Month: February 2022
Stevenson’s army, February 22
– Fred Kaplan analyzes Putin’s revanchist address.
– WaPo says administration argues over whether this is an “invasion.”
– NYT has good tick tock on administration plans since last fall for major information operations to expose Russian plans.
– Germany has halted NordStream2.
– WaPo has background on the contested Donbas region.
– Here’s background on “Putin’s enabler.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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First bite taken, but still hungry for more
Russian President Putin has made his move against Ukraine. He yesterday recognized the “independence” of Luhansk and Donetsk and deployed Russian forces. For now, they remain in territory already under Russian control. No one will swallow his “peacekeepers” line, which he has previously used in the occupied Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The irony of occupying a territory you’ve just recognized as independent seems lost on him.
There is another irony. Putin’s move is not welcome in Kyiv, but it relieves Ukraine of any lingering obligation to implement the Minsk 2 agreement. That would have given Luhansk and Donetsk some say-so, if not a veto, in Kyiv. But there would still have been no near-term prospect of reintegrating them with the rest of the country. If Kyiv continues on the path of serious political and economic reform, it will be clear soon enough to the remaining residents of the secessionist territory where their bread is best buttered.
Crimea, which Russia has annexed and militarized, is a separate question.
The big question is how much further Putin will go. In the best of all possible worlds, he would stop now, declaring his objective achieved. That is unlikely. An obvious next move would be to occupy parts of the secessonist provinces not already under Russian control. That would be harder, but not likely too hard. He could also take part or all of Ukraine’s southern coast, focusing first on the littoral of the Sea of Azov. That approach would be more feasible for Moscow and less deadly than a full-scale invasion and occupation of the entire country.
Full-scale invasion would be colosally stupid
Some think however that Putin is in the first stage of a full-scale invasion aimed at occupying all of Ukraine. That would be colosally stupid:
- Ukraine is a country of 44 million people, larger than Iraq or Afghanistan when the US invaded them. It is the second largest in Europe, next to Russia.
- Even if every one of the 150,000 Russian troops in the invasion force were to enter Ukraine, there would still be 300 Ukrainians for every Russian.
- Past experience suggests a force of over 650,000 would be required for a comparable “heavy” peacekeeping operation, 80,000 or so for a “light” one in which the local security forces are cooperative. In Ukraine, they won’t be.
- The direct costs would range up to $100 billion if things go well, not counting the economic impact.
- Moscow is claiming the West is weak so now is the time to strike, but there are lots of indications that the West is united and not so weak. The sanctions it imposes will be unprecedented and punishing if Russia tries to take all of Ukraine.
- Putin believes in a history of Ukraine and its relations with Russia that is at best fabricated and at worst delusional.
- It makes no sense to invade a country whose population you claim are your “brothers” or to occupy one you’ve just recognized as independent.
- Russia has been alleging Ukrainian provocations that are blatant lies.
- Moscow wants Ukraine not to join NATO, but it knows that is not in the cards for at least another decade, if ever.
- The Russian invasion threat has made NATO membership far more desirable to many Ukrainians than it once was. Removing Luhansk and Donetsk from Kyiv’s control subtracts a lot of anti-NATO people from the political equation inside Ukraine.
Moscow theater
Putin started yesterday staging a National Security Council meeting that looked more like a school room listening to his dull lecture:
Then these top officials took turns glumly lying to the press about Ukrainian provocations. Putin wrapped the day with his recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk. The Soviets were better at this, but the performance was in their tradition.
The Western reaction
Ukraine and the West will not accept the already announced partition or full-scale occupation. Yesterday, the Americans announced sanctions on the economy and secessionist authorities in Luhansk and Donetsk. That won’t frighten Putin or anyone else. Far more effective is German Chancellor Scholz’s halt to the administrative procedure needed to open the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. That will get some attention in Moscow, but it is also painful in Berlin.
The West needs to be ready to react with more vigorous and united sanctions. But we also need not hit so hard that Putin concludes we have nothing left in reserve. The European security order is at stake in Ukraine. Washington should ensure the punishment for undermining that order is not only severe but can also get worse.
Putin has taken his first bite, but he is hungry for more.
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Putin is hesitating but not yet lost
Russian President Putin has given his military orders to prepare for the invasion of Ukraine, but he is hesitating to give the green light. The French claim he has agreed to a meeting with President Biden following on a meeting between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State Blinken February 24. For the Americans, all of this is contingent on the Russians not invading Ukraine. Moscow says there are no plans for a presidential meeting.
What is going on? There are several possible explanations:
- Military preparations are not yet complete.
- Putin is not satisfied with his domestic support in Russia and Donbas.
- The Chinese warning against invastion has given him pause.
- Diplomatic efforts are promising.
- The Western threat of sanctions is deterring action.
Military preparations
I’m no military expert, but journalists report that Russian commanders have everything they need to proceed. Blood supplies and field hospitals were already in place by last week. Putin was lying when he said Russian forces were drawing down. They are now up to 150,000, enough to seize and control a piece of the country but not enough to occupy its entire territory.
I still am not inclined to believe the Russian objective is to seize Kyiv. I think they aim to make the Sea of Azov a Russian lake. A movement toward Kyiv might make the Ukrainians draw down in the south. But a serious attack on Kyiv would cause devastation that would be difficult for the Russians ever to repair, not to mention Ukrainian hostility and resistance.
Support in Russia and in Donbas
Russia’s parliament has already urged Putin to recognize the independence of the Russian proxy authorities in Donestk and Luhansk, as he has done for South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. The de facto authorities in Donbas have ordered an evacuation of civilians, many of whom have been getting Russian citizenship.
But they are for the most part not departing, even though the rebel military forces have ratcheted up the bombardment of Ukrainian targets to provoke a response. The popular mood in Russia does not favor full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But extending Russian control in the Donbas area would not prove highly problematic either in Russia or in the insurgent portion of Donbas.
Chinese opposition
President Xi did not give Putin the full-throated endorsement he sought for invasion of Ukraine when they met at the opening of the Beijing Olympics. Then last week the Chinese Foreign Minister used the occasion of the Munich Security Conference to back Russia’s position on keeping Ukraine out of NATO but also to pull the rug out from under Putin’s invasion plans.
China favors continued diplomacy instead. Russia will desperately need China to help in sanctions-busting if the invasion proceeds. Beijing however wants to avoid further aggravation of relations with the US. Putin needs again to seek and get Chinese reassurance.
Diplomatic efforts
There is little sign that diplomatic efforts are bearing fruit. According to French President Macron, Putin has agreed to meet with Ukraine and the OSCE. But that is thin gruel.
The US has rejected Russia’s demand that Washington guarantee no NATO membership for Ukraine. Moscow has continued to insist. The Americans have tried to shift the diplomatic agenda to mutual arms and conventional force limitations. They hope Russia will view those as responsive to Moscow’s effort to roll back NATO forces from its borders. Putin however isn’t buying. He wants Russian forces right on the borders of the Baltics, Poland, Belarus, or Ukraine.
Sanctions
Sanctions are a likely factor in Putin’s hesitation. Britain is prepared to end Russia’s access to pounds and British property. The Americans are presumably ready to do likewise. For a country that depends on oil and gas exports, both normally denominated in dollars or another hard currency, that is major.
We don’t know what German Chancellor Scholz said to Putin during his visit last week to Moscow. But President Biden has repeatedly asserted that the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline (completed but not yet operational) is toast “one way or the other” if Russia invades. We don’t know what that means. Scholz likely does. He has shown no sign of disagreeing with Biden.
Bottom lines
Putin holds his cards close, but he is hesitating. I’d give sanctions and the China factor each 40% as factors in his hesitation. Support in Russia and Donbas as well as military preparations I’d each put at 10% each. The diplomatic factor is important only insofar as Blinken continues to reassure Putin that the Americans are still willing to negotiate. That gives him reason not to hurry while he gets China and sanctions-busting fixed.
Still, invasion is more likely than not. Putin is hesitating, but he is not yet lost.
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Stevenson’s army, February 20
– NYT says 2 teams of computer scientists have identified 2 likely QAnon authors.
– NYT says DOJ is changing its ‘China Initiative” aimed at academics
.- NYT examines Russian claims of “genocide” in Ukraine.
– Politico reports back-and-forth at Munich.
Tomorrow, legally, is Washington’s Birthday federal holiday, not “Presidents’ Day.” But celebrate as you wish.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 19
Stay current with NYT’s Ukraine updates.
WSJ reportsRussian missile tests.
I strongly recommend signing up for Politico’s Nat Sec Daily. It has a lot of original reporting and nuggets not widely seen. Such as this: Leaders in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, known as the DNR and LNR, urged an immediate evacuation of potentially more than 3 million people to Russia over unproven claims that Ukrainian forces planned to attack, an accusation Kyiv firmly denies. Savvy journalists, however, found the metadata attached to the videos ordering civilians to urgently flee to the safety of Mother Russia were recorded two days ago.
WSJsays DOD intelligence hampered by workplace harassment problems.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Putin’s ugly war of choice
Today the de facto authorities in the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine are ordering the mass evacuation of civilians to Russia. Supposedly in response to the threat of a Ukrainian attack, this is classic self-cleansing. Its purpose is to create a free-fire zone without a friendly civilian population and to cast the adversary as an ethnic cleanser.
Putin is determined
President Putin appears determined to use force once again in Ukraine. He succeeded eight years ago in the occupation and annexation of Crimea as well as his use of Russian and proxy forces to establish rebel zones in Donbas. Why not try again? With luck, Ukrainian resistance might collapse altogether and allow Moscow to set up a puppet government in Kyiv. More likely, Russian forces will succeed in extending their area of control along the Sea of Azov, perhaps going as far as Crimea.
In the meanwhile, NATO will be reinforcing its forces in the eastern-most member states, something Russia says it doesn’t want. They will also be trying to decide on the sanctions required to respond to Russian aggression. Putin is betting the Alliance will split on that issue and reduce the sanctions to the lowest common denominator. Net result: a NATO military presence that doesn’t really threaten Russia and a falling out among Russia’s adversaries.
Europe whole and free in smithereens
Once the smoke clears, the idea of “Europe whole and free” will be in smithereens. A new curtain will have descended. It won’t be made of iron. On one side will be Lukashenko, the Russian proxies in Moldova and Georgia, Armenia and the central Asian ‘stans. On the other side will be NATO and EU members. Others will either need to choose which sphere of influence they wish to align with or reinvigorate the idea of non-alignment that Serbia and others already champion.
NATO expansion is still possible
It is anyone’s guess how many people will be killed in Putin’s effort to convince the Americans that Ukraine can’t be allowed to decide whether it wants to join NATO. Putin already knows that Ukrainian membership is impossible now and for the foreseeable future, because all of NATO’s 30 member states would need to approve. I doubt even a majority would favor Ukraine’s accession at this point.
But that doesn’t mean NATO won’t expand. Russian behavior in the Baltic and aggression in Ukraine is already well on the way to convincing Sweden and Finland that NATO membership would be a good idea. Both are well-equipped and trained. But neither has the means to defend itself on its own. The NATO door may well be open to both well-ordered and consolidated democracies.
Net results
Putin has succeeded in getting America’s attention and reasserting Russia’s claim to superpower status. The invasion may well split the Alliance on the issue of sanctions. Ukraine will be divided at best and subjugated at worst. But NATO forces will be far stronger and closer to Russia after this war than before it. Moscow will be saddled with an enormous reconstruction burden as well as sanctions.
The biggest known unknown is how Russians will react. This war will belie Putin’s claim of brotherhood with Ukrainians and undermine the Russian economy. Moscow has tried hard to hide the body bags coming back from its military ventures in Syria and Libya. But Russians are not supportive of war in Ukraine and hiding the body bags may be much harder in a ground war of these dimensions. A Russian told me long ago: “We support our czars until we don’t. Then we get rid of them quickly.” Putin’s ugly war of choice could be ugly not only for Ukraine and NATO, but also for him.
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