Month: August 2021
Stevenson’s army, August 7
– To commemorate the 20th anniversary of the PDB warning of what became the 9/11 attacks, WOTR reprints the document and an excerpt from the 9/11 Commission report.
-Politico details the budget games and deceptions used by Trump to get money for the border wall.
– New Yorker writer complains about the press blackout in Afghanistan.
– Notre Dame prof summarizes his new book on Soviet-German cooperation during 1920s-30s.
-SAIS prof Anne Applebaum dumps on Tucker Carlson over Hungary, as does a TPM writer.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 6
The Senate is all tangled up this morning. No wonder several majority leaders have used the same metaphor for their job — “herding cats.” Leader Schumer is using the allure of an August recess to force action on the infrastructure package and a budget resolution that will allow a filibuster-free package of other measures. But since so much is done by unanimous consent, any Senator can slow things down. And the budget process leads to all-nighters. with meaningless vote-a-ramas. We’ll sort this out in class.
Politico says China is worried about US withdrawal from Afghanistan. But State reminds us that there is a great power venue for Afghan policy.
Australia is launching a reparations program for indigenous people.
Book note: I’ve just finished reading Alexander Vindman’s memoir, a chapter of which was published last week. It’s a typical military memoir — lessons learned at key points in his career, one of which was a willingness to “start over and start over again.” Besides the impeachment-related story, he describes normal NSC staffer work. Most troubling to me is his tale of punishment by his colleagues after his testimony and the ways the Army misled him and then failed to protect him from White House retaliation.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Some ideas are better than others
I have been puzzled by some Balkan economic initiatives. So I turned to Demush Shasha, Executive Director of the Pristina-based thinktank EPIK and former Secretary General of the Ministry for European Integration, for answers. While I think Demush has done an admirable job of analyzing the situation, I’d be glad to hear from others who may have different views of the merits and demerits of the initiatives discussed. Demush writes:
First let’s try and delineate the discussion surrounding these issues. So, these are two separate, though related, conversations.
1. CEFTA vs SEFTA;
2. Mini-Schengen vs Berlin process.
Former is more specific and economic discussion, later is more general and political discussion. To put it differently, the former is about “free movement of goods” – so almost exclusively a trade discussion. Later is about more than trade, it is about ALL types of freedoms in Western Balkans – people, capital, goods, establishment of companies, recognition of academic and professional qualifications, etc.
With that out of the way, a few words on differences between competing proposals.
CEFTA vs SEFTA
Kosovo proposed that CEFTA is succeeded by SEFTA. There are two reasons for this: (1) When CEFTA was launched Czechoslovakia was part of it 😊. So, the first argument is that agreement was designed for a different time and place, and it needs simply an update to new realities. (2) Kosovo is not a party to CEFTA as a sovereign country, but through UNMIK. This is because of Serbian veto within CEFTA mechanisms and procedures. So, Kosovo believes that with the launch of SEFTA, as a new mechanism, this issue can be addressed. Serbia on the other hand, for obvious reasons is against the proposal.
Mini-Schengen vs Berlin process
The Berlin process was launched in 2014 by the EU as a political mechanism to spur political cooperation in the region, allocate funds for important infrastructure investment, and ensure that the region gradually increases its competitiveness and prepares itself for EU Single Market. Since the launch, all 6 WB [Western Balkan] countries + 10 EU countries have been part of the process. So no brainer, everything was running great and smooth, until…
Mini-Schengen was launched in 2019 by three WB countries, without serious international political support, it failed to ensure inclusiveness of all WB countries and without any financial resources. Immediately, after a few first meetings it was obvious that this is not a serious undertaking, but rather a platform from which frustrated WB countries can get together and communicate their displeasure with the EU. Albania and North Macedonia were not being allowed to start accession talks, and Serbia’s accession process practically stalled, without any new negotiating chapter being opened.
In this light, Kosovo decided that it will continue to support Berlin process initiative and stay out of the Mini-Schengen. This decision is based on several factors:
1. Berlin process goal is regional cooperation in view of EU accession. Mini-Schengen goal is to create a mechanism that “will take the fate of the Balkans in our own hands”. You can imagine why in the Balkans, and in particular countries like Kosovo and BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], this kind of language makes people edgy.
2. The Berlin process is led by Germany, and supported by its key EU member states. Mini-Schengen is led by Serbia.
3. Mini-Schengen goal is to undermine the Berlin process and EU influence in the region, since it is a duplication of the Berlin process. Mini-Schengen would create a political forum where out of all participating countries, Serbia would be a natural leader of the group. This raises eyebrows with regard to creating an opening for Russian influence in the region through Serbia and Mini-Schengen.
4. The Berlin process has at its disposal 9 billion EURO funding, for 2021-2027, allocated by the EU in the forms of grants, which the EU has assessed will generate additional 20 billion investments in loans. Mini-Schengen has zero.
On US position: No high level US official ever took part in Mini-Schengen meetings. Mini-Schengen is mentioned in Washington KS [Kosovo]-SRB [Serbia] letters of intent, but it was never followed-up in any serious and structural manner by US administration. My reading is that the US supports any initiative that contributes to regional cooperation, and additionally on Mini-Schengen I think they understand the politics of it and they are simply allowing those 3 countries (Srb, Alb, NM) for the moment to vent some (justified to an extent) displeasure with the EU.
On EU position: Despite that the initiative in its title had the word “Schengen”, and aimed to transpose four fundamental freedoms of the EU, the EU never supported the initiative. They have continuously communicated that the Berlin process is the way forward. However, noting the current lack of enlargement momentum they really had little moral capital to be more aggressive publicly.
In a nutshell, I think it is one of those things that is not on the priority list of the US/EU, so they refrained from going publicly against it. They recognize that the initiative has no teeth, nor future. However, I believe that behind the public eye, they have strongly advised Kosovo, Montenegro and BiH to stay outside of the initiative.
PS: At this event earlier this week, Jim O’Brien of Albright-Stonebridge gave a vigorous and detailed defense of “Open Balkans,” which is a rebranding of mini-Schengen:
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Stevenson’s army, August 5
– The administration announced a $750 million arms sale to Taiwan, its first.
– Reuters says a new arms transfer policy will be coming soon, with added human rights criteria.
– CRS has an updated report on the congressional process in arms sales.
– China may have converted ferries for amphibious operations.
– Politico explains how HAC Chair Delauro gets her bills approved. [This reinforces my point that appropriations and armed services are the rare committees that know how to pass controversial legislation.]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 4
– SFRC will vote today on legislation repealing the 1991 and 2002 AUMFs on Iraq.
– Administration officials signaled support, but with caveats.
– David Ignatius says Biden hit “sweet spot” with Iraq.
– Senate Homeland Security Committee has bipartisan report criticizing agencies’ cybersecurity.
– CNO blasts lobbying by defense firms.
I’ve long argued that you can’t write a good paper on Congress using Google because the best information is behind paywalls. Lobbyists pay $5K to $10K a year for access to Politico Pro and similar sites. Now it looks like Axios is joining the fray. See this from a competitor:
Axios executives plan to jump into the policy journalism market this fall with new mid-and high-priced subscriptions products, according to a person briefed on the plan.
This represents an effort by the D.C.-based news outlet to take on Politico Pro, and jump into a market with Bloomberg owned B-Gov and CQRoll Call.
Axios plans to start offering mid-range products for investors and private equity firms first, and then higher-priced ones that are designed to challenge Politico Pro. Jim VandeHei and Roy Schwartz — Axios’ founders — started Politico Pro, and have long toyed with a similar product at Axios. They have intimate knowledge of the business and would seek to create a modernized version. VandeHei had no comment.
Disclosure: We all worked at Politico with VandeHei, Schwartz and Mike Allen, and we now compete against them.
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Russia is an option, but not a good one
While I’ve had lots of agreement about my assertion last week that there are no good American options for Syria, some of my friends are still hoping for the US and Russia to make progress on the political front. This idea certainly makes sense in principle. The Russians are a strong military force inside Syria and have lots of political clout, not only with President Assad but also with what is left of the Syrian opposition, the Kurds, the Turks, and the Iranians. Their main interest in Syria would appear to be maintaining their bases there, which the Americans have never really opposed. Having spent a good deal, they also want to benefit from Syria’s reconstruction. Unlike the Iranians, Russia does not threaten Israel, though there is rumint that they are shifting towards blocking its bombing inside Syria.
But that is too narrow an assessment of Moscow’s interests. The Russians would like a stronger role throughout the Middle East and want to make trouble for the West while protecting autocrats. They like the higher oil prices their cooperation in OPEC+ with Middle Eastern oil producers has brought. They see economic and political opportunities in American withdrawal from the region. And they want to re-assert the sovereign rights of leaders who, like Vladimir Putin, don’t have genuine support from their people. Preventing “regime change” has become the Russian equivalent of Biden’s “promoting democracy.”
Moscow is not going to defenestrate Assad, or even open the window so that the Syrian people can do it. While they talk smack about him to any Westerner who will listen, they in fact have supported him even when he undertook military offensives they had advised against. Moscow doesn’t see anything better (for its interests) than Assad on the horizon. If the Russians had any intention at all of seeking alternatives, they had an excellent opportunity to signal that during the UN Security Council debate this month on cross-border aid, which the West favors because it provides assistance to Assad’s opponents without requiring his approval. The Russians by contrast took a hard line and allowed only one cross-border point to remain open for six months, or maybe a year.
Is there anything the West could do to change Moscow’s behavior? We can try. The Biden Administration has shut down work by a US company that was planning to help the Kurds in eastern Syria produce and refine oil production from one of Syria’s main fields. The Kurds as a result will have to continue to sell a good part of it, one way or another, to the regime, which controls the only remaining refinery in the country. Not surprisingly, a Russian-controlled company has now indicated it is willing to return to Syria to produce some of that oil. It is hard to believe the Americans didn’t understand the consequences of their move in shutting down the US company.
The question is this: what did Biden’s people get in exchange for giving a Russian company control of a major source of Syria’s oil? So far, the answer seems to be “very little,” perhaps only the UNSC resolution holding that one cross-border assistance point open. Could they have gotten more? It is hard to tell, but my guess is not much more. The Americans just don’t have enough bang in Syria, where their troops are hunkered down providing intelligence, logistical, and other assistance to Kurdish-led forces who are trying to deal with Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, local issues, and sometimes the Turks.
American and European policy on Syria has focused on sanctions and holding back reconstruction assistance until there is an “irreversible” way forward on a political solution. That position is holding for now, but not producing any significant diplomatic results. In the meanwhile, Syrians suffer the consequences. Assad is careful to feed his supporters before the opposition and to throw any reconstruction contracts the Iranians and Russians are willing to fund to their companies and to his own cronies. He hasn’t survived more than 10 years of civil war without figuring out what it takes to stay in power. Moscow occasionally plays a mediator role in negotiating a ceasefire here and there but shows no sign of pressuring him to prepare a political transition.
I’ll be glad to be surprised. But at least for now, Russia is not a good option.
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