Day: March 5, 2022
Stevenson’s army, March 5
– A distinguished historian of Russia says the US made a key mistake last November in signing a“strategic partnership” with Ukraine. I hadn’t noticed it myself.
– Politico reports on the supply lines of western equipment into Ukraine.
– WaPo notes what US & NATO are not saying.
– FP reports a new NSC hire.
– In a new annual report, China says it wants to “resolve” the Taiwan issue.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
No fly won’t fly, despite what you may think
Why can’t NATO do more to help Ukraine? Why not institute a no-fly zone that prevents Russian aircraft from attacking Ukrainians forces and population centers?
Yes it would make a difference
Preventing Russian air attacks and close air support would certainly make a difference. The Russians have not established absolute supremacy in the air, but they are stronger there than the Ukrainians. Moscow still has lots of air power in reserve. Preventing it from coming into the fight could be necessary to preserve the viability of Ukraine’s forces.
But enforcing it would entail unacceptable risks
Enforcement of a no-fly zone requires willingness to force down or shoot down violators. Or to destroy violating aircraft while they are on the ground. That’s where things get dicey. NATO would need to be ready to attack Russian aircraft. Bluffing won’t work. Putin would quickly test whether the Alliance is prepared to put its pilots where its declarations are. He would not worry about getting a few Russian pilots killed.
No doubt NATO could put up rather than shut up, but that would initiate hostilities with Russia. Putin could retaliate against the Alliance in any number of countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or the Baltics. That would trigger Article 5, NATO’s mutual defense commitment, puttng the Alliance at war with Russia. It is easy to imagine further escalation and even eventually a nuclear attack. President Biden is wise not to want to risk that.
It could happen anyway
An escalation of that sort could happen even without a no-fly zone. I hear tell that NATO AWACS flying in Polish airspace is jamming Russian signals. Putin could take that, too, as reason enough to attack Poland. Arms shipments to Ukraine from NATO countries could be another trigger for widening the war. Supply of effective air defenses might be particularly provocative from the Russian perspective.
That argues for ending this war quickly
The risks of escalation will be there so long as the fighting continues. Ending this war quickly is the best way of eliminating those risks. The Russians so far seem unable to defeat Ukraine, but the Ukrainians aren’t able to defeat Russia either. Negotiation is the way to go, but there is no overlap between what Russia wants and what Ukraine is prepared to give, or between what Ukraine wants and Russia is prepared to give. A no fly zone would have virtues, but it won’t fly. The fighting is likely to continue until one side or the other can claim at least pyrrhic victory.
RSS - Posts
