Sanctioning Syria might work, but not the way it’s done now

The Assad regime and the Syrian economy at large have been under Western sanctions for years, but they have yet to lead to serious concessions. This has caused some analysts and policy makers to favor lifting most sanctions altogether, fearing that their only effect currently is to harm the Syrian civilian population. However, concessions from the Assad regime remain elusive, making this option difficult to realize. In response to these issues and considerations, the Middle East Institute’s Wael Alalwani and Karam Shaar published a paper reviewing US and EU sanctions on Syria earlier this month. On August 24, MEI convened a panel to discuss the report and the issue in general. The discussants agreed that the West lacks focus on the Syrian conflict. Western sanctions regimes lack thought and dedication, causing them to fail at bringing about regime change, while disproportionately harming the Syrian civilian population. Sanctions have a definite function in the fight against injustice in Syria, but their types and application need to be seriously reviewed for them to fulfil it efficiently.

The speakers were:

Natasha Hall
Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Jomana Qaddour
Nonresident Senior Fellow & Head of Syria
Atlantic Council
Member
Syrian Constitutional Committee

Karam Shaar
Research Director,
Operations Policy Center (OPC)
Nonresident Scholar,
MEI
Senior Lecturer
Massey University

Andrew Tabler
Matin J. Gross Fellow, Geduld Program on Arab Politics
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Engagement

Charles Lister (moderator)
Senior Fellow and Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism programs
MEI

The report

Karam Shaar summarized the findings of the report:

• Lift certain sanctions and rely more on others. All country or sector-wide sanctions should be lifted, as they hurt civilians the most and can’t be maintained in the long run. These should be lifted in exchange for concessions as soon as possible. On the other hand, targeted sanctions such as travel bans, asset freezes and secondary sanctions should be expanded.
• Implement a more proactive, all-of-Syria policy and focus on it. The current policy lacks focus and dedication.
• Pursue Syrian officials by using universal jurisdiction legislation in Western countries. Only small steps have been taken in this direction.
• Improve the effectiveness of sanctions. This can be done by targeting the deep cadres of the regime, not the tip of the iceberg (e.g. target known security chiefs who aren’t currently sanctioned, rather than a cabinet minister with little actual importance to the regime). The US and EU should also expand their use of secondary sanctions that target third parties who cooperate with or aid sanctioned individuals, even in activities that aren’t technically under sanctions.
• Make realistic demands. It is completely unrealistic for Assad to agree to the current demand, namely a political transition which will inevitably lead to his downfall and possibly even his death. Regime allies will also never favor this option. If this is the aim, far more pressure would be necessary than is currently applied.

Shaar considers the current sanctions policy a lazy attempt by the US and EU to feign an interest in the fate of the Syrian people, while allowing the situation to fester.

In response, Tabler, who was part of designing Syrian sanctions in the US government until recently, emphasized that mistakes are inevitable. However, it is also important to remember that certain decisions might be made based on classified information that the public isn’t privy to. He also considered scrapping all sector-based sanctions unrealistic. Certain sectors must remain sanctioned, although he does admit that there are sanctions that disproportionately harm citizens.

Bypassing sanctions

Natasha Hall turned the panel’s attention to regime efforts to bypass sanctions. North Korea’s ‘Room 39’ works on ways to access hard currency for Pyongyang through drug trafficking, ransomware, etc. The Assad regime’s ‘Room 39’ activities are perhaps more advanced than that already. It gains currency through the expropriation of IDP assets, as well as UN food aid. Qaddour added that the Syrian regime has become a major exporter of the illegal drug Captagon. The value of only the seized Captagon in the Gulf in 2020 was five times that of the legitimate exports of Syria.

Tabler described sanctions as good for the long haul. The threat of military action has a limited shelf life and diminishing deterrent value. However, when challenged by Shaar and Hall, he acknowledged that sanctions are a cat-and-mouse game. They must continuously be updated as those under sanctions discover loopholes to avoid them. Shaar criticized the Biden administration’s decision not to review and update sanctions, but rather continue to implement the Trump administration’s existing package. This has allowed such loopholes to expand.

The UN has also become a threat to the effectiveness of sanctions. Hall mentioned that the UN doesn’t have to adhere to US or EU sanctions and does work with regime insiders to deliver aid. Qaddour pointed out that this year’s UNSC discussion on aid provision led to the inclusion of early recovery assistance for the first time. Such efforts need to be viewed skeptically. If we can ensure strong conditions and follow-up for where this aid goes, it can benefit ordinary Syrians through the reconstruction of hospitals and schools. Otherwise, it is likely to flow into the pockets of companies owned by regime insiders.

Civilian wellbeing

Qaddour emphasized the need to balance the regime and the welfare of normal Syrians. We shouldn’t maintain a philosophy of ‘down with Assad or we burn the country’. Hall also warned that a failure to engage in sanctions as part of a broader strategy would lead to a North Korea on the Mediterranean: a heavily sanctioned regime that perseveres while its population suffers.

However, Qaddour thinks that Syrian citizens opposed to Assad are aware of the good intentions behind the current sanctions. This is particularly true for the Kurdish-held areas, which don’t bear the brunt of the sanctions and where Assad’s propaganda isn’t a factor. Also in regime areas, people tend to have a nuanced perspective. They can see firsthand that whatever wealth does enter the country flows to those in the regime. Their suffering is starkly contrasted with the wealth of regime insiders.

Re-engaging the West

The panel was unanimous in thinking that the West isn’t engaged enough with the Syrian conflict and that its actions reflect that. Hall made clear that there is much more at stake for the West than humanitarian considerations. The war and the Syrian regime cause arms trafficking, drug (Captagon) smuggling, and potentially the trafficking of foreign fighters. Especially if the regime captures Kurdish-held areas, thousands of foreign fighters would come under its jurisdiction. Tabler also feared that the West underprioritizes Syria.

There are those in Washington who favor ending sanctions. Not for love of the Assad regime, but for fear of the effects. Particularly the experience of Iraq in the 1990s and the suffering caused by US sanctions without tangible results inform this idea, according to Hall and Tabler. However, Qaddour pointed out that lifting sanctions without receiving concessions is impossible. It would devastate US and EU credibility in the future, and vindicate authoritarians claiming that the West will lose interest after a while.

Hall also indicated that ending sanctions won’t solve the suffering of the Syrian people. They would still be under the stress of the demographic engineering the Assad regime is engaging in. The expropriations of IDP and regime opponents property while investing reconstruction efforts in loyal areas that aren’t the most in need makes it impossible for many refugees to return to the country. Under these conditions reconstruction won’t succeed: it will lack the human capital that must also be rebuilt. If we lift sanctions now, we would just allow the entrenchment of a system of injustice. Shaar suggested there is no reason at all to lift targeted personal sanctions such as asset freezes. These don’t hurt Syrian civilians.

The panel came to a number of immediate recommendations:

• They agreed that establishing a high-ranking special envoy for Syria would serve to signal US seriousness and allow the sanctions system to be applied in earnest.
• Hall also recommended a comprehensive review of the effects and effectiveness of our current sanctions regimes.
• Shaar was pessimistic about the prospect of enticing European or American governments to take a genuine interest. He believed the best bet is to focus on what Syrians and those that do care about Syrian interests can do without their help.

Watch the recording of the event below: