaning that this shouldn’t be seen as a call on the highest level. Nonetheless, it does signal willingness on both sides for some level of communication.
Current disagreements
At the core of the bilateral strife are the Palestinians. Erdogan attacks Israel frequently and supports Hamas, whose leaders are often present in Turkey itself. This support for Hamas is an absolute red line to Israel. Shaffer believes that diplomatic initiatives are infeasible if a military presence of Hamas in Turkey remains. Some sort of civilian representation might be feasible, but no more than that. Furthermore, Bryza explained that Turkey’s rhetoric angers Israelis. Erdogan has moderated his comments recently, but with (potentially early) elections coming up, Bryza questioned if he will he be able to avoid nationalist rhetoric in his battle against right-wing rivals.
Israeli domestic politics also complicate the matter. Ferziger said that it is certain that Netanyahu will do whatever he can to paint reconnection with Turkey as a bad choice, while he privately is convinced that it is a good thing. The opposition will use Turkey’s ties to Hamas to make this diplomatic development very difficult.
Ferziger explained that the Hamas connection does help Erdogan, although not as much as one might think. He is popular in Gaza. But in the West Bank he is ‘banned’ and support for him is repressed by the Palestinian Authority. In East Jerusalem, PA control is not universal, meaning that this repression is less total. Nonetheless, Erdogan isn’t the only leader attempting to woo the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia is also engaging in humanitarian and development projects in Palestine. Alongside streets adorned with images of Erdogan, there are streets with those of Mohammed bin Salman. Moreover, Turkish attempts to become involved with the al-Aqsa mosque are met with resistance from Jordan, who currently operates it.
Rende underlined an issue from the Turkish perspective. There is a perception in Turkey that Israel supports the YPG and the establishment of an autonomous territory for the Kurds in Syria. Turkey rejects this as it considers the YPG a terrorist organization linked to the PKK. Shaffer believes that Turkish support for Hamas appears similar to Israel as Israel’s support to the YPG appears to Turkey. There is a need to understand from both sides that support for the Palestinians doesn’t have to equal support for Hamas and that support for the Kurds doesn’t have to equal support for the PKK.
The potential for future cooperation
Despite these issues, the panel generally appeared optimistic on the prospect of cooperation in other fields. The potential for establishing a natural gas pipeline was often mentioned in this regard. Turkey is the region’s only growing market for natural gas according to Rende. As Shaffer opined, connecting Israeli gas to Europe is most logical by attaching to the existing pipelines in Turkey. She explained that Israel is in doubt whether to attempt a gas pipeline through Greece or through Turkey. As Shaffer put it, there is an idea in Israel that it’s either good relations with Greece or with Turkey. But Turkey and Greece have more functional relationships with one another than Israel and Turkey. “There is no reason to be more Greek than the Greeks.”
The prospect of compartmentalizing their relationship was something some panelists were enthusiastic about. Shaffer suggested Turkey should deal with Israel as it does with China. The suppression of Uyghurs in China is completely unpalatable to the Turkish population, and yet Turkey is able to compartmentalize the relationship and engages with China extensively. Iran and Turkey too have tensions surrounding the Azeri population of Iran, which Erdogan has hinted in the past should be united with Azerbaijan. Despite these tensions, Turkey engages with Iran where necessary. Rende added that Turkey has huge differences with the US as well, but that doesn’t stop from cooperating fruitfully.
Shaffer hoped the US might attempt to steer Israel and Turkey more in that direction. The role of a superpower is not only to fight its enemies but to manage its allies. Obama and Trump have done a bad job at this according to her. Having Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, etcetera bickering is not good for the US.
Rende summarized his perspective neatly. Common grounds:
But the countries countries suffer from a lack of trust and confidence in one another. They must build these up slowly again.
Good steps towards this would be:
Watch the recording of the event here:
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