Month: March 2022
Stevenson’s army, March 4
– US & Russia establish military hotline.
-Russia has friends in Africa.
-WH wants$10 Billion in new Ukraine aid.
– NYT assesses Ukraine military so far.
– BBC tells who’s who in Putin’s inner circle.
– Lawfare lists pros and cons of foreign fighters.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
One more Trump first
I know we are all focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but in the meanwhile the Congressional committee investigating January 6 is considering referring Donald Trump for prosecution:
This is good news, as it both nails the January 6 assault on the Capitol as criminal and also assigns accountability to the then President. That’s a first for the US Congress and a past President. Now let’s see what the Department of Justice will do with it.
Stevenson’s army, March 3
– NYT details Western help to Ukraine.
– WSJ notes pro-Russia sentiment in Middle East
– FP China Brief notes how China is censoring Ukraine news.
– Defense News assesses chances for Ukrainian resistance.
– Atlantic assesses Russian economic vulnerabilities.
– Changing mood on Capitol Hill. Concerns over Sen. Rubio’s tweets of war info.
Policy process: All cables going from the State Dept go under the name of the SecState, though few have actually been seen by him. Axios has the story of a cable to 50 countries urging US diplomats to say India and UAE were “in Russia’s camp.” Oops. Cable recalled. The recall of the strongly worded cable indicates either a process error with a fabled and vital work product — or a policy dispute inside the U.S. government involving two key allies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Putin has failed, but that’s little comfort
Russians are going to be a lot better off if their army fails in Ukraine than if it succeeds. Ukrainians as well. President Putin by contrast thinks he cannot survive failure. He is likely right. The invasion he thought would enable absorption of Ukraine and Belarus into an enlarged Russian Federation is a strategic failure. Most Ukrainians and Russians don’t want it. Putin may declare it, but reality will deny it.
The situation on the ground
That however makes little difference right now. The Russian army has overtaken, if not entirely taken, Kherson, near Ukraine’s southern coast. Kharkiv is under bombardment, as is Kyiv. The Russians are planning to surround both and demand surrender. Failing that, they will obliterate parts of these two largest cities in Ukraine. The picture is not good:
Ukrainian military and civilian resistance is still strong but faces overwhelming force. My guess is Putin will have to use it, making an eventual occupation even more difficult than it might otherwise have been.
The situation in the world
The international effort in support of Ukraine is going far better than the war. Sanctions have already begun to bite. The ruble is down. Interest rates are up. Russian hard currency reserves are mostly frozen. International companies are moving out. Russians may not yet have understood the consequences, but their standard of living is going to collapse.
Almost a million Ukrainians have fled, mostly to neighboring countries. The EU so far is welcoming them. The logistics of handling the crowds at the border are however daunting. Housing, feeding, and providing education and healthcare for the mainly women and children refugees will be more than daunting.
The situation in Russia
Russians have demonstrated against the war. Opposition leader Alexey Navalny has appealed on Twitter from his prison cell for more protests. How Russians react will be pivotal. If they blame Putin for their economic troubles and turn out by the millions in peaceful demonstrations, Ukraine might be saved sooner rather than later from Moscow’s designs. If the Russians blame the West and fail to demand withdrawal from Ukraine, Putin will be able to survive, at least for now.
Things will get harder
The West has proven remarkably unified and forceful in its reaction to Russian aggression. It won’t be easy to keep it that way. Europe is solid, because the threat is clear and immediate. The Americans so far are solid too, but higher gasoline prices and a slowed recovery could put Biden in a bind before the November election. The coordinated drawdown of petroleum reserves , in which 31 countries participated, was the right thing to do. But it did not have the immediate effect desired. Oil everywhere and natural gas prices in Europe are still spiking.
None of that changes the strategic picture. Putin has lost. The ambition to absorb Ukraine into a new Russian empire is unachievable. But the Ukrainians are also losing. Their country faces destruction, occupation, and repression. Putin has failed, but that’s little comfort.
Stevenson’s army, March 2
Just in time for our week 6 discussion of foreign economic policy, USTR released her first annual report and future year plans. WSJ analyzes. China impact.
Politico reports USTR fights with other US officials.
China offers to mediate Ukraine fighting.
Turkey blocks Russian navy entering Black Sea.
Western arms to Ukraine hindered by need for Russian models.
NYT notes Russian casualties undermine Putin narrative.
WOTR has 2 great reports — on Russian logistics and on recent Marine Corps University war game.
Opinions — from Eliot Cohen and from our brownbag guest next week, AEI’s Kori Schake.
RollCall reports on party unity in Congress last year.
Politico says SecState Blinken is Biden favorite:
Biden begins each day with the presidential daily briefing. On most days in recent weeks, the intelligence briefer has been joined by some of Biden’s top national security advisers: Secretary of State Antony Blinken, national security adviser Jake Sullivan, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley and more. Carrying over reading habits from his three-plus decades in the Senate, Biden dives into the briefing books and peppers his aides with questions, according to two senior White House aides. But the routine has gotten more time-consuming and frantic in recent weeks as the threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine turned into a reality. Unlike his last foreign policy crisis — the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan — Biden has been forced to spend his time responding to the actions of a foreign nation rather than shaping U.S. policy there. In recent days, Biden has attended morning meetings in the Situation Room as well as evening sessions in the Oval Office; he worked in the Treaty Room last Wednesday when aides believed a Russian invasion was imminent. Blinken, above all others, has emerged as the president’s top confidant, used as a sounding board and consigliare on how to shape U.S. policy and rally global pressure against Russia in light of its invasion. Biden has also leaned on those with vast Russian experience, including Bill Burns, the CIA director who once served as the nation’s ambassador to Moscow, and Victoria Nuland, the under secretary of State who was a top liaison to Ukraine under President Barack Obama.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Ukraine and Iran will make Syria harder
Ukraine may seem far from Syria. But it is not. Nor is Iran. What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine. What happens in Iran as well as Ukraine will affect the now more than decade-old war in Syria, through geography, markets, diplomacy, and politics.
The fighting and sanctions will hamper Russia in Syria
The Russians have been fighting insurgency in Syria since 2015, primarily with air power but also with some troops on the ground. The effort is not large, but Ukraine will take priority. Sanctions will severely limit Russian financial resources. This could affect not only military resources but also willingness to invest in reconstruction. The state-owned companies that might take such a risk are not going to have the cash to do it.
In addition, Russian relations with Turkey, the US, and possibly Israel will be strained. Cooperation with Turkey is important in northwest Syria, where Turkish troops and proxies are in control. Cooperation is important with the US in northeast Syria, where American troops are supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel depends on Russian restraint when its aircraft attack Iranian forces and shipments inside Syria.
Moscow will have little reason to segregate the diplomatic and deconfliction issues in Syria from Ukraine. A weakened Russia may well seek pressure points in Syria to respond to international pressure in Ukraine.
Iran will be emboldened
Russia and Iran both support the Assad regime in Syria, but they also compete for influence there. Assuming the Iran nuclear deal revives, Tehran will have a lot more money with oil at around $100/barrel. Some portion of that will find its way to military and financial support for Assad. Even if the JCPOA remains moribund, Iran will find itself strengthened in Syria relative to Russia. It will try to use that strength to embed itself more strongly into the Syrian regime, in particular its security forces (which have grown closer to Russia in recent years).
An emboldened Iran will be less likely to compromise on Syria issues than a weakened Russia, but Moscow has the vital veto in the UN Security Council. Tehran might be even more inclined than Russia to shut off vital cross-border humanitarian assistance to Syrians, but in the end Moscow will decide.
The West’s stake in Syria will increase
The Ukraine war increases the West’s stake in Syria. Abandoning its anti-regime fight there would raise serious doubts about American and European resolve to continue support for Ukraine. Credibility isn’t everything, but it is something. The Biden administration had already tacitly recommitted the US to its continuing presence in northeast Syria supporting the Kurds and allied Arabs, if only to avoid a second Afghanistan debacle and to continue the counter-terrorism fight.
Net net
Syria has not been going anywhere anyway. The UN-sponsored constitutional talks are stalled, humanitarian relief is falling short, terrorism threats are growing, and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is limited for now to gathering of documentation and the German courts. Russian weakness, Iranian strength, and Western resolve are going to make things harder, not easier.
