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Last month’s threat by Serb political boss Milorad Dodik is fading into the holiday mist. No one who watches Bosnian poitics should relax. He has made it clear his goal is de facto secession of Republika Srpska. This regional entity’s authority extends to 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory.

Dodik is moving small step by small step. Each time he slices the salami to get closer to what he wants. Last month the RS National Assembly convened to begin planning for withdrawal starting in six months from Bosnia’s security, justice, and taxation institutions. These were all established in the aftermath of the 1992-95 war that ended in the Dayton peace agreements. American efforts “to walk Bosnia back from the cliff” at least made Dodik stop at the edge.

The plan is to eviscerate the minimal Bosnian state

He is unlikely to step much farther back or to declare independence. Dodik’s plan is to eviscerate the Bosnian state, minimal though it is. He wants the RS to withdraw from Sarajevo’s vital institutions under a veil of legislative approval. He would then be all-powerful and unaccountable in his own fief. Failing that, he wants his threat of secession to prevent any further strengthening of Sarajevo governance.

Russia will support Dodik’s moves and try to protect him. Moscow is already denying the authority of the High Representative in Bosnia, who is responsible for civilian implementation of the Dayton agreements. Serbian President Vucic will be more circumspect, as he fears EU and US disapproval. But his minions, including Interior Minister Vulin, cheer more openly. The RS is an important component of what they call the “Serbian world.” That would be a Greater Serbian state incorporating neighboring Serb populations.

The ethnic authoritarian paladin

Dodik is the embodiment of the ethnic authoritarian ideal. He started political life as a relative moderate in the Bosnian context. But he has become a denier of crimes (including genocide) the RS committed during the 1990s war. He is now a champion of Serb exceptionalism, a subservient puppet of Moscow, and a deeply corrupted pocketer of ill-gotten gains. The Dayton agreements divide the Bosnian pie along ethnic lines. That reduces political competition and incentivizes predatory behavior. Most people in Washington and Brussels understand that Dodik is irredeemable. So their diplomats work hard instead to get Serbian President Vucic to restrain him, offering mostly carrots and few sticks.

That is no longer working as well as once it did. Like his genocidaire predecesssor Radovan Karadzic, Dodik regards himself as a political competitor to Vucic in Belgrade, not just a provincial party chief in Banja Luka. The time is coming for a showdown between these Serb paladins.

Vucic is unquestionably more powerful, but Dodik is more useful to the Russians. They would regard de facto RS secession as a useful precedent and bargaining chip for breakaway provinces in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Moscow would also enjoy derailing a Western triumph of the 1990s unipolar moment: the negotiated end of the Bosnian war.

What is to be done?

Dodik is making it impossible for the US and EU to continue ignoring his moves towards de facto independence. The question is: what can they do about it? Next time he slices the salami, how should they react?

First, the EU and US need to nullify any decisions in the RS Assembly that contradict the Dayton accords and subsequent decisions of the High Representative. This the HiRep can do with the stroke of a pen. But then what? How do his decisions get enforced?

Once upon a time, the HiRep would not have hesitated to remove Dodik from office. But is that any longer feasible? Another possibility is his arrest for insurrection against the Bosnian state, of which he is blatantly guilty. But Bosnia’s prosecutors seem unwilling and likely incapable of doing that.

The US and EU will need to act

If nothing can be done inside Bosnia, then the burden falls to Washington, Brussels, and European capitals (if the EU fails to act jointly). They will need to levy punishing sanctions on Dodik personally, all members of the RS Assembly who vote for withdrawal from Bosnian institutions, and the RS institutionally, including an end to all World Bank and IMF as well as bilateral assistance and access to international financial markets. If the RS has de facto seceded from Bosnia, it shoud not benefit from grants or loans available to its sovereign. It would be rank hypocrisy to allow any international financiing or official development assistance to reach the RS.

There are other possible moves. Brussels and Washington could shut down RS representational offices. The international military presence, EUFOR, could move troops to the vital northeast town of Brcko while the UK and US deploy NATO troops there, to prevent any effort by either Sarajevo or Banja Luka to seize it. Want to make an impression? The British and Americans could arrive in the hundreds by parachute outside Banja Luka, in a NATO training exercise.

Dodik and any other politicians supporting de facto secession could be barred from Sarajevo and any requirements for Serb approval of Bosnian government actions there could be abrogated. Any funding for the RS from Sarajevo could stop. Bosnia could revert to its pre-war constitution, or devise a new one that erases the RS as well as the Federation and its cantons, relying on municipalities for local governance.

Dodik should not be ignored

This is an illustrative, not an exhaustive, list of options, not recommendations. The main point is that Brussels and Washington should no longer downplay or ignore Dodik’s moves. If they do, patriotic Bosnians, who were the main victims of the 1992-95 war, will take matters into their own hands, seizing Brcko before Dodik does.

That too, would mark a failure of Dayton, but one that would preserve the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as its multi-ethnicity. For anyone thinking democracy is a preferable system of government, it would be better than secession by genocide-denying political and ideological successors to Radovan Karadzic, bent on ethnic authoritarian rule with Moscow’s support and on creation of Milosevic’s Greater Serbia.