Day: February 10, 2022
China and Russia are friends but not equals
Professor Evan Medeiros of Georgetown University analyzed the Xi-Putin declaration this week on NPR:
The Washington Post comes to similar conclusions: there is less to the declaration than some think.
Craig Singleton at Foreign Policy looks also at the readouts and Chinese press coverage. He goes a step further to suggest that President Xi gave President Putin little in order to protect Chinese economic interests, especially in Europe. Those interests he suggests could provide the West with a wedge to separate China from Russia. Economic prosperity trumps authoritarian solidarity.
The good news
The combined military and economic power and geographic extent of a China/Russia alliance would be formidable. It is good news that the Putin’s Olympics jaunt did not solidify into a genuine defense pact. Unless more was agreed than we know, Russia cannot rely on China to help beat Western sanctions. The Chinese may not like NATO enlargement, but it is not a primary concern for Beijing. The flagging Chinese economy is far more important.
The bad news
Moscow and Beijing are both exercised over human rights. Their joint declaration declares their own countries democracies but denounces human rights as a nefarious concern of the West. This may sound illogical to liberal democratic ears, but it is consistent with their distortion of “democracy.” To them, it means any system that somehow expresses the supposed will of the people, even if the people have no rights and have never validated that will in a free and fair election. Xi and Putin, like many other autocrats, think of themselves as the embodiment of the people’s will, evident in their successful assent to power.
China and Russia may be friends but are not equals
For now, Russians and Chinese are putting up with that claim, which in a perverse way demonstrates the power of the democratic example. Chinese and Russians all know the consequences of contesting the power of their leaders. But there is a big difference. Beijing can afford to repress the opposition and buy off the rest. For now, they are doing it in grand style in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as in more retail ways in other parts of the country. Moscow can afford to buy off a few oligarchs but is leaving the majority of the population in straitened circumstances with shortened life expectancies, low incomes, and few free means of expression.
Putin has reasons to invade
It seems likely Putin will go ahead with the invasion of Ukraine. The Russian deployment is not a Potemkin village. It has gotten him little so far that he could not have gotten for more polite asking. The Americans have offered to limit armaments in Europe, provided the agreement is reciprocal. Putin’s moves have also unified NATO in favor of drastic sanctions, including extinction of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, and solidified Ukrainian support for the Alliance, precisely the opposite of what Putin wanted.
None of that however will make Putin hesitate. He wants to prove to the world that Russia is indispensable. “Nothing about Europe without Russia” is his motto. He is trying to reassert Moscow’s claim as a superpower capital, a claim that died with the Soviet Union. For someone for whom power is he be-all and end-all, only the successful use of force can revalidate it.
Beijing stands to lose little
Beijing won’t be happy if Russia invades Ukraine and disrupts the world’s economy, but it will be in his corner when he tries. If he succeeds, the Chinese will enjoy the outcome as a defeat for the Americans, NATO, and human rights. If he fails, the Chinese can walk away unscathed, comforted in the knowledge Putin will need to sell even more natural gas. China and Russia are friends, but not equals.
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Stevenson’s army, February 10
– This time, WH has better plans to evacuate a threatened country.
– Africom head sees “hand of Russia” in African coups.
– WSJ reports debate over new Iran nuclear deal.
Thomas Edsall says academic studies link populist support to status anxiety and loss of jobs through trade.
A group of Senators want intelligence sharing with Ukraine. A friend with long experience in intelligence sees problems: But intelligence sharing with Ukraine is not an easy call. Judging from the unclassified literature, it seems likely that Ukrainian intelligence is penetrated by the Russians. So, how do you share, how much, when, and with whom? Here are my guesses: You share only at a very high level, and only with professionals. Probably only with the military. If we and they are lucky, we have already trained them to receive and use what we pass. You leave an air gap between the “western” intelligence and whatever else they have. If we and they are lucky, the “western” equipment is already installed and tested. But you don’t exercise the equipment in Ukraine until the war is real, so as to limit what the Russian penetrations can learn and what advantage the Russian forces can gain as a result. And if you’re really serious, some American “trainers” come with the equipment — and stay there. Not “boots on the ground,” maybe, but “operatives in the ops center.” And if we and they are lucky, the operatives are neither killed nor captured. So, why the letter? To tell the bureaucrats that we have their back, both parties, if that last bit of luck does not come to pass.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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