Day: April 13, 2022
Stevenson’s army, April 13
Appropriators plan June markups.
State has released its latest human rights report.
Eliot Cohen’s new column says US shouldn’t be self-deterred in aiding Ukraine:
Before Pearl Harbor, the American Volunteer Group, known as the Flying Tigers, was sent to China to fly P-40 fighters against the Japanese air force there. The group did so with the support of the U.S. government. Something similar can be done in Ukraine, if only there is the will to do it.
If the Soviet Union could deploy thousands of advisers to North Vietnam in the middle of the Vietnam War without triggering a nuclear conflict, the U.S. can deploy advisers to western Ukraine, or at least to Poland, to train Ukrainian soldiers. Instead, we ship Ukrainian troops to Biloxi, Mississippi, to learn how to operate the Switchblade drone, where their congratulations come from the Secretary of Defense on a Zoom call from his Pentagon desk. It would be better if he were draping his arm about their shoulders in some muddy field a lot closer to their homeland.
[I think those supposed precedents are far too risky. This is a different world with a different enemy.]
Recently I read Caroline Elkins’ history of the British empire, Legacy of Violence. The New Yorker has a review with both praise and criticism. As an Anglophile, I had a much more benign view of that empire [“rule of law,” democracy, etc.]. But now I’m persuaded that the Brits were pretty brutal.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Realism and idealism point the same way
Lots of folks are seeing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as a watershed. Charles Kupchan does it intelligently in the NY Times Monday. He thinks America needs to dial back its idealist ambitions to accommodate a realist world in which China and Russia could combine to challenge American power.
Biden’s preference
That level of generality, however, tells us nothing about how to end the Ukraine war.
President Biden is signaling his preference. He has already said Russian President Putin cannot (he later explained he meant should not) stay in power. Now he has used the g-word. Accusing Russia of genocide reinforces the impression that the United States is looking for person change, if not regime change, in Russia.
There are two routes to change in Moscow. A peaceful, non-violent rebellion would be the better. But Russians who protest the war have been unable to mobilize the necessary mass to make their point. Putin has overwhelming popular support for the war in Ukraine. Putin may have lost the international information war, but his increasingly autocratic regime appears to have won the domestic equivalent. Government control of the press has consequences.
A coup is the second option. Russian army officers could combine with oligarchs to deprive Putin of his presidency. But there too the path seems blocked. The Ukrainians have shredded the Russian army in northern Ukraine and killed a lot of generals. Western sanctions are depriving many of Putin’s oligarchs (and hopefully Putin himself) of ill-gotten gains. But there are few signs of dissent within the ruling elite.
The military option
Putin has abandoned negotiations for a settlement. He is intending instead to mount a major offensive in southern and eastern Ukraine. There Russia is interested in enlarging its area of control in Donetsk and Luhansk as well as establishing a land bridge to Crimea. Putin might even still be hoping to take all of Ukraine’s southern coast. That could link Russia to the Transnistrian area it controls in Moldova.
Military experts are suggesting the Russians have better odds of success in the south than they had in the north. The terrain is flat and more suitable to Moscow’s heavy armor. Supplies can flow directly from Russia and Russian-controlled Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea directly into Ukraine. Moscow has appointed a new military commander responsible for the obliteration of civilian areas in Syria. He has been doing likewise to Mariupol, a vital city on the southern coast. Ukrainian President Zelensky claims the Russians plan to use chemical weapons there:
The war in the south has already gone much better for the Russians than near Kiev and Kharkiv.
But the enemy has a vote. The Ukrainians seem to be prepared to defend Mariupol to the last brick. They have been stalwart as well near Kherson and Mikolaiv, which is on the way to Odesa. Arms are flowing rapidly from the West into Ukraine, though it is unclear whether the upgraded resources will arrive in time. Heavier armor, better artillery, and longer-range air defenses require training and elaborate logistical support.
The politics
The Ukrainians have been winning the battle for international support. The UN General Assembly backed civilian protection and humanitarian aid even before the Russian withdrawal from the north revealed its atrocities against civilians. But there are still key countries either sitting on the fence or supporting Russia. Prime among these are China, India, Israel, and Turkey. Lots of countries in Africa and the Middle East (in addition, for the benefit of my Balkan readers, to Serbia) are leaning in Moscow’s direction. “Not our fight” is the “nonaligned” motto.
The military situation inside Ukraine will affect the international politics of this war. If the Ukrainian army manages to prevent further Russian advances in the south and east, international opinion will swing in Kiev’s direction. If it loses more territory, the fence sitters will swing in Russia’s direction. Kiev is already under pressure from international commentators who claim continuing the war will only kill more people. But Ukrainians appear ready to continue what so far has been a successful effort to stem Russian advances.
Bottom line
The war is far from over. There is lots of mutual hurt, but no stalemate. Nor is their any way out. While both Russia and Ukraine say they are prepared to accept Ukrainian “neutrality,” their definitions of it remain far apart. Kiev wants international guarantees of Ukraine’s territorial integrity (including Donestk, Luhansk, and Crimea) and sovereignty, including by NATO members. Moscow wants Kiev to cede territory and sovereignty to Russia. There is no “zone of possible agreement” between these two positions.
For now, realism and idealism point in the same direction: the fight will go on.
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