Month: February 2022
Putin is committed but not a fool
All indicators are go for a large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The troops, equipment, and support apparatus are in place. Weapons have been moved close to the northern and eastern Ukrainian border inside Belarus and Russia. Amphibious landing ships are in the Black Sea. Large-scale military exercises, used as cover in the past for Russian troops deployments in neighboring countries, are in progress.
The diplomatic indicators are also signaling war. Foreign Minister Lavrov walked out of a press conference with the UK Foreign Secretary yesterday. President Biden has called on Americans to leave Ukraine right away. A European “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia) discussion of the never-implemented Minsk 2 accord broke up yesterday without a press statement. Public discourse inside Russia has become more strident.
Russian objectives
The question is which invasion Putin will try. He could attempt to push forward on all fronts at once, from the north, east, and south. The aim would be to take Kiev and install a puppet government there. That would unify the Western powers and provoke the strongest economic sanctions. Or he could use the troops in Belarus to distract Ukrainian defense while pressing in the south to take a land bridge along the Sea of Azov from territory Russian proxies already control to Russian-occupied Crimea. A limited operation of that sort might divide the West and enable Putin to declare victory with minimal combat losses and lesser sanctions imposed.
Ukrainian intentions
Ukrainian intentions are clear. Kiev will try to defend its territory. But its capacity is dubious, despite a massive infusion of military assistance in the past year or so. Ukrainian forces are not only smaller than Russia’s but far less technologically advanced. Neither their equipment nor their training is equal to Moscow’s. The will to fight can make up for such shortfalls, but we won’t know much about that until the balloon goes up. As we saw in Afghanistan, even a well-equipped force can disintegrate rapidly.
Clashing perspectives
There is no sign however that the Russian forces are anything but robust and committed. Putin has told Russians for years that fascists who took power illegitimately govern in Kiev. They are Western puppets in this view. He claims Ukraine is not a real state and that Ukrainians are really Russians, or at least close kin to Russians. Russia’s state and culture he says originated in Ukraine. In this view, the invasion will liberate Ukraine, not conquer it.
Ukrainians will not validate that perspective. Occupying Ukraine and setting up a proxy regime there will be many times more difficult for Putin than what he has done in the Donbas region. There the Russians have failed to establish functioning governance and a viable economy. Crimea is in somewhat better shape, but mainly because of the massive military presence.
Kiev hasn’t been a model of good governance, but it has been improving. Ukrainians, especially those in the Europe-oriented west, aren’t going to like whatever regime Moscow imposes. But even in Kharkiv, the second largest city, most people are not going to welcome a Russian invasion.
The south is the real target
Putin presumably knows this. He also knows occupying all of Ukraine will lead to a ferocious Western reaction. My bet is on a massive Russian attack from three directions in the first few days, accompanied by cyber attacks, disinformation, and destabilization. But then Putin will pivot to focus on the south once it is clear the Ukrainians are resisting. The south is the real military target. Putin is committed, but not a fool.
Stevenson’s army, February 11
– WaPo has ticktock on ISIS leader raid.
– Military complains of distracting calls from WH & Congress on behalf of individuals seeking to flee Afghanistan.
– NYT has good background on Canadian trucker protests.
– Politico China newsletter tells how China is a political issue in coming elections
– David Ignatius complains about political infighting in Ukraine.
– FP says BJP is pushing hijab ban for votes in India.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
China and Russia are friends but not equals
Professor Evan Medeiros of Georgetown University analyzed the Xi-Putin declaration this week on NPR:
The Washington Post comes to similar conclusions: there is less to the declaration than some think.
Craig Singleton at Foreign Policy looks also at the readouts and Chinese press coverage. He goes a step further to suggest that President Xi gave President Putin little in order to protect Chinese economic interests, especially in Europe. Those interests he suggests could provide the West with a wedge to separate China from Russia. Economic prosperity trumps authoritarian solidarity.
The good news
The combined military and economic power and geographic extent of a China/Russia alliance would be formidable. It is good news that the Putin’s Olympics jaunt did not solidify into a genuine defense pact. Unless more was agreed than we know, Russia cannot rely on China to help beat Western sanctions. The Chinese may not like NATO enlargement, but it is not a primary concern for Beijing. The flagging Chinese economy is far more important.
The bad news
Moscow and Beijing are both exercised over human rights. Their joint declaration declares their own countries democracies but denounces human rights as a nefarious concern of the West. This may sound illogical to liberal democratic ears, but it is consistent with their distortion of “democracy.” To them, it means any system that somehow expresses the supposed will of the people, even if the people have no rights and have never validated that will in a free and fair election. Xi and Putin, like many other autocrats, think of themselves as the embodiment of the people’s will, evident in their successful assent to power.
China and Russia may be friends but are not equals
For now, Russians and Chinese are putting up with that claim, which in a perverse way demonstrates the power of the democratic example. Chinese and Russians all know the consequences of contesting the power of their leaders. But there is a big difference. Beijing can afford to repress the opposition and buy off the rest. For now, they are doing it in grand style in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as in more retail ways in other parts of the country. Moscow can afford to buy off a few oligarchs but is leaving the majority of the population in straitened circumstances with shortened life expectancies, low incomes, and few free means of expression.
Putin has reasons to invade
It seems likely Putin will go ahead with the invasion of Ukraine. The Russian deployment is not a Potemkin village. It has gotten him little so far that he could not have gotten for more polite asking. The Americans have offered to limit armaments in Europe, provided the agreement is reciprocal. Putin’s moves have also unified NATO in favor of drastic sanctions, including extinction of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, and solidified Ukrainian support for the Alliance, precisely the opposite of what Putin wanted.
None of that however will make Putin hesitate. He wants to prove to the world that Russia is indispensable. “Nothing about Europe without Russia” is his motto. He is trying to reassert Moscow’s claim as a superpower capital, a claim that died with the Soviet Union. For someone for whom power is he be-all and end-all, only the successful use of force can revalidate it.
Beijing stands to lose little
Beijing won’t be happy if Russia invades Ukraine and disrupts the world’s economy, but it will be in his corner when he tries. If he succeeds, the Chinese will enjoy the outcome as a defeat for the Americans, NATO, and human rights. If he fails, the Chinese can walk away unscathed, comforted in the knowledge Putin will need to sell even more natural gas. China and Russia are friends, but not equals.
Stevenson’s army, February 10
– This time, WH has better plans to evacuate a threatened country.
– Africom head sees “hand of Russia” in African coups.
– WSJ reports debate over new Iran nuclear deal.
Thomas Edsall says academic studies link populist support to status anxiety and loss of jobs through trade.
A group of Senators want intelligence sharing with Ukraine. A friend with long experience in intelligence sees problems: But intelligence sharing with Ukraine is not an easy call. Judging from the unclassified literature, it seems likely that Ukrainian intelligence is penetrated by the Russians. So, how do you share, how much, when, and with whom? Here are my guesses: You share only at a very high level, and only with professionals. Probably only with the military. If we and they are lucky, we have already trained them to receive and use what we pass. You leave an air gap between the “western” intelligence and whatever else they have. If we and they are lucky, the “western” equipment is already installed and tested. But you don’t exercise the equipment in Ukraine until the war is real, so as to limit what the Russian penetrations can learn and what advantage the Russian forces can gain as a result. And if you’re really serious, some American “trainers” come with the equipment — and stay there. Not “boots on the ground,” maybe, but “operatives in the ops center.” And if we and they are lucky, the operatives are neither killed nor captured. So, why the letter? To tell the bureaucrats that we have their back, both parties, if that last bit of luck does not come to pass.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, February 9
– WSJ touts US information warfare over Ukraine.
– Politico reports some intelligence officials think too much is being released.
– Russians deny promises to Macron.
– At FP, writer sees Xi-Putin statement as no big deal.
– Maybe hypersonic weapons can easily be defeated, but that technology is on the critical list.
– The FY23 budget was due yesterday, but the 2022 budget hasn’t been passed. Expect lengthy delays.
– Sanctions against Honduran president revealed.
– Updated version of WaPo report on Afghan evacuation gives more evidence supporting my view that a key factor was the organizational culture clash between a State Dept that always resists closing an embassy and was sympathetic to the destabilizing effects on the host nation government and a military that makes detailed, rigid plans without regard to diplomatic and psychological consequences — coupled with a White House that prefers hedging to binary choices.
CORRECTION: The stopgap spending bill runs to March 11, not April as I wrongly said yesterday.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, February 8
– French officials say Putin promised no new military initiatives for now.
– WaPo has Army report on Afghan withdrawal.
– Vox says Biden learned from Crimea handling under Obama.
– Yesterday I sent Ezra Klein’s report that social trust was key factor in pandemic coping. Kevin Drum argues that loss of social trust correlates with rise of Fox News. [FWIW, I think social media’s stimulation of anger and outrage also mattered.]
– FP says hypersonic missiles are easy to counter.
– RollCall says Continuing Resolutions hurt defense. [Latest plan is to kick the can to April]
-SAIS prof Paula Thornhill comments on new civ-mil research. And she links to great issue of Air University’s SSQ.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).