Month: March 2022
Stevenson’s army, March 7
– NYT says US has approached Venezuela about buying oil.
– WaPO says US is planning in case there is a Ukrainian govt in exile.
– WSJ says Russians are recruiting Syrians for Ukraine war.
– K St Lobbyists for Russia out of luck.
– Politico has more on the interagency fight over trade policy
– A student told me of Treasury Oct 2021 report on sanctions policy.
– Amy Zegart analyzes effects of Ukraine info ops.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Russian victory is a nightmare for Moscow
The Ukrainians have demonstrated incredible determination and heroism in resisting the Russian invasion. But they are still losing territory. What happens if they are defeated? Say, for example, that Kyiv falls. What then?
Moscow’s intentions are clear
Moscow has made no secret of its intention to replace President Zelensky and his government. That they can do if the Russian army takes the capital, no matter what happens to Zelensky. They could even name someone in advance.
If Zelensky were to escape, either to Lviv in western Ukraine or abroad, he would no doubt try to run a government in exile. Belarus’ opposition leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, is trying something comparable, though she was never in power before fleeing. Juan Guaido’s effort to establish an alternative government inside Venezuela has failed.
If Zelensky is captured or killed, the situation becomes more fraught. The immediate constitutional successor is the Speaker of Parliament, Zelensky ally Ruslan Stefanchuk. Beyond that, the situation appears ambiguous.
The Russians could settle for partition
The Russians have so far shown little military interest in taking Lviv. They are already having difficulty in the east. Kharkiv, a city with a Russian-speaking majority, is proving recalcitrant. Western Ukraine has far fewer Russian speakers and a more positive attitude towards the EU and NATO. President Putin has seemed insatiable so far, but Ukrainian resistance may force him to accept partition of Ukraine somewhere west of Kyiv and north of Odesa.
That however isn’t an attractive proposition from Putin’s perspective. A successful democratic state on his borders is precisely what he is trying to prevent. If he is forced to accept partition, he will do everything he can to make life hard for the “Lviv republic.”
Insurgency is likely
If the Russians are successful in occupying all or part of Ukraine, an insurgency seems likely. Much of the population is armed. Demoralization and lack of will to fight appear rife among the Russians. Ukrainian civilians are often defying them openly in nonviolent confrontations. Parts of the Ukrainian army will no doubt be willing to fight a continuing guerilla war against Russian occupation.
The Russian response will be draconian. Putin will try to do what he did in the second Chechnya war. Then he levelled Grozny, killed with abandon, and installed and funded a puppet government that has executed his will.
But Ukraine is not Chechnya
But there is a big difference in Ukraine, which is a country of 44 million people (before 1 million and more left as war refugees). Chechnya had fewer than 1.5 million. That is a gigantic difference. Russia will need upwards of 500,000 troops to maintain an occupation of Ukraine. It is using only 150,000 or so to invade it, not so successfully. Reconstruction of Ukraine will be a monumental task. Even if Putin leaves Ukraine to rot, as he did Luhansk and Donetsk, it will cost Russia tens of billions of dollars per year.
The price tag will be staggering
That kind of money will be hard to come by in a Russia under Western sanctions. Oil today has spiked above $130/barrel, which gives Putin a big windfall. But the longer-term effect of Western sanctions will be to reduce economic growth worldwide. He won’t be able to rely on oil above $100/barrel. And Western supplies will in due course increase in response to prices anywhere near that level.
So whatever happens this month or next in Ukraine, the longer-term prospects are not good for Moscow. Russian victory and occupation of Ukraine are Moscow’s nightmare, as well as Ukraine’s.
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Stevenson’s army, March 6
– WaPo says declassified list of US aid shows speed up to Ukraine last December.
-WSJ says Poland plans to send Soviet fighter planes.
– NYT says US wants clear line of succession after Zelensky to make aid easier.
– The Hill sees bipartisan opposition to no fly zone.
– SAIS Prof Mary Sarotte says new cold war will be worse than before.
– The news inside Russia: WaPo sees cracks in social media. New Yorker shows breadth of Putin control.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 5
– A distinguished historian of Russia says the US made a key mistake last November in signing a“strategic partnership” with Ukraine. I hadn’t noticed it myself.
– Politico reports on the supply lines of western equipment into Ukraine.
– WaPo notes what US & NATO are not saying.
– FP reports a new NSC hire.
– In a new annual report, China says it wants to “resolve” the Taiwan issue.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No fly won’t fly, despite what you may think
Why can’t NATO do more to help Ukraine? Why not institute a no-fly zone that prevents Russian aircraft from attacking Ukrainians forces and population centers?
Yes it would make a difference
Preventing Russian air attacks and close air support would certainly make a difference. The Russians have not established absolute supremacy in the air, but they are stronger there than the Ukrainians. Moscow still has lots of air power in reserve. Preventing it from coming into the fight could be necessary to preserve the viability of Ukraine’s forces.
But enforcing it would entail unacceptable risks
Enforcement of a no-fly zone requires willingness to force down or shoot down violators. Or to destroy violating aircraft while they are on the ground. That’s where things get dicey. NATO would need to be ready to attack Russian aircraft. Bluffing won’t work. Putin would quickly test whether the Alliance is prepared to put its pilots where its declarations are. He would not worry about getting a few Russian pilots killed.
No doubt NATO could put up rather than shut up, but that would initiate hostilities with Russia. Putin could retaliate against the Alliance in any number of countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or the Baltics. That would trigger Article 5, NATO’s mutual defense commitment, puttng the Alliance at war with Russia. It is easy to imagine further escalation and even eventually a nuclear attack. President Biden is wise not to want to risk that.
It could happen anyway
An escalation of that sort could happen even without a no-fly zone. I hear tell that NATO AWACS flying in Polish airspace is jamming Russian signals. Putin could take that, too, as reason enough to attack Poland. Arms shipments to Ukraine from NATO countries could be another trigger for widening the war. Supply of effective air defenses might be particularly provocative from the Russian perspective.
That argues for ending this war quickly
The risks of escalation will be there so long as the fighting continues. Ending this war quickly is the best way of eliminating those risks. The Russians so far seem unable to defeat Ukraine, but the Ukrainians aren’t able to defeat Russia either. Negotiation is the way to go, but there is no overlap between what Russia wants and what Ukraine is prepared to give, or between what Ukraine wants and Russia is prepared to give. A no fly zone would have virtues, but it won’t fly. The fighting is likely to continue until one side or the other can claim at least pyrrhic victory.
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Timing matters, but no one has a good clock
While Russian forces in Ukraine continue to advance, the invasion is moving slower than Moscow wanted. Internatioinal sanctions are just beginning to bite. The question now is how long it will take for Russians to realize that they need to get rid of President Putin.
Ukrainian resistance is strong, but the Russian forces are overwhelming
The Ukrainians are fighting hard. Their mobile and agile territorial defense is doing a lot of damage to the heavily armed but slow-moving and much less agile Russian forces. Moscow has admitted to losing 500 soldiers. Likely the number is far greater. Russian media are still portraying the war a “special military activity” at the invitation of the secessionist “republics” of Luhansk and Donestk rather than as an full-scale, unprovoked invasion. Most Russians will understand that it is risky to say anything else.
Even heroic resistance cannot immediately overcome overwhelming force. The Russian army is now shelling population centers, targeting civilian institutions, and seizing nuclear power plants. Yesterday’s firefight and fire at the largest concentration of nuclear plants in Europe suggests how little the Russian army cares about imperiling millions of people.
International sanctions are also strong, but their full impact will not be immediate
The US and EU have imposed unprecedented sanctions intended to cripple Russia’s economy. Some consequences are immediate: interest rates have spiked in Russia, the ruble has tanked, and the stock market is closed to avoid catastrophic losses. Russians are unable to withdraw money from banks while prices have skyrocketed. Foreign investors are fleeing. Foreign airlines are shut down. Many local airlines flying Boeings and Airbuses will be unable to get spare parts, making travel even within Russia (which spans 11 time zones) problematic.
While some of the effects of sanctions are apparent right away, many others will take time to manifest. Within a year or so, Russians will lose a big slice of their real incomes. The Russian government, which depends heavily on oil and natural gas revenues, will be straitened. Even in the current tight oil market, buyers are refusing to purchase Russian products, which are selling at a 20% discount. Russian foreign currency reserves were massive before the invasion, but about half are now frozen. It will take time to exhaust the rest.
Ukraine’s fate depends on how quickly people in Russia react
The key variable is how quickly Russians react. The oligarchs are already feeling the pinch, but Putin has them on a short leash. The usual elite Russian coup is unlikely. Demonstrations in Russia have so far attracted thousands and perhaps tens of thousands, most of whom are the usual suspects. Academic scholarship suggests that mobilizing on a sustained basis about 3.5% of the population will bring results (but there are exceptions in both directions):
That would mean about 5 million people, or at least ten times the number mobilized so far. Some would not be the usual suspects, who don’t number that many.
Putin will do what he can to prevent that from happening. Popular protest is his worst nightmare. The war in Ukraine not only portends a long insurgency and ferocious occupation but also an end to anything resembling free speech and association inside Russia. Its “democracy,” imperfect as it was, will become a full-fledged draconian autocracy.
Timing matters
The damage Putin will do depends then on timing. If something like those 5 million Russians get to the streets soon, we could see an abrupt reversal of Ukraine’s fate. But if they don’t, Ukraine will become Putin’s laboratory for how to subjugate a population of more than 40 million, most of whom want to live in Europe rather than a newly constructed Russian empire. There is no telling when or if the protests in Russia will reach critical mass. Timing matters, but no one has a good clock.
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