Month: August 2021
Stevenson’s army, September 13
-About 8000 US troops are being deployed to help in what the Pentagon refuses to call an evacuation from Afghanistan.
– AEI’s Fred Kagan says Biden could have stopped the Taliban
-In the Atlantic, a retired Army colonel says US training of Afghan forces was flawed.
-Speaker Pelosi says House staff can now earn more than Members.
We’ll have an exercise in week 2 where you get to decide on the jobs and pay for a House office. Here’s more background from CRS.
-The Guardian profiles Biden’s head of legislative liaison.
-Venezuelan government and opposition are talking.
– FP profiles new Chinese ambassador to US, who used to work for UPI.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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It’s all over but the shouting, in Kabul or not
It is hard to keep up with the Taliban advance in Afghanistan, which has now engulfed at least 12 provincial capitals and perhaps two-thirds of the country. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is collapsing in many places. Civilians who can are fleeing to the capital. Civilians who can’t are suffering dreadful Taliban depredations. There will soon be little left of the hard-won progress on women’s rights, relatively free media, improved health care, and property rights. The Taliban will take what they want, destroy the hospitals and clinics, dictate to radio and TV, and drive women into hiding. Their is no sign that their years out of power have moderated their extremist views.
The American withdrawal unquestionably precipitated this debacle. It was poorly executed and far too fast for the limited ANA capabilities. President Biden, who says he doesn’t regret it, will take the rap, but it was President Trump who agreed to it. Taliban promises have proven empty. They have not negotiated seriously with the government delegation in Doha and they have not broken with Al Qaeda. They may still do both, but only if the government forces are able to block their advance. That is unlikely.
It would be wrong however to conclude that everything would have been okay had the Americans stayed. The Taliban were already gaining territory before the American withdrawal. The ANA might well have collapsed, even if more slowly, had American support continued. A longer “decent interval” might have allowed for more negotiation in Doha, but the ultimate outcome would likely not have been a lot better than we are likely to see now.
What are we likely to see now? The Taliban will want to secure as much of the country as they can. The only big question is whether they will try to take Kabul by force. They could conceivably conclude it would be better not to do that, in hope of capturing some international aid, or avoiding international opprobrium, in the aftermath. But if they spare Kabul, they will still want President Ghani out and some sort of transitional regime friendly to their cause installed. There is no hope that the negotiations in Doha can produce better results than the military situation on the ground, which is catastrophic from Ghani’s perspective.
Western countries are busy threatening the Taliban with isolation if they continue the offensive. That is pointless. The Taliban don’t care about isolation from the West, which they assume will not provide assistance in the aftermath. The countries whose attitudes will count for the Taliban are the neighboring powers, especially Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia. Pakistan in particular has a lot of clout, because it provides the Taliban with safe haven, but Chinese or Russian aid might carry some weight as well. It will be interesting to see if the Taliban avoid atrocities against the (Shia) Hazaras, in order not to provoke Iran. It will also be interesting to see if the Taliban continue to maintain friendly relations with Al Qaeda and even allow it to use Afghanistan again as a platform for international terror.
President Ghani is calling on civilians to arm and resist the Taliban, including the warlords whom he has rightly tried to marginalize in recent years. Even if he did not try to summon support, the prospect of insurgency against Taliban rule is real. That will make their behavior in victory more abusive, not less. They will want to squelch any armed resistance as quickly and decisively as possible. No one should doubt their level of brutality.
It’s all over but the shouting, in Kabul or not.
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If you don’t trust doctors, stay out of the hospital
I don’t really think there are many anti-vaxxers reading this, but just in case, here is something for you (the foul language is entirely appropriate under the circumstances):
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Stevenson’s army, August 12
– Belarus rejected US proposed ambassador.
– China punished Lithuania over Taiwan.
– FP assesses problems in Afghanistan’s forces.
– FWIW: Here’s the Trump-Taliban peace agreement.
-CBO says debt limit likely to be reached in Oct or Nov
– Data for redistricting to be released today.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Americans should care about the Tunisian President’s power grab
Eddie Grove*, now on to bigger and better things, was a Middle East Institute intern in the summer of 2015. He writes:
Tunisian President Kais Saied’s decision to invoke Article 80 of Tunisia’s constitution to seize broad executive power represents the latest front in the 21st century’s struggle between autocracy and democracy.
President Biden has made the importance of democracy a cornerstone of his presidency. In his first address to a joint session of Congress, President Biden noted that President Xi and other autocrats “think that democracy can’t compete in the 21st century with autocracies.” While the US record in supporting democracy is imperfect, there has historically been a bipartisan understanding that supporting democracy serves US interests; President Reagan underscored this in his 1982 Westminster Speech.
The 21st Century, however, ushered in what political scientist Larry Diamond has termed a “Democratic Recession.” Various degrees of democratic backsliding have occurred in countries as diverse as Turkey, Hungary, Poland, India, Brazil, Myanmar and the Philippines. In the US, President Trump spent four years praising dictators, culminating in his rejection of a free and fair election.
It is too early to say what President Saied’s consolidation of power will mean for the future of Tunisia’s democracy. In recent days, some Tunisians active in Tunisia’s pro-democracy civil society space have taken to social media to decry what they see as self-proclaimed international experts prematurely pronouncing their democracy dead. Many Tunisians point out that Saied’s move had broad popular support and that the status quo was untenable. The decade since Tunisia’s 2011 Jasmine Revolution has been characterized by economic stagnation and deteriorating infrastructure. Dozens of political parties have been formed, almost all of which lack a platform or vision. Tunisians widely blame Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and the country’s largest political party, Ennahda, for mishandling Tunisia’s Covid-19 crisis. Tunisia has had almost as many deaths per capita as the US and less than 15 percent of Tunisia’s population is fully vaccinated.
Nevertheless, President Saied’s actions are fraught with peril. Saied may be a former constitutional law professor, but legal training is not required to see that his use of Article 80 of Tunisia’s constitution to justify his actions does not stand up to scrutiny. Saied’s takeover of Tunisia’s public prosecution is particularly dangerous because vague and draconian defamation laws remain in Tunisia’s penal code, which can be used to arrest those who criticize public officials. Besides, there is no Constitutional Court to rule on the legitimacy of Saied’s actions.
The coming days and weeks will provide greater clarity as to whether Saied is engaged in a good faith effort to save Tunisia from crisis and reform its democracy or whether he intends to install an authoritarian regime with himself at the helm. Several of Saied’s actions so far are cause for alarm, including closing Al Jazeera’s bureau in Tunis, arresting MP Yassine Ayari, arresting two more MPs between July 31 and August 1, lecturing a New York Times journalist on the US Constitution while comparing himself to Abraham Lincoln. and placing a senior Ennahda member under house arrest on August 6.
US officials should continue to emphasize the importance of returning to a democratic path in discussions with Saied and Tunisian officials. Secretary Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan conveyed the right message in their calls with Saied on July 26 and July 31, respectively. US officials should continue to emphasize that America’s deep partnership with Tunisia is not based solely on security but also on Tunisia’s commitment to shared values, including democracy and the rule of law.
If Tunisia’s democracy manages to survive, Washington can no longer take a democratic Tunisia for granted. The US should continue to support Tunisia, not only in the democracy and governance space but also economically. If democracy can reemerge and deliver for its people, Tunisia will be a powerful example of democratic success for the world. If not, Tunisia will be another casualty in the 21st Century’s battle between autocracy and democracy.
*Eddie Grove is a graduate of the Columbia Law School class of 2021, where he led research projects focused on Tunisian laws that threaten individual freedoms. He was previously a summer associate at El Ajeri Lawyers in Tunis and a Senior Program Associate for the International Republican Institute’s Tunisia program. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. He can be reached by email at r.eddie.grove@gmail.com.
PS: MEI held a discussion today of many of the issues Eddie treats:
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Stevenson’s army, August 11
– Lured by the prospect of an August recess, the Senate approved the infrastructure package and, after only 14 hours of votes, and 47 amendments, approved the budget resolution intended to pave the way for a filibuster-proof reconciliation bill.
-WaPo reports an intelligence assessment says Kabul could be overrun in 6-12 months. The reporters give no hints of their sources, but I would note that Senators got a secret briefing on Afghanistan on Monday.
– Politico reports that the administration has made a major effort to fill Senior Executive Service positions across government.
– Meanwhile, Senator Cruz [R-TX] still blocks many State Dept nominations because of his opposition to the administration’s NordStream2 policy. [Here’s a CRS report from June, shortly before the Biden-Merkel deal on the project.]
– Nobody blocked former SAIS Prof Mara Karlin, who was confirmed yesterday.
– Biden’s promised “Summit of Democracies” is now set for December.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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