Recognition can weaken Serbia’s leverage

Edward Joseph, a Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, writes:

It’s the Newtonian law of policy debate: every idea that challenges orthodoxy produces an equal and opposite reaction.

We, the co-authors of the recent SAIS-Wilson Center report, ‘From Crisis to Convergence: A Strategy to Tackle Instability at its Source’, welcome debate on our approach, which has generated at least 16 articles, interviews and two controversies, along with interest in key capitals.  At the very least, it represents an original way of thinking about a region where the West has struggled for too long, despite holding the strategic advantage.

We will host a live critique of our recent SAIS-Wilson Center report – along with an assessment of just how bad the situation in the Balkans is — on-line this Tuesday, 15 February at 9:30AM ET.  Sign up here. 

This event will feature leading experts from: Bosnia-Herzegovina – Srecko Latal (Balkans Crossroads); Kosovo — Engjellushe Morina (ECFR); Serbia – Igor Bandovic (BCSP); Albania – Albert Rakipi (AIIS.)  They will explore: ‘Balkans 2022: How Bad Can It Get? Is a Breakthrough Possible?’

The report’s co-authors — who hail from the countries most affected by the strategy, including two respected experts from Serbia and Kosovo – will respond. 

One of the more thoughtful critiques of our report appeared in Dan Serwer’s Peacefare post of 19 January.  To summarize, Dan supports convergence by the European states that don’t recognize Kosovo, and, critically, he acknowledges the threat from “Serbian irredentism” in the Balkans.  Dan then questions the impact of convergence – even NATO membership for Kosovo – on Belgrade’s policies.  Instead of altering Serbia’s “strategic calculus,” as we state, Dan believes it will “incentivize Serbia in the opposite direction.”

Anti-democratic Serbia is the problem

Dan’s post raises essential and under-examined questions: what drives Serbia’s posture in the Balkans?  Why does only Serbia (and its proxies) reject the liberal Western order for the region?

Let me begin with a challenge to Peacefare readers:

How do you explain that more than three-decades after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia began, the region is not just stagnant – but going backwards, with open talk of “war” from responsible international and regional figures alike?  Bear in mind that, unlike in Ukraine, the US, NATO and EU hold the strategic advantage in the Balkans.

We give our answer in the report.  The Balkans is not a ‘morass’ of intractable ethno-national tensions.  Instead, those ethno-national tensions – which stand in the way of the fight against corruption and the fight for rule of law and democracy – are a function of two factors: national power and strategic orientation.

And that’s the crux of the problem: the largest Western Balkans state – Serbia – has polities in four neighboring states, and is oriented towards the illiberal powers: Russia and China.  In power for a decade, the Vucic regime has methodically rolled back Serbia’s weak democracy.  The regime is protected within the EU by the leading European illiberal power: Hungary.

In sum, no matter how many Special Envoys are sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, fundamental reform will remain out of reach as long as this condition in Serbia continues.  To put it another way, don’t expect democratic progress in BiH or its neighbors, with an anti-democratic Serbia.

Serbia’s leverage

But that only addresses Serbia’s strategic orientation. Where does the Vucic regime get the power to subvert its neighbors – and confound US and EU diplomats?  Why do capable, dedicated US officials assail corruption and organized crime in Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo – but are generally quiet on official corruption in Serbia?  Why do US officials in Serbia repeatedly laud a regime that openly – on billboards – promotes Beijing, and backs Moscow over Ukraine as, “the political and economic leader” in the region?  Why was Serbia invited to the ‘Summit for Democracy’ after US officials stated clearly that it would not be invited?  Why did the EU give Serbia a pass on rule of law standards? 

The source of the leverage

We believe the answer is clear: Serbia has leverage over Kosovo, and through it, over the US and EU.  The source of that leverage is the four NATO non-recognizers.  The best way to understand Serbian leverage is by comparison with Bulgaria and North Macedonia.  As an EU member, Sofia can unilaterally block the opening of Skopje’s EU accession negotiations.  Similarly, Belgrade can unilaterally block Pristina’s pathway to NATO and the EU – even though it’s not a member of either organization.  The reason: the non-recognizers have, effectively, handed their proxy to Belgrade: ‘we won’t recognize Kosovo, until Serbia does.’

Kosovo cannot advance until Belgrade, with the proxy of the non-recognizers, says so.  The status quo – no settlement between Pristina and Belgrade – inflicts pain on only one side.  Indeed, the status quo is beneficial for the Vucic regime as it insulates it from Western scrutiny.

In short, the West is participating in Vucic’s charade.  Belgrade’s main aim in the EU-led Dialogue is simply to avoid being blamed for lack of progress, so that the Vucic regime can continue the pretense of interest in making EU reforms and becoming a member.  Meanwhile, the regime draws Western praise, even as Vucic – through others – promotes what they call the ‘Serb World.’ 

The way forward

The way forward is also clear: Western strategy should focus on eroding Serbia’s leverage, reducing the illiberal Vucic regime’s ability to project its destructive vision in the region and domestically.  Rather than “incentivizing Serbia in the wrong direction,” we see precisely the opposite: reducing regime power incentivizes it to scale back its destructive aspirations and cooperate.  In other words, this is about power dynamics, not incentives.  EU membership has incentives ample enough to attract Serbia’s neighbors, Albania and North Macedonia.  Tirana and Skopje are desperate simply to have the same right that Belgrade already enjoys and exploits.

Eroding Serbian leverage is not a binary event, i.e. either full recognition by the four NATO non-recognizers, or nothing.  Instead, we see Belgrade’s obsessive bid to isolate and weaken Kosovo – evidenced in its own words and actions – as proof of its vulnerability.  That’s why senior Serbian officials run nervously to Greece and Spain to shore up – as officials openly state – non-recognition of Kosovo.  That explains why at a time of grave European crisis, Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selakovic last week visited – of all places – Equatorial Guinea! – praising the country for not recognizing Kosovo.  Same with the visits to dangerous countries like Iran and obscure ones like Suriname – all mainly in the name of isolating Kosovo.

Our strategy

Our strategy is entirely pragmatic.  Steps towards ‘convergence’ beginning, for example, with returning Slovak and Spanish troops to KFOR, bringing Kosovo into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, aided by continuing movement from Greece, and steps by Romania as well, will have immediate impact on the regime’s posture.  Greece’s role is particularly significant because Athens has its own clearly stated strategic reasons for moving toward recognition of Kosovo.

The Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council are no match in this regard.  A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership. 

Let’s finally bring the curtain down on the three-decade crisis over Yugoslavia, where it began – in Kosovo.  Convergence is the way.  Most current approaches, including the fight against corruption, and building a regional common market, continue under convergence — empowered by a US and EU that can finally apply the same standards across the region.  Join us on Tuesday to hear how experts from the region process this argument!